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P R E F A C E
This is a study of the way in which the United Nations Secretariat 
seeks the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Its basic 
premise is that such a role for the Secretariat is implied in the UN 
Charter and has become established in practice. The study sets out to 
examine the nature and development of the Secretariat's role, its limits 
and its effectiveness. The very nature of that role makes it rather 
elusive, and an important aim of the study is to document the Secretariat's 
role through three case studies of international disputes which occurred 
during the U Thant period, from 1961 to 1971. The case studies are the 
Yemen dispute in 1963 and 1964, the Bahrain dispute in 1969 and 1970, and 
the Bangladesh crisis in 1971. In the light of the evidence from these 
case studies the initial analysis of the Secretariat's role is re-examined. 
Finally, it is suggested that there are some important implications of 
this role which might be considered by governments concerned to settle 
international disputes peacefully while protecting their own interests and
sovereignty.
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T E R M S
The terms contained in the title of this study are intended to convey 
the following:
'International disputes' refers to serious tensions, crises, 
threats to international peace, or actual armed conflict 
between nations.^
'Peaceful settlement' refers to the resolution of these disputes 
by non-violent means.
The word 'seeking' is used because the emphasis is on the search 
for agreement between disputants on both the desirability 
of peaceful settlement and the approach to be followed.
'The United Nations Secretariat' refers to both the Secretary 
General and those of his colleagues who work closely with 
him in the role described - that of seeking the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes.
The three case studies occurred during 'the U Thant period' which 
refers to the period from the appointment of Thant as Acting 
Secretary General in November 1961 to his retirement at the 
end of 1971.2
For further discussion of international disputes and crises, see H.G. 
Darwin, in David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Report 
of the Study Group on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 
London, 1966, p.49; Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in
International Crises, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967, pp.9-25.
2 Reference is also made to a mission undertaken by Mr Winspeare 
Guicciardi on the Indian sub-continent in January 1972, following a 
Security Council resolution adopted in December 1971. See Chapter VI.
Some writers always refer to U Thant in full; others generally refer 
simply to Thant. This study adopts the latter usage.
(xii)
U N I T E D  N A T I O N S  D O C U M E N T S
United Nations documents are cited according to the official UN 
numbering system. The series of documents used in the study are listed at 
the beginning of the Bibliography. Where a document is cited in the text 
for the first time its number and date is given, and in the case of 
special reports the title of that report is also given. Where a document 
is cited subsequently only the number is given.
1I N T R O D U C T I O N
The Charter
Since its formation in 1946, the United Nations Secretariat has 
developed a role of providing intermediary assistance for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes between nations. While such an intermediary role 
is not specifically mentioned in the Charter, Article 1(1) makes it an 
express purpose of the United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: 
(inter alia) . . .  to bring about by peaceful means . . . 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or, 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace . . . .
Article 2(3) requires that the Organisation and its Members shall act in 
accordance with the principle that:
All Members shall settle their international disputes in such 
a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered.^
Chapter VI of the Charter, headed 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes', begins 
with the requirement in Article 33(1) that:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice.
For the full text of this and other relevant sections of the Charter, 
see Appendix A.
2 See David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, op. C'Lt. , 
pp.6, 7. The study group held that Article 2(3) requires a Member State 
to actively seek the peaceful settlement of disputes, not to merely refrain 
from using force. The latter requirement is the subject of Article 2(4).
2The remainder of Chapter VI is concerned primarily with the role of 
the Security Council. Similarly, Article 99, which gives the Secretary 
General an explicit role in relation to matters which may threaten 
international peace and security, again asserts the primary role of the 
Security Council by stating that the Secretary General may bring such 
matters to the attention of the Council. Important as Article 99 has 
become as the basis for the role of the Secretary General as international 
statesman, that Article, together with the remainder of the Charter, is 
silent on ways in which the Secretariat might assist in bringing about 
the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Rather, such a role may be seen as a practical implication of the 
clear responsibility of the Organisation as a whole, and its Members 
collectively, to seek the peaceful settlement of disputes as indicated in 
Articles 1(1), 2(3) and 33(1) quoted above."'’
There is a common theme throughout the statement of purposes in 
Article 1, a theme which is highlighted by taking the first few words of 
each clause:
1 To maintain international peace and security . . . .
2 To develop friendly relations among nations . . . .
3 To achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems . . . .
4 To be a centre for harmonising the actions of 
nations . . . .
The theme of peace rather than war, of friendly relations rather than 
international feuds, of co-operation rather than conflict is summed up in 
the fourth clause. U Thant stated that:
1 David Davies Memorial Institute, op. C'it. , p.6.
3I have always felt that the most important political duty 
of the Secretary General was to concentrate on the harmonising 
functions of the United Nations as set out in Article 1(4) of 
the Charter.^
By stating that the United Nations is to be a centre for harmonising
the actions of nations, the Charter implies a role for the 'international
2officials responsible only to the Organisation', who are thereby 
committed to the pursuit of its purposes. The appropriate way in which 
such a role may be performed is in providing intermediary assistance to 
governments in the course of the interactions which they pursue through 
the United Nations.
The point may be illustrated by considering possible alternatives. 
Should the Secretariat play no part at all in political interactions, so 
that international officials remain as mute witnesses to events? Or 
should the Secretariat be stronger and somehow able to impose solutions 
on recalcitrant disputants, especially in the face of political deadlocks 
within organs such as the Security Council? To assert either of these 
propositions would be equally incongruous in terms of the fundamental 
statement of purpose contained in Article 1(4). Harmonising the actions 
of nations points towards a role between these two extremes, entailing
U Thant, 'The Role of the Secretary General', speech to the Memorial 
Scholarship Fund of the United Nations Correspondents Association, New 
York, Press release SG/SM/1531, 16 September 1971 (hereafter cited as 'U 
Thant, Correspondents Association Speech'). For similar comments by u 
Thant in other statements, see his article 'Looking Ahead' in A. Cordier 
and W. Foote (eds) , The Quest for Peace: The Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial
Lectures, Columbia University Press, New York, 1965, p.43, and 'The Role 
of the Secretary General' (speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society, 
London, 15 June 1970) in Public Papers of the Secretaries General of the 
United Nations, Vol. VIII (edited by A. Cordier and M. Harrelson), 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1977.
Article 100.2
4the intermediary services of international officials who are the servants 
of all and yet the ciphers of none.
Such a view of the implications of the Charter accords with political 
reality. It is inconceivable in the context of contemporary international 
affairs that governments would cede to an international secretariat the 
power to act authoritatively against their collective will. Yet the 
complexities of multilateral political interaction, of the search for 
common interests in the midst of conflicting interests, are such that 
mutually acceptable outcomes might well be possible in many circumstances 
only with the intermediary assistance of international officials.
The Secretariat
The title of this study refers to the Secretariat rather than the
Secretary General. It should be noted that Chapter XV of the Charter,
which deals primarily with the Secretary General, is headed 'The
Secretariat' while under Article 7, the Secretariat is designated as one
of six principal organs of the United Nations.
On matters related to international conflicts and crises, the role
of Secretary General has usually been the centre of attention because of
2the very nature of the position, just as the role of President or Prime
For a brilliant juxtaposition of the first and the middle positions 
described above see Hammarskjöld's Introduction to the Annual Report on the 
Work of the Organisation, 17 August 1961 (A/8401/Add.l). Also, 'The 
International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact', (Oxford, 30 May 1961), 
reprinted in Public Papers of the Secretaries General of the United Rations, 
Vol. V, pp.471-489.
2 Examples of scholarly works which focus on the Secretary General are 
Leon Gordenker, The United Rations Secretary General and the Maintenance of 
Peace, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967; Marie Claude Smouts, Le 
Role du Secretaire General des Rations Unies dans les Conflits Intemation- 
aux, A. Colin, Paris, 1971; Arthur Rovine, The First Fifty Years: The
Secretary General in World Politics3 1920-1970, A.w. sijthoff, Leyden, 1970; 
Mack Jones, The Development of the Political Role of the United Rations 
Secretary General; 1945-1967, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 
1968; David Saffell, The Secretary General as Chief Executive of the United 
Rations, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1969.
5Minister has been central to many studies of national foreign policies.
But the assumption is often made in the literature on the United Nations 
that the Secretary General and the UN Secretariat are virtually synonymous. 
Under the UN Charter the Secretary General bears full responsibility for 
Secretariat actions'^ - he is answerable to the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, and the Secretariat is his 'arm', his means of operating. 
The Secretary General is the key figure in the Secretariat's handling of 
specific issues. He can also have a profound effect on the general 
approach adopted by the Secretariat, the assumptions which underlie 
Secretariat practice and the ethos which pervades the Organisation.
Within the Secretariat, officers engaged in political work are them­
selves at pains to emphasise that their work is carried out on behalf of
2the Secretary General and in his name. It is the Secretary General who 
makes the decisions and bears the responsibility. Secretariat officials 
invariably speak of the role of the Secretary General, rather than the 
role of the wider entity known as the Secretariat.
Such an approach is entirely appropriate in the context of the 
Secretariat's day to day work. To assume for the purpose of analysis, 
however, that the Secretary General and the Secretariat are one and the 
same would be rather like stating that a Minister in the Westminster 
parliamentary system is synonymous with his department because the Minister 
bears the ultimate responsibility. Analogies are often drawn between the 
UN Secretariat and national civil services, in particular through the use 
of the phrase 'the international civil service'. In both cases, the study 
of the role played by key officials provides a broader and more accurate
Gordenker, op. cit.3 p.xiv, p.64.
Interviews with members of the UN Secretariat, New York and Geneva.
6perspective than that gained by studying only the role of the organisation's 
head.'*’
The significance of senior Secretariat officials has evidently always
been recognised by member governments in both the UN and its predecessor,
the League of Nations. In the League there were extensive debates over the
2'haute direction'. When the UN was formed, the original eight Assistant
Secretaries were appointed by the first Secretary General in accordance
with a 'big five' agreement which provided for one Assistant Secretary from 
3each of the five. In 1961 the appointment of a new Secretary General
following the death of Dag Hammarskjöld was delayed because of criticism by
the Soviet Union directed at the operations of the Secretariat's senior
level. In particular the Soviet Union criticised the small group which
4worked closely with Hammarskjöld in the Congo crisis. When the Soviet 
proposal for a 'troika' of three joint Secretaries General failed, the 
Soviet Union then proposed what was dubbed the 'sub-troika' proposal.
The recent literature on national bureaucracies has succeeded in 
looking behind the personality-oriented headlines at organisational factors 
influencing the making and implementing of national foreign policies, e.g., 
Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC, 1974; Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy and 
Foreign Policy, Studies in International Affairs, No.17, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1972; Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1971. A 
similar study of the United Nations is Katherine Sebo, Bureaucratisation at 
the International Level: A Case Study of the UN Secretariat, Ph.D. disser­
tation, the American University, Washington DC, 1973.
2 Arthur w. Rovine, The Top-Level Structure of the United Nations 
Secretariat, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1966, pp.102-5.
 ^ Ibid., pp.177-9.
4 The so-called Congo Club was said to comprise two Americans, but to 
have excluded the Russian Under Secretary. Rovine lists the members of the 
'club' as A. Cordier, R. Bunche (both American), C.V. Narasimhan, Maj. Gen. 
Rikhye (both Indian) and R. Gardiner (Ghana), ibid., p.12. Urquhart says 
it was simply 'a convenient term to describe the group of officials dealing 
with the Congo at any given time', Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1972, p.473.
7This proposal envisioned three Deputy Secretaries General, one from the 
western bloc, one from the socialist bloc, and one from the non-aligned, 
with whom the Secretary General would be bound to consult. The Soviet 
Union eventually agreed to the appointment of an Acting Secretary General,
U Thant, on the understanding that he would announce the proposed desig­
nation of eight 'principal advisers', with whom he would consult 'in a 
spirit of mutual understanding'.^
Successive Secretaries General have shared member governments' 
appreciation of the political significance of senior Secretariat officials,
as indicated for example, by their statements in support of reorganisation 
2proposals. Rovine has described the role of these officials as follows:
The Secretary General's closest assistants have a large range 
of political responsibilities. They help prepare speeches, 
reports, documents, the annual report, all communications from 
the office, and assist in the establishment and administration 
of field forces. Indeed, high level personnel perform very 
much the same set of functions as the Secretary General, 
although most frequently without the visibility or public 
knowledge usually associated with their chief's many tasks.
U Thant made a statement, as agreed with the major powers beforehand, 
in his acceptance speech before the General Assembly, naming two of the 
principal advisers immediately - Ralph Bunche and George Arbekev. Thant 
insisted on maintaining the independence of the Secretary General's 
position by his use of the 'spirit of mutual understanding' formula, and 
also by saying clearly that his statement did not prejudice the possi­
bility of review in the future. Rovine, The Top-Level Structure of the 
United Nations Secretariat, p.289. See also Cordier and Harrelson, op. 
cit. , p.21; and U Thant, View from the UN, Doubleday, New York, 1978, 
pp.14-18.
2 Hammarskjöld reorganised the top levels of the Secretariat in 1954 
and 1957, and further proposals were pending at the time of his death in 
1961. The main reorganisations during U Thant's time in office were in 
1963 and 1965.
Rovine, The First Fifty Years, p.436. See also Jean Siotis, Essai sur 
le Secretariat International, Libraire Droz, Geneve, 1963, Part 3,
Chapter II, especially pp.175-208; and Howard Lentner, The Folitical Role 
of the United Nations Secretariat, Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 
Syracuse, New York, especially pp.158-176.
8T h is  s tu d y  e s t a b l i s h e s  c l e a r l y  t h a t  d u r in g  th e  U T h a n t  p e r i o d  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  c o n s u l t e d  c l o s e l y  w i th  s e n i o r  o f f i c i a l s  on key p o l i t i c a l  
i s s u e s ,  s e e k i n g  t h e i r  a d v ic e  and re c o m m e n d a tio n s ,  and r e l y i n g  on t h e i r  
s k i l l  and d e d i c a t i o n  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  I n  g e n e r a l  h e  was 
a s s i s t e d  i n  h i s  r o l e  a s  i n t e r m e d ia r y  by  th e  Under S e c r e t a r i e s  G e n e ra l  f o r  
S p e c i a l  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s  and t h e i r  s t a f f ,  as  w e l l  a s  h i s  own e x e c u t iv e  
s t a f f ,  w h i l e  o t h e r  o f f i c e r s  were in v o lv e d  on s p e c i f i c  is s u e s .^ "  At h e a d ­
q u a r t e r s ,  S e c r e t a r i a t  o f f i c i a l s  were r e g u l a r l y  engaged  i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i th  
d e l e g a t e s ,  w h i l e  i n  th e  f i e l d  th e y  had  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  c a r r y i n g  o u t  
m is s io n s  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o m p le x i ty  and s e n s i t i v i t y  i n v o lv i n g  d e t a i l e d  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  h e a d s  o f  governm ent and o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  
f i g u r e s .
The o f f i c e  o f  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  rem a in s  c e n t r a l  t o  a  s tu d y  o f  t h e  r o l e  
o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  i n  s e e k in g  th e  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s ,  b u t  
t h a t  o f f i c e  i s  more a c c u r a t e l y  p e r c e i v e d  i f  i t  i s  n o t  a n a ly s e d  i n  i s o l a t i o n  
from  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t .
H am m arsk jö ld  a p p o in te d  two Under S e c r e t a r i e s  w i t h o u t  p o r t f o l i o  -  
Dr R alph  Bunehe ( n a t i o n a l  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s )  and I l y a  T che rnychev  (USSR) 
on 1 J a n u a r y  1955 . He announced th e y  were t o  be  a d v i s e r s  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e ra l  on s p e c i a l  q u e s t i o n s .  In  November 1957 th e  t i t l e  was changed  to  
Under S e c r e t a r y  i n  c h a rg e  o f  S p e c i a l  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s .  Bunche rem ained  i n  
t h i s  p o s i t i o n  u n t i l  h i s  r e t i r e m e n t  due t o  i l l  h e a l t h  i n  1971. He was 
s u c c e e d e d  by B r i a n  U rq u h a r t  (UK). T chernychev  r e t u r n e d  to  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union i n  1957 , and t h a t  p o s i t i o n  was h e l d ,  i n  t u r n ,  by A n a to ly  D obrynin  
(USSR), 1957; S i r  Humphrey T re v a ly n  (UK), 1958; C.V. N arasim han  ( I n d i a ) ,  
1958-1962 ; Omar L o u f t i  (U n i te d  Arab R e p u b l i c ) ,  1962-63 ; D ra g o s la v  P r o t i t c h  
( Y u g o s l a v i a ) ,  1963-65 ;  J o s e  R olz  B e n n e t t  (G u a te m a la ) ,  1965 -70 , R o b e r to  
Guyer ( A r g e n t i n a ) , 1970 to  th e  p r e s e n t .  R o v in e , The Top-Levet S tvu c tu re  
o f  the  U nited  N ations Sec?>e ta i ii a t , p p .  230 -2 9 3 .
9Structure of the study
Chapter I analyses the nature of the Secretariat's role as it 
developed prior to Thant's appointment and during his tenure. The nature 
of that role is summed up in the interrelated concepts of good offices 
and quiet diplomacy.
The chapter describes the contributions of earlier Secretaries General 
to the concept of good offices as exercised by an international secretariat, 
and the way in which the concept became institutionalised under Thant. The 
difference of emphasis between good offices and mediation in the United 
Nations context is also discussed.
The related concept of quiet diplomacy became accepted by governments 
and within the Secretariat during the U Thant period as an appropriate 
basis for Secretariat intermediary activity. It is highlighted by consider­
ing three aspects:
the notion of preventive diplomacy as it came to be 
understood during the U Thant period; 
the process of consultation and consensus in the 
Security Council developed with Secretariat encourage­
ment and participation;
the question of how the Secretariat handled pressures 
from the public media for news of sensitive negotiations.
Chapter II raises questions about both the effects and the impli­
cations of Secretariat intermediary activity. There is firstly the 
question of the extent to which the Secretariat was able to influence 
events. In relation to the primary goal of seeking a peaceful approach 
to the settlement of disputes, this chapter suggests a systematic list of 
possible effects of the Secretariat's good offices role on decision makers. 
Questions are also raised about the effects of international disputes on
10
internal affairs. Governmental perceptions that such effects might flow 
from intermediary action can lead to the imposition of severe 
restrictions on the Secretariat's role, dependent as it is on the 
continuing consent of the parties. It is suggested that the problem of 
effects on internal affairs is part of the broader question of the 
relationship between the maintenance of peace and order, and struggles for 
social change. That broader question is posed most acutely on issues such 
as self-determination and human rights, issues which have both internal 
and international aspects.
Case studies
There is considerable difficulty in obtaining hard information on how 
the Secretariat of the United Nations has pursued an intermediary role in 
the many disputes with which it has become involved during the past 30 
years. In part, this difficulty is due to the necessary confidentiality 
of many communications between UN officials and the various parties to 
disputes. Those communications which are included in publicly available 
reports are likely to be only the 'tip of the iceberg'.^  Beneath the 
publicly visible tip there will have been detailed discussions, exchanges 
of notes and the like, which would provide a much clearer picture of the 
extent and nature of Secretariat involvement. An added difficulty for the 
investigator is the tendency for the role of intermediary to be played 
down, both by the disputants, and by the Secretariat itself, which is 
firmly committed to the view that a low profile is more effective than a 
highly visible one.
The writer was fortunate in being granted access to internal docu­
mentation within the Secretariat on three disputes which occurred during
U Thant, Statement at Annual Dinner of'UN We Believe', New York, 24 
September 1971, SG/SM/1539.
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the tenure of Thant as Secretary General, and which reflect his particular 
approach to Secretariat intermediary activity, as will be described in 
Chapter I. In the first two cases, Yemen and Bahrain, the writer examined 
files relevant to the aspects of the disputes listed below. In the third 
case, Bangladesh, information on the Secretariat's political role was 
provided by a comprehensive account of the UN's humanitarian relief effort 
in East Pakistan, prepared within the Secretariat by Thomas Oliver. This 
account quotes extensively and in detail from relevant cables, notes and 
letters.
The three cases are as follows:
1. Yemen, 1963 and 1964 (Chapter III) -
(a) The informal good offices role of Thant and Ralph 
Bunche, and the latter's fact-finding mission in 
March 1963.
(b) The establishment of UNYOM (the UN Yemen Observation 
Mission).
(c) The appointment of Pier Spinelli as head of the 
Mission in November 1963, and his efforts to bring 
about disengagement by the United Arab Republic and 
Saudi Arabia.
2. The Bahrain dispute, 1970 (Chapter IV) -
(a) The role of the Secretary General and Dr Bunche in 
discussions between the United Kingdom and Iran.
(b) The good offices mission undertaken by Vittorio 
Winspeare Guicciardi.
3. The Bangladesh dispute, 1971 (Chapters V and VI) -
(a) The Secretary General's unsuccessful attempts to
alleviate tension, April to November 1971.
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(b) The Secretary General's formal offer of good 
offices, November 1971.
(c) The limits on the Secretariat's role during the 
Security Council and General Assembly debates 
in December 1971.
(d) Negotiations undertaken by the Secretariat for 
the establishment of humanitarian operations in 
both India and Pakistan during 1971.
(e) The good offices missions on humanitarian problems 
undertaken by Winspeare in late December 1971 and 
early 1972.
In the first case, Yemen, the efforts of the United Nations resulted 
in neither success nor failure. Disengagement of the disputants was not 
achieved but a potentially dangerous situation was contained. Settlement 
of the second dispute, over Bahrain, is regarded by the Secretariat as 
one of its most successful intermediary exercises. The third, Bangladesh, 
was disastrous for the United Nations, marking a low point in the 
effectiveness of both the Secretariat's intermediary activity and the role 
of the Security Council. The only bright spot in the UN's role in the 
Bangladesh war was in the area of humanitarian assistance, which required 
several Secretariat officers to engage in difficult and often thankless 
intermediary activities. U Thant's success in establishing the UN's 
humanitarian role later provided an opportunity to alleviate important 
political issues immediately after the end of the war.
Chapter VII summarises the conclusions drawn out from each of the 
case studies on the involvement of Secretariat officers as well as the 
Secretary General, as suggested in this introductory chapter, and on the 
nature of good offices and quiet diplomacy as suggested in Chapter I.
13
In the light of the case studies, Chapter VIII takes up the questions 
posed in Chapter II about the effects of intermediary activity. The final 
chapter makes some suggestions about both the limitations and the 
possibilities of the Secretariat's intermediary role.
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CHAPTER 1
GOOD OFFICES AND QUIET DIPLOMACY
GOOD OFFICES
The te rm  'good  o f f i c e s '  was h i s t o r i c a l l y  u sed  to  d e s c r i b e  a r o l e  which 
c o u ld  be u n d e r ta k e n  by  one o r  mroe n o n - in v o lv e d  governm en ts  t o  a s s i s t  
d i s p u t i n g  p a r t i e s  t o  s e t t l e  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s . 1 I t  was u se d  i n  t h i s  s e n se  
i n  t h e  1899 Hague C o nven tion  f o r  t h e  P a c i f i c  S e t t l e m e n t  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
D i s p u t e s . ^
3
W hile  governm en ts  may s t i l l  o c c a s i o n a l l y  u n d e r ta k e  such  a c t i v i t i e s ,
th e  r o l e  o f  good o f f i c e s  h a s  now become c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  work o f
t h e  UN S e c r e t a r i a t .  M oreover , i t  h a s  o f t e n  been  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  a re
u n iq u e  e le m e n ts  i n  t h e  r o l e  w hich  can be p l a y e d  by  th e  UN S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,
4and by i m p l i c a t i o n ,  h i s  s e n i o r  c o l l e a g u e s .
D arw in , op. c i t .  , p . 7 3 ;  A r th u r  L a l l ,  Modem In te r n a tio n a l N eg o tia tio n s , 
Colum bia U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  New Y ork , 1966, p . 9 ;  K o r f f ,  Rabbi I r a ,  The 
P a c ific  S e ttle m e n t o f  In te r n a tio n a l D isputes w ith  S p ec ia l Reference to  
R ecent U nited S ta te s  P o lic y , Ph.D . d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  F l e t c h e r  Schoo l  o f  Law and 
D iplom acy, 1976, p . 1 2 .
2 D avid  D av ies  I n s t i t u t e ,  op. c i t . ,  p .3 0 ;  L a l l ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p . 12 -13 ;
K o r f f ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 1 3 .
3
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  p e rm a n e n t  Commission o f  Good O f f i c e s  composed 
o f  member s t a t e s ,  was p ro p o s e d  by Y u g o s la v ia  i n  1950 . The Assembly ad o p te d  
a r e s o l u t i o n  b u t  t h e  m a t t e r  was n o t  c a r r i e d  f u r t h e r .  R es. 379 (V) GAOR,
5 th  S e s s .  S u p p l .  N o .20 , A /1775 , p . 1 3 .  An exam ple o f  a good o f f i c e s  r o l e  
e x e r c i s e d  by  a s i n g l e  governm en t  was p r o v id e d  by  th e  S o v i e t  G ove rnm en t 's  
r o l e  i n  t h e  T a s h k e n t  ag re e m e n t  be tw een  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n  i n  1965.
4
V r a t i s l a v  P e c h o ta ,  The Q uiet Approach: A Study o f  th e  Good O ffic e s
E xerc ised  by the  U nited  N ations S ecre ta ry  General i n  the  Cause o f  Peace, 
UNITAR, New Y ork , 1972; V en k a ta  Raman, The Nays o f  the  Peacemaker, A Study  
o f  U nited N ations In term ed iary  A ss is ta n ce  in  the P eacefu l S e ttle m e n t o f  
D isp u te s , UNITAR, New Y ork , 1975 , p . l l ;  L a l l ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .1 0 0 ;  Howard 
L e n t n e r ,  The P o l i t ic a l  Role o f  the U nited N ations S e c r e ta r ia t ,  Ph.D . 
d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  S y ra c u s e  U n i v e r s i t y ,  S y r a c u s e ,  New Y ork , 1969, p p . 6 2 -7 8 .
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Origins - Drummond
The UN Secretariat's good offices role had its origins in the days of 
the first Secretary General of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond. 
Skilled in the traditions of the British Civil Service, Drummond carefully 
eschewed any participation in public debate, but exercised considerable 
influence behind the scenes by establishing a reputation for impartiality, 
integrity and most of all, discretion. It was a reputation which encouraged 
statesmen to express confidences and to seek his views in private.
Drummond did not set out to mediate or to find solutions to disputes. But 
he was in a position to discuss matters privately with the various parties, 
to clear up misunderstandings, to facilitate communications and to make 
suggestions, provided the parties sought him out. His good offices were 
available to the parties if they wished to use them.
The interventionist approach - Lie
The first Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, adopted 
a more activist and visible approach as an international mediator, putting 
forward his ideas on political issues such as Palestine and Berlin, even 
when his advice was not solicited.
From the beginning he delegated sensitive political missions to members
of the Secretariat. In 1948 he sent members of his staff to London and
3Washington to seek information and make suggestions on Palestine.
For various accounts of Drummond's role see Rovine, The First Fifty 
Years, pp.25, 29-30, 53; Gordenker, op. cit., p.6; Sydney Bailey, The 
Secretariat of the United nations, p.9; and Andrew Boyd, The UN3 Piety3 
Myth and Truth, Penguin, 1962, p.87.
2 See Trygve Lie's autobiography, In the Cause of Peace, MacMillan, New 
York, 1954; and also Rovine, The First Fifty Years, pp.223-238; Gordenker, 
op. cit., pp.36-44; Bailey, op. cit., pp.35-36; and Boyd, pp.89-100.
Gordenker, op. cit., p.161.3
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After the assassination of Count Bernadotte, his personal representative
in the Middle East, he sent Dr Ralph Bunche, a member of the newly-formed
Secretariat. For his part in the subsequent Middle East settlement Bunche
was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace.
In 1949, after the Security Council had failed to agree on a course
of action over Berlin, Lie again sent members of his staff to meet the
main protagonists and present proposals on his behalf. However, the crisis
was settled without his participation by direct negotiation between the
United States and the Soviet Union.^
In his introduction to the Annual Report later in 1949, Lie reverted
to the concept of good offices by offering his services to facilitate
2consultations among the great powers.
3Articulating good offices - Hammarskjöld
Lie's successor, Dag Hammarskjöld, initially endeavoured to combine 
Lie's activism with Drummond's low profile approach. He brought disputants 
together, but adopted the stance that he was encouraging them to find 
solutions themselves, down-playing his own role in inspiring the insights 
which came to the participants. As Gordenker put it:
He [Hammarskjöld] always tried to claim that he was merely 
assisting the delegates to see their own somewhat obscured 
agreements.^
1 Ibid. , p .162.
Ibid. , p . 79 .
3 There are many accounts of Hammarskjöld's role during his eight years 
as Secretary General. Those consulted for this account included Urquhart, 
op. oit., Rovine, op. cit., Gordenker, op. oit ., and Mark Zacher, Dag 
Hammarskjöld's United nations, Columbia University Press, New York, 1970.
4 Gordenker, op. c^t., p.167.
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Hammarskjöld's personal role in negotiations was actually considerably 
more significant than that implied by his description of the concept of 
good offices. This was in large part a result of his intellectual mastery 
of complex situations and his diplomatic skill. His approach was more 
subtle than that of Lie, yet in practice it was also more dynamic.
Hammarskjöld's conception of good offices was based on Article 33 of 
the Charter. He argued that the Secretary General was bound to respond, 
even in the absence of specific authorisation from the Security Council, 
if member states requested his assistance as an intermediary for their 
attempts to fulfil their obligations under that Article to settle disputes 
peacefully.^
Good offices was an appropriate description of the Secretariat's
role, for it connoted a posture of providing intermediary services as
required, rather than the unsolicited presentation of preconceived
proposals on substantive points. Such a posture was both acceptable to
2governments and workable for the Secretariat.
Hammarskjold's readiness to exercise his good offices without a
formal mandate from a deliberative organ had added significance as he
developed the independence of the Secretary General's role during his 
3second term. Nevertheless, he undertook good offices missions only at
the request of governments, and he refused to take initiatives of this
kind if he believed 'that either his right to do so or his changes of
4success were seriously in doubt'. When his role later became the subject 
of controversy, the objections raised by the Soviet Government related
Urquhart, op. oit. , p.258; Rovine, The First Fifty Years, p.33.
Korff, op. oit., pp.35-39.
Rovine, The First Fifty Years, p.332; Urquhart, op. oit., pp.257-259. 
Ibid., p .309.4
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primarily to the implementation of Security Council resolutions, rather 
than to the exercise of good offices as such.'*’
2Institutionalising good offices - Thant
Under Thant good offices became institutionalised in the sense that 
it became established within the Secretariat as a usual and appropriate 
mode of operation. It became part of the pattern of the Secretariat's 
regular political activity. Harrelson comments that:
Thant himself was convinced that the exercise of his good offices 
constituted one of his most significant contributions to peace 
during his two terms as Secretary General.^
Thant devoted considerable attention to the role as it had developed
during his decade of office when he delivered a major speech on the role
of the Secretary General to the UN Correspondents Association shortly
4before his retirement. Making it clear early in his speech that both the
Secretary General and the Secretariat had been drawn by Article 98 'into
5the arena of political conflict', he commented that much of the Secretary
Saffell, op. cit. , p.331.
2 See U Thant, View from the UN; June Bingham, U Thant: The Search for
Peace, Knoph, New York, 1967; Thomas Manton, U Thant3 A Political Biography: 
An Enquiry into the Background and the Mayor Political Actions of the Third 
Secretary General of the United Nations, Ph.D. dissertation, The American 
University, Washington DC, 1968; and Rovine, The First Fifty Years.
3 Public Papers of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Vol. v m  
(Introduction by Max Harrelson) p.15.
U Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.7. Thant reiterated the 
main points of this speech in the Introduction to his final Annual Report 
(A/8401/Add.l, 17 September 1970) . For comments on the significance of 
these two statements see Harrelson's introduction cited above. Another 
important statement by Thant on the same topic was a speech delivered to the 
Royal Commonwealth Society in London on 15 June 1970 reprinted in Public 
Papers of the Secretaries General of the United Nations, Vol. v m ,  pp.380- 
392. See also Thant, View from the UN, Chapter III, 'What is the Secretary 
General?', pp.29-34.
u Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.7.5
19
General's time was spent in 'attempts to exercise good offices in one form
or another'.'*" Like Hammarskjöld, he stressed the constitutional basis
contained in Article 33 for the exercise of his good offices, and his
authority to respond to requests from member states without specific man-
2dates from the deliberative organs.
The concept of good offices was for Thant, as for his predecessor, a
means of understating his role as an intermediary in highly sensitive
negotiations. But Thant faced a new set of political realities which
required a lower profile and less divergence from the concept of good
offices in its historically rather narrow and passive sense.
His initial appointment in an acting capacity had itself been a part
of a compromise in the face of an intense attack by the Soviet Union on
the concept of a Secretary Generalship occupied by one person. Soviet
Premier Krushchev's assertion at the height of the controversy that 'there
are no neutral men' gave notice of a major contraction in the scope avail-
3able to the new Acting General Secretary. Thant himself later expressed 
the situation quite bluntly:
Things that are possible for one Secretary General are no 
longer possible for his successor, and vice versa. There are 
times when action, dynamism and innovation are in demand, and 
other times when Governments shun them like the plague.^
As will be seen in the case studies on Yemen and Bahrain, the Soviet
Union consistently sought to restrict the scope for activity by the
Secretary General on his own authority. Thant effectively defended the
5Secretariat's good offices role throughout his tenure. But the necessity
1 Ibid.j p.ll.
2
Ibid., p.10.
3 Bailey, op. cit. , p.51.
U Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.3.
Harrelson, toe. cit.5
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f o r  d e fe n c e  i t s e l f  e x e r t e d  p r e s s u r e s  f o r  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  good o f f i c e s  t o  
conform  more c l o s e l y  t o  a s t a t e d  and a c c e p te d  a p p ro a c h .
F u r th e r m o r e ,  T h a n t ' s  method o f  o p e r a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  was 
l e s s  c e n t r a l i s e d  th a n  t h a t  o f  H am m arsk jö ld . He was more i n c l i n e d  to  
d e l e g a t e . ^  W hile H a m m a rsk jö ld 's p e r s o n a l  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  th e  s m a l l  d e t a i l s  
o f  c a s e s  had  a l lo w e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  f o r  c o n s i d e r a b l e  f l e x i b i l i t y  and room f o r  
m anoeuvre, d e l e g a t i o n  u n d e r  T han t  l e d  w i t h i n  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  t o  a g r e a t e r  
s e n se  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n fo r m i ty .
Even s o ,  i t  w i l l  be se en  i n  t h e  c a se  s t u d i e s  t h a t  t h e  te rm  'good  
o f f i c e s '  was a c t u a l l y  u se d  a s  a g e n e r a l  h e a d in g  f o r  a ran g e  o f  S e c r e t a r i a t  
a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  was som etim es used  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  and s e n i o r  S e c r e t a r i a t  o f f i c e r s  f o r  p r i v a t e  d i s c u s s i o n s  
w i th  l e a d e r s  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  g o v e rn m e n ts .  I t  was more o f t e n  used  
to  d e s c r i b e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e r m e d ia r y  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i n  w hich  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  
and h i s  s t a f f  engaged  i n  q u i e t  d ip lom acy  w i t h  t h e  aim o f  f i n d i n g  common 
ground be tw een  th e  p a r t i e s  t o  a d i s p u t e .  In  t h i s  r e s p e c t  T h a n t  s t r e s s e d  
th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  P e rm anen t  M is s io n s  t o  t h e  UN, s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t :
. . . i s  one o f  t h e  m ost im p o r t a n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  advances  o f  
o u r  f i r s t  25 y e a r s .  I t  h a s  g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
work o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  f o r  i t  makes p o s s i b l e  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  m ost  s e n s i t i v e  p ro b le m s  i n  p r i v a t e  and on 
i m p a r t i a l  g ro u n d ,  w here t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  and h i s  s e n i o r  
c o l l e a g u e s  a re  a v a i l a b l e ,  i f  r e q u i r e d ,  as o b j e c t i v e  go- 
b e tw e e n s ,  and m id d lem e n .2
In  t h i s  s i n g l e  s t a t e m e n t  T h an t  e x p r e s s e d  a l l  t h e  e le m e n ts  o f  t h e  good 
o f f i c e s  r o l e  a s  p r a c t i s e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  UN H e a d q u a r t e r s :  p r i v a c y ,
i n p a r t i a l  g round , in v o lv e m e n t  o f  n o t  o n ly  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  b u t  a l s o
R ov ine ,  The F irst F ifty Years, p .3 4 3 ;  L e n t n e r ,  op. a l t . ,  p . 6 4 .
2 U T h a n t ,  Correspondents Association Speech, p . 1 2 .  See a l s o  G ord en k e r ,  
op. c it. , p .1 5 5 .
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his senior colleagues, their availability (but only if required) and their 
objectivity as intermediaries.
There were also 'good offices missions', either mandated by the 
Security Council or undertaken on the Secretary General's own authority.
They involved members of the Secretariat in top-level discussions with 
government leaders in areas of dispute or in potential troublespots
Whether at headquarters or on a mission, Secretariat officers some­
times limited their role to communicating information or proposals between 
the parties. More frequently they suggested procedural measures aimed at 
engaging the parties in direct negotiations with each other. A procedure 
which was often acceptable, even where one or other of the parties refused 
to participate in formal negotiations, was for the representatives of both 
parties to have an informal discussion together with the Secretary 
General in his office. This could lead naturally to suggestions by the 
Secretary General or his colleagues on substantive issues. Similarly, 
field missions in which an officer met with political leaders could provide 
opportunities for substantive suggestions.
Good offices and mediation
Good offices and mediation may be seen as overlapping concepts on the 
same spectrum of intermediary activity, with good offices implying a lower 
level of intervention than mediation.* 2
In the case of mediation, there is an implication that the third party, 
the mediator, enters the dispute with a definite mandate or commitment to
Persons outside the Secretariat, including diplomats and other persons 
of eminence have also been designated as Representatives of the Secretary 
General on such missions. Thant was more inclined to use Secretariat 
officers than Hammarskjöld.
2 See David Davies Memorial Institute, op. oit. , p.31; Rovine, The First 
Fifty Years, p.451; Lall, op.cit., p.18; Korff, op. cit., pp.15-18.
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bring about a resolution of differences. The mandate may be a formal one 
from a body such as the Security Council. In the case of good offices, it 
is more clearly understood that the responsibility for resolving the 
dispute lies with the parties, and that the third party is merely there to 
assist them if they so wish. A mediator may be inclined to present 
proposals for settlement; an intermediary exercising good offices will at 
most merely offer suggestions. It is a difference of degree.^
Many of the activities undertaken by the Secretariat in the case 
studies which follow might suggest that the term 'mediation' would have 
provided an adequate description of the Secretariat's role, even in the 
absence of a formal mandate. Furthermore, mediation is one of the methods 
of settlement listed in Article 33, while good offices is not mentioned in 
the Charter at all. Yet almost invariably 'good offices' was the term 
preferred by the Secretariat during the Thant period.
In one note to correspondents during the Bangladesh crisis Thant
2stated firmly that he had made an offer of good offices - not mediation.
He did not explain the distinction, but his deliberate insistence that one 
existed not only reflected the Security Council's failure to provide him 
with a definite mandate but was also indicative of the particular approach 
which he had adopted to intermediary activities throughout his tenure.
The David Davies Memorial Institute study group made a slightly 
different distinction, stating that 'If a distinction has to be made, "good 
offices" is action to bring about or facilitate negotiations but without 
participation in the substance of the dispute, whereas "mediation" includes 
the latter'. (David Davies Memorial Institute, op. cit., pp.30-31). See 
also Darwin in his annex to the same work, p.72. However, good offices as 
practised by the UN Secretariat often involves suggestions on substantive 
issues. Furthermore, Darwin himself notes that substantive points are often 
introduced into a procedural discussion (p.74). On the actual practice with 
respect to the presentation of proposals by the UN mediator in Cyprus (1965) 
and the Special Committee (later Commission) of Good Offices in Indonesia 
(1947-49) see Raman, op. ait., pp.81, 82.
2 UN Office of Public Information (OPI), note to correspondents No.3703, 
28 October 1971.
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Thant firmly believed that the responsibility for solutions rested 
with the sovereign powers which were engaged in the dispute; that he could 
do no more than assist them to resolve their differences if they so desired. 
Good offices required 'the co-operation, restraint and goodwill of all 
the parties concerned^ He stressed in his memoirs that:
. . . in all cases, the Secretary General can never exercise 
his good offices without the consent of the parties primarily 
involved.2
The involvement of a third party undoubtedly required the consent of the 
disputants whether intermediary activities were described as good offices 
or as mediation. But good offices was the preferred term because it 
connoted the absence of any attempt by the Secretariat to persuade or to 
exert pressure; the responsibility for success or failure rested with the 
disputants.
This view of the relationship between the disputants and the inter­
mediary followed closely the concept of good offices articulated by 
Hammarskjöld. But in the 1960s it more than ever reflected Thant's own 
beliefs about human affairs. In particular he held a deep conviction
that the resolution of conflict at all levels could only occur if the
3parties themselves achieved truthfulness and understanding. He conceived
4his role as the building of bridges. It was up to the disputants to 
recognise the bridges and to exert the will to cross them.
u Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.ll.
2 U Thant, View from the UN, p.28.
Robert Muller, The Example of a Great Ethical Statesman: U Thant,
Agni Press, Jamaica NY, undated. Muller, a member of U Thant's executive 
staff, describes how in internal disputes between senior members of the 
Secretariat, U Thant wanted the officers concerned to realise that the 
solutions rested with themselves and with their own attitudes.
4 U Thant, View from the UN, p.27.
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Nevertheless, good offices was not merely a passive role. The act of 
building a bridge introduced a new element into a political situation both 
for the parties directly in dispute and for those with indirect interests, 
and the bridge was not always welcomed by all concerned. The case studies 
include instances where Thant was under pressure, for various reasons, not 
to initiate particular proposals. He commented that:
. . . the Secretary General must always be prepared to take an 
initiative, no matter what the consequences to his office or 
to him personally may be, if he sincerely believes that it 
might be the difference between peace and war. In such a 
situation, the personal prestige of a Secretary General - and 
even the position of his office - must be considered expend­
able . 1
The distinction between good offices and mediation is inevitably 
blurred. In different disputes, and even at various stages of the same 
dispute, the emphasis will shift between a strictly facilitative role and 
one which involves - in however understated a fashion - some form of 
pressure on the disputants. But in the Thant period the prevailing 
emphasis was on the exercise of a good offices role in which the central 
feature was the absence of any prescription which might be construed as 
infringing upon the sovereignty of governments.
QUIET DIPLOMACY
Quiet diplomacy has developed as a predominant feature of the 
Secretariat's approach to political work, parallel to and in association 
with the development of the good offices role. The two terms are not 
synonomous, since quiet diplomacy could entail various forms of pressure 
and might thereby extend beyond the limits of good offices. But both good
1 u Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, pp.14-15.
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offices and quiet diplomacy are derived from a belief in the efficacy of
discreet, low profile approaches to intermediary activity.
Hammarskjöld's suggestion of the term as a description of his own
approach was partly a reaction to the style of his predecessor. Lie was
committed to the concept of the Secretary General as a spokesman for the
world interest, believing that the position had an influence on public
opinion which gave him an important tool of political action.^ Hammarskjöld,
on the other hand, stated clearly that he did not believe the Secretary
General was a kind of 'Delphic oracle who alone speaks for the international 
2community.' Rather, he sought to influence governments through direct
and private discussion with decision-makers. In so doing, he saw quiet
diplomacy not only as a more effective means of seeking the resolution of
3particular disputes, but as a dynamic concept which enhanced the UN's 
influence in the longer term. In the introduction to his Annual Report of 
1957, Hammarskjöld said:
In the diplomacy of world organisation the quiet work of 
preparing the ground, of accommodation of interests and view­
points, of conciliation and mediation, all that goes into the 
achievement of consent to agreed solutions and common programs, 
this forms a basis upon which the UN can become an increasingly 
influential and effective force.4
The practice of quiet diplomacy was specifically endorsed by Thant who 
stated that he considered Hammarskjöld's concept of his role as a model for
Gordenker, op. cit. , p.80.
2 Hammarskjöld, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact, 
address at Oxford, 1961, reprinted in Public Papers of the Secretaries 
General of the United nations, vol. V, p.487.
3 Urquhart, op. cit. , p.255.
Introduction to the Report of the Secretary General in the Work of the 
Organisation, GAOR, 1957, pp.3-4; see also Hammarskjöld's address at Ohio 
University, printed in UN Review, March 1958, Vol. 4, No.9, p.ll.
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him to follow. In his Correspondents Association speech Thant stressed
the link between quiet diplomacy and good offices, stating that good
2offices required total discretion. He commented that:
Working in private, the Secretary General cay play a useful 
part in the process of negotiations but his usefulness will 
usually vanish as soon as he proclaims it publicly.^
As in the case of good offices, while Hammarskjöld articulated the
concept of quiet diplomacy, it became institutionalised as Secretariat
practice during the Thant period. It became an integral part of the
Secretariat's role in seeking the peaceful settlement of disputes. There
was no greater exponent than Bunche, who was a central figure in the great
majority of the Secretariat's initiatives and actions during that period,
4and perhaps may be seen as the custodian of the Hammarskjöld ethos.
The following sections consider three different ways in which, during 
the Thant period, the Secretariat's adherence to quiet diplomacy was 
manifested:
firstly, the application of the notion of preventive diplomacy; 
secondly, the further encouragement of private consultations 
among members of the principal organs, especially the Security 
Council;
thirdly, the Secretariat's approach to press coverage of 
negotiations.
Gordenker, op. cit. , p.80.
2 u Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.ll; also SG/SM/1539, 
24 September 1971, p.2.
3 U Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.14.
Rovine, The Top-Level Structure of the United Nations Secretaociat,
pp.256-261, pp.293-294.
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Preventive diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy emerged as a new and original strategy for the 
UN in the late 1950s. As conceived by Hammarskjöld, preventive diplomacy 
brilliantly identified a crucial role for the UN in preventing localised 
tensions from acting catalytically on the explosive potential of the cold 
war. The strategy was described by Hammarskjöld as follows:
Temporarily and pending the filling of a vacuum by normal means, 
the United Nations enters the picture on the basis of its non­
commitment to any power bloc, so as to provide to the extent 
possible a guarantee in relation to all parties against 
initiatives from others.^
Entering the picture, in practice required a 'UN presence', and generally 
involved field operations. As Claude has pointed out, preventive diplomacy 
became for a time virtually synonymous with the UN's role in mounting peace­
keeping operations in the field.2 In this sense preventive diplomacy was a 
very public strategy.
But within the notion of preventive diplomacy there was also a strong 
impetus towards quiet diplomacy. In Gordenker's words, it was also con­
ceived as diplomatic action to keep an international dispute 'off the
agenda of . . . United Nations' organs where it might become a cold war 
3issue.' Gordenker's description was closely associated with the notion of 
consultation within the Security Council and the belief that open debate by 
the Council in the absence of consensus could, in the cold war era, 
exacerbate international crises rather than alleviate them.
Introduction to the Secretary General 's Report on the Work of the 
Organisation, 26 September 1957, paras. 72-3.
p Inis L. Claude, The Changing United Rations, Random House, New York, 
1967, p .45.
Gordenker, op. cit., p.76.2
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Towards the end of Thant's first year of office, while he was still 
in an acting capacity, relations between the superpowers, jolted by the 
cathartic effects of the Cuban missile crisis, began to move tentatively 
out of the cold war era. During the next edcade the notion of preventive 
diplomacy was broadened beyond the original cold war context and was 
presented as the rationale underlying the Secretariat's approach to dispute 
settlement in general. The 'quiet method' was justified as the most 
effective means of forestalling conflict."*-
The linkages between good offices, quiet diplomacy and preventive 
diplomacy during the Thant period can be seen clearly in the following 
passage:
The exercise of good offices has proved on occasion to be a 
useful method of preventing differences between states from 
developing into major crises and of getting results on 
sensitive problems before they reach the insoluble stage.
Preventive diplomacy of this kind is far more effective - and 
incidentally much cheaper - than attempting to cure a con­
flict which has been allowed to reach an acute stage. It 
requires total discretion and the co-operation, restraint and 
goodwill of the parties concerned. It also requires from them 
courage and vision, as well as confidence in the discretion 
and integrity of the Secretary General. When these conditions 
are present, much can be done quietly.2
When Kurt Waldheim took office several months after these remarks of
Thant, perhaps the point he emphasised most strongly in a number of press
interviews was this same interpretation of preventive diplomacy as the
3rationale for quiet diplomacy and good offices. In this sense preventive 
diplomacy had become by the end of the Thant period both less overtly 
interventionist than the original strategy conceived by Hammarskjöld, and 
more attuned to traditional notions of private diplomacy.
u Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, pp.10-11. 
Ibid.
3 e.g. SG/SM/1615, 6 January, and 1617, 11 January 1972.
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The case studies illustrate each of the three notions of preventive 
diplomacy. Of the three, only Yemen could be considered to involve 
preventive diplomacy in the sense of the strategy outlined by Hammarskjöld, 
and then only in a very limited way. The Bahrain case provided an 
excellent example of preventive diplomacy in the sense described by 
Gordenker of keeping a dispute off the agenda of the Security Council for 
fear that it would be complicated, even in the era of detente, by super­
power interests. Finally, the Secretary General's persistent but frustrated 
efforts to forestall the conflict on the Indian sub-continent in 1971 were 
based on the notion of preventive diplomacy as the rationale underlying the 
quiet approach.
Consultation and consensus
Rule 48 of the rules of procedure of the Security Council provides
that 'Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in
public'.1 In the early years of the United Nations, suggestions that the
Council should meet in private were generally regarded as flouting the
2ideal of open diplomacy. To suggest taking the discussions of the 
Security Council out of the public gaze and off the formal record was seen 
as heralding a return to the secret diplomacy and intrigue of pre World 
War I.
Hammarskjöld introduced the practice of consultation, at least between
the President and key members of the Council, with a view to arriving at a
3formula for resolving major issues before they came to the Council.
S/96, rev.5.
p. Hasluck, quoted in F.Y. chai, Consultation and Consensus in the 
Security Council, UNITAR, New York, 1971, p.8.
3 Ibid.
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To conduct Security Council discussions only in open session seemed to 
engender rhetoric for domestic consumption, rigid positions from which 
governments found it difficult to retreat, lack of frankness in exploring 
possible solutions to problems and difficulty in achieving compromises.^
The process of consultation was seen as facilitating a degree of flexibility 
whereby delegations could talk freely out of the public gaze, and 'off the 
record' in an attempt to discover whether there was common ground between 
them.
It is worth noting that these justifications for consultation were
actually very similar to those advanced in support of traditional notions of
private diplomacy. The new elements were the multilateral dimension and the
institutional framework provided by the United Nations, and participation in
the process by the Secretary General and the Secretariat.
Hammarskjöld saw his personal role in this respect as facilitating the
search for a formula to deal with a question of which the Council was 
2seized. This again was the posture of exercising good offices. In
Hammarskjold's case his role was in fact often central to the discovery of
such a formula; frequently he actually drafted resolutions which were then
3presented by Council members.
Thant was firmly convinced that consensus was an important prerequis­
ite for Security Council action. Referring to his powers under Article 99 
he stated that:
Dag Hammarskjöld, International Co-operation within the United Nations, 
address at University of California UN Convocation, Berkeley, California, 
1955, cited in Raman, op. cit. , p.91. See also Lentner, op. dt. , p.325.
2 Chaij loo. cit.
3 Ibid.
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Nothing could be more divisive and useless than for a Secretary 
General to bring a situation publicly to the Security Council 
when there is no practical possibility of the Council agreeing on 
effective or useful action. On the other hand, a quiet approach 
which avoids a public confrontation may often hold some hope of 
success. In this context, I hope that it may be possible to 
develop further the procedure of quiet consultations among members 
of the Security Council on threatening situations.^
He felt that he could initiate such processes, and in keeping with the good 
offices approach he could make suggestions on substantive questions if 
asked to do so. His role again was that of the bridge builder; in this 
case not only between the disputants, but also between the members of the 
Council, particularly those with competing interests and with commitments 
to the respective disputants.
As the concepts of good offices and quiet diplomacy have become
institutionalised, so has the practice of consultation within the Security
Council. It is one of the key roles to be undertaken by the Council's
2President during his month of office and a room for consultations has
3recently been established next to the Security Council chamber.
Chai states that 'throughout the consultative process the Secretary
General is usually kept informed of the developments and sometimes his 
4advice is sought'. It is difficult to document the extent of Secretariat
U Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, pp.11-12; u Thant referred 
specifically to his approach to the Bangladesh situation, see Chapter V, 
p .169, infra.
2 The President in December 1971, Mr Taylor-Kamara (Sierra Leone), 
stated that before a Council meeting was held:
. . . it was necessary, in accordance with custom to hold informal 
consultations, first with the representative requesting the 
holding of the meeting, next with the permanent representatives on 
the Council, and afterwards with the non-permanent representatives 
on the Council. (S/PV.1611, para. 251)
3 Interview, New York, April 1977.
4 Chai, op. cit. , p.8.
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involvement in consultations since records are rarely kept. However inter­
views with Secretariat officers leave no doubt that the Secretary General 
and senior political officers can be intensely engaged in the process.
One difficulty for the Secretariat is that consultation can be a 
means of parliamentary gamesmanship rather than a genuine search for con­
sensus. The United States has on occasion accused the Soviet Union of
seeking consultations in order to delay decisions. On the other hand, the
Soviet Union has accused the United States of not genuinely seeking con­
sensus among the permanent members, but only seeking majority decisions so 
as to force a Soviet veto which could be the subject of anti-Soviet 
propaganda. Both accusations were levelled by the respective sides during 
the Bangladesh crisis.
If the superpowers do not want a consensus in the Security Council 
there is little more the Secretariat can do. Consultation in the Security 
Council in the second half of the twentieth century has been no more of a
panacea for avoiding the clash of great power interests than private
diplomacy was at the beginning of the century. The process may help to 
ease such clashes. But it can only resolve them if there is a mutual 
political will to work for agreed solutions.
The role of the Secretariat in the process of consultations in the 
Security Council is further discussed in the case studies. In the case of 
Yemen, once the initial meetings had been held on the issue, all further 
decisions were made by the Secretary General on the basis of consultation 
with Council members without formal meetings. In the case of Bahrain, 
the Council met only to endorse action taken, and there were prior 
consultations which achieved a consensus on the manner in which the 
Council would handle the question. In the case of Bangladesh an intensive 
series of consultations indicated that no consensus was possible, and after
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months of private discussion a meeting was only held after open war had 
occurred between India and Pakistan. This episode raised serious questions 
as to whether continued quiet diplomacy was the best course when prior 
consultations indicated the apparent impossibility of consensus.
Press coverage
In his Correspondents Association Speech Thant told the newsmen that:
The press and the media play an incalculably important role in 
our affairs, and I may add, in the daily life of the Secretary 
General. I would be the first to recognise that our relation­
ship, in the very nature of things, cannot always be an easy one.
Your duty is to find out and report news - mine, often to my 
regret, is usually to be discreet, sometimes to the point of 
total silence.^
As a former journalist he appreciated the role of the press. Like his 
predecessor he attempted to explain the principles underlying his approach 
to problems. Also like Hammarskjöld, he was usually not forthcoming on
2the details of specific negotiations, and was the epitome of discretion.
But Thant was capable on occasions of a certain public bluntness. As 
Burma's Ambassador at the UN he had trenchantly criticised the bloc policies 
of both superpowers. When taking up his second term of office he made it 
clear that he had accepted renomination only after receiving assurances that 
the major powers acknowledged his right and duty to speak out on important 
issues. Later he spoke out forthrightly over United States actions in 
Vietnam and Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. In each case it seemed that 
Thant 'went public' only after attempts to influence events through quiet 
diplomacy had failed.3
u Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.l.
2 Lentner, op. cit. , pp.42-43.
Manton, op. cit. , pp.10-11; Bingham, op. cit., p.232; Jones, op. Cht. , 
p.190; Saffell, op. cit., pp.356-7.
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The choice of making such statements is not open to other officers of 
the Secretariat, nor do they face the same consistent pressure for public 
comment on specific issues. Even so, officers representing the Secretary 
General on missions were engaged in a publicly visible form of diplomacy, 
and on those occasions they too faced such pressures. This was particularly 
true in the case of Bunche's visit to Yemen.
Within the Secretariat there is an acute awareness that discretion is 
integral to the role of good offices and is a prime requirement of the 
parties. In fact, during negotiations on a dispute there can be consider­
ably more sensitivity about public comments by an intermediary than about 
comments from either of the disputants.
Reinforcing this requirement for discretion is the conviction that 
the intermediary role is most effective when least visible. In the case of 
Bahrain, strict secrecy prior to the announcement of Winspeare's mission 
was regarded as being absolutely essential to the operation's success.
There is a dilemma for the Secretariat, however, in terms of the long­
term effects of a self-effacing role on public opinion. It can be argued 
that the UN has suffered quite severely from lack of public knowledge 
about its actions, particularly its achievements. In this respect the UN 
Secretariat faces the same general questions as that faced by any insti­
tution which lacks power in its own right. To what extent is the broadly 
based support which underlies the institution's legitimacy to be traded 
off against the opportunity to influence events by direct but private con­
tact with decision-makers?
Both Hammarskjöld and Thant sought to resolve this dilemma by trying 
to explain to reporters at length the principles underlying their actions. 
But statements of principle were never likely to have the same impact as 
hard news about specific negotiations.
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Maintaining the immediate confidence of disputants while preserving 
the long-term confidence of publics is one of the most intractable ongoing 
problems which the Secretary General must deal with on a day to day basis. 
The record of the eight months prior to the Bangladesh crisis reveals 
starkly the magnitude of this problem in a crisis situation as well as 
the dramatic effect of leaks and press speculation in undermining the 
effectiveness of the Secretary General's initiatives.
Summary
The terms discussed in this chapter together encompass the various 
aspects of the intermediary role undertaken by Thant and his senior 
colleagues. The concepts underlying good offices, quiet diplomacy, 
preventive diplomacy and consultation in the Security Council were inter­
related, as were the practices associated with those terms.
Hammarskjöld had previously articulated in a most innovative fashion 
the application of traditional concepts of good offices and private 
diplomacy to the role of the Secretary General. The terminology which he 
adopted connoted restraint, yet Hammarskjöld saw both good offices and 
quiet diplomacy as dynamic concepts, and so applied them in practice.
Thant consolidated both concepts at a time of great controversy over 
the Secretariat and the role of the Secretary General. In response to 
political realities and a greater emphasis on delegation of duties, the 
practice of good offices and quiet diplomacy became less personalised 
within the Secretariat and more institutionalised. Thant's own philosophy 
further emphasised the consensual nature of the Secretariat's intermediary 
role.
Consultation and the seeking of consensus in the Security Council was 
a natural consequence of quiet diplomacy, applied in this case not only to
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not only to the direct disputants but also to indirect parties, and in 
particular to the superpowers. Moreover, Hammarskjöld's original concept 
of preventive diplomacy as a specific strategy designed to localise 
conflicts in the cold war era was modified. Preventive diplomacy became 
simply quiet diplomacy aimed at forestalling conflict.
Good offices and quiet diplomacy emphasised the need for the consent 
of the disputing parties. The need for consent further dictated the 
importance of discretion. The underlying and continuing dilemma of the 
quiet approach is the tension between the requirement of absolute 
discretion and the necessity to maintain the confidence of the publics 
which the United Nations ultimately serves.
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CHAPTER II
EFFECTS OF UN DIPLOMACY
This chapter deals firstly with the effects of the Secretariat's 
intermediary role in terms of the primary goal of maintaining international 
peace. It also considers the difficult question of the effects of 
Secretariat intermediary activity on internal affairs.
Influence on events
The previous chapter closed on the note that the necessity for dis­
cretion inherent within a quiet intermediary approach can be at odds with 
the maintenance of confidence amongst wider publics. In Western countries 
the UN has had its share of media critics. During the last decade those 
criticisms have been fuelled in part by reactions to the growing assertive­
ness of third world countries. Antagonism resulting from resolutions 
adopted in UN organs against the views and wishes of sections of western 
opinion has been directed also at the Secretariat, which has been portrayed 
as a wasteful and ineffectual bureaucracy.'*' The charge of ineffectuality 
generally suggests that the UN Secretariat has no effect in achieving goals 
regarded by the critic as important. It is this accusation of ineffectual­
ity - the assertion that the Secretariat has no influence on events and is 
therefore useless - that is perhaps the most damaging.
A recent example was a five part series syndicated in major dailies 
across the United States - William Sherman, 'The UN Today: How the Dream
Went Sour', Daily Dews, New York, 2-6 May 1977. There is nothing new about 
such criticism. Boyd comments that 'A scathing chorus of press comment 
greeted the opening of the 1947 UN Assembly', Boyd,op. ait., p.ll.
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Underlying such criticism is the false assumption that the Secretary 
General - and the Secretariat - could somehow be expected to determine 
events. Many statements by successive Secretaries General have aimed at 
correcting that assumption. U Thant said:
There is a persistent illusion that the Secretary General's 
position is in some way comparable to that of the head of a 
government, and that clear-cut and decisive action can, and 
should be taken by him on problems which have defied the 
collective wisdom of the 127 Member Governments. The truth, 
of course, is that the United Nations, and the Secretary 
General, have none of the attributes of sovereignty, and no 
independent power.^
The role of international intermediary is different in kind to the
more familiar role of the decision-maker within a national society, who is
generally backed by enforceable laws and the resources of the state. The
2intermediary seeks to facilitate solutions but cannot dictate them. His 
role may reinforce a complex of pressures tending to dampen conflict, or it 
may be frustrated by pressures which tend to exacerbate conflict. That 
intermediary role is not a panacea for the avoidance of war, although it 
may make the difference between war and peace.
The dependence on the consent of the parties, the necessity for dis­
cretion and the refusal to take public or even private positions in favour 
of one side or the other, make it difficult to identify the influence on 
events of an intermediary role exercised in the midst of competing 
pressures. But the mistake made by the critics, particularly those in the 
western media, is to dismiss the significance of an intermediary role on 
the basis of an apparent lack of simple and visible causal relationships.
U Thant, Correspondents Association Speech, p.5.
2 There is, of course, considerable debate among political scientists 
as to the extent to which a decision-maker can 'dictate solutions' within 
a given national society. However, national leaders generally do seek to 
create the impression that they are 'in control of the situation'.
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If the media critics can be dismissed on the grounds of super­
ficiality, the question remains of the extent to which the Secretary 
General and the Secretariat have an influence, or the prospect of influence, 
over events. In general works on international relations by recognised 
scholars there is a wide range of opinion. To cite some examples,
Morgenthau argued in the late 1950s that:
It is a measure of the weakness of the Secretary General's 
position as a political agent that he is almost completely 
deprived of the two most potent instruments of conciliation, 
threat and promise, and limited to the use of rational 
persuasion and formulation of agreements already substantially 
attained
Similarly Hinsley believes that the United Nations is limited to 'peripheral
2functions' in international affairs and that the Charter invested the
Secretariat with a purely administrative role which, he suggests, is the
3only practicable one. Rosecrance states in a recent work that 'most
important national initiatives and responses take place outside the frame-
4work of the United Nations', and he thereafter makes only passing 
references to the United Nations in general, with no specific comments on 
the role of the Secretariat.
Northedge and Donelan make a more cautious assessment of the 
effectiveness of the United Nations as an institution, but they do not 
refer explicitly to the role of the Secretariat as distinct from other 
organs. Reviewing fifty post 1945 disputes they agree with the commonly 
expressed view that while the United Nations may help to stabilise crisis
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace (3rd ed.) Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1960, p.492.
2 F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge University 
Press, 1963, p.357.
Ibid. , pp.344-345.
Richard Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War?, McGraw- 
Hill, New York, 1973, p.62.
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situations, it has a far less impressive record in actually working out
settlements."^" Another work by Northedge and Grieve elaborates on this
2opinion, with particular reference to peacekeeping operations. An
analysis of the United Nations presented by Schuman in his most recent
edition is compatible with these comments, although he goes a little
further in suggesting the institution's usefulness as a means of
facilitating 'the pacific solution of problems of power' .^  Again, he does
not comment specifically on the role of the Secretariat.
Other general works in the international relations field, for example
a recent one by Couloumbis and Wolfe and a long established one by Claude,
place particular emphasis on the concept of preventive diplomacy as
4developed by Hammarskjöld. They perceive such a role as realistic and 
fulfilling a vital function in a global situation which is characterised 
by limited but dangerous great power disputation. In their references to 
Hammarskjöld they imply a role for the Secretariat in implementing this 
vital function, although the role is not spelt out.
F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, International Disputes: The Political
Aspects, Europe, London, 1971, pp.237-240. These authors comment on the 
lack of 'an authoritative and comprehensive study analysing in detail the 
case histories of disputes which the UN has handled', p.242. Two studies 
which go part way towards meeting this need are Wainhouse (ed.) International 
Peace Observation: A History and Forecast, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore,
1966; and Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967> Documents 
and Commentary, Oxford University Press, London, 1970. These studies 
provide comprehensive accounts of peacekeeping operations.
2 F.S. Northedge and M.J. Grieve, A Hundred Years of International 
Relations (2nd impression), Duckworth, London, 1974, pp.279-302.
3 Frederick Schuman, International Politics: Anarchy and Order in the
World Society (7th ed.), McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969.
4 Theodore Couloumbis and James Wolfe, Introduction to International 
Relations: Power and Justice, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1978,
p .268. Inis Claude, Power and International Relations, Random House, New 
York, 1962, p.283. See also Claude's Swords into Plowshares: Problems
and Progress of International Organisation, Random House, New York, 1956, 
and The Changing United Nations, Random House, New York, 1967.
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These examples of general works on international relations by no means
comprise an exhaustive list, but they indicate both a range of opinion on
the effectiveness of the United Nations as an institution, and a paucity of
specific comments on the role of the Secretariat. Similarly, accounts of
particular international disputes - including those discussed in the
following chapters - sometimes discount the Secretariat's role, or ignore
it altogether.'1' At the same time, it must be said that other such accounts,
which are cited in the relevant chapters, give rather more attention to the
2Secretariat's role than do the general works.
An initial problem in assessing effectiveness is created simply by 
lack of knowledge about the extent of activities undertaken by the 
Secretary General and his senior colleagues. This is a strong reason for 
endeavouring to document such activities in the three particular cases 
considered here. But even when the Secretariat's activities are able to 
be documented it is still valid to question whether those activities had 
any effect or whether events were in any case determined by decisions taken 
beyond the reach of UN influence. For this reason each of the three cases 
includes some discussion of the broader political context and the main 
factors influencing the course of the dispute, as well as the limitations 
imposed by that context on the intermediary activities of the Secretariat.
It is in the light of these constraints that each of the case studies 
attempts to make a brief assessment of the effects of intermediary activity, 
using a procedure which is described below.
For example, Ingrams, on the Yemen dispute (p.49, infra), Halliday on 
the Bahrain dispute (p.106, infra) and Ball on the Bangladesh war (p.151, 
infra).
2 See also Wainhouse, op. cit. , and Higgins, op. oit. Both these studies 
refer frequently to the role of the Secretariat in peacekeeping operations.
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Effects of intermediary activity
In each case study the Secretariat's activities and the apparent 
responses of the disputants are compared with a checklist of possible 
effects of intermediary activity, compiled basically from an analysis of 
third party functions by Oran Young.1 This checklist of possible effects 
is as follows:
1. a catalytic effect - the mere presence of an intermediary 
may lead to moderation of the behaviour of the disputants;
2. acting as a means for justifying concessions and for 
rationalising flexible behaviour;
3. altering the disputants' calculations of advantage and 
disadvantage; an effect flowing particularly from the 
intermediary function of acting as a possible source of 
external approval (or disapproval);
4. clearing up misunderstandings and 'unnecessary incompati­
bilities of images';
5. dramatising the danger of failing to resolve the conflict 
peacefully;
6. communicating messages between the disputants without
distortion; and providing a means of communication which
is acceptable to both disputants on the basis of mutual
2confidence in the intermediary;
Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, 
Princeton UP, Princeton NJ, 1967, pp.36-43. Other sources used include 
Rovine, The First Fifty Years, pp.444-451; Darwin, op. cit. , p.84; Raman, 
op. cit. , p.l. The writer is also indebted to Robert Muller for notes 
entitled 'Some Reflections on Mediation', December 1977.
2 Young goes further on this point, suggesting that when the intermediary 
has control of the communication process, messages between the disputants 
may be blocked or altered to avoid 'disruptive' effects on the negotiations. 
He notes that this raises 'some extremely delicate and complex problems'.
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7. creating 'saliency', that is, emphasising key focal 
points which are likely to lead to a resolution of the 
conflict. Schelling describes the creation of focal 
points in terms of giving prominence to particular 
issues which, if agreed upon, will engender a climate 
of greater co-operation between the parties.1 This 
study looks in particular at the creation of 'saliency' 
by identifying areas of mutual interest;
8. influencing procedural matters, including the agenda 
of discussions, the order of dealing with issues, and 
the 'packaging' of various issues in a manner likely 
to assist resolution of the overall dispute. A key 
procedural point is winning the agreement of the 
parties to meet and negotiate directly with each other.
Although this rather basic aspect is not highlighted 
by Young, it forms an important focus in the case 
studies;
9. initiating 'face-saving' operations to provide one or 
more of the parties with a way out of earlier positions 
or commitments which are obstructing agreement.
Ultimately, the question of influence on events requires an overall 
evaluation of all the factors which might have affected particular 
decisions - the perception of economic and strategic interests, 
psychological, ideological and cultural factors, the influence of
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp.57, 144.
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behavioural norms, and so on. The list of possible factors is intermin­
able, and the weight given to the various factors in a conflict will 
always be the subject of interpretation and debate.
The combination of documentation, broad context, and assessment of 
intermediary effects cannot provide definitive proof that a particular 
action of the Secretariat made the difference between peace and war. But 
it does submit a basis for informed judgments. It throws serious doubts 
on simplistic accusations of ineffectuality based on incomplete knowledge. 
Furthermore, it provides a balance to analyses which may tend to overlook 
the contribution of intermediary activity by an international secretariat.
Effects on internal affairs
Article 2(7) of the Charter provides that:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the members to submit such matters for settlement 
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter 7.
This clause has been the subject of detailed analysis - and consider­
able debate - amongst scholars of international law, in particular with 
respect to the precise meanings to be attached to the words 'intervene' 
and the phrase 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction'.'*" But the 
view generally prevailing among member states of the UN has been summed up 
by Schächter as follows:
For example, Schächter in J.N. Moore (ed.), Law and Civil Wax* in the 
Modem World, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, p.401; Abdelazim Elganzory, 
Evolution of the Peacekeeping Powers of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1973, pp.39-52.
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. . . the goal of maintenance of national sovereighty and 
independence, expressed in various principles of the Charter, 
reflects the widely shared conviction of virtually all member 
governments that . . . states should be free to decide on 
their domestic political, economic and social arrangements ^
without interference by other states or by international bodies.
Thus the general view of member states has ensured that non-interference in
internal affairs is a cardinal principle recognised by the Secretariat while
2seeking the peaceful settlement of disputes.
But the adoption of such a principle does not remove a series of 
problems which can face the Secretariat.
Firstly, international disputes may arise out of internal disputes, 
and vice versa. In such cases it is difficult for the Secretariat to adopt 
the role of intermediary between the external parties without that role 
having effects, directly or indirectly, on the internal dispute. This is 
illustrated in the cases of Yemen and Bangladesh.
Secondly, there is the problem which occurred in all three cases, of 
disputed recognition. When the source of authority within a country is 
part of the dispute between the external parties, decisions by the 
Secretariat as to whom it will consult in the course of exercising an 
intermediary role can have both internal and external effects.
Thirdly, if a party so wishes the domestic jurisdiction clause can all 
too readily be presented as a justification for denying the consent 
required for an intermediary role to proceed. When this occurs there is at 
least a prima facie case for suggesting that the denial of consent is
Schächter, op. cit. , p.406; see also Bennett in David Davies Memorial 
Institute, op. cit., pp.162-163.
2 Raman, op. C'it. , p.21; Raman points out that members of the UN now 
generally hold that two forms of state practice - large-scale racial 
discrimination and denial of the right to self-determination in colonial 
territories - are no longer matters essentially within the domestic juris­
diction of states.
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motivated by the fear that the effects of external intermediary activity 
will be disadvantageous internally."*" This seems to have been the case in 
the early months of the crisis in East Pakistan.
Fourthly, success in alleviating threats to international peace may 
be seen by groups opposing the status quo and their external supporters as 
reducing opportunities for internal social change. This was particularly 
true in the case of Bangladesh and was another factor which helped to 
present not only the Secretariat, but the organisation as a whole, with 
one of its most vexing and apparently insoluble crises.
The dilemma which frequently faces the Secretariat is that internal 
effects flowing from its intermediary activity may be unavoidable. Those 
effects, or the possibility of such effects as perceived by one or other 
of the parties, may result in severe limitations being imposed on the 
Secretariat's intermediary role - an inherent danger for a role based on 
consent. This dependence on consent is directly derived from a clear 
recognition of national sovereignty; yet the more that sovereighty is 
threatened internally, the more likely it is that limitations of domestic 
jurisdiction will be imposed.
The question of peace and justice
The role of good offices has as its primary goal the maintenance of 
international peace. Yet questions of peace cannot be completely 
dissociated from questions of justice, and once the UN Secretariat seeks 
to determine where justice lies in a dispute, or to adopt an adjudicative 
role, the concept of good offices is endangered. This dilemma arises 
particularly as the Secretariat becomes more involved with substantive 
rather than procedural issues in a particular dispute.
1 Raman, op. oit., pp.20-26.
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The view has been expressed that it is the responsibility of a
mediator not only to suggest solutions based upon an exact intersection
of the interests of the disputants, but also to make proposals in accord
with principles and values established by the international community as
a whole.1 Yet in practice a great range of actions can find justification
in the principles accepted by the international community through
declarations and resolutions of the United Nations: the problem remains
of determining the justice of competing claims based on principles which
2may themselves be in conflict. Raman argues that in practice it can only
be said 'that the mediator should act in a manner not contrary to the
3purposes and principles stressed in Article 1 of the Charter'.
The dilemma is inescapable, for even totally neutral good offices 
activity, if effective in ameliorating conflict, may tip the balance in 
competitions for political power. Indeed, to preserve peace may be to 
prolong repression, unless there is a workable mechanism for non-violent 
means of altering the status quo.
The question of peace and justice arises in particularly acute form 
when aspirations for international peace are juxtaposed against demands 
for domestic justice. The case studies which follow indicate in more 
detail the nature of the dilemmas which face the Secretariat in attempting 
to maximise the effect of its activities in alleviating threats to inter­
national peace, while minimising those effects which might lead to 
limitations being imposed on the grounds of domestic jurisdiction.
1
2
3
Pechota, op. cit., pp.19-20. 
Schächter, op. O'it., p.406. 
Raman, op. O'it., p.14.
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY ONE: YEMEN, 1963 AND 1964
INTRODUCTION
For most of the period from the seventeenth century until September 
1962 the ancient land of Yemen was ruled by a succession of Imams, the 
religious and military rulers of the Zeidi hill tribesmen from the north. 
The territory controlled by the Imams extended for a time to Aden and 
Lahej on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, but these areas broke 
away in 1728. The British occupied Aden from 1839 onwards, while there 
were invasions of the area to the north by the Egyptians in 1849 and the 
Ottoman Turks in 1871. Following the defeat of the Turks in the First 
World War, Imam Yahya re-established control as far south as the border 
with the Aden protectorates. Yahya and his son Ahmad maintained feudal 
regimes stricken with poverty and largely isolated from the outside world.'*' 
In September 1962 Imam Ahmad died after a long and harsh rule, and 
his son Al Badr was installed as the new Imam. On 26 September the royal 
family was overthrown by a group of officers. A republic was established 
under the presidency of Colonel Abdullah Al-Sallal, a veteran nationalist 
whom Al Badr had placed in charge of his palace guard in a measure 
intended ironically to win support from the army. Sallal was a non-tribal 
Zeidi who had been sent to Baghdad in the 1930s for training by Imam Yahya, 
and was later imprisoned several times for his political activities.
F. Halliday, Arabia without Sultans, Penguin, 1974, pp.81-92; R.B. 
Serjeant in M. Adams The Middle East: A Handbook, pp.335-339. Halliday
claims the Imams adopted a policy of deliberate isolation (p.86, 90) but 
Serjeant says they 'were not altogether unprogressive' (p.339).
49
Al Badr escaped from the ruins of his palace and fled to the northern 
mountains where he and several princes, with the aid of Zeidi tribesmen, 
mounted guerrilla operations against the new republican regime.^
Shortly after the revolution both the United Arab Republic and Saudi 
Arabia became involved, the UAR sending troops to support the republican 
government and Saudi Arabia supplying arms, ammunition and finance in 
support of the royalists. Both the UAR and Saudi Arabia later claimed
2that their interventions were in response to the actions of the other.
Regardless of the competing claims, the intervention of two major Arab
countries on opposing sides of the internal struggle within Yemen clearly
posed a significant threat to international peace.
For President Nasser of Egypt, the Yemen revolution came at a time
when he was on the defensive in Arab politics following Syria's seccession 
3in September 1961 and it provided an unanticipated fillip to his
4aspirations for Arab republicanism. He had broken off diplomatic
relations with Jordan, denounced the Saudi Arabian dynasty, and returned
5to his earlier stance as the champion of revolutionary progress.
Accounts of the Yemen revolution are contained in Halliday, toe. cit. 
Dana Adams Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown War, The Bodley Head, London, 1968
Manfred Wenner, Modem Yemen 1918-1966, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
1967, Chapter VIII; Robert Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab
Republic, Westview Press, Boulder, 1978, pp.225-299; Harold Ingrams, The 
Yemen: Imams, Rulers and Revolutions, John Murray, London, 1963; and
Rosalyn Higgins, United Rations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1969, pp.609-669.
2
r .j . Bunche, Special Report to the Secretary General on Visit to 
Yemen, 27 February to 7 March 1963, unpublished.
3 Halliday, op. cit., p.106.
Stookey, op . cit., p.231; Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Nasir
and His Rivals, 1958-1970, (3rd ed.), Oxford University Press, London, 
1971, pp.40-41.
5 Tbid. , p .27.
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The Saudi royal family had maintained an alliance with the Imams of
Yemen since the signing of a treaty in 1934. Imam Ahmad had come to power
with Saudi support in a bloody sacking of Sana, the capital, following his
father's assassination in 1948.'*’ A successful revolution in Yemen was
2seen by the Saudi dynasty as a direct threat to itself.
As the UAR and Saudi Arabia became involved in the Yemen civil war
they broke off diplomatic relations and the threat of direct conflict
between them seemed very real. In November 1972, Egyptian planes dropped
3arms inside Saudi Arabia and the Saudis deployed their crack White Army 
4along the border. Early in the new year the Egyptians bombed Saudi
positions from which the royalists were operating, and in February the
Commander of the Egyptian Army, Field-Marshall Amer, took personal control
in Yemen and mounted raids across the border, during what was known as
5the 'Ramadan offensive'.
The prospect of a direct UAR-Saudi Arabian conflict aroused wider 
concerns. Saudi Arabia, with its immense oil reserves, was backed by the 
United States with military and economic aid.^ The UAR was armed mainly 
by the USSR, and the Middle East as a whole was an area of increasing
Halliday, op . d t ., p.97.
2 Wenner, op. d t ., p.199. Stookey comments that Saud's initial 
impulse had been to hold aloof, but he had been persuaded to assist the 
royalists by Prince Hassan, uncle of Al Badr (Stookey, op. dt., p.246). 
For an account of the internal differences within the Saudi Arabian 
ruling family, in particular the role of Crown Prince Faisal, see Schmidt, 
op. dt. , pp.51-52.
3 Halliday, op. d t ., p.109.
4 Ibid., p .58.
Ibid., p . 109 ; Schmidt, op. d t ., p.164-165.
Halliday, op. d t . , p.54.6
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competition between the superpowers. The Soviet Union had also supplied
arms to Yemen and had completed a harbour at Hodeida earlier in 1962,
2while China had built a road from Hodeida to Sana. The Soviet Union and
other Eastern bloc countries recognised the new regime on 29 September, as 
3did Egypt. The United States recognised the new regime on 19 December in
4the hope that such action would help stabilise the situation. When the
Egyptians bombed Saudi Arabian towns, the Americans sent jet fighters, a
destroyer and paratroopers to the region in a display of support for Saudi
5Arabia, code-named 'Operation Hard Surface'. The United States reportedly 
also agreed to the publication of a letter from President Kennedy pledging
0full United States support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabian integrity.
The British, fearing Nasser's intentions towards Aden, withheld recog- 
7nition and re-established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. (They 
had been severed in 1956.) Internationally, in the words of Arthur
gSchlesinger, 'the matter . . . became incredibly tangled'.
Wainhouse, op. ait., p.422; Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days:
John F. Kennedy in the White House, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1965, p.567.
2 Ingrams, op. cvt., p.126; Schmidt, op . oit., pp.80-81.
3 Wenner, op. cvt., p.194.
Ibid., pp.202-203; Schlesinger, Zoo. oit. For the text of the US 
announcement, see Schmidt, op. oit., p.301.
5 •Wenner, op. ovt. , p.205; Schmidt, op. oit., p.168; Halliday, op. 
oit., pp.58, 141.
 ^ Schmidt, op. oit., p.186.
7 Schlesinger, Zoo. oit.
8
Ibid.
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INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN SECRETARIAT
The newly formed Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) sent a delegation to the
UN and on 20 December, the day after recognition by the United States, its
credentials were accepted by the General Assembly,^ To summarise briefly
the involvement of the UN Secretariat, the Secretary General had held
talks in New York during the weeks following the revolution with the
representatives of the UAR and Saudi Arabia, as well as the new
Republican regime in Yemen, in relation to the threat to international 
2peace. As a result of his continuing discussions Thant decided to send
Bunche to the area in late February, on what he described as a fact- 
3finding mission. At the same time the United States sent retired
4Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Saudi Arabia and later to Cairo. After
several weeks of intense discussions Bunker negotiated an agreement
between the governments of the UAR, Saudi Arabia and Yemen under which the
two external parties would disengage from Yemen, with impartial observers
5to check on observance of the agreed terms. The United Nations Yemen
Observation Mission (UNYOM) was established after a Security Council
6meeting endorsed proposals circulated by the Secretary General. For the 
first four months UNYOM operated solely as a military observation mission 
with no mediatory function, but disengagement did not occur as anticipated,
A/PV.1202, 20 December 1962, paras. 19-22; A/5395, Report of 
Credentials Committee, 20 December 1962.
S/5298, 29 April 1963, para. 1.
Ibid., para 2.
Ibid. Kennedy had earlier sent letters offering his good offices to 
Presidents Nasser and Sallal and to King Saud and King Hussein (Wenner, 
op. oit., p .199; Ingrams, op. cit., p.141.
5 Ibid., para. 9. For details, see p.65 / infra.
S/5330, 10 June 1963.
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and on 4 November the Secretary General appointed Pier Spinelli, Director 
of the UN Office at Geneva, as both head of UNYOM and his personal repre­
sentative with the task of meeting with the parties to discuss the 
political issues which were blocking disengagement. Over the following 
ten months Spinelli visited the area four times for extensive discussions 
with the leaders of the Yemen Republic, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, aimed at 
finding a way of implementing the disengagement agreement and achieving a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute between the external parties.
This chapter considers the intermediary role of the United Nations 
Secretariat throughout the period from October 1962 to September 1964 with 
particular reference to the Bunche mission of March 1963 and the Spinelli 
missions from November 1963 to August 1964.
THE BUNCHE MISSION
The role of good offices undertaken by the Secretary General in the
Yemen situation was indicated in his first report to members of the
Security Council.'*’ Thant stated that his talks with representatives of
the three governments had been held 'with a view to making my Office
available to the parties for such assistance as might be desired toward
ensuring against any development in that situation which might threaten
2the peace of the region'.
The characteristics of a good offices role were clearly contained in 
this statement. His public stance was not to propose solutions, but 
rather that his office was available to the parties for such assistance 
they might desire. Furthermore, his activities clearly arose out of the
1
2
S/5298.
Ibid., para. 1.
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concept of preventive diplomacy in the general sense of acting against 
developments which might threaten the peace.
The Bunche mission in the first week of March 1963 must be seen in the 
context of the regular discussions which the Secretary General, often 
accompanied by Bunche, had with the parties from October 1962 onwards.
The mission was one part of an ongoing exercise in the good offices role 
of the Secretary General and his staff.
Quiet diplomacy
The act of sending a special representative to the region made the 
good offices role more visible, but Thant and Bunche tried to play it down 
in the press as much as possible. On 26 February the Secretary General made 
a bare announcement of the mission, providing few details.^- The following 
day Bunche arrived in Beirut where he was met by the press. In his own 
words:
I fended off all questions by repeating that my sole assignment 
from you thus far was to go to Yemen and talk with the President 
and other officials of the government. Beyond that no plans and 
nothing else to say.2
But quiet diplomacy was not readily achieved. Bunche arrived in Taiz, the 
second city of Yemen, on 1 March, flying from Beirut in a UN Dakota air­
craft supplied by UNTSO. He was met by Dr A1 Aini, Yemen's Ambassador to 
the UN, other officials of the government and a loud and noisy crowd 
estimated at 20,000 people, the entire population of the city. The crowd 
enthusiastically waved banners and shouted slogans, then burst through the 
line of soldiers and surrounded the car carrying Bunche and A1 Aini,
SG/1440, 26 February 1963.
Bunche in Beirut to Secretary General, unpublished, 27 February 1963.
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slowing it down to walking pace for the entire journey from the airport
to the so-called 'palace' where Bunche's party was to stay the night.1 234
Reuters carried a story of the demonstration in its world-wide news
services while the official Yemeni news reports sought to get the maximum
advantage from the Bunche visit for the Yemen government's point of view.
Sana radio enthusiastically reported the demonstration at Taiz, saying
2Bunche had been welcomed as 'a messenger of peace'.
3From Taiz, Bunche and Al Aini flew to Sana where they were met by
more demonstrations. Sana radio reported that from the balcony of
Muntazal Palace, where he was staying as the President's guest, 'Bunche
told a teaming crowd that the world body was the friend of the Yemeni
4people and government'. The radio report added that the demonstration
had been called to protest against British violation of Yemen's air
space, and the demonstrators carried banners condemning British
imperialism, King Hussein of Jordan and King Saud of Saudi Arabia. An
incident involving British troops at Harib on the border between Yemen
and Beihan protectorate in the south had occurred shortly before Bunche's
visit and had generated considerable excitement within Yemen, adding to
5the drama of his reception.
Report by Colonel Tony O'Connell, Security Officer, unpublished.
2 Reuters, Aden, 1 March 1963.
3 The Dakota's starboard engine starter would not work so the crew 
started the engine by using a jeep with a rope tied to the propellor hub!
4 Reuters, Aden, 2 March 1963.
Sallal sent a cable of protest to the Security Council (S/5248,
24 February 1963). There had been similar incidents on the borders with 
the Aden Protectorates throughout the 1950s (Ingrams, op. oit., pp.77-103).
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Discussions in Yemen
Bunche's discussions with President Al Sallal included two sessions
of private talks with only Al Aini present to act as an interpreter.^
Sallal made it clear that he regarded Saudi Arabia as the real problem.
He had been one of the original group of eleven leaders of the first
Yemeni revolution in 1948. The revolution was defeated when Saudi Arabia
armed northern mountain tribes which swept down and sacked Sana. Seven
of his fellow revolutionaries were executed by the royalists; he was
2tortured and was imprisoned for eight years. Sallal told Bunche that
once again the Saudi Arabian dynasty had sent money, arms, infiltrators
and propaganda in support of the royalists who were entrenched among tribes
in the inaccessible northern mountains. King Hussein of Jordan had also
sent supplies. He thought the Security Council ought to adopt a resolution
calling on all States not to intervene in the internal affairs of Yemen,
3nor to allow their territory to be used by rebel forces.
The Yemeni President maintained that the UAR troops had come to Yemen
at the Republican government's request to help defend Yemen against
aggression. He said they would go when the members of the Yemeni royal
family left the area altogether, infiltration ceased and the United
Kingdom and Saudi Arabia recognised Yemen. He stated that in return Yemen
was prepared to give firm guarantees of non-interference in neighbouring 
4countries. This was evidently in response to one of the suggestions in
5Kennedy's letter in November.
'L Bunche, op. ait.
2 Sallal had been sentenced to death, but was reprieved. He was 
released from prison through Al Badr's intercession after another revolt 
in 1955 (Ingrams, op. oit., pp.121-122).
3 Bunche, op. oit.
4 Ibid.
Ingrams, op. cit. , p.141.
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The following day Bunche met with Field-Marshall Amer, who had taken 
personal command of the UAR forces in Yemen. Amer's comments emphasised 
the danger of direct fighting between Saudi Arabia and the UAR, when he 
stated that if the UN could not stop the infiltration across the border 
in the north, the UAR troops would have to cross the border themselves 
and destroy bases in Saudi Arabia.^-
Al Aini told Bunche, as he had the Secretary General during earlier 
discussion, that the Soviet Ambassador to Yemen continued to offer every 
type of help which the government desired. He warned Bunche that if the 
policy of diplomatic action did not produce results soon, Sallal had said 
he would be forced to go into union with the UAR in order to preserve 
Yemen's security.^
In Bunche's record of his discussions with Al Aini, the first mention 
was made of the possibility of placing UN observers on the border. Bunche 
noted that although Al Aini could not commit his government, he felt that 
Yemen might accept an arrangement for UN observers on the border, pro­
vided such an arrangement applied to both sides.
The President invited Bunche to travel anywhere he wished in Yemen,
and Bunche chose Marib, a town near the desert in the East, because the
royalists were supposed to be strong in that area, and there had been
3recent fighting with the Egyptian forces. He noted in his report that the 
trip was taken at very short notice so there was very little time to 'stage 
anything'. He was warmly welcomed by fifty to sixty tribal sheiks, all
Bunche, op. cit.; see page 50, supra concerning the raids which Amer 
had carried out prior to Bunche's arrival.
Bunche, op. cit.
3 Ibid. Marib had, in fact, been occupied by the royalists until 
26 February, the week before Bunche's visit (Ingram, op. cit., p.137; 
Wenner, op. cit., p.206).
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armed with rifles, who were excited over the incident at Harib and wanted 
to fight the British. He commented in his report that the UAR troops 
seemed to be solidly in control and there were far fewer of them than he 
had expected.^"
Aden
Before leaving Beirut, Bunche had been advised of a letter from Al
Sallal to the Secretary General complaining about the British action at
Marib. Bunche had cabled the Secretary General stating that he could go
2to Aden to talk to the British if Thant saw any utility in doing so.
Although he did not receive a reply before leaving Sana, Bunche decided
to go via Aden anyway, mainly he stated in his report, for the purpose of 
3refuelling.
On arriving at Aden, still accompanied by Al Aini, Bunche found
there were no difficulties with formalities and decided to stay overnight
4while the Dakota's starter was repaired. Bunche was invited to Government 
House as the Governor's guest and met over lunch and dinner with three 
local Arab leaders and two strongly pro-royalist Western correspondents.
He reported that the discussion gave him ample opportunity to get the 
royalist side of the story, but he found that the descriptions of royalist 
strength and support given to him by the Governor and the two journalists
1 Bunche, op. cit.
2 Bunche to Secretary General, 1 March 1963, unpublished.
3 For sensitive communications with headquarters Bunche had to rely on 
a circuitous channel which was very slow. The alternative refuelling 
point would have been Taiz, but the pilot preferred Aden.
4 A clearance was provided for Al Aini to enter Aden although he had 
been deported by the same Governor, Sir Charles Johnstone, three years 
earlier. Al Aini was at that time Secretary General of the Teachers' Union, 
and was deported for his part in an Aden Trade Union Congress strike.
He went to Cairo as the representative of the Congress (Ingrams op. cit., 
pp.124-125).
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were at odds with his own observations within Yemen.
Bunehe was impressed by the local Arab leaders, who seemed to him
to provide a more balanced account of the situation, despite their close
ties with the royalists in the north. They told him that the main reason
for the opposition to the YAR among their supporters was resentment over
the YAR's claim to Aden. They did not wish to be ruled by such a backward
country and people, they said. These views were strongly reinforced by
2the British governor.
Bunche's mission continued to attract press attention. While in Aden
he learnt that he had been quoted in press reports from Sana as saying in
Marib that the UN was opposed to 'British aggression in Yemen'. Bunche 
3issued a denial. A press conference was called and Bunche told reporters
that he had a three-hour private talk with President A1 Sallal, but
declined to give further details before reporting to the Secretary General,
saying only that Sallal had expressed a clear desire to live peacefully
4with Yemen's neighbours. This statement was clearly intended to
alleviate some of the anxiety about the Yemeni claim to Aden. Finally at
Aden Airport on the morning of 5 March, as he was about to board his plane
for Cairo, Bunche was greeted by yet another demonstration, this time by
members of the Aden Trade Union Congress opposed to the British and their
5policies in the region.
 ^ Bunche, op. eit.
Ibid.
3 Bunche cabled a report of his statement to the Secretary General. He 
had told the assembled sheiks at Marib that the UN always sought peaceful 
solutions to problems, that it was against intervention from outside in the 
internal affairs of states, including the activities of infiltration about 
which they were complaining. He added that the UN had been called upon to 
help prevent infiltration in Lebanon in 1958, and more recently in the 
Congo (Bunche en route to Cairo, to Secretary General, 5 March 1963, 
unpublished).
 ^ Reuters, Aden, 5 March 1963.
5 Bunche, Report on Visit to Yemen.
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Cairo
In Cairo Bunche met with President Nasser and Foreign Minister Fawzi. 
Nasser stressed the heavy burden of the military operation in Yemen and 
emphasised his government's early reluctance to respond to the appeal made 
by A1 Sallal. But he said that the UAR could not withdraw its troops 
while infiltration continued as that would be desertion of Sallal and 
would result in the collapse of the republican government.^
Like Sallal, Nasser saw the Saudi Arabians as the main threat to the 
new Yemeni government. He did not consider infiltration from the British 
side to be a serious problem any longer. Bunche reported that he spoke
2quite seriously about two attempts by King Saud to have him assassinated.
3And he spoke scathingly about the Saudi Arabian dynasty's life style.
Nasser stated that he did not seek bases in Yemen, and he had no 
intention or desire to launch an attack either on Saudi Arabia or the 
Aden protectorates, as 'this would not be the way to bring about the 
changes which the UAR hopes to see take place in those territories'. He 
had only agreed to the UAR attacking Yemeni royalist bases across the 
Saudi Arabian frontier after receiving an appeal from Amer, and on 4 March 
he had instructed Amer not to undertake any further activities across the 
border for a period of ten days, so as not to hamper the Bunker and Bunche 
missions
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. Nasser told Bunche that when King Saud later visited Cairo, he 
asked the King why he had tried to have him killed. Saud replied that he 
had been grossly misinformed about Nasser.
3 At one point he referred to Saudi Arabian 'indolence' in contrast to 
the Yemenis who were 'fine people'. Later he related how during a visit to 
Riyadh, he had told Saud that he should use his money to help his people, 
instead of squandering it on lavish palaces and banquets. According to 
Nasser, Saud had replied that such luxuries were necessary to impress his 
people, who were 'only simple bedouins'.
4 Ibid.
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On the key question of withdrawing his troops, Nasser said the
republican regime in Yemen would fall if the troops were withdrawn all
at once, but the UAR would undertake a 'phased withdrawal', which would
start as soon as the infiltration ended. He felt that the UN should try
to bring an early end to the infiltration. He had thought about the
stationing of UN observers along the border, but doubted that it was
necessary to go that far. If the UN could get firm assurances that there
would be an end to infiltration and that members of the royal family
would be kept away from the sensitive border areas, this could be enough.
He was confident of being able to verify Saudi Arabian actions through
the UAR's own sources of intelligence.^
In a separate meeting with Foreign Minister Fawzi, Bunche was told
that the question of UN observers could be left open, and the position of
the UAR would depend on the attitude of the Yemen government. He was very
cautious about any idea of a Security Council meeting on Yemen, feeling
it might be used politically or result in greater confusion of the issues.2
Bunche seemed optimistic after the talks, and advised the Secretary
3General that they had been very useful.
Apparently there had been discussion between the Secretariat and Saudi
Arabian officials in New York about the possibility of Bunche visiting
Saudi Arabia as well. Bunche inquired from Headquarters as to whether he
was correct in assuming that there had been no new developments on such a 
4visit. Wenner indicated that the lack of such an invitation was due to
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Bunche, in Cairo, to Secretary General, 6 March, unpublished.
4 Bunche, in Cairo, to Secretary General, 5 March 1963, unpublished.
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the fact that Bunche had not visited the Imam while in Yemen. In any
case Bunche did not believe that he should visit Jeddah at the same time
as Bunker, who was undertaking an independent (although obviously
2parallel) mission on behalf of the United States.
Bunche had felt that little or nothing would be gained by making any
further stops beyond Cairo. In particular, he considered it unwise after
his Aden experience to stop in London before talking to the Secretary
3General in New York. Following a phone conversation the Secretary
General confirmed that he expected Bunche back in New York by the most
4direct route after concluding his discussions in Cairo. Bunche made a
brief statement to the press indicating that he had completed his mission
5and was returning to report to the Secretary General.
Bunche's assessment
Summing up his report to the Secretary General, Bunche wrote that the 
situation was dangerous, and that while the trend was encouraging it could 
easily deteriorate with the most distressing consequences. The danger of 
involvement on the part of the major powers was clearly in his mind. With 
the memory of the Cuban missile crisis still fresh, Bunche wrote, 'I do 
not exclude the possibility that Yemen could become a Cuba in the Near 
East'.
Wenner, op. cit. p.206.
2 Bunche, in Cairo, to Secretary General, 5 March 1963. In his subse­
quent report to the Security Council, Thant stated simply that the possi­
bility of Bunche visiting Saudi Arabia was left open, but developments 
made this unnecessary (S/5298, para. 2).
3 Ibid.
4 Secretary General to Bunche in Cairo, 6 March 1963, unpublished.
5 PM/4209, 14 March 1963. (Statement made 6 March 1963.)
Bunche, Report on Visit to Yemen.
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His suggestions to the Secretary General were based primarily on
diplomacy to be undertaken through private contacts with all those
involved, both directly and indirectly. He suggested that the Secretary
General press the British to agree to give assurances of non-interference
in Yemeni affairs from Beihan or elsewhere in the protectorates, in return
for which the Secretary General would obtain similar assurances from the
Yemen government of non-interference in the affairs of Aden and the
protectorates. Further, he suggested that the British be urged to
recognise the new regime (which had already been recognised by 46 states).^
Wenner comments that the Americans had expected the British to follow
their lead in recognising the republican regime in the previous December,
and that their decision not to do so had been a key factor in the failure
2of United States efforts to bring about a quick end to the war. In March 
Bunche obviously regarded the British position as a key obstacle to the 
success of the UN Secretariat's efforts. He stated that Britain should 
not, in return for recognition, demand recognition by the Yemen government 
of the new federation of Southern Arabia as this was politically impossible. 
But the Secretary General could assure Britain of a non-public engagement
3by the President of Yemen not to press Yemen's claim to the protectorates.
Here, Bunch was proposing a classic intermediary action. From his 
visit to Aden he had identified Yemen's claim to the protectorate as the 
major concern amongst both the British authorities and the Arab leaders.
His talks with Sallal had indicated that Yemen was prepared to remove this 
source of concern by giving assurances of non-interference in neighbouring 
countries, in return for recognition of the YAR. In so doing Sallal had 
signalled, through Bunche, the kind of action by Britain to which he could
1 Ibid.
2 Wenner, op. eit.3 p.204. For critical comments on the US recognition 
and attempts to end the Egyptian and Saudi involvement in December 1962, 
see Schmidt, op. eit. , pp.185-189.
Bunche, Report on Visit to Yemen.
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respond. Bunche had conveyed that signal publicly at his press conference 
in Aden, and undoubtedly he and Thant did so privately as well, both in 
Aden and in New York. In the absence of direct contact between the Yemen 
government and the British, the UN was able to act as an intermediary in 
conveying those signals from one to the other.
As became apparent during the later Spinelli missions,^ had the 
British heeded the signals from Sallal immediately following the Bunche 
mission, the UN might have been better placed to exert leverage for the 
withdrawal of troops. The reliability of such signals is always a matter 
for judgement, but Bunche obviously took them seriously. The intermediary 
could only pass on the signals. After that it was up to the British to 
respond. Unfortunately, they did not.
With regard to Saudi Arabia Bunche observed that it would be necessary 
to await the outcome of the Bunker mission. Clearly the United States was 
in the best position to exert pressure for disengagement on the Saudi 
Arabians. Should the Bunker mission not produce results, Bunche suggested 
that it would be advisable for the Security Council to call on all the 
states concerned to refrain from interference in any form in the internal 
affairs of another state. He noted that the first aim should be to 
persuade Saudi Arabia and Yemen to give firm assurances of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of each other, and he suggested that the Secretary 
General explore the possibility of a meeting between Sallal and Saud or 
Faisal.2
As he wrote his report on the flight back to New York, Bunche re­
mained uncertain about the question of observers. 'I am far from sure',
See p.94, infra.
2
Ibid.
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he wrote, 'that an arrangement for UN observers would have any practi­
cality in view of the terrain and conditions.'"*’
Throughout his mission, Bunehe sought, unsuccessfully at times, to 
maintain a low public profile. His comments to the press were reticent 
and discreet. This emphasis on quiet diplomacy did not mean, however, 
that he lacked strong views on the things he had seen. He was obviously 
appalled by the conditions, referring to 'the poorest people in the world 
in possibly the most backward country'. The conditions in the country 
were so appalling, he wrote, that one could easily understand why there 
had been four revolutions since 1948 (1948, 1955, 1960 and 1962). He 
commented that the two 'palaces' he stayed in were 'not much better than
cold water walk-up flats in some of New York's slum sections'. His visit
2to Marib was like going to a world of two thousand years ago.
He recommended that the UN regently discuss technical assistance
with the Yemen government and 'try to do something special for that
3country this year'. Bunche's discretion as an international civil 
servant did not prevent him from conveying in his confidential report 
the impact of the situation on his sense of justice and humanity.
THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT
During the following seven weeks, while the secretary General and
Bunche continued their consultations with the representatives of the UAR,
Saudi Arabia and Yemen in New York, Elsworth Bunker kept them informed
4of the progress of his mission.
Ibid. This concern was recognised by Thant and was a major factor 
investigated by General von Horn during his initial visit to the area in 
May (see p.67, infra).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Ibid.4
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President Kennedy's letters to the Middle East leaders in November
1962 had reportedly proposed as a first step towards ending the crisis
the withdrawal of UAR forces and the cessation of Saudi Arabian support
for the royalists. Faisal, as Executive Head of the Saudi government,
had rejected the proposal while Sallal had welcomed it.'*' It appeared
that the first task of the Bunker mission was to exert pressure on the
Saudi Arabians for them to agree to this proposal. American gestures of
military support through 'Operation Hard Surface', together with economic
and military aid, undoubtedly gave the United States considerable leverage
over the Saudis. Faisal eventually agreed to the terms proposed by Bunker,
as did Nasser and Sallal, and their government sent identical letters to
2the Secretary General setting out the agreed terms of disengagement.
Saudi Arabia agreed to cease aid to the royalists and to prohibit
the use of Saudi Arabian territory in their struggle, while the UAR
agreed to undertake a phased withdrawal of its troops, take no punitive
action against the royalists for prior resistance, and end actions on
Saudi Arabian territory. The governments also agreed to the establishment
of a demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres on each side of the demarcated
Saudi Arabian-Yemen border, the stationing of impartial observers to
check on observance of the terms of disengagement, and further co-operation
3with the Secretary General or another mutually acceptable intermediary.
The firmness of these commitments is a matter for conjecture. Schmidt
reports a meeting of Yemeni royalist leaders with Faisal to discuss
supplies in early April and portrays both sides as scrambling to build up
4their forces before the disengagement was due to come into effect.
1 Ingrams, op. ait., p.141.
2
3
4
S/5298, para. 3.
Ibid., para. 4.
Schmidt, op. oit. pp.165-166.
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The Security Council
The Secretary General circulated a report on these developments to
members of the Security Council on 29 April,^ at the same time sending
the commander of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)
in Jerusalem, Major General von Horn, to each of the three capitals to
2consult the governments on details for a UN observation mission.
Reflecting the concerns expressed earlier by Bunche, one of the major
factors investigated by von Horn was the physical practicality of mounting
an observer operation in the difficult terrain. After receiving von
Horn's report, the Secretary General informed members of the Security
Council, once again in a circulated report, that although the terrain and
climatic conditions were forbidding, he believed UN observers were
vitally necessary and could well be the decisive factor in avoiding serious
3trouble in that area. He pointed out that the presence of UN observers
was desired by all the parties concerned and he stated that 'because of
the importance and urgency of the United Nations observation function to
the peaceful resolution of the Yemen issue' he intended to establish the
operation as soon as possible, sending a small advance party within a few 
4days. Evidently the outcome of the Bunker negotiations had convinced
Thant of the political need for such an operation, despite the concerns
about its practicality in view of the terrain and physical conditions.
At the same time, Thant had reservations about the limitations placed upon
5the UN operation by the terms of the disengagement agreement.
1 S/5298.
2 Ibid. , para. 5.
3
4
5
S/5321, 27 May 1963, para. 4. 
Ibid., para. 5.
See p .72, infra.
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Nevertheless, on 3 June he supplied a detailed breakdown of the costs of
the operation"*' and on 7 June informed Council members that Saudi Arabia
and the UAR had agreed in effect to share those costs for an initial
2period of two months. He stated that he intended to proceed with the
3mission without further delay.
By stating his intention to proceed with UNYOM without placing the 
matter formally before a Security Council meeting, the Secretary General 
indicated that he regarded a formal mandate as unnecessary. It should 
be noted that the Secretariat's activities during this period accorded 
closely with the concept of preventive diplomacy in the sense of attempt­
ing to find solutions with the parties before the dispute reached the 
stage where open debate occurred in the Security Council.
The following day, however, the Soviet Union requested a meeting of 
the Security Council to consider the Secretary General's reports, on the
grounds that decisions on measures to maintain international peace and
4security were required under the Charter to be taken by the Council.
When the Security Council met on 10 June the Secretary General
commented in a terse statement that he had already reported on his
conception of measures which might be taken and the fact that there were
5no financial implications for the UN. The meeting was then adjourned. 
During the next few hours Thant talked with each member of the Security 
Council. The next day, aware of objections raised by the Soviet Union
S/5323, 3 June 1963.
S/5325, 7 June 1963, para. 1. 
Ibid., para. 3.
S/5326, 8 June 1963.
5 S/PV1037, 10 June 1963, paras. 6 and 7.
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over the duration of the mission and the method of financing, he made a 
strong statement:
I am compelled to say that I feel strongly that it would not 
be in the interest of peace in the Near East, and certainly 
not in the interest of this Organisation, if it should for 
any reason fail to provide the observation assistance 
requested by the parties, the UAR, Saudi Arabia, and the YAR, 
or delay much longer in doing so.l
The cease fire had technically come into operation on 30 April, but
fighting continued sporadically and Thant warned the Council that any
further delay in getting UN observation personnel on the spot might
2jeopardise the agreement.
From his discussions the Secretary General was able to tell the 
Council that everyone agreed the observation function should be provided. 
The only question at issue was a difference over what should be 
included in the resolution. He advised that he was prepared to commence 
the operation immediately and urged the Council to reach prompt agree­
ment. 3
The Soviet delegate stated that:
Developments in recent years have shown that the sending of 
observers or the stationing of troops of the United Nations 
in different regions of the world has been used by the 
imperialist Powers for the purpose of establishing, under 
the United Nations flag, their control over certain areas.
He continued, however, that in this particular instance the UAR and 
YAR considered that UN observers might help protect Yemen against 
aggression, and his delegation would therefore not object to a Security
S/PV1038, 11 June 1963, para. 2. 
Ibid., paras. 5 and 6.
Ibid. , paras. 5 and 6.
Ibid., para. 16.4
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Council decision to send a limited number of observers for two months. 
Nor did he object to the method of financing the operation, since the 
parties concerned had reached agreement and the UN was not committed to 
any financial expenditure, although the Soviet position remained that 
the 'aggressor nations' should pay the cost of such operations.’*’
The resolution
A draft resolution was then presented by Morocco, whose delegate
pointed out that the repercussions of the events in Yemen had spread
throughout the Middle East, and as a result of foreign intervention,
2might well have had consequences far beyond the region.
The mover stated that the UAR and Saudi Arabia had both accepted a 
political solution recommended by the UN, and similar statements were
made by the Soviet delegate, who referred to the Secretary General's
3 4'useful initiative', as well as several other delegations.
The Secretary General had participated in the talks, had encouraged 
a peaceful settlement, and had then brought the matter to the attention 
of members of the Security Council. But the actual terms of disengage­
ment resulted from a United States initiative, negotiated with the
5parties by Ellsworth Bunker. It was therefore apparent that the UN 
Secretariat acted as a means for rationalising flexible behaviour, 
especially on the part of the Soviet Union, whose delegate carefully 
avoided any reference to the Bunker mission.
1 Ibid. , paras. 19-21.
2 Ibid. , para. 24.
Ibid., paras. 14 and 22, and S/PV1039, 11 June 1963, para. 26.
Brazil, S/PV1039, para. 29; France, ibid. , para. 38, and Ghana, 
ibid., para. 45.
5 Bunche to Spinelli, unpublished.
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The resolution noted 'with satisfaction the initiative of the 
Secretary General' and requested that he establish the observation 
mission as defined by him. It urged the parties to observe fully the 
terms of disengagement and requested the Secretary General to report to 
the Council on implementation of its decision.^
The Moroccan delegate, in presenting the draft resolution congratu­
lated the Secretary General:
. . . for the discretion and perseverance with which, ever 
since the situation developed, he has been converting what 
might have been an acute crisis with grave consequences into 
a problem allowing of a much more deliberate search for a 
solution, the elements of which now seem calculated to bring 
peace to the area.^
3These sentiments were endorsed by a number of other delegations. At the 
Council's third meeting on the issue held on the evening of 11 June, the 
resolution was adopted by ten votes to nil. The Soviet Union abstained 
from voting on the grounds that the resolution contained no specific 
reference to a time limit and omitted a direct statement on sources of 
finance.* 34 5
The mission was designated the United Nations Yemen Observation
5Mission (UNYOM), with General von Horn as commander. An advance party
arrived in Yemen two days after the adoption of the resolution and the
operation of the mission officially began with the arrival of Yugoslav
0military reconnaissance unit on 4 July.
S/5331, 11 June 1963; S/PV1038, para. 27, see Appendix B.
S/PV1038, para. 25.
3 Britain, S/PV1039, para. 25; Soyiet Union, ibid., para. 26; Brazil, 
ibid., para. 29; Philippines, ibid., para. 34; France, ibid., para. 38; 
China, ibid., para. 41, and Ghana, ibid., para. 45.
4 S/PV1039, para. 23-25.
5 S/5412, 4 September 1963, para. 2.
Ibid. , paras. 4 and 5. For the first four months, 4 July to 4 
November 1963, UNYOM comprised about 200 persons: the Yugoslav reconnais­
sance unit of 114, a Canadian air unit of 50 persons with Caribou and Otter 
aircraft and H-19 helicopters, a small military headquarters staff and 48 
civilians in Sana, and 6 military observers.
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THE SPINELLI MISSIONS
At the end of UNYOM's initial two month period, the Secretary 
General reported to Council members that 'in some important respects the
terms of the disengagement agreement have not been fulfilled by either of
the parties''*' and the task of the mission had therefore not been completed.
He reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAR had agreed to defray the
2expenses of UNYOM for a further period of two months.
Towards the end of this further period the Secretary General gave
notice of the withdrawal of UNYOM, since Saudi Arabia indicated it was
3not prepared to share the cost of extending the mission. He said that 
although developments in Yemen were far short of disengagement, the scale
of fighting had been reduced and conditions of temporary truce applied in 
4most areas. He added that in the course of his consultations with the 
parties:
I have made clear my own dissatisfaction with the mandate of 
UNYOM as now defined. That mandate, set forth in the disen­
gagement agreement, is so limiting and restrictive as to make 
it virtually impossible for UNYOM to play a really helpful 
and constructive role in Yemen.
Ibid. , para. 16.
2 Ibid., para. 19. During the first two months, there were internal 
differences over the conduct of the mission, General von Horn resigned 
and the Secretary General sent his military adviser to the area to 
inspect and assist the situation. Ibid. , paras. 9 and 10. See also 
Wenner, op. oit., pp.208-209; Schmidt, op. ait., pp.194-196.
S/5447, 28 October 1963, paras. 27 and 28.
4
Ibid. , para. 24.
5 Ibid., para. 29. UNYOM's functions were limited to observing, certi­
fying and reporting. The Secretary General noted that these functions 
were more restrictive than those of peacekeeping operations such as UNTSO, 
UNEF, UNMOGIP and UNOC (S/5412, para. 7). Tasks undertaken by these 
operations included truce supervision, arrangement of ceasefires, inter­
position between opposing forces, investigation of incidents and efforts 
to settle complaints, determination of troop strengths, control of 
civilians, and the maintenance of law and order (Wainhouse, op. oit., 
pp. 272 (UNTSO); 284 (UNEF); 367 (UNMOGIP), and 406 (UNOC).
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Nevertheless, he believed that a UN presence:
. . . would be most helpful and might even be indispensable 
to an early settlement of the Yemen problem which clearly 
is primarily political and will require a political solution.
The Secretary General stated, therefore, his intention to maintain a
civilian UN presence in the area, with terms of reference to be worked
2out with the parties concerned. He initially asked Spinelli to go to 
Yemen for a short period to establish the new civilian presence and to
appraise the situation for him. The Secretary General's message to
Spinelli said that the Yemen situation was potentially very dangerous
and went on to say:
I must therefore find a high level officer of great political 
acumen to head the new mission. I do not ask you to assume 
that responsibility, although you are ideally qualified by 
wisdom, experience and nationality. I would however, be 
greatly pleased if you would be willing to go to Yemen early 
in November for a very short period of three to four weeks 
to establish the new presence, have talks in Sana and Jeddah, 
and provide me with your analysis and appraisal of the 
situation and the possibilities for helpful UN action."^
The Secretary General added that he hoped the officer to be assigned to 
Yemen would be able to overlap with Spinelli for a week or so, and said
that it was a challenging but not very pleasant assignment. Spinelli
4replied the next day accepting the task.
S/5447, para. 31.
2 The small cost of such a presence would be met under a resolution 
of the General Assembly authorising the Secretary General to pay unfore­
seen and extraordinary expenses relating to the maintenance of peace and 
security (Resolution 1862, (xvii la), Tb^id. , para. 31).
3 Secretary General to Spinelli, 29 October 1963, unpublished.
4 Spinelli to Secretary General, 30 October 1963, unpublished.
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Unexpectedly, however, Saudi Arabia altered its position and on 31
October advised the Secretary General that it would continue to share the
cost of financing UNYOM for a further two months.1 The arrangements for
2a total withdrawal were cancelled. Bunche advised Spinelli that despite 
this 'unexpected development' the Secretary General would wish him to go 
to Yemen for a short period for the same purposes as those indicated in 
his earlier message. He stressed that it was the Secretary General's
3intention in any case to shift the emphasis to the political level.
Meanwhile it had been agreed previously that General Gyani, who had
taken over from von Horn, would return to his post as Commander of the
United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) in Gaza, and Spinelli was appointed
with the dual role as the head of UNYOM and special representative of the
4Secretary General. The military command functions were carried out by a 
5Chief-of-Staff. UNYOM was reduced in size considerably following a 
report from Gyani that the armed military reconnaissance unit comprising 
114 men could be withdrawn due to the co-operation of the authorities on 
both sides of the northern frontier, and the friendly attitude of the 
people in the area. The number of military observers was increased from
six to 21. _^________
■*" S/5447/Add. 1, 31 October 1963.
Ibid., para. 5.
Bunche to Spinelli, 31 October 1963, unpublished.
 ^ S/5501/Add.1, 10 January 1964, para. 4.
Until 25 November the Chief-of-Staff was Colonel Pavlovic, who had 
been deputy commander and twice acting commander ('ibid. ). After the with­
drawal of the Yugoslav military reconnaissance unit on 25 November, Colonel 
Chabhawarl was appointed Chief-of-Staff.
By 4 November all but four of the military observers had returned to 
their normal missions, while two Yugoslav reconnaissance units at Sana and 
Harad had already been withdrawn. One remaining Yugoslav detachment at 
Najran continued patrols while new observers were brought in, then withdrew 
on 25 November. After that date, UNYOM comprised a Headquarters staff in 
Sana, 21 military observers and a small air unit with two Caribou aircraft 
(S/5501, 2 January 1964, paras. 7 and 10).
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During the following months Spinelli undertook four separate political 
missions in the area, each lasting several weeks and involving intensive 
discussions with all three governments. Every two months until the follow­
ing September the Secretary General sought the agreement of Saudi Arabia 
and the UAR to share the costs for a further extension of UNYOM, on each 
occasion consulting the members of the Security Council and then proceed­
ing on the basis that none objected.^"
The first visit
Spinelli arrived in the area in late November, having met General
2Gyani in Geneva on 15 November. He spent two weeks in Yemen meeting with
the UAR command and Yemeni political leaders, before going to Jeddah and
Cairo. The Egyptian commander, General Montagy, who Spinelli described
as reticent, admitted that the traffic in arms and ammunition across the
border had lessened, but said that some military support was still
reaching the rebels either by little-known camel tracks or runs through
the desert east of the effective limit of UNYOM observation. He cited the
royalists' ability to still undertake active operations as evidence that
3they were continuing to receive aid.
Despite the increased number of military observers Spinelli noted 
in his report that their spread made it impossible to certify that no 
military aid was being provided. But he then identified a more fundamental 
difficulty. The Egyptian commander maintained that the disengagement
 ^ S/5501/Add.1, 10 January 1964; S/5572, 3 March 1963; S/5681, para.
10, 4 May 1964; S/5794, 2 July 1964, para. 4.
Spinelli, Report to Secretary General, 26 November 1963, unpublished.
3 Ibid. Schmidt gives several accounts of the various ways in which 
the supplies were sent, see Schmidt, op. oit., pp.67, 162.
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agreement called for Saudi Arabia to discontinue 'all aid and support', 
requiring in his view the cessation of all movement of goods across the 
frontier. Spinelli told General Montagy that in his interpretation the 
disengagement agreement did not require a blockade. He reported, however, 
that even if UNYOM were to be greatly extended, he doubted whether the UAR 
would agree to substantial withdrawals until the border traffic entirely 
ceased and the resistance in the north ended.^
Spinelli also pointed to the difficulties caused by Egyptian over­
flights of Saudi Arabian territory. The UAR Command said they were due to
navigational errors, but the number of such incidents decreased shortly 
2after.
President Sallal and his Foreign Minister were in Cairo, so Spinelli
met with First Vice President El Amry, who also maintained that the
Egyptian troops must remain as long as the republic was threatened. At
the same time he indicated that there was growing dissatisfaction with
the Egyptians, especially amongst the younger ministers who were irritated
by what they felt to be Egyptian interference and obstacles to development.
The government also felt discredited by the military activities of the
Egyptians, especially bombing of civilian targets. The Yemenis were not
masters of their own house and some members of the government felt that
the Egyptians intended to maintain control indefinitely and even welcomed
4the military stalemate as an excuse for staying.
Spinelli to Secretary General, 26 November 1963.
Ibid.
3 Bunche had anticipated such difficulties for the UAR in his report 
of 8 March, observing wryly that Egyptian troops were not the best 
ambassadors of goodwill and would regard the Yemenis as backward.
4 Spinelli to Secretary General, 26 November 1963.
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Spinelli commented that although impatience with the Egyptians was 
steadily increasing, the republican government was unlikely to take a 
strong stand on the question of Egyptian troops until the security issue 
had been settled. In the meantime, the government remained very responsive 
to Egyptian pressures. As one key leader put it, if the choice was between 
restoration of the Imam and unity with Egypt, he would prefer the latter.
Spinelli noted that UNYOM seemed to give a feeling of security and 
safety to the people in the border regions. Soon after the deployment of 
UNYOM units in the area, those who had left towns to escape aerial and 
artillery bombardment by the UAR returned to their homes and developed 
friendly relations with UNYOM units, which they credited with bringing an 
end to the Egyptian bombardment."*"
Spinelli had the impression that all the interested parties were for 
various reasons satisfied with UNYOM. The Egyptians felt that while 
surveillance was not complete, UNYOM limited military aid to the royalists 
along the main access roads. The local Saudi Arabian authorities in the 
border towns appreciated UNYOM's presence because it prevented the 
situation on the frontier from deteriorating. Yemeni politicians in Sana 
welcomed the presence of UNYOM. Finally, the royalists perhaps considered 
UNYOM's presence as an admission of their existence. Overall, he felt, 
the mission had exerted a certain pacifying effect on the situation in the 
frontier region.^
Spinelli advised the Secretary General that he was not optimistic
about an immediate solution, but in the long term he was not pessimistic.
He believed the presence of the UN could make an important contribution to
3ensuring the security and independence of Yemen.
1 
2
3
Ibid.
Ibid.
Spinelli, letter to Secretary General, 27 November 1963, unpublished.
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In Jeddah Spinelli met with the Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Saqqaf, and in Cairo he met with President Nasser and Foreign 
Minister Fawzi. Saqqaf asserted that the republican government had 
supported the UAR in a campaign of propaganda and subversion against 
Saudi Arabia aimed at the very existence of the kingdom. Nasser main­
tained that the UAR had been obliged to intervene in Yemen to support 
the republican government against foreign inspired attack.^ Neither 
the Saudi Arabians nor the Egyptians gave Spinelli cause to be any more 
optimistic about the prospects for an early settlement.
Bringing the parties together
A major concern for Spinelli as an intermediary was to find some way 
of getting the parties to talk to each other. In October the Secretary 
General had offered his good offices towards a meeting of the represent­
atives of Saudi Arabia and the UAR in New York, either by themselves, or
2 3in his presence. The UAR evidently accepted the proposal and the Saudi
Arabian Ambassador stated there was no obstacle to the Secretary General 
exploring the Yemen situation in the presence of the two permanent 
representatives. He advised a week later, however, that so far as direct 
bilateral talks were concerned, there was nothing to discuss between Saudi 
Arabia and the UAR with regard to Yemen, since the Saudi Arabian govern­
ment believed that the political differences of Yemen were for the Yemenis 
to decide.^_________
1 Spinelli, Report to Secretary General, 17 December 1963, unpublished.
2 Note on meeting of Secretary General and Bunche with Mr Rashad Phanom 
of the UAR and Ambassador Baroody of Saudi Arabia, 9 October 1963.
3 U Thant and Bunche met UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi and Ambassador Riad 
on the previous day, 8 October. It is not clear from the note of the meet­
ing whether the UAR actually accepted the Secretary General's offer at that 
time, but Spinelli later referred to the fact that the UAR had been prepared 
to enter into talks with Saudi Arabia.
4 Note of meeting between Ambassador Baroody and Secretary General with 
Bunche, 14 October 1963, unpublished.
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Spinelli felt that talks between all three governments would be best,
but they would be difficult to arrange. Nevertheless, he advised the
Secretary General he would explore the possibilities.'*' The United States
Charge in Sana informed Spinelli that he had, with the approval of his
government, suggested bilateral talks between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and
that a similar proposal had been put to the Saudi Arabian government.
Spinelli received confirmation in Sana that such talks would be acceptable
to the Yemen government, provided they were held on neutral ground, but
2Saqqaf rejected the proposal. The latter stated, however, that the best
way to solve the Yemen question was to solve the general question of
relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. Shortly after, in Cairo,
Spinelli received confirmation from Fawzi that the UAR's offer to meet
3Saudi Arabia was still current. In his report to Security Council members 
on 2 January 1964, the Secretary General observed that:
My Special Representative in Yemen has held extensive 
discussions with the members of the three governments concerned.
These discussions have been of an exploratory character with a 
view to ascertaining whether there were areas of agreement 
between the parties which might, through bilateral discussions 
or otherwise, lead to further progress towards disengagement 
and towards a peaceful situation in Yemen. I do not wish to 
prejudice the results of these efforts, except to state that 
they have started in an encouraging manner, and that I intend to 
have them pursued. I believe also that the government con­
cerned are anxious that they should continue.^
Spinelli to Secretary General, 26 November 1963. 
Spinelli to Secretary General, 17 December 1963.
Ibid.
4 S/5501, para. 23.
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The Arab League
Meanwhile strong pressures were being mounted within the Arab world
itself aimed at overcoming the hostility between the UAR and Saudi Arabia.
In January, in a major move for reconciliation on a number of issues
dividing the Arab world, the Arab leaders held a summit meeting in Cairo.
Kerr comments that 'one of the major results of the Cairo summit was the
resumption of Saudi-Egyptian cordiality and the initiation of a serious
effort to negotiate a compromise settlement in Yemen.'"*' The governments
of Algeria and Iraq were appointed as mediators who would try to settle
the dispute between the UAR and Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Arab
countries. These moves followed visits by the Secretary General of the
Arab League to Geneva and New York in early November, where he met with
2Spinelli and Thant respectively.
When Spinelli made his second visit to the area in February 1964, 
Nasser and Fawzi reiterated the readiness of the UAR government to hold
3discussions with Saudi Arabian representatives at any level. The 
stumbling block to direct discussions remained the official attitude of 
the Saudi Arabian government, and Spinelli's report of his discussion 
with Faisal gives a fascinating insight into the UN mediator calling on 
all his diplomatic skill and experience in his encounter with the shrewd 
and proud Crown Prince.
Faisal began by maintaining his position that the Yemeni people 
should decide their future without foreign interference and it was there­
fore inappropriate for the question to be discussed between his government 
and the UAR. Nevertheless, he said that he was cautiously pleased with
"*" Kerr, op. Git., p.101.
2 Spinelli, in Geneva, to Secretary General, 9 November 1963, 
unpublished.
3 Spinelli, Report to Secretary General, 5 February 1964, unpublished.
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the improved climate resulting from the Arab summit, and agreed with 
Spinelli's suggestion that it might be possible for the UAR and Saudi 
Arabia by some arrangement to facilitate a solution by the Yemeni people. 
But Faisal said he would be reluctant to enter into discussions without 
some form of proposal being placed before him. Spinelli replied that in 
his opinion an arrangement based on direct negotiations would be much 
sounder and more durable. Faisal expressed difficulty in undertaking 
direct negotiations while UAR troops were present in Yemen in large 
numbers, but spoke favourably of the possibilities for negotiations to 
begin through a mediator.'*'
Spinelli was to continue his discussions with Faisal on the following
day but by then the Algerian/Iraqi mission sent by the Arab League had
arrived, and it was decided that further duscussions should be suspended
2until the results of that mission were known.
UAR and Saudi Arabia negotiations
As a direct result of the Arab League mission, assisted by Spinelli's 
representations on behalf of the Secretary General, the UAR and Saudi 
arabia announced the holding of high level discussions in Riyadh to 
negotiate the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two govern­
ments. Spinelli observed that the Riyadh meeting might lead to some 
progress on the Yemen question, pointing out that fundamentally lasting 
diplomatic relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia would be impossible 
without agreement on this matter. There would be heavy diplomatic pressure 
on Saudi Arabia from the Arab States to settle this one remaining rift in
Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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INTERNAL AFFAIRS
When Spinelli visited Yemen for the second time in February 1964 he 
found it necessary to engage more directly than before in the discussion 
of substantive issues in which the distinction between internal and 
external aspects became less and less apparent. In particular, his talks 
both within Yemen and with the governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAR 
became concerned with moves to broaden the composition of the government 
of Yemen. Spinelli's talks on this matter followed several months of 
quiet 'sounding out' by the Secretary General and Bunche in New York, and 
Spinelli himself in his earlier mission.
To understand how the UN Secretariat became involved in what appeared 
on the surface to be purely domestic questions, it is necessary to look 
back to the time when the Yemen situation first emerged as a matter of 
international concern. In fact, the link between internal and external 
questions had been a significant background factor all along.
The question of recognition
To begin with there was the question of whom the UN should negotiate 
with in Yemen. Bunche noted that there were not 'two sides' from the UN 
standpoint in Yemen, as the UN had accepted the credentials of the 
republican government and that was therefore the only legal government. ■*" 
This view was confirmed by the Director of the General Legal Division who 
noted that in accepting the credentials of the Yemen Arab Republic, the 
General Assembly had therefore rejected in effect the credentials issued 
by the Kingdom of Yemen. Although member states of the UN were divided 
on the question of recognition, the Secretary General, he advised, was 
bound by the decision of the General Assembly. Therefore the Secretary
1 Bunche, Report on Visit to Yemen.
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Nasser and Faisal finally took place about a month later at the September 
1964 Arab Summit in Alexandria.^
By mid 1964 the aim of bringing about direct negotiations between
the two external parties had been achieved, and diplomatic relations
between the UAR and Saudi Arabia had been re-established. The interventions
of the Arab League following discussions with the Secretary General in
November, and Spinelli's missions on the Secretary General's behalf,
appeared to have had, at the very least, a significant catalytic effect 
2on the parties. Until April 1964, UNYOM had played an important backup 
to Spinelli's political role by diminishing the likelihood of incidents 
that might have wrecked the significant diplomatic moves at the Riyadh 
conference. The major disappointment was the recurrence of fighting, first 
in January, then in April, and the failure of moves for an early meeting 
between Nasser and Faisal. The outbreaks of fighting were due not only to 
the manoeuvres of the external parties but also to the changing fortunes 
of the main parties in the civil war within Yemen. It is therefore worth­
while examining more closely the situation within Yemen, and in particular 
the way in which internal affairs influenced the course of the inter­
national dispute and the role played by the Secretariat.
Introduction to 1964 Annual Report, A/8501/Add.1, 20 November 1964, 
p .8; Kerr, op. cit., p.106.
2 Schmidt credits Spinelli with laying the groundwork for the beginning 
of serious negotiations during his 'intense round of visits between Riyadh, 
Cairo and Sana' (Schmidt, op. cit., p.206). Wenner, on the other hand, 
overlooks Spinelli's role, and also the importance of the re-establishment 
of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
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Discussions would continue at a meeting between President Nasser and 
Prince Faisal in Cairo at the end of April.“*"
The delayed Nasser-Faisal meeting
The Secretary General reported on 4 May 1964 that he had endeavoured
to encourage the parties towards a meeting of the two leaders, but the
2date had not yet been announced. Meanwhile, far from avoiding incidents
on the frontier, it appeared that Nasser attempted to strengthen his
bargaining position. In April he visited Yemen personally, and the
Egyptian forces mounted a major attack on the royalists in their northern
strongholds, with air raids on supply lines between Saudi Arabia and the
Yemeni mountains. Imam A1 Badr was forced to flee from his headquarters,
3but the royalists were able to maintain their harrassment.
The meeting was not held during the next two months and the 
Secretary General stated more categorically in his July report that:
I am now even more strongly of the view that real progress can 
be hoped for only through such high level discussions . . . 
between Crown Prince Faisal and President Nasser.^
Four months later, the meeting had still not taken place and the Secretary 
General reported there was no certainty that it would.^ However he 
repeated his call, adding that he was, as always, 'at the disposal of the 
parties in the search for a peaceful solution'. The meeting between
S/5681, para. 8.
Ibid.
3 Halliday, op. cit., p.lll; Schmidt, op. oit., pp.177-178; Wenner, op. 
cit., p.212.
4 S/5794, para. 7.
5 S/5927, 2 September 1964, para. 9.
Ibid. , para. 15.
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Spinelli recommended that the term of UNYOM should again be extended,
as otherwise incidents on the frontier were bound to make an eventual
agreement between the UAR and Saudi Arabia more difficult.“*" In this
sense the UN field operation, small though it was, was performing a
limited role of preventive diplomacy. That is, its presence for a time
gave some assurance to each side against actions by the other. Although
incomplete, such assurances helped to deter incidents in the field which
the Secretariat felt would jeopardise the diplomatic efforts in the capitals.
Accordingly the Secretary General consulted the parties and having obtained
their agreement, advised members of the Security Council on 3 March 1964
that he intended to extend the mission.^
The Secretary General also expressed the hope that the high level
meeting at Riyadh would result in some progress towards disengagement
and towards an understanding between the two governments to co-operate in
promoting political progress and stability in Yemen. In so doing he chose
to move out a little from the framework of quiet diplomacy and give public
approval to the Riyadh meeting, at the same time exhorting the parties to
3use this opportunity to settle the question of Yemen.
The communique issued by the two governments at the conclusion of the 
Riyadh discussions announced that there had been considerable progress on 
a number of problems, in particular the problem of Yemen. The two govern­
ments declared that they had no ambitions in Yemen and unreservedly 
supported the independence of that country and the freedom of its people.
1 Ibid.
S/5572.
3 Ibid.
82
A rab u n i t y ,  w h ile  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  w ould  be re a d y  to  in te r v e n e  d i s c r e e t l y  
i n  th e  same sense .'* '
D e s p i te  th e s e  p r e s s u r e s ,  h o w ev er, a d o u b t rem a in ed  in  S p i n e l l i ' s  mind
a s  to  w h e th e r  th e  S a u d i A ra b ia n  a u t h o r i t i e s  w ere  re a d y  to  e n t e r  i n t o  r e a l
2
d i s c u s s io n s  o f  th e  m a t t e r .  The r o y a l i s t s  w ere o b v io u s ly  g e t t i n g  s u p p o r t
from  somewhere as  th e y  w ere  s t i l l  a b le  to  u n d e r ta k e  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s .
W hile  t h e r e  was no lo n g e r  o f f i c i a l  S a u d i A ra b ia n  a s s i s t a n c e ,  s u p p l i e s  w ere
3
s t i l l  o b v io u s ly  g e t t i n g  th ro u g h . A c o m p lic a t in g  f a c t o r  in  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
was th e  r e s u rg e n c e  o f  r o y a l i s t  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t y  i n  J a n u a r y ,  when th e y  had  
su c c e e d e d  i n  c u t t i n g  th e  m ain  S a n a -H o d e id a  ro a d  f o r  a  w eek. The S au d i 
A ra b ia n s  w ere  i n  a  s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  s in c e  no d i r e c t  l i n k  w ith  th e  r o y a l i s t  
s u p p l i e s  c o u ld  be p ro v e d , y e t  th e  c o n tin u e d  r o y a l i s t  h a r r a s s m e n t  in  Yemen 
was ty in g  down a l a r g e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  UAR army and  p ro v in g  to  b e  a con­
s i d e r a b l e  em b a rra ssm e n t t o  N a s s e r .  He a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  F a i s a l  had  to  be
c a r e f u l  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  h i s  own ' e l e c t o r a t e ' ,  th e  many p r in c e s  o f
4r o y a l  b lo o d  who w ere e m o t io n a l ly  a t t a c h e d  to  th e  r o y a l i s t  c a u s e .
S p i n e l l i  recommended t h a t  th e  UN s h o u ld  a llo w  th e  A rab e f f o r t s  a t  
c o n c i l i a t i o n  and m e d ia tio n  to  ru n  t h e i r  c o u r s e ,  and  hope t h a t  th e y  w ould 
s u c c e e d . He a d v is e d  t h a t  he  p la n n e d  to  r e t u r n  w i th in  a b o u t  a m onth and 
s u g g e s te d  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  was no p r o g r e s s  by t h a t  t im e ,  more d i r e c t  a c t s  o f  
m e d ia tio n  by th e  UN m ig h t be  c a l l e d  f o r .  He s a id  in  t h a t  e v e n t u a l i t y  he 
h ad  some id e a s  to  d i s c u s s  w i th  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l .5
1 Ib id .
2 S p i n e l l i ,  R e p o r t to  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l ,  22 F e b ru a ry  1964 , u n p u b l is h e d .
3 Ib id .
4
I b id . The p r e v io u s  y e a r  F a i s a l  h ad  r e p la c e d  Saud a s  E x e c u tiv e  Head 
o f  g o v e rn m en t, and  i n  O c to b e r  1964 he  o u s te d  Saud a l t o g e t h e r  and becam e 
K in g .
5 Ib id ,
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General and his representatives should, as a general rule, refrain from 
entering into any relationship with a competing government or authority.
Only in exceptional circumstances would the Secretary General or his 
representatives deal with authorities not recognised by the UN.”'-
Related to this was the question of the stability of the Sallal govern­
ment. Instability could well lead to the 'exceptional circumstances' which 
might require the Secretariat to deal with non-recognised authorities. The 
stability of the government was also an important factor influencing the 
actions and positions of the two external parties, Saudi Arabia and the UAR.
It was therefore necessary for the Secretariat to make its own assessment 
of the situation. At the same time, such assessment had of necessity to 
remain within the Secretariat, with the sole function of informing the 
Secretary General and his staff of possible eventualities. For it to 
become public while negotiations were in progress would clearly have been 
prejudicial. In the confidential report of his fact-finding mission,
Bunche noted that quite apart from the legal aspects referred to above,
'the government of the republic, so far as I could ascertain, is the only 
government seeking to do any governing in the country'.2 He reported 
that the practically universal view in Taiz and Sana among unofficial as 
well as official sources was that the royalists could continue to harrass, 
but had no chance of regaining power. He judged that the government was
reasonably confident, but was frightened by the tribesmen, many of whom
3had never been controlled by any Yemen government.
0. Schächter, Director of General Legal Division, unpublished memoran­
dum to Secretary General, 'Legal position in regard to the Secretary 
General's relations to opposition forces in Yemen', 8 March 1963. Schächter 
noted that exceptions had been made on the basis of resolutions of competent 
organs, e.g., Res. 906, XX, re prisoners in China. It also followed, he said, 
that the Secretary General or representatives might find it necessary to 
communicate with non-recognised authorities when acting within the scope of 
his authority under Article 99. For a criticism of the approach taken in 
Yemen see Schmidt, op. oit., p.190.
2 Bunche, Report on Visit to Yemen.
3 Ibid.
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The republican threat to neighbouring dynasties
The key linkage between internal and external questions was estab­
lished by Bunche in a comment that the successful republican revolution 
had raised danger signals for the royal rulers of Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan. They were, he said, helping the Yemen royal family in order to 
protect themselves
Sallal told Bunche in March 1963 that Yemen had deliberately
refrained from interfering in Saudi Arabia's internal affairs. His
government had not permitted activities from Yemen against the present
Saudi Arabian regime by those princes who opposed Faisal. He also
offered a firm guarantee of no interference in neighbouring countries as
2part of an overall settlement. But such statements and assurances were 
not sufficient to allay the fears of neighbouring dynasties. The fact 
that a republican revolution had succeeded was itself a threat one 
which was reinforced by the presence of Egyptian troops and Nasser's 
reassertion of revolutionary goals throughout the Arab world.
Formation of a broader government
In his meeting with the UAR Foreign Minister, Fawzi, on 8 October 
1963 the Secretary General proposed the formation of a coalition govern­
ment in Yemen. Fawzi replied that a broader-based government in Yemen
3could not include members of the royal family.
Despite this qualified response from the Egyptians, the proposal 
had considerable potential for easing the overall situation. Internally
1 Ibid.
Ibid.
3 Note of meeting, Secretary General with Foreign Minister Fawzi,
8 October 1963, unpublished.
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a coalition government would strengthen stability, which by then was 
becoming a cause for concern because of domestic political differences. 
Externally, it would make intervention on the side of the rebels more 
difficult, the threat perceived by neighbouring regimes from the original 
revolutionary government would be diminished, and it would pave the way 
for significant withdrawals of Egyptian troops by being less reliant on 
their support.
By November the domestic political situation within Yemen, aggravated 
in particular by the prolonged absences of Sallal and some of his senior 
ministers from the country, led to moves within Yemen itself for a broader 
government. Ambassador Al Aini described a plan for a new government to 
the Secretary General, together with Bunche and Spinelli, on the day the 
latter was appointed to head UNYOM.'*' He described the plan as his own, 
and said that Al Sallal would oppose it. He also told the UN Secretariat 
of growing opposition amongst Yemenis to the UAR troops, who gave advice 
and ran everything, he said. Yemenis were tired of the occupation, and 
he commented that if the Saudi Arabian authorities were wise they would 
assure Yemen's security and this would be the surest way to get rid of 
the Egyptian troops.
A week later Al Aini urged the Secretary General to assist the 
Yemenis towards achieving a political situation. He stated that the UN 
was the only important body that could play such a role, and that all 
Arab states agreed on this kind of approach. It would, he said, be 
difficult for Cairo to oppose a solution backed by the UN. He went so 
far as to press the UN to help the Yemen government administer the 
country.^
Note of meeting, 4 November 1963, unpublished.
Note of meeting, 12 November 1963, unpublished.2
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Thus as the political vacuum became more apparent in the country,
pressures similar to those experienced by the UN in the Congo became
stronger. It should be noted that Al Aini, who had briefly been Foreign
Minister after the revolution, was a leader of the Ba'athist group within
the government and was therefore inclined to be anti-Nasser.^ At this
time a broadly based 'third force' was beginning to emerge within Yemen.
It was nationalistic and opposed to both the Egyptian influence over
Sallal's government, and the traditional Imamate. The 'third force'
formed the government (with Al Aini briefly as Prime Minister) when the
2Egyptians eventually withdrew in 1967.
When Spinelli first arrived in Yemen at the end of November 1963, 
conversations with people on-the-spot confirmed AI Aini's report of 
Yemeni attitudes towards the UAR troops. The government had been 
broadened somewhat to include representatives of important tribal groups 
and intellectuals. A mission had been sent to Egypt to persuade Nasser 
that an even more broadly based government, less dependent on Egyptian 
support, should be established. In his report, Spinelli indicated that 
he had given discreet encouragement to such moves, at the same time 
treading very carefully on domestic ground.
While emphasising that it is no business of the UN to be 
concerned with internal politics, I have at times expressed 
the opinion that if the government were broadened the 
possibility of a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and a 
solution of the Yemen problem would be increased.^
He also raised the possibility of an approach by the UN to the Egyptians
pointing out that it would be in their interests to accept a broader
Since April 1963 relations between Nasser and the Ba'athists in Syria 
and Iraq had broken down completely with mutual recriminations and con­
demnations (Kerr, op. ci-t. , pp.89-92) .
2 Halliday, op. cit., p.120; Wenner, op. cit., p.196; Schmidt, op. 
oi,t. , p . 231.
3 Spinelli to Secretary General, 26 November 1963.
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based government. When Spinelli met Nasser in Cairo at the beginning of
February, the UAR President agreed that the government could be strengthened
by new elements from outside republican circles, provided the republican
2form of government was respected. Spinelli had the clear impression that
the Yemen operation was rather unpopular in Egypt and the UAR was eager to
3find a formula for withdrawal without loss of face.
On 10 February a reorganisation of the Yemen government was announced,
together with the formation of a popular organisation called the 'Yemeni
4Progressive Union' aimed at winning more popular support. Later in
February Spinelli wrote, however, that the reorganisation provided no great
additional strength. He reported that during his conversations with the
UAR and Saudi Arabia he had always emphasised that a real disengagement and
a political solution in Yemen could only result from an agreement reached
by the external parties to promote the formation of a government of
5national unity in Yemen which could be friendly to both of them.
It is worth noting that external support enabled the respective 
factions within Yemen to maintain their positions. It also rendered those 
factions more susceptible to pressures for compromise should the external 
parties become so disposed. But while Nasser was prepared to discuss 
these matters with Saudi Arabia, Faisal was in the stronger position and 
was not helpful, particularly as discussions were unlikely to lead to the 
re-establishment of the royalists. He was under little pressure within 
his own country to participate in an agreement on the internal affairs of
1 Ibid.
2 Spinelli to Secretary General, 5 February 1964.
3 Ibid.
4 Spinelli to Secretary General, 12 February 1964, unpublished.
5 Spinelli to Secretary General, 22 February 1964, unpublished.
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Yemen, and he was able with equanimity to maintain the stance of insisting 
that the Yemeni people should determine their own form of government 
following the withdrawal of UAR troops."*"
During Spinelli's third visit in April 1964 Faisal stuck to this 
position, although with the improvement in relations with the UAR, he said 
magnanimously that he was ready to help the UAR out of a difficult pos­
ition, and he also wished to assist Spinelli. However, he said, it would 
be contrary to his sense of honour and fairness to bring pressure on the 
Imam and the royal family to withdraw from Yemen, even though this was 
the basic requirement put forward by the UAR for withdrawal of its troops.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia could not be expected to recognise a government 
2headed by Sallal.
In May a government of broader composition was finally formed under 
General Hannand Jaifa as Prime Minister. The Secretary General stated 
that the new government gave promise of an improvement in the political 
stability and independence of the country, and had assured him of its 
desire for good and peaceful relations with all of its Yemen neighbours.3 
Although the new government did not come to an accommodation with the 
royalists leaders and the military stalemate continued, its formation 
seemed to hold out the prospect of greater internal stability within 
Yemen than before. In turn this prospect for a time eased the threat to 
international peace.
Spinelli's intermediary role of discreetly encouraging developments 
which seemed likely to bring the parties together brought him into 
closer contact with internal issues. Nevertheless, it is to be noted
1 Ibid.
2 Spinelli to Secretary General, 18 April 1964, unpublished.
3 S/5794, para. 5.
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that his involvement arose directly from the 'aspects of . . . external 
origin' referred to in the Secretary General's first report,"*" and 
incorporated within the Security Council resolution. The linkage between 
internal and external aspects was inherent in the situation, at the same 
time adding to its complexity and to the difficulty of finding a solution.
THE QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT
The Secretariat's efforts to get the external parties talking to
each other gradually bore fruit, as did its discreet representations on
the question of a government of broader composition. But little headway
was achieved on the key substantive issue of implementation by the parties
of the agreed terms of disengagement. Saudi Arabia insisted that it had
carried out its obligations, while the UAR maintained that the royalists
were still receiving supplies. UNYOM checks on commercial traffic across
the border, made with the full assistance of Saudi Arabian authorities,
revealed no military supplies at all. However, the aerial reconnaissance
2unit had sighted vehicle tracks across the desert in the east.
During Spinelli's second visit in February the UAR command told him
that its intelligence pointed to the Beihan protectorate as the main route
for supplies to the royalists. Spinelli reported that the UAR command
believed that arms were still supplied by Saudi Arabia, but by a roundabout
3route with British connivance. He commented that UNYOM had no direct
evidence for such a claim, although supplies were obviously still reaching
4the royalists and Beihan seemed the most likely route. Britain's
1 S/5298.
2 S/5501, para. 11.
3 Spinelli to Secretary General, 22 February 1964.
 ^ Ibid. See also Schmidt, op. oit., p.263.
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carefully worded reply to Iraq's accusations on this matter in the 
Security Council fell short of a categorical denial.1 Halliday maintains 
that Britain, and also France, provided aid 'through an operation in which 
they "turned a blind eye" to the activity of supposedly private entre­
preneurs',2 while Schmidt details the activities of British and French
3mercenaries and comments on assistance organised by Neil McLean, a
4British MP.
If, as seems likely, these claims were true, British co-operation 
following the Bunche mission might have closed off such a channel. At 
the very least, such co-operation would have weakened the UAR case for 
retaining its troops, and would have given the UN and Arab League 
negotiators additional leverage. But British co-operation was not forth­
coming and this was one more element adding to the difficulty of resolv­
ing the situation.
At the end of March 1964, the situation was further aggravated by a 
fresh series of incidents between the British and the Yemenis in the 
south. The Security Council met to consider a complaint from Yemen over 
a British reprisal raid on the police station in Harib. The Council 
adopted a resolution condemning reprisals, deploring the British military
action and all attacks and incidents which had occurred in the area and
5calling upon Yemen and the United Kingdom to exercise restraint.
S/PV1107, 3 April 1964, para. 8. See also statements by Iraq 
(S/PV1106, 2 April 1964, paras. 70-71; S/PV1108, 6 April 1964, paras. 103- 
104) and the Soviet Union (S/PV1106, para. 90); also The Times, London,
5 April 1964.
2 Halliday, op. eit., p.146.
3 Schmidt, op. czt., p.217.
4 Ibid. , p.191.
5 Later in 1964, further incidents occurred on the Yemen-Beihan border.
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The Council also requested the Secretary General to use his good offices 
to try to settle outstanding issues.^
TERMINATION OF UNYOM
When Spinelli visited the area for the third time in April 1954,
overall relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia had improved, but little
had changed in their respective positions on implementation of the
disengagement agreement. Shortly afterwards Spinelli was forced to rest
2for several months due to ill health.
During July and August 1964, following the formation of the new 
government of broader composition and an improvement in the military
3situation, UNYOM noted substantial reductions in the number of UAR troops.
The UN Secretariat had, however, hoped for a breakthrough arising out of
the proposed meeting between Faisal and Nasser which was first scheduled
for the end of April. When the meeting did not take place till later in
1964, the prospects for early settlement receded.
In July 1964 the Secretary General, apparently believing the
observation mission would serve little useful purpose in tackling the
underlying problem, gave notice in his bimonthly report that if there was
no prompt progress in fulfilment of the disengagement agreement he could
not envisage an extension of UNYOM in its existing form. He stated that
he was reluctant to extend the mission even beyond 4 July, but did so to
4provide a further opportunity for negotiation. The mission had already
S/5649, adopted 9 April 1964. There were a number of favourable 
comments about the value of such a role. S/PV1108, para. 72 (Adlai 
Stevenson, US); S/PV1110, 8 April 1964, para. 47 (Morocco); S/PVllll,
9 April 1964, para. 14 (China) and para. 35 (UK).
2 Spinelli to Bunche, 14 May 1964 and 16 June 1964, unpublished.
3 S/5927, para. 8.
4 S/5794, paras. 7-8.
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continued far longer than his original estimate of 'three or four months
at the most'.'*’ Spinelli wrote that he shared the UN headquarters' view
that there was no chance of a settlement while the UAR and Saudi Arabia
were not inclined to make serious attempts to implement the terms of the
agreement. He recommended the continuation of a small UN presence in Sana
2with liaison officers in Jeddah and Cairo.
In August 1964 Spinelli visited the area for the fourth time, after
which he went directly to New York for discussions with the Secretary
3General and Bunche. On 19 August the Secretary General sent identical
notes to the UAR and Saudi Arabia asking them to inform him of their
4wishes with regard to the termination or extension of UNYOM. Saudi
Arabia replied that it had carried out its responsibilities genuinely and
honestly, but the other party had not, and Saudi Arabia would therefore
5withdraw from the agreement. The Saudi Arabian government expressed its
gratitude and appreciation of the Secretary General's good offices and
unceasing goodwill. The UAR informed the Secretary General orally that
it did not object to termination of the mission,^ and UNYOM was terminated
7by the Secretary General on 4 September 1964. In so doing Thant stated 
that:
S/5298, para. 5.
2 Spinelli to Bunche, 3 July 1964, unpublished.
3 Spinelli to Headquarters, 7 August 1964, unpublished. On this 
occasion Spinelli apparently did not send written reports.
4 S/5927, para. 10 and annex 1.
5 Ibid. , para. 11 and annex 2.
6 Ibid.
1 Ibid. , para. 12.
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It is a matter of regret to me that the Mission has been able 
to observe only limited progress towards the implementation 
of the disengagement agreement.'*'
But he then went on to say that:
My regret, however, is tempered by reason of the fact that the 
potential threat to international peace and security represented 
by the Yemen question has greatly diminished during the exist­
ence of the Mission and, I believe, to a considerable extent due 
to its activities.^
EFFECTS OF INTERMEDIARY ACTIVITY: SUMMARY
In September 1964, the outcome after two years of intermediary 
activity by the UN Secretariat was a stalemate which, while unsatisfactory, 
was considerably less dangerous in terms of a threat to international 
peace than the situation at the end of 1962. In summarising the effects 
of the UN Secretariat's role of good offices and mediation, it should be 
reiterated that this temporary outcome resulted from a complex of 
political pressures, both internal and external, on each of the three 
governments most directly concerned. It may reasonably be asserted,
2however, that the actions of the UN Secretariat had the following effects:“
1. The presence of the UN Secretariat, through the discussions in the 
Secretary General's office in New York and the on-the-spot missions under­
taken by Bunche and Spinelli, had a moderating effect on the behaviour of 
the principals. Each party felt the need to justify its position, and in 
order to do so, avoided rash or precipitate action. In October 1962 the 
Egyptians dropped arms and ammunition apparently intended for rebel groups
Ibid. , para. 13.
Ibid.
3 Based on the list suggested by Oran Young's analysis of third party 
functions (see Chapter II, pp.49-51).
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inside Saudi Arabia. But once international attention was directed to the 
area the UAR no longer undertook such provocative action.
2. The UN Secretariat provided a means for justifying concessions. Nasser 
ordered his forces to cease raids across the Saudi Arabian border, in order 
to assist the Bunche mission as well as the Bunker mission undertaken by the 
United States. Faisal said he wanted to help Spinelli's mission when he 
indicated a softer line towards the UAR in April 1964.
3. The UN Secretariat provided external approval for moves towards
bilateral discussions between the UAR and Saudi A r a b i a a n d  to other moves
for the establishment of a more broadly representative government in Yemen.
The Secretary General increasingly spoke out on the reluctance of the
parties to implement the agreed terms of engagement, thus exercising a form
2of external disapproval although with little effect on the parties. During 
his first mission Spinelli was able to bring pressure on the Egyptians to 
cease overflights of Saudi Arabian territory.
4. A function of UNYOM was to clear up misunderstandings between the
parties and correct misleading information which tended to aggravate the
situation. In the words of the Secretary General, UNYOM was an endorser
of good faith between the parties. Thus at the end of October 1963 UNYOM
was able to report the cessation of Saudi Arabian military assistance
3across the northern frontier, and the cessation of UAR air attacks over
4Saudi Arabia and the demilitarised zone. In so doing it reduced the level 
of accusation and counter-accusation both within Yemen and in the two
S/5681, para. 8.
2 S/5412, para. 20. 
3
4
S/5447, para. 17. 
Ibid., para. 22.
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opposing Arab countries. It is worth noting that by the time of the 
General Assembly debate in September and October 1963, both the UAR and 
Saudi Arabia exercised great restraint in their statements on the 
situation.^" On the political side, Spinelli attempted to clear up some 
misunderstandings with the Egyptians arising out of conflicting inter­
pretations of the disengagement agreement.
5. The Secretary General and Bunche dramatised the danger of failure 
during the early stages of UN involvement, in particular when the Secretary 
General addressed the Security Council. Spinelli's later experiences with 
Faisal when the main danger period had passed illustrated Oran Young's 
point that a dispute is difficult to resolve when one or both of the 
parties believes that there are no substantial risks to them in a failure 
to reach agreement.
6. The visits by Bunche and Spinelli to the various capitals, and the 
discussions in New York, established channels of communication at a time 
when the Saudi Arabian government refused to communicate directly with the 
UAR or Yemen governments. Other channels of communication existed through 
diplomatic missions of countries which had relations with all three 
governments, in particular the United States, and most importantly, through 
the Arab League.
7. The Secretariat was able to emphasise a key focal point which was 
likely to help in resolving the conflict, by stressing the desirability 
of establishing a more broadly representative government within Yemen.
8. The Secretariat applied continual pressure for a procedural break­
through by strongly supporting the Arab League mediators in their attempts
Saudi Arabia, A/PV1235, 26 September 1963, paras. 87-89; UAR, 
A/PV1236, 10 October 1963, para. 70.
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to bring about meetings between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. The meeting 
held in Riyadh in March 1964 resulted in the resumption of diplomatic 
relations between them. This success was marred by the long delay in 
arranging a meeting between Faisal and Nasser.
9. Although the UN was credited by a number of delegations with 
initiating the formula contained in the agreed terms of disengagement, 
this was actually the result of mediation by Ellsworth Bunker. Thus in 
this sense the UN acted more as a means for justifying flexible behaviour, 
particularly by the Soviet Union, than as the actual initiator of a face­
saving arrangement. The Secretary General later made clear his dissatis­
faction with the limited conditions imposed on UNYOM by the agreement.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
At the September 1964 summit in Alexandria Nasser and Faisal issued
a joint appeal for a coalition government in Yemen, and the next month
royalists and republicans met at Erkwit in the Sudan.^ A ceasefire was
announced and a national congress planned, but fighting broke out again
2and over the next ten months the royalists made large gains. In August 
1965 Nasser met Faisal in Jeddah, and they reached a further peace agree­
ment, which in turn broke down when the Yemeni factions could not settle
3their differences.
The war imposed a great economic burden on the UAR, and over 15,000
4troops were reported to have been killed up to June 1964, but Egyptian
Schmidt, op. oit., p.205; Wenner, op. oit., pp.214-215; Halliday, 
op. oit., p.lll.
2 Ibid. , and Serjeant, op. oit., pp.340-341.
3
Ibid., Halliday, op. oit., p.113; Kerr, op. oit., p.106.
 ^ Schmidt, op. oit., p.234; Halliday, op. oit., p.lll.
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troops were not withdrawn completely until after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to subsidise the shattered 
Egyptian and Jordanian economies.'*' The republic in Yemen survived after 
several more changes of government and was finally recognised by Saudi 
Arabia in 1970.^
CONCLUSION
The Yemen dispute occurred at a time when the forces of republicanism 
in the Arab world were assertive and threatening to traditional monarchies 
in the region. The successful republican revolution in Yemen in September 
1962 was accompanied by immediate support from external parties with their 
own interests to promote and protect. The situation was complex, 
reflecting both the twists and turns of inter-Arab relations and the 
ambiguity of tribal and factional politics within Yemen.
The British complicated the situation with a pro-royalist approach 
consistent with their traditional policy in the near east since the nine­
teenth century. Their prime concern was to protect their position in 
Aden. The United States had less difficulty in dealing with the republican 
regimes of Nasser and Sallal. Its preeminent concern was to maintain 
stability and avoid a widening of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and 
the UAR which might eventually involve itself and the Soviet Union.
During the two years following the revolution, the UN's presence, both 
through UNYOM and through the continual role of good offices exercised by 
the Secretary General, Bunche and Spinelli was a significant factor in 
diminishing the dangers of the situation. At the same time, the 
Secretariat was able to play a discreet role in facilitating the efforts
"*■ Kerr, op. cit., p.139.
Ibid., p.130.
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of the Arab League and other countries such as the United States. In 
this sense the Secretariat acted, not as a separate entity, but in the 
words of Article 1(4) of the Charter, as 'a centre for harmonising the 
actions of nations 1. More than anything else UNYOM and the Secretariat 
provided time which enabled the international situation to be eased.
The Secretariat did not achieve a resounding success with Yemen, but 
it helped to contain a serious threat to international peace.
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CHAPTER IV
CAST STUDY TWO: BAHRAIN, 1969 AND 1970
INTRODUCTION
Some 300 years ago Bahrain was part of the Persian empire, although
it was subjected to frequent disputes involving Persians and Arab sheiks
of the Gulf littoral.'*' The founder of the Al Khalifa family and
ancestor of the present ruler signed a series of treaties with the British,
and from 1820 onwards Bahrain was an Arab sheikdom with the status of a
protected British territory. Nevertheless Persia maintained its claim to
the island, and in 1928 brought the issue to the attention of the League 
2of Nations. In 1948 a unanimous vote of the Parliament directed the
Government to 'take effective measures with a view towards implementing
3Persia's sovereignty' over Bahrain, and strong public feelings over the
Husain M. Albaharna, The Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and
Political Status and Their International Problems (2nd rev. ed.)
(Librairie du Liban, Beirut, 1975) p.167; Kuwait, a monthly bulletin, Vol. 6, 
No.II, June 1970.
2 For the respective positions of the Persian and British Governments, 
see, for example, letter to the Secretary General of the League of 
Nations from the then Persian Government on 2 August 1928 (Official records 
of the League of Kations September 1928, pp.1360-1363), and from the British 
Government on 18 February 1929 {ibid., May 1929, pp.790-793); references 
cited by Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi (referred to hereafter as Winspeare, 
in accordance with his own preference, and general usage) Report of the 
personal representative of the Secretary General in charge of the good 
offices mission3 Bahrain, in SCOR S/9112, 30 April 1970. The British 
treaties are described in Albaharna, op. cit., chapter 3 (pp.31-35). The 
history of Iran's claim is described from the Bahrain point of view in the 
same work, chapter 12 (pp.167-195) and from the Iranian point of view in 
Houshary Mokhtader, 'The Settlement of the Bahrain Question: A Study in
Anglo-Iranian-UN Diplomacy', in Relations Internationales, Vol. 1, No.l, 
Universite de Teheran, Summer, 1974, pp.23-30.
3 Mokhtader, op. cit., p.29.
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i s s u e  w ere  a ro u s e d  d u r in g  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  f e r v o u r  o f  th e  e a r l y  1950s.
In  November 1957 th e  I r a n i a n  P a r l ia m e n t  a d o p te d  a B i l l  d e c la r in g  B a h ra in
2to  be th e  f o u r t e e n th  p ro v in c e  o f  I r a n  w ith  th e  r i g h t  to  e l e c t  a d e p u ty .
The f o l lo w in g  y e a r  th e  Shah s t a t e d  t h a t :
We c o n s id e r  B a h ra in  an  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  P e r s i a  and w i l l  g la d ly  
a c c e p t  th e  a l l e g ia n c e  o f  S h e ik  Sulman b in  Ahmed Al K h a l i f a ,  th e  
p r e s e n t  r u l e r ,  i n  th e  c a p a c i ty  o f  th e  f i r s t  P e r s ia n  G o v ern o r- 
G e n e ra l o f  B a h r a in .3
When B r i t a i n  i n d i c a t e d  i n  1968 i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  i t s  p o l i c y  o f  w i th ­
d raw a l from  e a s t  o f  Suez t h a t  i t  w ould  no lo n g e r  e x e r c i s e  p r o t e c t i o n  o v e r  
B a h ra in  a s  from  December 1971 , th e  G overnm ent o f  I r a n  a g a in  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  
th e  i s l a n d  was an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  I r a n .  I t s  view  was summed up in  a l a t e r  
s ta te m e n t  t h a t  o n ly  ' t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  w hich  B r i t a i n  h a s  a s s e r t e d  f o r  more 
th a n  a c e n tu r y  o v e r  th e  i s l a n d  p r e v e n te d  I r a n  from  e x e r c i s in g  h e r  l e g i t i -
4
m ate r i g h t s  t h e r e ' .  I r a n  d id  n o t  r e c o g n is e  th e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  r u l i n g
S h e ik . B r i t a i n  a d o p te d  th e  v iew  t h a t  B a h ra in  was a s o v e re ig n  A rab s t a t e
5
w ith  w h ich  i t  h ad  s p e c i a l  t r e a t y  r e l a t i o n s ,  and  t h e r e f o r e  d id  n o t  a c c e p t
0
t h a t  I r a n  had  any l e g i t i m a t e  c la im .
S h o r t ly  a f t e r  th e  announcem ent o f  B r i t i s h  w i th d ra w a l ,  B r i t a i n ,  K uw ait 
and  S a u d i A ra b ia  s e p a r a t e l y  an d  p r i v a t e l y  d i s c u s s e d  th e  c la im  w ith  I r a n ,  
and  l a t e r  i n  1968 s e c r e t  m e e tin g s  o f  B a h r a in i  and I r a n i a n  o f f i c i a l s  w ere
1 Ib id .
Ib id .
^ Ib id .  , p .3 0 .
^ W in sp e a re , op. o i t . , p a r a .  11 .
I b i d . ,  p a r a .  12 .
L e t t e r  from  P erm anen t R e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  th e  U n ite d  Kingdom to  th e  
S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l ,  20 M arch 1970 , p a r t i a l l y  p u b l is h e d  in  S /9 7 2 6 , 28 March 
1970.
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held in Switzerland. Albaharna reports that the Iranians suggested
referring the dispute to the Security Council under Articles 34 and 35 of
the Charter, to the General Assembly's Special Committee on Decolonisation,
or to the International Court of Justice. The Bahrainis rejected all
these proposals, apparently believing that they opened the way to doubts
2about Bahrain's independent status. They in turn suggested that the
dispute be referred, for mediation, to regional organisations or Heads of
State friendly to both parties. This was unacceptable to the Iranians, and
the talks ended without any agreement on a means of settling the dispute.
The dispute was a potential source of serious trouble in the region.
Bahrain had an important role in the political and commercial activity of
the gulf, and had been the seat of the British residency. Only a few
miles from Saudi Arabia, and with a predominantly Arab population, Bahrain
3had long had close links with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia had
declared its readiness to come to the defence of Bahrain to safeguard its
4independence and territorial integrity, and any attempt by Iran to pursue 
its claim through military action held the danger of a major confrontation 
with the Arab world. At the same time serious tensions already existed 
between Iran and the neighbouring Arab republic of Iraq while several 
revolutionary movements in the Gulf and a guerrilla war in Dhofar added to 
the volatility of the area. Furthermore, any major confrontation was likely
Albaharna, op. cit., p.315. Albaharna participated in these discussions 
as legal adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain.
2 Ibid., see also p.lll, infra.
3 j .d . Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People3 Politics3
Petroleum3 the Middle East Institute, Washington DC, 1975, p.68.
4 Mokhtader, op. cit., p.38.
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to draw in the major powers because of the region's oil reserves and 
strategic significance.'*'
In the face of these dangers, a breakthrough in the dispute came on 
4 January 1969 when the Shah of Iran said in New Delhi that:
If the people of Bahrain do not want to join our country we 
shall never resort to the use of force to oblige them to do 
so. 2
The Shah said that Iran would accept an expression of the will of the 
people of Bahrain, but he warned that:
We cannot accept that this island which was separated from 
our country by the British can be just handed over by them 
to other people at our expense. This is a matter of 
principle on which Iran cannot compromise.^
Conditions for settlement
The Shah's statement opened the door to the possibility of a settle­
ment, but although all parties desired a settlement it was not easy to 
reach agreement on conditions which justified sufficiently the alteration 
of Iran's longstanding position.
Concessions are rarely offered without conditions, and it is on the 
conditions that many a peaceful initiative has stumbled. The diplomacy of 
mediation has much to do with the negotiation of conditions of settlement.
A series of articles on the regional situation are contained in 
Interplay, Vol. 3, No.12, September 1970. They include Jan Nasmyth, 'If 
the British Leave the Gulf'; Alvin J. Cottrell, 'A New Persian Hegemony?' 
and Tom Dammam, 'Saudi Arabia's Dilemma'. See also Edward Gordon,
'Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute', in The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 65, No.3, July 1971, p.561; Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, 
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974, chapters 10-15; and Rouhollah K. Ramazani,
'The Settlement of the Bahrain Dispute', in The Indian Journal of Inter­
national Law3 Vol. 12, 1972, pp.1-14.
2 Mokhtader, op. czt., p.30.
3 Ibid.
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In many cases, of course, conditions may be proposed by one party in the 
clear knowledge that those conditions will be unacceptable to the other 
party. But even where the expressed desire reflects a definite move for 
settlement, a successful outcome still requires the negotiation of con­
ditions which are acceptable to both parties, and in particular the 
reconciliation of those minimum conditions to which the respective sides 
feel themselves bound.
The basic condition presented by the Shah was that there be an 
expression of the will of the people of Bahrain which was recognised inter­
nationally. Mokhtader says that later statements indicated that Iran was 
prepared to accept a referendum or plebiscite in Bahrain to determine the
future status of the islands.1 It seems that this requirement was conveyed
2privately to the British. For the Iranians to be justified in relinquish­
ing their claim, it was essential that the will of the people of Bahrain 
be expressed through a procedure that was completely credible.
On being consulted by the British, however, the Ruler of Bahrain
objected to the idea of a plebiscite on the grounds that it could arouse
3dangerous communal tensions. The majority of the population of Bahrain
Awere Arabs, but as a trading and entrepot centre there were descendants of 
many different races from the surrounding region - Iranians, Indians, 
Pakistanis and Africans. Some thousands of Bahrainis were of Iranian 
extraction, using the Persian language at home, and in other ways having 
Iranian cultural leanings. There was also a significant transient popu-
4lation with several thousand more Iranians as well as other nationalities.
1 Ibid.
2 The Times, London, interview with Ruler of Bahrain, 18 September 1969,
P.6.
3 British Mission, note handed to UN Secretariat, 19 September 1969, 
unpublished.
4 S/9772, paras. 19-21.
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About half the Bahrainis belonged to the Shia sect of Islam, which is the 
main sect of Iran, while the other half, including the Al Khalifa family, 
were of the Sunni sect. Thus on the surface there seemed to be some 
prospects of communal tension becoming aroused by a procedure which 
allowed for the public interplay of opinion on the Iranian claim.
But there were also other factors underlying the Ruler's objections.
The first was directly linked to the communal issue in that he was not 
prepared to countenance debate or controversy over the question of whether 
or not Bahrain was to be an Arab country. To him the question was already 
settled and was not a matter for debate.'*’ The second was indirectly linked 
in that Bahrain was governed as a traditional Arab autocracy, and the 
ruling family was most sensitive to any proposal or procedure which might 
arouse debate over the existing form of government. The Ruler's sensi­
tivity on both these points was reflected in objections by the Bahraini
authorities to the use of the term 'future status of Bahrain' during the
2exchanges of views which took place throughout 1969. The danger of 
communal strife may have been present but the Ruler's veto of a plebiscite 
was undoubtedly based also on the danger which he perceived to the 
traditional Arab form of government existing under his rule.
After a series of discussions during which there were consultations
3with U Thant and Ralph Bunche, both Iran and the Ruler of Bahrain accepted 
in principle a British proposal for a mission by a UN representative who 
would ascertain the wishes of the people. However, there were still diffi­
culties over the crucial question of the means of carrying out this task.
1
2
3
See statement by Presidency of State Council of Bahrain, p.131, infra. 
Bunche to Winspeare, 24 December 1969, unpublished.
British note, op. oit.
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The Ruler of Bahrain insisted that the method of operation of the UN 
representative be agreed in advance and should clearly exclude a 
plebiscite. The British supported this view and pressed it with the 
Iranians, who for their part insisted that the Secretary General and his 
representative had to be free to operate as they thought best."*" The 
parties had come closer together but the same fundamental concerns kept 
them from reaching complete accord. The Ruler of Bahrain, supported by 
the British, wanted to avoid any action which might engender instability, 
the Shah of Iran insisted that the exercise must have complete credibility.
Resolution of these differences became possible only when both sides 
effectively agreed to put the matter into the hands of the UN Secretariat, 
each having confidence that the Secretariat would act so as not to 
jeopardise the basic positions of either Bahrain or Iran.
THE EARLY QUIET DIPLOMACY 
Role of Thant and Bunche
The good offices exercised by Thant and Bunche when they were con­
sulted during the early discussions between the British and the Iranians 
was in keeping with the role originally practised by Drummond in the 
League of Nations. The consultations were completely confidential. No 
records were kept so that it will never be clear who suggested what, but 
something of the discussions can be inferred from remarks in the Security 
Council debate a year later. In particular, Lord Caradon, the British
representative, after noting that at times the prospect of agreement seemed 
2remote, referred to 'the understanding and the impartiality and the
Albaharna, op. cit. , p.318; see also p.121, 'infra. 
S/PV1536, 11 May 1970, para. 24.
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persistence of the Secretary General' who, with 'his small company' was
'constantly searching for the common ground of agreement'.'*' Earlier Caradon
had referred in a letter to the Secretary General to the 'outstanding skill
2and patience and resource shown by Dr Bunche in dealing with the matter'.
The agreement which was eventually reached required considerable trust. 
It was not the result of any single initiative, but rather it evolved out 
of a process by which channels of communication were kept open and confidence 
was gradually developed on all sides. The Secretariat undertook a good 
offices role in the classical sense - creating the conditions for agreement 
by maintaining the discussion and developing confidence between the parties, 
and in the Secretary General and his staff as trusted, impartial inter­
mediaries .
The agreement between the parties was incorporated in a statement of 
the 'terms of reference' for the proposed mission, together with an agreed 
'order of procedure' for setting the operation in motion. These statements 
are described below. Separate communications between the Secretariat and 
the British and Bahraini authorities established the framework for the 
actual 'method of operation' within Bahrain, the significance of which is 
also discussed below.* 23
Ibid., para. 28. A number of other representatives expressed similar 
tributes to the Secretary General (Syria, para. 39; United States, para. 54; 
Spain, para. 64; USSR, para. 95; Zambia, para. 112; Nepal, para. 121; 
Pakistan, para. 143).
2 Lord Caradon to Secretary General, 30 December 1969, unpublished.
3 Albaharna's account uses the terns 'order of procedure' and 'method of 
operation' interchangeably. There were in fact two separate documents, one 
agreed between Britain and Iran, the other not (see p.113, infra).
I l l
Terms o f  r e f e r e n c e
The te rm s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  f o r  th e  UN m is s io n  w ere th e  r e s u l t  o f  p r o t r a c t e d  
d i s c u s s io n s  b e tw een  th e  p a r t i e s  c o n d u c te d  th ro u g h  B r i t i s h  d ip lo m a t ic  c h a n n e ls  
d u r in g  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1969. A lb a h a rn a  r e p o r t s  t h a t  th e  w o rd in g  o r i g i n a l l y  
p ro p o se d  'd e s c r i b e d  th e  B a h ra in  i s s u e  a s  a  " d is p u te "  be tw een  th e  members o f  
th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  (nam ely B r i t a i n  and I ra n )  w i th in  th e  m eaning o f  A r t i c l e s  
34 and  35 o f  th e  C h a r t e r ' . ^ The B a h r a in is  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  B a h ra in  was an 
in d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e ,  and  a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  d i s p u te  was be tw een  B a h ra in  and I r a n ,  
n o t  B r i t a i n  and  I r a n .  Such a f o rm u la t io n  was u n a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  I r a n i a n s  
s in c e  i t  e n t a i l e d  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  an in d e p e n d e n t s t a t u s  f o r  B a h ra in  p r i o r  to  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  th e  d i s p u t e .  T hese d i f f e r e n c e s  w ere f i n a l l y  r e s o lv e d  by 
o m i t t in g  any e x p re s s  m en tio n  o f  B r i t a i n  o r  I r a n ,  o r  o f  th e  w ord 'd i s p u t e ' . 2 
The te rm s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  a s  a g re e d  b e tw een  th e  p a r t i e s  w ere  as fo l lo w s :
H aving r e g a r d  to  th e  p ro b lem  c r e a te d  by th e  d i f f e r i n g  v iew s 
o f  th e  p a r t i e s  c o n c e rn e d  a b o u t  th e  s t a t u s  o f  B a h ra in  and th e  
n eed  to  f in d  a s o lu t i o n  to  t h i s  p ro b lem  in  o r d e r  to  c r e a t e  an 
a tm o sp h e re  o f  t r a n q u i l i t y ,  s t a b i l i t y  and f r i e n d l i n e s s  th ro u g h ­
o u t  th e  a r e a ,  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  i s  
r e q u e s te d  by th e  p a r t i e s  c o n c e rn e d  to  s e n d  a P e r s o n a l  R ep re ­
s e n t a t i v e  t o  a s c e r t a i n  th e  w ish e s  o f  th e  p e o p le  o f  B ahra in ."^
An e a r l y  d r a f t  p ro v id e d  to  Bunche c o n ta in e d  i n  a d d i t io n  to  th e  above th e
4
w ords ' . . .  i n  a  m anner a g re e d  by th e  p a r t i e s  c o n c e r n e d '. I t s  d e l e t i o n  
i n  th e  f i n a l  v e r s io n  was a r e c o g n i t io n  o f  th e  dilem m a o v e r  th e  m ethod o f  
o p e r a t i o n ,  w h ic h , i n  th e  a b sen ce  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  a g re e m e n t be tw een  th e  p a r t i e s ,  
was r e s o lv e d  by b o th  o f  them  b e in g  p r e p a r e d  to  t r u s t  in  th e  good f a i t h  o f  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t .
^ A lb a h a rn a , op. o i t .  , p .3 1 7 .  F o r th e  t e x t  o f  A r t i c l e s  34 and 35 se e  
A ppendix  A.
Ib id .
3 S /9 7 2 6 , 28 M arch 1970.
4
D r a f t  'T erm s o f  R e f e r e n c e ',  6 O c to b e r  1969 , u n p u b l is h e d .
112
The agreed 'order of procedure'
A draft 'Order of Procedure' was first handed to Bunche by the British 
on 13 October. It required firstly, an informal and confidential approach 
by Iran and Britain to the Secretary General to seek his general agreement 
with the proposals, to suggest names of a possible representative, and to 
take advice on any general outstanding procedural points. Following this 
there would be an exchange of letters between the parties and the Secretary 
General which would formalise their request and his agreement. An 
announcement would be made in terms to be agreed. The representative would 
visit Bahrain and his report would be transmitted confidentially to the 
parties, who would in turn confirm their acceptance of it subject to 
endorsement by the Security Council. The parties agreed not to promote 
debate in the Council. The Secretary General would forward the report to 
the Security Council for endorsement.'*'
Bunche suggested a number of amendments to the draft emphasising that 
the Secretary General's agreement to exercise his good offices would be at 
the request of the parties, and that his representative would be sent to 
Bahrain in pursuance thereof. He also asked for the inclusion of state­
ments that the Secretary General would seek formal confirmation from the 
parties as to the terms of reference and the procedure, that the terms of 
reference would be included in his announcement and that the Security 
Council would be advised of events leading up to the presentation of his 
representative's report.^
The agreed 'order of procedure' involved the Secretariat at every step, 
from the first informal approach, to the formal exchange of letters, the
Draft 'Order of Procedure', 13 October, unpublished.
Revised draft 'Order of Procedure' 16 October, unpublished.
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announcement, the report, its presentation to the parties and its circu­
lation to the Security Council. The agreement between the United Kingdom 
and Iran depended on the intermediary role undertaken by the Secretariat 
in both formalising the agreement and in setting the operation in motion.
The Secretariat provided not only an assurance of good faith, but also an 
essential mechanism.
The ’method of operation1
As indicated earlier the question of the method of ascertaining the 
views of the people of Bahrain remained the major stumbling block to 
agreement throughout much of 1969. It became possible to join the opposing 
positions only when the Secretariat was, in effect, accepted by both sides 
as the means of bridging the remaining gap between them. Firstly, the 
Iranians dropped their insistence on a plebiscite and indicated that they 
were prepared to rely on the judgement of the Secretary General and his 
representative, being satisfied that they would make sure that the operation 
was genuine and credible. After further discussion, the Ruler of Bahrain 
dropped his insistence on Iranian agreement to a statement excluding a 
plebiscite, being satisfied that the stability of his regime would not be 
undermined.
A draft 'method of operation' was discussed between the British and 
the Secretariat, and the British sought an affirmation that the UN would be 
proceeding along the lines indicated. Bunche later advised Winspeare that 
the affirmation requested by the British had been given because it was 
felt there was nothing in it which would handicap the mission."*’ The state­
ment was phrased in general terms and dealt mainly with administrative 
matters. It said that the UN representative would be given a list of all
1 Bunche to Winspeare, 24 March 1970, unpublished.
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councils, committees, organisations and institutions known to exist in 
Bahrain. The UN representative would invite these bodies to nominate 
representatives to present their views and would also be free to consult 
individuals not included in the organisations, if necessary. The inter­
views would be in private, and both sides would undertake not to disclose 
either to the press, or to third parties any matter discussed until the 
Secretary General reported to the Security Council.
The statement also provided that departments of the Bahrain admini­
stration would assist with office accommodation, secretarial staff and 
transport. The cost of the operation would be borne by the parties and 
the report would be forwarded to the Secretary General by a date to be 
fixed in advance.^ At Bunche's suggestion the privacy of interviews with 
the UN representatives was emphasised by adding the words 'i.e. unaccom­
panied by representatives of the parties'.^
This statement had a central importance in the context of the differ­
ences which had earlier prevented agreement. It gave a general indication 
of the method to be used by the UN representative and in it the local 
authorities undertook to provide essential information and full co­
operation, but nowhere did the document exclude, as the Ruler of Bahrain 
had originally insisted, any particular method which might be adopted by
the representative. It was made clear that there was no agreement on
3this statement, even informal, between Britain and Iran. Although Iran, 
Bunche understood, was aware of the statement, it took no part in the 
discussions of this aspect, and maintained the position that Iran would 
rely on the Secretary General's judgement.
1 Draft 'Method of Operation', 6 October, unpublished.
2 Revised draft 'Method of Operation', 16 October, unpublished.
Bunche to Winspeare, 24 December 1969, unpublished.3
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Overall agreement became possible when Britain and Bahrain no longer 
pressed Iran to agree to the method of operation. The UN Secretariat 
provided the means by which the minimum conditions of both sides could be 
met.
The lead-up to the formal stage
From October 1969 onwards Bunche was engaged frequently in quiet 
consultations with the parties. During this period the parties agreed 
informally to the Secretary General's choice of Winspeare Guicciardi, Under 
Secretary General and Director of the United Nations Office at Geneva, as 
his personal representative. At the beginning of December Bunche dis­
cussed the project with Winspeare in New York, providing him with its 
background and asking him to consider such matters as the possible com­
position of the mission and the duration of its stay in Bahrain.'*’
On 27 December the Secretary General was provided with identical 
notes from Iran and the United Kingdom setting out the agreed order of
2procedure, based on the drafts which had earlier been discussed with Bunche.
Thant responded with identical memoranda to both permanent represent­
atives , providing for their information the general guidelines under which 
he and his representative would operate. These guidelines incorporated 
elements of the draft 'method of operation' statement discussed earlier 
with the British, with particular reference to the information and logistic 
support which his representative would require. The Secretary General 
advised the parties that when formal agreement had been reached between 
himself and the parties, he intended to appoint Winspeare as his personal
Winspeare to Bunche, 4 December 1969, unpublished.
2 Notes from permanent missions of Iran and the United Kingdom to the 
Secretary General, 27 December 1969, unpublished.
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representative, the mission to then proceed early in the new year, 
spending about three weeks in Bahrain. He stated that he expected 
Winspeare to receive the full co-operation of the authorities of Bahrain 
with all administrative facilities to carry out the necessary consultations 
with representatives of groups and institutions, and with other Bahraini 
individuals. He understood that his representative would have free access 
to these persons, and his interviews would be held without representatives 
of the parties present. Finally the full cost of the mission would be 
shared by the parties.'*’
On the night after Thant sent his identical memoranda to the principal
parties Bunche flew to Geneva to meet with Winspeare and representatives of
the Bahrain authorities. Those attending the meeting in addition to Bunche
and Winspeare were Sheik Khalifa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa, who was effectively
Prime Minister of Bahrain, Sheik Mohammed bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Director
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Geoffrey Arthur, later British
Political Representative in the Gulf, and Albaharna in his capacity of
2legal adviser to the Ruler. Albaharna links this meeting with the
Bahrainis' concern over the question of a plebiscite, saying that they
wished to ensure that the method of operation for the mission 'would not be
3confused with a plebiscite procedure'. He reports that the meeting was 
held with the agreement of the Iranians, and those present approved a nine
Secretary General, memoranda to Ambassador Vakil, Permanent 
Representative of Iran, and Lord Caradon, Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom, 29 December 1969, unpublished.
2 Albaharna, op. O'Ut., p.318.
3 Ibid. In a footnote, Albaharna says that the Bahrain Government 
argued that a plebiscite was inappropriate in Bahrain because the govern­
ment did not consider Bahrain's sovereighty to be in dispute.
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point document for the operation of the mission. He notes that the meet­
ing 'provided an opportunity for the Bahraini delegation to meet, face-to-
face, with United Nations officials closely connected with the operation
2of the good offices mission'.
After a day of discussions, Bunche returned on the evening flight to
New York. He was in very poor health, having made the trip against
doctor's orders, and his action greatly impressed the Bahrainis and the 
3British. It demonstrated the crucial importance which Bunche himself
placed on maintaining the confidence of all concerned. He informed the
Secretary General that the trip had been worthwhile and the meeting had
clarified many points. He said there were no hitches and the Secretariat
4was now awaiting receipt of the formal request.
Bunche's meetings with the Bahrain Government representatives in 
Geneva provided his first contact with them, as the British Permanent 
Mission in New York had previously undertaken all the negotiations with 
the Secretariat on their behalf. Bunche had maintained close contact with 
Anthony Parsons, the responsible officer of the British Mission, as he had 
with Ambassador Mehdi Vakil, the Iranian Permanent Representative.
Ibid. This was probably the Secretary General's memorandum of the 
previous day.
2 Ibid.
3 Winspeare to Bunche, 7 January 1969, unpublished. Bunche left New 
York at 6.50 p.m. on the Tuesday, arrived in Geneva at 8.15 a.m. the 
following morning, departed again at 5.55 p.m. and arrived back in New 
York at 10.40 p.m. on the Wednesday night. Sir Geoffrey Arthur commented 
that Bunche's action 'displayed a devotion to duty the like of which I 
have seldom seen anywhere(interview, Oxford, May 1978).
4 Bunche to Secretary General in Dakar, 2 January 1970, unpublished.
118
Both parties were consulted about the appointment of Winspeare as the
personal representative.'*' Winspeare had met Parsons while in New York at
the end of November. Amongst other things, Parsons had explained why the
British felt a plebiscite was technically impossible because of a lack of
2electoral rolls, as well as politically unwise. At that time Vakil had
declined a similar invitation as he felt that the time was not then ripe,
but he called on Winspeare in Geneva later in January, together with a
senior official of the Iranian Department of Foreign Affairs. Winspeare
commented privately to Bunche that he had the impression that the main
3purpose of Vakil's visit was 'to have a good look at me'. Again it was 
clear that the confidence of both parties in the Secretariat, and specifi­
cally in the Secretary General's proposed representative was crucial to the 
success of the exercise.^
The Secretariat now awaited the next step in the agreed procedure,
which was the formal request from Iran. Vakil had told Winspeare that the
text would be shown to the British through the Iranian Embassy in London
and Winspeare understood that he proposed to deliver the formal request
5to the Secretary General during the next week. During the following weeks, 
however, a series of delays frustrated the Secretariat's plans for an early 
start and gave rise to some concern.
1 S/9726, p.3.
2 Winspeare to Bunche, 4 December 1969, unpublished.
3 Winspeare to Bunche, 23 December 1969, unpublished.
4 Vakil's visit surprised Thant who was unsure as to its purpose. Through 
Bunche he advised Winspeare that he was awaiting a formal request and only 
he could decide whether it was acceptable. Until that request was received 
and accepted, there was no UN involvement of any kind. However Thant felt it 
was difficult to respond negatively to Vakil's approach and that Winspeare 
should see the Ambassador, but should make it clear that he could only listen 
and could not express opinions or appraisals (Bunche to Winspeare, 20 January, 
unpublished).
5 Winspeare to Bunche, 23 December, unpublished.
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Early in February Bunche advised Winspeare that the parties were still
negotiating over the final wording of the letter of request.^ On 5
February Bunche met with Vakil and they reached agreement on the wording.
It was then up to the British to informally indicate their agreement.
Meanwhile Bunche advised Winspeare that if it was not possible for the
mission to arrive before 7 March, it would have to be delayed until April
because of the ceremonial period of Moharren, when the local authorities
2feared that the risk of demonstrations would be greater. Winspeare worked
3out a tentative schedule to fit these requirements, with an arrival date 
of 20 February.
The British then advised that they were still clearing the text of the
4formal request with the Bahrain Government. They also discussed the text
of their reply with Bunche. Two days later Bunche was advised that the
Bahrainis needed another two or three weeks for consultations with
influential citizens and some neighbouring governments in order to minimise
5the risk of negative attitudes and activities against the mission. A new
schedule was worked out based on an arrival date of 23 March.^ After a
further two weeks the Iranian Government advised it could not call its
parliament into special session to coincide with the announcement until
7after the Iranian New Year. Winspeare in particular became concerned about
Bunche to Winspeare, 2 February, unpublished.
2 Bunche to Winspeare, 6 and 7 February 1970, unpublished.
3 Winspeare to Bunche, 7 December 1970, unpublished.
4 Bunche to Winspeare, 7 February 1970, unpublished.
5 Bunche to Winspeare, 9 February 1970, unpublished. Two neighbouring 
governments were advised during this early period (Bunche to Winspeare, 16 
February, unpublished), almost certainly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with whom 
Bahrain had the closest relations.
Bunche to Winspeare, 10 February 1970, unpublished.
Bunche to Winspeare, 25 February 1970, unpublished.7
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the delays, fearing that secrecy would be jeopardised. Another problem 
was that delays increased the possibility of an action by one or other of 
the parties which might cause damage to the rather delicate agreement. In 
January, for example, Vakil told Winspeare that there was great dissatis­
faction in Teheran following a decision in Bahrain 'to change the form of
2top level administration to make it look as if it were a real government'. 
The date of the formal request was finally set for 9 March, with the 
announcement to be on 28 March and the mission to begin on 30 March.
The formal stage
On 9 March Ambassador Vakil handed Iran's formal request to the
Secretary General. The wording of the request had been discussed thoroughly
with all concerned including the British, and through them the Bahrainis,
as well as Bunche. It contained a number of significant elements arising
out of the months of quiet negotiations. Firstly, the letter referred to
'conversations between Your Excellency and myself' and formally requested
the Secretary General to exercise his good offices using wording similar to
that contained in the terms of reference. Secondly, it set forth the
Iranian Governments' position on the dispute. Thirdly, it referred to the
3reaching of agreement between Iran and the United Kingdom.
The fourth paragraph was most important because it justified the 
decision taken by the Iranian Government in terms of both its adherence to 
the UN charter, and the 'importance it attaches to the office of the United 
Nations Secretary General and the high respect in which it holds you 
personally'. ^
Winspeare to Bunche, 26 February 1970, unpublished.
2 Winspeare to Bunche, 23 January 1970, unpublished.
3 Ambassador Vakil, letter to Secretary General, 9 March 1970, partially 
published in S/9726.
4 Ibid.
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The stress placed on the office of the Secretary General underlined 
the importance of confidence in the Secretariat, which was further 
elaborated in the fifth paragraph. This was a crucial paragraph because 
it dealt with the question of the method to be used in implementing the 
terms of reference. It stated that:
Accordingly my Government wishes to leave it entirely to you 
to choose the most appropriate method or methods to be 
applied in carrying out the task involved. We are confident 
that in selecting the most appropriate method or methods 
you will be guided by the paramount consideration that the 
method that is selected should, in fact, ensure an expression 
of the true wishes of the people of Bahrain.
Finally, the letter committed Iran to accept the results of the
Secretary General's findings after and subject to their endorsement by the 
2Security Council.
In a separate letter on the same day, Vakil responded specifically to
the Secretary General's memorandum of 29 December. He emphasised again,
on the instructions of his government, that Iran left it entirely to the
Secretary General to choose the most appropriate method of operation,
stressing that 'your authority in this regard remains the cardinal
3principle on which the conduct of the whole operation must rest'. He
added that his government did not recognise the 'so-called authorities of
, . , 4Bahrain'.
1 Ibid.
Ibid.
3 Ambassador Vakil, second letter to Secretary General, 9 March 1970, 
unpublished.
4 Ibid. This phrase appeared in paragraph 4 of the Secretary General's 
memorandum of 29 December 1969. Vakil told Winspeare in January that he 
might have to raise reservations over this matter with Bunche (Winspeare to 
Bunehe, 23 January, unpublished).
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On the same day the Secretary General forwarded a copy of the Iranian 
request to Lord Caradon, and inquired if his Government concurred. 
Caradon's reply on 20 March reiterated the British Government's position 
on Bahrain, and stated that it fully shared the views expressed by Iran in 
support of the UN charter, the importance attached to the office of 
Secretary General, and the high respect for Thant personally. On behalf 
of the UK government (for Bahrain) Caradon stated that the proposal was 
acceptable and confirmed that the UK would also accept the results of the 
Secretary General's findings after and subject to their endorsement by the 
Security Council.1
The Secretary General then sent identical notes to both governments, 
quoting the agreed terms of reference and confirming his readiness to 
exercise his good offices as requested. He stated that he would proceed 
without delay and designated Winspeare as his personal representative, 
noting the parties' agreement to accept the findings of the report once 
it had been endorsed by the Security Council, and their agreement to bear 
the entire cost.^
Three key paragraphs of the Secretary General's letter related to the 
main issue which had impeded settlement, the method of operation. The 
first stated that he had been given assurances that the people of Bahrain 
would have ready and full access to his personal representative and would 
be able to express their wishes freely and privately without fear of 
personal consequences. Assurances had also been given that he could meet 
and talk with all persons in private and in confidence who wished to see
Lord Caradon, letter to Secretary General, 20 March 1970, partially 
published in S/9726 .
2 Secretary General, identical letters to Ambassador Vakil and Lord 
Caradon, 20 March 1970. The substance of these letters was contained in 
the announcement in S/9726.
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him, and that he would receive full co-operation locally. In the second 
paragraph the Secretary General offered his assurance that:
. . .  my foremost concern and that of my personal representative 
will be to record as accurately and fully as circumstances per­
mit the wishes of the people of Bahrain about their status.
Thirdly he expressed gratitude to each government for its reliance upon his
judgement in determining the method to be employed in achieving the pur-
3pose of the good offices mission.
On the same day the Secretary General sent a personal letter to
Winspeare formally designating him as his representative and setting out
4detailed instructions.
The announcement
5By prior agreement between the parties, the mission was announced on
28 March.6 Bunche had previously sent a draft of the announcement to both
7the British and Iran Missions for their review and comment. The announce­
ment referred to the informal discussions between the Secretary General and 
each of the permanent representatives over the preceding months, advised of 
the formal request by the two governments, quoted the terms of reference, 
and reiterated the points contained in the Secretary General's letters to 
the parties on 20 March.
The words 'local authorities' were not used due to the earlier Iranian 
objection.
Secretary General, ioc. cit. 
Ibid.
Secretary General to Winspeare, 20 March 1970, unpublished.
5 Bunche to Secretary General, 17 March 1970; Bunche to Winspeare, 
25 February 1970, both unpublished.
6 S/9726.
7 Bunche to Parsons and Vakil, 13 March 1970, unpublished.
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In particular, the announcement spelt out the 'ready and full access'
clause."*" Bunche advised Winspeare that this clause 'more than offsets any
narrowing or restrictive implication' in the 'method of operation' state- 
2ment. He observed that there had been some difficulty between the
British and the Bahrainis on this matter. Bunche and the Secretary
General had insisted upon its retention unchanged and had prevailed. He
had made it clear to the British that Winspeare would be advised to report
promptly and fully to the Secretary General if he should encounter any
difficulty about access while in Bahrain. If a serious hitch developed on
this matter the Secretary General would no doubt withdraw the mission
forthwith since free access was imperative in ascertaining the will of the
people. The British had assured him that Winspeare would experience no 
3such difficulty. Thus the key element of confidence was maintained, not
by mere acquiescence in the wishes of one or other of the parties, but
by firmly maintaining a position which ensured that the integrity of the
Secretariat's role would not be compromised.
The announcement also quoted Iran's willingness to rely upon the
Secretary General's judgement in choosing the method of operation, and
most significantly, indicated that the British representative had communi-
4cated a similar reliance to him orally.
The Secretary General paid credit to the constructive and statesman­
like approach of the parties and noted their agreement to transmit his 
findings to the Security Council for its endorsement. He concluded by
S/9726, p .3.
Bunche to Winspeare, 24 March 1970, unpublished.
4
Ibid.
S/9726, loc. cit.
125
stating that the paramount concern in the exercise of his good offices 
would be the wishes of the people of Bahrain.1 The text of the announcement 
was conveyed to all members of the Security Council and was released to the 
press later on the same day.
Quiet diplomacy and press coverage
The negotiation of a means of settling the Bahrain dispute was a 
classic example of quiet diplomacy. From the beginning the discussions 
between the British and the Iranians were highly confidential. When the 
parties then consulted the Secretary General it was axiomatic that their 
expressed wish for confidentiality be respected. Bunche, acting on behalf 
of the Secretary General in many of the day-to-day consultations, was by 
temperament and by conviction most responsive to this requirement. With 
almost a quarter of a century of experience as an international inter­
mediary, from the time of the Palestine settlement onwards, it was his 
strong belief that the effectiveness of the good offices role depended 
upon an extraordinary degree of discretion. Such discretion built confi­
dence, and in the case of Bahrain, the confidence of the parties in the 
Secretariat was the necessary element which enabled them to span the 
final gap between their respective positions.
Throughout the leadup to the formal stage and the announcement of the 
mission, the consultations between Bunche and the parties were detailed 
and meticulous. Bunche was consulted in particular on the order of pro­
cedure, the wording of Iran's formal request and the British reply. There
was discussion on the method of operation and Bunche and the Secretary
2General were provided with drafts of the terms of reference.
1 Ibid.
2 The record does not show any Secretariat input on the terms of refer­
ence. Bunche made it clear that these were the result of intense negoti­
ations between the parties (Bunche to Winspeare, 24 March 1970, unpublished). 
See also Albaharna, op. cit., p.317.
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The Secretariat, for its part, consulted through Bunche with both parties 
on the wording and the timing of the announcement and the explanatory note 
to members of the Security Council. All these consultations were carried 
out in the strictest confidence.
After the informal exchange of notes between the parties and the 
Secretary General at the end of the December there were frequent communi­
cations between Bunche in New York and Winspeare in Geneva. Although 
their cables were coded they took no risks, referring to the Iranians and 
the British only as the 'first party' and the 'second party' respectively, 
and the Bahrain Government as the 'local authorities'.1 23 Similarly the
Secretariat took precautions to prevent disclosure of the operation before
2the official announcement. By agreement between the parties the announce­
ment was released to the press on the evening of Saturday, 28 March. The 
duty press officer for the day was briefed by Bunche on the morning of the 
release, locked the text in his drawer, and did not duplicate it until 
twenty minutes before the release time of 6.30 p.m. Three correspondents 
filed stories on the announcement some six hours before its release,
3apparently due to an earlier release in Bahrain.
Messages between Bunche in New York and Winspeare in Geneva, 2 February 
to 16 March 1970, unpublished. The Permanent Missions in New York were 
identified as 'first source' and 'second source'.
2 At a very early stage of the negotiations there had been a leak when 
the Ruler of Bahrain gave an interview to a correspondent from the London 
Times (September 1969) but other media had not followed up the story. During 
the delays in February when Winspeare expressed concern that they would jeo­
pardise secrecy (p.120, supra) , Bunche replied that it was 'something of a 
miracle' that there had been no public word, especially as local authorities 
were consulting some neighbouring governments and local people. He was sur­
prised there had not been more hitches and delays 'in view of the extreme 
delicacy and sensitivity of this operation from beginning to end' (Bunche to 
Winspeare, 26 February, unpublished).
3 Note on Saturday duty operations, 28 March 1970, unpublished. Some of 
the press were irritated at having had to wait after being told there would 
be an important announcement by the Secretary General that night. A few were 
critical that they were given no idea of the nature of the announcement. 
Apparently they expected something more 'newsworthy'. (Note by W. Powell, 
Director of Information, OPI, on regular press briefing on Monday, 30 March 
1970, unpublished.)
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The p o i n t  o f  th e  e a r l y  em p h asis  on s e c r e c y  was t h a t  p u b l i c  d e b a te  
w ould have made th e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  an a g re e m e n t much more d i f f i c u l t ,  o r  
even  im p o s s ib le ,  b o th  b e c a u se  o f  i t s  e f f e c t  on th e  p a r t i e s  th e m s e lv e s , 
and b e c a u se  o f  th e  l ik e l i h o o d  o f  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  becom ing in v o lv e d .
P u b l ic  d i s c u s s io n  d u r in g  th e  n e g o t i a t i n g  s ta g e s  w ould  have  made i t  
e x tre m e ly  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  gap b e tw een  th e  two s id e s  o v e r  th e  m ethod o f  
o p e r a t io n  to  be n a rro w e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f o r  them  to  a g re e .  The d a n g e rs  o f  
p u b l ic  d ip lo m acy  w ere d e m o n s tra te d  by th e  outcom e o f  an in te r v ie w  w hich  
th e  R u le r  o f  B a h ra in  gave to  th e  London Daily Telegraph i n  A ugust 1969.
He was r e p o r t e d  a s  s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  c o u ld  be no q u e s t io n  o f  a p l e b i s c i t e .  
The Shah r e p o r t e d ly  r e p l i e d  a few days l a t e r  t h a t  i f  h i s  p r o p o s a l  was 
tu rn e d  down he  w ould  r e c o g n is e  n e i t h e r  th e  p ro p o se d  G u lf F e d e ra t io n  n o r  
an in d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e  o f  Bahrain."*- The a d o p tio n  o f  such  p o s i t i o n s  i n  p u b l ic  
te n d e d  to  p re e m p t f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  m aking i t  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  two 
s id e s  to  d i s p l a y  th e  f l e x i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e d  to  r e a c h  a g re e m e n t.
Once th e  i n i t i a l  a g reem en t had  b een  r e a c h e d ,  i t  was i n  th e  i n t e r e s t s
o f  a l l  th e  p a r t i e s  to  s e e  th e  o p e r a t io n  th ro u g h  to  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o n c lu s io n .
The p a r t i e s  and  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  w ere  t h e r e f o r e  a n x io u s  to  a v o id  th e
a d d i t i o n a l  coup l i c a t i o n s  w hich  m ig h t have  b een  r a i s e d  by p u b l i c  d i s c u s s io n .
The s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  was d e m o n s tra te d  by th e  r e a c t i o n  in  T eheran
2
t o  th e  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  th e  B a h ra in  G overnm ent i n  e a r l y  1970. P u b l ic  
s ta te m e n ts  by e i t h e r  o f  th e  p a r t i e s  m ig h t w e l l  have  had  s i m i l a r  o r  even 
more dam aging e f f e c t s .
More s i g n i f i c a n t l y  th o u g h , was th e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  p u b l ic  d i s c u s s io n  
w ould  have l e d  t o  th e  in v o lv e m e n t o f  o t h e r  p a r t i e s .  The p o s i t i o n s  l a t e r  
ta k e n  by s e v e r a l  A rab n a t io n s  i n d ic a te d
M o k h tad er, op. e i t . , p .4 1 .
2 See p .1 2 0 , supra.
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that earlier public knowledge would have made it more difficult for the 
Ruler of Bahrain to entertain the possibility of an inquiry by a UN 
representative. In particular some Arab nations pressed the view that no 
doubts of any kind should be allowed with regard to Bahrain's Arab status.'1’ 
Public discussion would also have greatly increased the risk of local 
agitation, a foremost concern of the Ruler which was shared by the British. 
Finally, because of the strategic and political sensitivity of the Persian 
Gulf and the Middle East generally, public discussion would undoubtedly have 
given rise to competing pressures from the major powers. In this sense the 
exercise of quiet diplomacy was also an exercise in preventive diplomacy.
The Soviet objection
For the Secretariat there was an additional factor to be considered 
arising out of a previously expressed difference of view between the 
Secretary General and the Soviet Union over the exercise of his good 
offices. On 26 March, the British notified other permanent members of the 
Security Council of the proposed announcement. Shortly after, Mr Shevchenko 
of the Soviet Mission called with a message from Ambassador Malik stating 
that he trusted the matter would be brought before the Security Council for 
its decision.^
In response, the Secretary General added an additional comment to his 
explanatory note to members of the Security Council, circulated on 28 
March. He noted that actions such as that proposed at the request of 
member states:
Alahram, Cairo, 9 April 1970; At Baas, Damascus, 29 March 1970 and 
Ath Thaurah, Damascus, 30 March 1970 (translation by UNIC Damascus, 
unpublished).
Note, 27 March 1970, unpublished.2
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. . . have become customary in United Nations practice and 
have proved to be a valuable means of relieving and pre­
venting tension by a quiet approach in certain situations 
which could only be prolonged or aggravated by premature 
disclosure and public debate.
He stated that in his view:
. . . such resort by Member States to the process of peace­
ful settlement of differences in accordance with the ^
principles of the Charter is to be welcomed and encouraged.
When the note was circulated the Secretary General received a letter
from the Soviet Union objecting that he had communicated with members of
the Security Council 'on an ex postfacto basis and without consulting the
3members of the Council beforehand'. The Soviet letter stated that
'questions of this kind and the decisions taken on them come within the
jurisdiction of the Security Council'. The Soviet Union rejected the
Secretary General's comment that such actions had 'become customary in
United Nations practice', maintaining that this was an illegal practice
forced upon the United Nations in the past by 'certain Powers contrary to
and in violation of the Charter'. The Soviet letter referred to previous
4letters on the same principle, on 27 August 1966 and 19 March 1969. In 
fact, the well known differences between Thant and the USSR on this 
matter went rather deeply into the constitutionality of UN involvement in 
seeking the settlement of a dispute.
Thant's reply to the Soviet Union was also circulated to members of 
the Security Council. He defended his action on the grounds that when 
member states felt that a difference between them was capable of an amic­
able solution if dealt with at an early stage quietly and diplomatically,
1 S/9726.
Ibid.
3 S/9737, 4 April 1970.
4 Ibid.
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they were entitled to have the matter worked out through the good offices 
of the Secretary General on a completely confidential basis. If proposals 
put forward were fully consistent with the principles and purposes of the 
United Nations Charter, and if they in no way impinged upon the authority 
of the Security Council or any other organ of the United Nations, the 
Secretary General:
. . . unavoidably feels obligated to afford the Member States 
the assistance in the manner requested. To do otherwise 
would be to thwart a commendable effort by these Member States 
to abide by a cardinal principle of the organisation, namely 
the peaceful settlement of disputes.^
Thant added that 'the good offices mission to Bahrain is engaged only in a
fact finding exercise' and that the facts would be presented to the
Security Council so that 'any substantive action would be taken at that
2time and only by the Security Council'. This somewhat understated the 
purpose of the mission since it was mounted with prior agreement from the 
Governments of Britain and Iran that they would accept its findings, 
subject to the Council's endorsement, and thereby settle their dispute.
As such the good offices mission may be considered a substantive action 
aimed at resolution of an international dispute, and therefore as involv­
ing rather more than 'only' fact finding. But it is this very practice of 
understatement which is characteristic of the good offices role, in keeping 
with the notion that intermediary action is most effective when least 
emphasised.
S/9738, 6 April 1970.
2 Ibid.
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WINSPEARE'S GOOD OFFICES MISSION
In his detailed instructions to Winspeare the Secretary General 
pointed out that the mission called for the utmost in tact and discretion. 
He said the mission was extremely difficult and delicate, and that it was 
also highly important. There should be the strictest avoidance of any 
discussion with local people about the work of the mission or the views of 
the people, except during the official consultations. He warned that 
there could be disastrous consequences for the mission if there should be 
the least basis for an allegation that any member of it was seeking to 
influence Bahraini views. It was, he stated, a mission for wise men only, 
from top to bottom.^
Prior to the mission's arrival, the President of Bahrain's State 
Council made a broadcast explaining the Bahrain authorities' reasons for 
accepting the inquiry. He stated that:
Our belief is that Bahrain is an Arab country, and that as an 
Arab country Bahrain has its own independent personality and 
existence.2
He said the government had agreed to the Winspeare mission so that 'the 
real facts concerning Bahrain should be proclaimed to the whole world 
through the United Nations'. He went on to say:
We are certain of the opinion of the people of Bahrain on this 
question. This opinion, the personal representative of the 
Secretary General will carefully register in his report to 
the Secretary General. In his turn the Secretary General will 
submit this report to the Security Council for endorsement as 
an international document, recognised by all parties. Thus 
an end will finally be put to the problem.3
Secretary General to Winspeare, 20 March 1970, unpublished.
2 Statement from the Presidency of State Council in Bahrain, 28 March 
1970, unpublished.
3 Ibid.
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He noted that this means of settling the dispute had been welcomed by- 
Bahrain's brother Arab states, and stressed that Winspeare's mission 
would not mean a referendum. "*"
On the day of the public announcement Winspeare assembled for briefing
in Geneva the five Secretariat members assigned to assist him in the 
2mission. The following day, 29 March, an advance party led by Winspeare's
3deputy, F.T. Liu, left Geneva to make preliminary arrangements. On
arrival in Bahrain, Liu had discussions with the authorities about details 
4of the mission. He arranged for the establishment of a UN office which
would be open from 8.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. each day, and to which any
citizen of Bahrain could come and make comments or a statement to the UN
representatives. The authorities suggested that two policemen be
staioned in the office 'for the protection of the UN personnel', but Liu
insisted that no police be present inside the building so as to provide
5complete freedom for any citizen to speak. The authorities also offered
1 Ibid.
2 The mission comprised:
Winspeare Guicciardi, Under Secretary General and Director of the 
United Nations Office at Geneva.
F.T. Liu, Principal Secretary of the Mission (Principal Officer,
Office of the Under Secretaries General for Special Political Affairs).
Erik Jensen, Political Officer.
George Khouri, Public Relations Officer and Interpreter.
Anders Tholle, Secretary and Code Machine Operator.
Lucien Comensoli, Security.
3 S/9772, para. 4.
4 Representatives of the Bahrain authorities had also visited Winspeare 
on 15 March for a discussion on administrative matters (Winspeare to 
Bunche, 16 March, unpublished).
5 Interview, New York, December 1977.
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to provide a police escort in front and behind the two UN cars when
travelling about the island, but Liu insisted again that no escort would
, 1 be necessary.
Winspeare arrived on 30 March and immediately made a public statement
explaining the nature and scope of the mission. He said he would meet and
consult with organisations, societies, institutions and groups, as well as
citizens and others. He gave assurances that all concerned would have
'ready and free access to my mission' and would be able 'to express their
views on the question and issues freely in private and in confidence'.
He concluded with an assurance that his mission was 'concerned only with
2the wishes of the people of Bahrain on the question at issue'. The state­
ment was broadcast in full and in summary the same day and published in 
the local press the next morning.
Winspeare had been given a list of organisations which was expanded 
so as to include, to the best of his knowledge, 'all associations and
3organised groups in Bahrain'. He decided not to be selective but to
interview representatives from all the organisations, a total of 106 in all,
noting that they 'appeared to offer a good cross-section in age, activity,
4status and geographical distribution'. They included six municipal
councils, with which were associated six administrative committees
responsible for specific sectors (agriculture and water, education, health,
5water supply, rural affairs and minors' estates). Both the municipal
Ibid.
S/9772, paras. 24-26. 
Ibid. , para. 28.
Ibid. , and annex. 
Ibid. , para. 30.5
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c o u n c i l s  and t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  co m m it tee s  were p a r t i a l l y  e l e c t e d ,  and
t h e  l a t t e r  r e p r e s e n t e d  t o  some e x t e n t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,
t e a c h e r s ,  d o c t o r s ,  and a g r i c u l t u r i s t s . ^  T here  were f i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s
2
whose p r i n c i p a l  o b j e c t i v e  was s o c i a l  w e l f a r e ,  n in e  s p o r t s  team s and  n in e
o t h e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  w hich  c a t e r e d  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t
g ro u p s :  f o r  ex am p le ,  t h e  Chamber o f  Commerce and  c u l t u r a l  and p r o f e s s i o n a l
3
s o c i e t i e s .  W inspeare  n o t e d  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  many
• c l u b s ' ,  70 i n  a l l ,  w hich  f u n c t i o n e d  as  t h e  f o c a l  p o i n t s  o f  community
a c t i v i t y  i n  b o th  u rban  and  r u r a l  a r e a s ,  and  whose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w ere  th e
4
spokesm en f o r  each  v i l l a g e  i n  d e a l i n g s  w i th  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  At l e a s t
t h r e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w ere  s e n t  t o  m eet W inspeare  n o t  o n ly  from  e ach
o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  main towns o f  Manama and  M uharraq b u t  a l s o  from  a
t o t a l  o f  28 o u t l y i n g  v i l l a g e s  and  c e n t r e s .  They a s s u r e d  W inspea re  t h a t
t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  were b a s e d  on m e e t in g s  o f  t h e  f u l l  m em bership o f
5
t h e i r  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  W inspeare  v i s i t e d  t h r e e  o t h e r  v i l l a g e s ,  t h u s
e n s u r i n g  a c o v e ra g e  o f  a l l  i n h a b i t e d  p a r t s  o f  B a h r a in ,  a s  w e l l  a s  s e v e r a l
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  whose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  had  a l r e a d y  b een  t o  s e e  h im , so as
' t o  e s t a b l i s h  t o  my own s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  v iew s p r e s e n t e d  were i n
f a c t  t h o s e  o f  t h e  m em bership  as a w h o l e ' . ^  He a l s o  met th e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e
two Muslim s e c t s ,  S unn i and  S h i a ,  who made a p o i n t  o f  b e in g  r e c e i v e d
7t o g e t h e r  to  em p h a s ise  t h e i r  common v iew  on t h e  s u b j e c t .  H a l l i d a y  c r i t i c i s e s
B ackground  p a p e r ,  u n p u b l i s h e d .  
S /9 7 7 2 ,  p a r a s .  31 -3 2 .
I b i d . ,  p a r a .  35.
I b id .  , p a r a s .  33 -3 4 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  36.
Ib id .  , p a r a s .  37 -38 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  45.7
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the list provided to Winspeare on the grounds that it did not include
'a single trades union or political party'. ^ A background paper provided
to Winspeare mentions a staff association representing all employees of
2the Bahrain Petroleum Company, including 6,000 Bahraini nationals, but
this was not included in the final report.
Some individuals were seen by appointment during the first few days,
while the majority of individuals came after a repeat broadcast of
Winspeare's statement a week later. In most cases individuals were
required to show proof of Bahraini nationality. Names, however, were
3recorded only when voluntarily offered. Winspeare conducted every inter­
view personally, assisted by the mission's interpreter and his other 
colleagues. The questions, put both to representatives and to individuals, 
were based exclusively on the terms of reference, and Winspeare commented
that 'the natural courtesy and politeness of the people made interviews
4and meetings easy and orderly'.
In summing up his findings, Winspeare stated that there were two 
common denominators in almost all the replies received by every method of 
inquiry. Firstly, he reported, they gave credit to the governments 
concerned for their request to the Secretary General and hoped that the 
cloud of the Iranian claim would be removed once and for all. Secondly:
The Bahrainians I met were virtually unanimous in wanting a 
fully independent sovereign state.^ The great majority added 
that this should be an Arab state.
Halliday, op. cit. , p.457. Halliday also makes the curious assumption 
that the Shah had a hand in drawing up the list.
2 Unpublished.
3 Ibid., para. 39.
4
5
S/9772, paras. 40-41. 
Ibid., para. 42.
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Winspeare found little difference in the opinions expressed according to 
membership of the Muslim sects, level of education, age or sex."*" Amongst 
representatives of rural communities, he found a greater emphasis on their 
Arab identity, and amongst the higher educated there was 'a pronounced 
awareness of a distinctively Bahraini identity'. The trading community 
showed particular interest in the improvement of external relations by 
removing the obstacle of the Iranian claim. The young tended to be more 
vocal, while the few women interviewed expressed views which coincided 
with those of the men.
Winspeare noted that there were more marked differences between
Bahrainis of different ethnic extraction, and in particular that 'among
those of Iranian descent were a number whose wish for an independent,
2sovereign state was qualified by the deliberate omission of "Arab"'.
Among the community clubs were a number which catered specifically to
persons of Iranian origin, whose representatives referred to restrictions
3on passports for members of the Persion community in Bahrain. Winspeare 
commented that these representatives made it clear that they expected
L'their own position to be consolidated as citizens of a sovereign state'.
As an example, one group stressed their loyalty to Bahrain and expressed
the hope that in a sovereign state Bahrainis of all origins would enjoy
5full and equal rights.
Ibid. , paras. 45-50.
Ibid. , para. 51.
Records of interviews, unpublished. 
S/4772, para. 51.
5 Records of interviews.
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Winspeare also noted in his report a variety of viewpoints, expressed
mainly by individuals, which he described as 'marginal' to the common
trends which he had identified. Some, for example, called for a special
relationship with Iran, or a continuation of the relationship with Britain,
as a guarantee of Bahrain's independence.^  There were isolated instances
2of support for union or association with Iran, while a few expressed views
3critical of the Al-Khalifa family. At the same time, Winspeare and the
Secretary General received a number of written communications, including
telegrams from Bahraini student associations in Britain, Sweden and India.
The students tended to be critical of the mission, claiming that the
Iranian claim should be treated with contempt and that the independent Arab
4status of Bahrain was not a matter for dispute. Communications from
Iranian student associations in Washington and New York, on the other hand,
registered their opposition to the actions of the Iran government in
5agreeing to 'the plebiscite' in Bahrain.
Another written communication suggested that people were scared to
express their true feelings.^* Winspeare, however, went to some pains to
assure himself that 'no-one was intimidated, influenced or prevented from
7communicating with my mission'. He stressed that ready and free access was 
assured at all times, and that all consultations took place in private and
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ibid. , para. 43.
Ibid.
Records of interviews, unpublished. 
Unpublished.
Unpublished.
Unpublished.
7 S/4772, para. 56.
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in confidence. He stated his confidence that the methods were
'appropriate and fully sufficient to ascertain the wishes of the people 
2of Bahrain' and that the total number of persons whose views were
3presented to him either collectively or by individuals was adequate.
In conclusion, Winspeare stated that:
My consultations have convinced me that the overwhelming 
majority of the people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition 
of their identity in a fully independent and sovereign 
state free to decide for itself its relations with other 
states.4
This brief statement captured succinctly the essence of the views 
expressed to Winspeare during his three weeks of consultations in Bahrain. 
It was always possible that the conclusions presented from such a mission 
could be open to challenge either by one of the parties directly concerned, 
or by others. That danger was amply demonstrated by the difficulty of 
the early negotiations between the parties, by the Soviet objection, and 
by official and press statements in such countries as Iraq and South Yemen. 
In its simplicity, directness and accuracy, Winspeare's concluding state­
ment presented little that could be objected to by any of the parties 
which had expressed a direct or indirect interest in the dispute.5
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. , para. 52.
3 Ibid. , para. 53.
4 Ibid. , para. 57.
5 Winspeare later commented that 
ment for some time after completing 
it down 'at one stroke' (interview,
he had pondered this concluding state- 
the rest of the report before writing 
Geneva, December 1977).
139
Internal affairs
In his instructions to Winspeare the Secretary General stated that
discussions of local politics by members of the mission was taboo.^ Bunche
advised Winspeare to make it clear at the outset that he would not be
concerned with local affairs and would strictly avoid involvement in
2internal political matters. Winspeare's public announcement on his
arrival in Bahrain stressed that his mission was specifically concerned
3with the question posed in the terms of reference.
But while the mission itself was able to avoid involvement in internal 
affairs, the negotiations leading up to the mission had unavoidably been 
influenced by aspects of Bahrain's internal situation. The ruling family's 
sensitivity to any proposal which it perceived as threatening the 
stability of its role had been reflected in the position adopted in the 
negotiations with Iran over the method of operation.
The approach adopted by the mission inevitably reflected that back­
ground. By giving the British and Bahrainis to understand that the 
representative would adopt an approach other than a plebiscite, while at 
the same time insisting on the 'ready and full access' clause which 
maintained the integrity of the exercise and the confidence of the 
Iranians, the Secretariat had facilitated agreement between the two 
external parties. But in so doing, it had implicitly taken a position with 
respect to the internal affairs of Bahrain. That is, the UN Secretariat 
would do nothing to disturb the political status quo within the islands.
Had the Secretariat, or for that matter, the Security Council, insisted
Secretary General to Winspeare, 20 March 1970.
Bunche to Winspeare, 24 March 1970.
Winspeare, statement on arrival at airport, 30 March 1970.
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on a plebiscite, the agreement might well have broken down. The subsequent 
widening of the dispute externally would most likely have provided oppor­
tunities for republican dissent within Bahrain, because of the tensions 
between republicanism and traditionalism in the Arab world. By facili­
tating the settlement of the external dispute it may be argued that the 
Secretariat had diminished the possibility of internal change.
The point is that there were unavoidable links between the internal 
and external aspects of the Bahrain situation, and the Secretariat's 
action on external aspects therefore could not fail to have internal impli­
cations. Thus the notion of non-interference in internal affairs could not 
mean that Secretariat actions had no effect on internal matters whatsoever. 
Effects of one kind or another, either tending to support the status quo 
or to support change, were impossible to avoid.
Thus the principle of non-interference in internal affairs meant in 
practice non-interference with the prevailing status quo. It should be 
noted that such a practice for the Secretariat was not derived from a 
belief in the inherent value of maintaining the status quo, but from the 
primary aim pursued by the Secretariat in accordance with the Charter - 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes. In the case of 
Bahrain, Thant and Bunche judged, in effect, that pursuit of that primary 
aim required strict adherence to the practice of non-interference with the 
prevailing status quo in the country in question.
Endorsement by the Security Council
Winspeare completed his mission by 18 April and his report was 
circulated to members of the Security Council by the Secretary General on 
30 April. Iran and Britain then requested a meeting of the Council for 
the purpose of considering the report.^
1 S/9779, letter from Iran, 4 May 1970; S/9783 letter from the United
Kingdom, 5 May 1970.
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The Council meeting was held on 11 May, and included in addition to
the current members, representatives of Iran and Southern Yemen, who had
specifically requested to be allowed to participate in the discussions.^
At the beginning of the meeting the President referred to a draft
resolution which had been prepared following consultations between the 
2members. He stated that members of the Council had already acquainted
themselves with the text and he therefore put the resolution prior to any
discussion. The resolution endorsing the report was adopted unanimously.'
Following the vote, the Iranian representative spoke of his govern-
4ment's commitment to a peaceful means of resolving the problem. The
British representative, referring to the 'prolonged and persistent
efforts' required to bring about a solution to the problem, stated that
this had been 'a classic example of how the peaceful settlement of
5disputes should be won'. He went on to say:
We had a deeply rooted dispute. There were strongly held 
views. At times the prospect of agreement seemed remote.
There were many halts and checks along the way.^
He described the resolution of the difficulties as being due to a number 
of converging favourable factors:
British restraint, Iranian magnanimity, United Nations 
impartiality, Italian fairness of judgement, and Arab 
dignity and self-respect. An irresistable combination.
S/9784, letter from Iran; S/9788, 7 May 1970; letter from the 
Democratic Republic of Southern Yemen, 8 May 1970.
S/PV1536, para. 7.
Ibid. For text of resolution see Appendix B.
Ibid. , para. 13.
Ibid. , para. 22.
Ibid. , para. 23.
Ibid., para. 31.7
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The U n i te d  S t a t e s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s t a t e d :
The r e a d i n e s s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  make t h e  n e c e s s a r y  accommo­
d a t i o n s  and t o  se ek  a s o l u t i o n  by n e g o t i a t i o n ,  i n q u i r y ,  and 
o t h e r  p e a c e f u l  means s h o u ld  s t a n d  a s  an exam ple  f o r  a l l  
n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  C h a r t e r  p r i n c i p l e s  
t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s . 1
The S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e ,  Ambassador M a lik ,  r e f e r r e d  to  h i s  l e t t e r  o f
o b j e c t i o n  and  s t a t e d  t h a t  h i s  d e l e g a t i o n  s t i l l  a d h e re d  to  th e  v iew p r e s e n t e d
i n  t h a t  docum en t,  b u t  he d i d  n o t  p u r s u e  t h e  m a t t e r  f u r t h e r .  H is  sp e e c h  was
d e v o te d  t o  an a t t a c k  on i m p e r ia l i s m  and t o  a d e fe n c e  o f  th e  ' j u s t  and
c o u ra g e o u s  s t r u g g l e  o f  t h e  p e o p le s  o f  t h e  Arab E a s t  f o r  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l
2
f reedom  and  human d i g n i t y .  S p a in  and F ra n ce  a l s o  e x p r e s s e d  some
r e s e r v a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  p r o c e d u r e .  S p a in ,  b e a r i n g  i n  mind i t s  d i f f e r e n c e s
3
w i th  B r i t a i n  o v e r  G i b r a l t a r ,  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h i s  was a s p e c i a l  c a s e .  I t
was n o t  a  c a s e  o f  d e c o l o n i s a t i o n ,  s i n c e  B r i t a i n  had  been  a p r o t e c t i n g
4r a t h e r  th a n  an a d m i n i s t e r i n g  power i n  B a h r a in .  S p a in  e x p l i c i t l y  s u p p o r t e d
t h e  v iew  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  good o f f i c e s  had  been  e x e r c i s e d  i n
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e ,  n o t  an
5
a c t  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  The S p a n ish  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f e l t  t h a t  th e  
C o u n c i l  s h o u ld  have  'c o n f i n e d  i t s e l f  t o  t a k i n g  n o te  o f  t h e  r e p o r t ' ,  b u t  
s t a t e d  t h a t  ' i f  a l l  p a r t i e s  c o n c e rn e d  a g re e  and  have  no r e s e r v a t i o n s  . . .
my d e l e g a t i o n  h a s  no o b j e c t i o n s  e i t h e r ' . ^
Ib id .  , p a r a .  53. 
Ib id .  , p a r a .  80. 
Ib id .  , p a r a .  66 .  
Ib id .  , p a r a .  61 . 
Ib id .  , p a r a .  62 . 
I b i d . , p a r a .  66.6
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The F ren ch  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s t a t e d  t h a t :
. . . t h e r e  was no r u l e  a g a i n s t  g o in g  o f f  t h e  b e a t e n  t r a c k ,  
and  d e m o n s t r a t in g  some i m a g in a t io n  p r o v id e d  th e  C o u n c i l  had  
t h e  l a s t  word i n  c o n s id e r in g  and  a p p ro v in g  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  
o f  t h e  i n q u i r y ,  a l t h o u g h  we and  o t h e r s  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  
w ould  have  w is h e d  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o  be  a s s o c i a t e d  e a r l i e r  w i th  
t h i s  a c t i o n .
He s t r e s s e d ,  how ever ,  t h a t  t h i s  was a s p e c i a l  c a s e  w hich  c o u ld  n o t  be
c o n s id e r e d  as  h a v in g  e s t a b l i s h e d  a p r e c e d e n t . ^
P a k i s t a n ,  r e f l e c t i n g  i t s  p o s i t i o n  on K ash m ir ,  n o t e d  t h a t  i f  e i t h e r  o f
t h e  p a r t i e s  w hich  had  r e q u e s t e d  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  good o f f i c e s  had
e x e r c i s e d  d i r e c t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  B a h r a in ,  ' t h e  a v o id a n c e  o f
t h e  method o f  p l e b i s c i t e  f o r  c o n s u l t i n g  th e  p o p u l a r  w i l l  c o u ld  have  been
2
open t o  c h a l l e n g e  by t h e  o t h e r ' .
3
S y r i a  and P o la n d  a t t a c k e d  im p e r i a l i s m  and  c o l o n i a l i s m ,  a s  d i d
S o u th e rn  Yemen w hich  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  o u t sp o k e n  a g a i n s t  B r i t i s h  a c t i o n s
4
i n  M uscat and Oman. B oth  S y r i a  and  S o u th e rn  Yemen made p o i n t e d  r e f e r ­
e n c e s  t o  t h e  m a j o r i t y  w is h  o f  B a h r a i n i s  t h a t  t h e i r  new ly in d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e
be  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  an Arab c o u n t r y ,  a  p o i n t  w hich  drew a b r i e f
5
r e p l y  from t h e  I r a n i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
The m a j o r i t y  o f  s p e a k e r s  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  p a i d  t r i b u t e  t o  th e  way i n  
w hich t h e  good o f f i c e s  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  h a d  been  u t i l i s e d  by th e  
p a r t i e s  to  t h e  d i s p u t e  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  C h a r t e r ,  
and  t h e  way i n  w hich  t h a t  r o l e  had  been  c a r r i e d  o u t  by th e  S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e ra l  and t h o s e  w o rk in g  c l o s e l y  w i th  him . In  a l l ,  th e  mood o f  th e
Ib id .  , p a r a s .  1 5 6 -1 5 7 .
2 Ib id .  , p a r a .  148 .
S y r i a ,  i b i d . ,  p a r a .  46; P o la n d ,  i b i d . ,  p a r a s .  102-104 .
Ib id .  , p a r a s .  1 3 7 -1 4 0 .
I b i d . ,  p a r a s .  1 6 0 -1 6 3 .5
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Council meeting was highlighted at the end by a brief recital from Lord
1Caradon, who had penned a few lines of verse which he read to the Council.
The President said that he hoped Lord Caradon would not hold it against
him if he too in conclusion came out on stage to take a curtain call, and
in a more serious vein he stated that the resolution of this affair had
2been to the Council's credit.
EFFECTS OF INTERMEDIARY ACTIVITY: SUMMARY
The secrecy which surrounded the negotiation of the agreement between 
Britain and Iran to seek formally the Secretary General's good offices makes 
it difficult to determine precisely all the effects which Thant and Bunche, 
as intermediaries, had on the parties and their negotiation.
However, some of the effects of both their early intermediary role, 
and of the Winspeare mission itself, may reasonably be assessed in terms of 
the checklist suggested by Young's analysis, as outlined in Chapter III, as 
follows:
1. The moderating effect of the presence of the UN Secretariat on the 
attitudes of the principal parties, Britain and Iran, was probably relatively 
slight, since both principals were actively seeking a solution. Even with­
out the presence of the Secretariat, it is unlikely that either Britain or 
Iran would have taken actions which might have aggravated their dispute 
while they were negotiating.
In the case of the Bahraini authorities, whose views were reflected by 
the British, the presence of the Secretariat appears to have been most 
significant in moderating their general attitudes and possibly in avoiding
1
2
Ibid. , para. 166. 
Ibid., paras. 169-172.
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actions or statements by them which might have made settlement more diffi­
cult. The UN presence in the negotiations was made emphatically apparent 
to the Bahrainis when Bunche made his special flight to Geneva. It is 
worth noting that in his public announcement before Winspeare's arrival, 
the President of the State Council adopted a conciliatory tone towards 
Iran, expressing a hope for 'a new era of friendship and constructive co­
operation with our Muslim neighbour, Iran'.^
2. Throughout the entire process the United Nations and the good offices 
role of the Secretariat provided a most important means for justifying 
concessions and rationalising flexible behaviour. This applied in respect 
of the Shah's initial statement in January 1969, the resolution of the 
differences over the method of operation, and the agreement of the parties 
to accept the findings of the Special Mission.
The significance of this effect in relation to the method of operation 
was emphatically underlined by the wording of Iran's formal request.
3. The Secretary General provided a source of external approval for the 
actions of the principal parties, in particular in his public announcement 
on 28 March. Both Britain and Iran took the opportunity to maximise the 
diplomatic advantages of such approval in their statements before the 
Security Council.
4. The Secretariat was able to clear up misunderstandings between the 
parties over the method of operation, in particular over the question of 
'ready and full access' by Bahraini organisations and individuals to the 
special representative.
1 Presidency of State Council of Bahrain, op. cit.
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5. Thant and Bunche indicated in a number of communications their 
conviction of the wider danger of a failure to settle the dispute.1 It 
seems likely that those dangers were emphasised to the parties during the 
consultations with them, in particular when agreement seemed difficult to 
achieve.
6. While the parties engaged in direct communication during the informal 
negotiations, the Secretariat provided an acceptable channel for the 
exchange of formal communications, in particular by transmitting the 
Iranian request formally to the British and in seeking their response.
7. The key focal point of agreement between the parties was their willling- 
ness to settle the dispute on the basis of ascertaining the wishes of the 
people of Bahrain. The Secretariat was able to create saliency by emphasis­
ing this key focal point, and building up confidence in both sides that the 
mission could be conducted in such a way as to meet the minimum conditions
of each.
8. On procedural points the Secretary General and Bunche were consulted 
about the drafts for the agreed order of procedure and suggested appropri­
ate amendments.
9. The Secretariat did not initiate any compromise or face saving pro­
cedure as such. The initiative for a means of settlement came first from 
the Shah of Iran, and the British responded with specific proposals. The 
eventual agreement over the method of operation was not the result of a
9
single initiative, but rather a process by which confidence was developed 
within both sides.
Secretary General to Winspeare, 20 March; Bunche to Winspeare, 24 
March 1970.
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The most important function of the Secretariat was that it provided 
a repository of good faith, and a guarantee that the initiative and pro­
cedure for settlement agreed upon in principle by both sides could be 
implemented in a way which took account of concerns which were of crucial 
importance to each.
CONCLUSION
Together, the quiet negotiations which took place in 1969 and 
Winspeare's good offices mission in March 1970 amounted to a successful 
exercise in preventive diplomacy. The possibility of an intensification 
of the longstanding dispute was averted, as was the prospect of that 
dispute having an adverse effect on international peace in the region and 
beyond.
The Shah of Iran's initiative in seeking a settlement of the Bahrain 
issue was consistent with his moves in the late 1960s and the early 1970s 
towards rapprochement with the Arab world,1 and his perception of common 
interests among oil producers. To have engaged in conflict over Bahrain 
would have put him on a collision course with the very countries which he 
was seeking to influence, and this was a powerful counterbalance to 
pressures for the reassertion of a claim to a Persian possession.2 
Furthermore, the Shah was determined to prevent the growth of revolution
3in the Gulf, and was fearful of the opportunities for Egyptian influence. 
Iran's concern to encourage co-operation in the area was indicated at the 
conclusion of the Iranian representative's speech in the Security Council,
For example, settlement of disputes over division of the continental 
shelf with Kuwait (settled June 1968), Saudi Arabia (August 1968) and 
Qatar (September 1969), (Mokhtader, op. oit. , p.37).
Ibid. , p.34.
3 Ibid.
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when he stated that 'a major obstacle has been removed from the path of 
fruitful co-operation in the Persian Gulf'. ^ At the same time it was 
possible for Iran to present itself as a peace loving nation dedicated to 
the principles of the UN Charter, an image that might give it some 
diplomatic advantage in its ongoing dispute with Iraq and its wider 
concerns in the Gulf area.
The British had no desire to have their withdrawal from east of Suez 
impeded by the reactivation of the Bahrain dispute, and were more than 
anxious to have it settled. They also wanted to avoid difficulties in the 
path of their proposal for a Federation of United Arab Emirates.
Thus both parties had strong reasons for seeking settlement. They 
also had a mutual interest in keeping the settlement of their dispute to 
the specific issue of Bahrain and avoiding wider political debate and 
pressure. By reaching agreement through quiet and direct negotiations, 
the two countries were able to sidestep the possibility of a prolonged 
Security Council debate in which the super powers might well have 
broadened the issues and made settlement more difficult.
While there were pressing reasons for each of the principal parties
to seek a settlement of their dispute, it was by no means a foregone
conclusion that they would be able to reach agreement. And in the event of
failure, the possibility of military confrontation posed the threat of
a serious increase in tension in the area. Iran's action at the end of
2the following year in forcibly annexing two small islands in the Gulf,
S/PV1536, para. 16.
2 Albaharna, op. ott. , pp.334-348. The islands were the Greater and 
Lesser Tunb at the entrance to the Gulf. Iranian troops also occupied 
the island of Abn Musa following an agreement between Iran and the Emir 
of Sharjah.
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and t h e  s t r o n g  r e a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  Arab n a t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  I r a q ' s  a c t i o n  i n
b r e a k in g  o f f  d ip lo m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  I r a n  and  B r i t a i n , ^ d e m o n s t ra te d
th e  d a n g e rs  w hich  m ig h t  have e x i s t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  B a h r a in .
The s i g n i f i c a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  UN S e c r e t a r i a t  in v o lv e m e n t  was t h a t
i t s  i n t e r m e d ia r y  r o l e  e n a b le d  t h e  two p a r t i e s  t o  r e a c h  ag re e m e n t  and th u s
p r e s e r v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e .  Members o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  r e g a r d  th e
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  B a h r a in  d i s p u t e  a s  an  o u t s t a n d i n g  example o f  th e  s u c c e s s -
2
f u l  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  good o f f i c e s  r o l e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l .  In  h i s
f i n a l  e i g h t e e n  m onths o f  o f f i c e ,  T h a n t  r e f e r r e d  s e v e r a l  t im e s  t o  th e
e x e r c i s e  a s  a model f o r  t h e  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  d i s p u t e s .
F u r th e rm o re ,  i t  was t h e  f i r s t  t im e  t h a t  a good o f f i c e s  m is s io n  had  ended  i n
4a fo rm a l  a c t i o n  by t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  and  i t  was a l s o  th e  f i r s t  t im e  
t h a t  two d i s p u t a n t s  had  a g re e d  in  advance  t o  a c c e p t ,  s u b j e c t  t o  S e c u r i t y
5C o u n c i l  e n d o rs e m e n t ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a U n i t e d  N a t io n s  good o f f i c e s  i n q u i r y .  
One w r i t e r  commented t h a t  ' t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  h a s  s c o r e d  
a q u i e t  t r iu m p h  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r o p o r t i o n s ' . 6
Ib id .  , p .3 4 6 .  I r a q  a c c u s e d  B r i t a i n  and I r a n  o f  c o l l u s i o n .  Some 
o b s e r v e r s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  S h a h 's  c o n c e s s io n s  o v e r  B a h ra in  had  been  p a r t  
o f  a s e c r e t  b a r g a i n  s t r u c k  w i th  B r i t a i n  r e l a t i n g  t o  th e  a n n e x a t io n  o f  th e  
t h r e e  i s l a n d s  ( e . g .  C o t t r e l l ,  op. c i t .  , p . 1 4 ) , a  s u g g e s t i o n  w hich h a s  been  
e m p h a t i c a l l y  r e j e c t e d  by S i r  G e o f f r e y  A r t h u r ,  who was B r i t i s h  P o l i t i c a l  
R e s id e n t  a t  t h e  t im e  ( i n t e r v i e w ,  O x fo rd ,  May 1 9 7 8 ) .
2
I n t e r v i e w s ,  New York and  Geneva, A p r i l ,  November, December, 1977.
3
For  exam ple ,  d u r in g  h i s  s p e ec h  t o  t h e  R oyal Commonwealth S o c i e t y  i n  
London, 15 June  1970 ( i n  P'ublic Papers o f  th e  S e c r e ta r ie s  General o f  the  
U nited N a tio n s , v o l .  V I I I ,  p p . 3 8 1 -3 8 3 ) ;  i n  t h e  In tro d u c tio n  to  the Report 
o f  the  S ecre ta ry  G eneral, 14 S ep tem ber  1970 , (A /8 0 0 1 /A d d . l ,  p a r a .  4 9 6 ) ;  
a l s o  h i s  Correspondents A sso c ia tio n  Speech, 21 S ep tem ber  1971 (SG/SM/1531)
4 U T h a n t ,  sp e ec h  t o  t h e  Royal Commonwealth S o c i e t y ,  London, op. <yit. , 
p .3 8 2 .
5
U T h a n t ,  View from the  UN, p .5 0 .
Gordon, op . c i t . ,  p .5 6 6 .
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The Iranian Parliament reaffirmed Iran's acceptance of the Security
Council resolution on 14 May 1970.'*' On 15 August 1971 the Special treaty
2relations between Bahrain and Britain were terminated. Bahrain was
admitted to the Arab League on 18 August 1971, and on 11 September 1971
3became a member of the United Nations.
Mokhtader, op. cit ., 
Albahama, op. oit., 
Mokhtader, op. cit.,
p . 21.
pp.393-394.
p . 22.3
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY THREE: BANGLADESH, 1971
INTRODUCTION
In 1970 President Yahya Khan of Pakistan announced his country's first 
nationwide elections on a one man-one vote basis. The elections were 
delayed twice, first by widespread floods then by a devastating cyclone 
which hit the Bengal area in December 1970, killing one million people and 
destroying vital food crops. Resentment over the way in which the central 
Pakistan Government responded to the two disasters contributed to the 
movement for Bengali autonomy which had already been developing for some 
time.^
Sheik Mujibur Rahman's Awami League swept to a massive victory, with
167 out of 169 seats in the East, enough for a majority out of the total
of 313 seats nationwide. His nearest rival was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the
2Pakistan People's Party (PPP) with 88 seats, all in the West.
There is a considerable literature on the Bangladesh war and the 
events leading up to it. An account which is representative of the 
Bangladesh point of view is contained in G.W. Choudhury, 'Bangladesh:
Why It Happened', International Affairs, Vol. 48, No.2. A strongly pro- 
Pakistan account is presented by L. Rushbrook Williams, The East 
Pakistan Tragedy, Tom Stacey, London, 1972. A more objective and compre­
hensive account is Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: IndiaPakistan3
Bangla Desh, Chatto and Windus, London, 1975. Jackson gives many details 
of both internal political influences within these countries, and the 
often intense international diplomacy which occurred throughout the crisis. 
Another account of the international influences is contained in Nicole 
Ball, Regional Conflicts and the International System: A Case Study of
Bangladesh, ISIO Monograph, First series, No.9, Institute for the Study 
of International Organisations, University of Sussex, 1974.
2
Bangladesh Documents, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. I, 
September 1971, p.130.
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The Awami League v i c t o r y  m eant t h a t  th e  W est had  to  e n t e r  i n to
s e r io u s  d i s c u s s io n s  on th e  E a s t ' s  g r ie v a n c e s  and demands f o r  g r e a t e r
p o l i t i c a l  and  econom ic autonom y, p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s  e x p re s s e d  in  th e  Awami
L e a g u e 's  'S i x  P o i n t s '  on w hich  i t  had  cam paigned  in  th e  e l e c t i o n .  The
'S ix  P o i n t s '  p ro p o se d  t h a t  th e  c e n t r a l  governm en t w ould be r e s p o n s ib le
o n ly  f o r  d e fe n c e  and f o re ig n  a f f a i r s ,  w h ile  th e  two w ings o f  P a k is ta n
w ould  ea ch  have  s e p a r a te  c u r r e n c i e s ,  f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s ,  f o r e ig n  t r a d e ,  a id
and exchange  a r ra n g e m e n ts , and  p a r a - m i l i t a r y  forces."*"
F o llo w in g  a p e r io d  o f  p o l i t i c a l  m a n o e u v rin g , B h u tto  announced  in
F e b ru a ry  1971 t h a t  th e  PPP w ould  b o y c o t t  th e  N a t io n a l  A ssem bly , due to
2
m eet i n  D acca on 3 M arch. On 1 M arch, Yahya Khan p o s tp o n e d  th e  A ssem bly 
i n d e f i n i t e l y .  The Awami L eague m ounted a m ass iv e  non c o - o p e r a t io n  move­
m ent w ith  w id e s p re a d  s u p p o r t  from  th e  p o p u la t io n  o f  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  
in c lu d in g  th e  c i v i l i a n  a d m in i s t r a t io n  and  th e  p o l i c e ,  and  th e  League 
v i r t u a l l y  becam e th e  de f a c to  governm en t o f  P a k i s t a n 's  E a s te r n  w ing .
Yahya Khan fle w  to  D acca f o r  m e e tin g s  w ith  M u jib u r and was l a t e r  jo in e d  
by B h u tto . B u t on th e  n ig h t  o f  25 M arch th e  P a k i s t a n  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s ,
w hich h ad  been  b u i l t  up to  a s t r e n g t h  o f  4 0 ,0 0 0  men d u r in g  th e  p r e v io u s  
3
th r e e  w eek s , to o k  o v e r  D acca , C h it ta g o n g  and o t h e r  m a jo r  c e n t r e s  a m id s t
w id e s p re a d  and  b lo o d y  f i g h t i n g .  M u jib u r was a r r e s t e d  and  ta k e n  to  
4I s la m a b a d .____________
G overnm ent o f  P a k i s t a n ,  White Paper on th e  C r is is  in  E ast P a k is ta n ,
5 A u g u st 1971 , A ppendix  C. F o r a  d e t a i l e d  s ta te m e n t  on th e  s i x  p o i n t s ,  
r e l e a s e d  by M u jib u r Rahman on 23 M arch 1966 , s e e  Bangladesh Doeimients , 
V ol. I ,  p p .2 3 -3 3 ;  f o r  th e  Awami L eague E le c t io n  M a n ife s to  o f  1970 s e e  
i b i d . ,  p p .6 6 -8 1 ; f o r  a sp e e c h  by M u jib u r Rahman on 25 O c to b e r  1970 c la im ­
in g  t h a t  th e  s i x  p o i n t s  w ould  n o t  d e s t r o y  P a k i s t a n  o r  I s la m , s e e  ib id .  , 
p p .1 0 2 -1 0 4 .
Ib id . , p . 155.
J a c k s o n , op. c i t .  , p .3 3 .
^ To b e g in  w i th ,  th e  o u t s id e  w o r ld  knew n o th in g  o f  M u jib u r R ahm an's 
f a t e .  I t  was i n i t i a l l y  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  he  had  gone u n d e rg ro u n d  w ith  o t h e r  
Awami League l e a d e r s  {The S ta tesm an, D e lh i ,  27 M arch 1 9 7 1 ). H is  a r r e s t  
was n o t  announced  u n t i l  Ju n e  (se e  p .1 7 6 ,  in f r a ) .
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The Pakistan Government claimed later that reports had become avail­
able of Awami League plans to launch a rebellion in the early hours of 
26 March.^ The Prime Minister of the provisional government of Bangladesh, 
Tajuddin Ahmed, claimed that no ultimatim was given to the Awami League 
and no curfew order was issued. He claimed that by the time first martial 
law proclamations were broadcast on the morning of 26 March some fifty
2thousand people, including many women and children, had been butchered.
Yahya Khan returned to Islamabad on 25 March, a few hours before the
army acted. On 26 March he announced in a broadcast to the nation that he
had banned all political activity, banned the Awami League, imposed press
censorship and had ordered the army to 'do their duty and fully restore 
3the government'. On the same day the Awami League issued a declaration of
4independence in a clandestine radio broadcast.
The East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and the East Bengal Regiment (EBR) 
both rebelled and joined with the police and irregulars to fight the 
Pakistan Army. The whole of densely populated East Pakistan was plunged 
into civil war. Each side levelled grave charges of atrocities against the 
other. The Pakistan Government accused the Bengalis of murdering all non 
Bengali officers in the EPR and EBR and attempting to wipe out the Urdu
White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, p.27.
2 United Asia, May-June 1971, p.132. Tajuddin Ahmed was named Prime 
Minister in the Bangladesh war cabinet on 3 April (Times of India, New 
Delhi, 13 April 1971).
3 White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, Appendix A, speech by 
Yahya Khan, 26 March 1971, pp.12-13; also Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, 
p.275.
The Statesman, Delhi, toe. cit. Also u Thant, View from the UN, p.421. 
The declaration was broadcast in Mujibur Rahman's name. Over the next few 
weeks, announcements by the Provisional Government of Bangladesh gave the 
impression that Mujibur Rahman was with the other leaders.
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speaking Biharis. The newly-proclaimed government of Bangladesh accused
2the Pakistan A m y  of committing genocide. Foreign journalists were
ordered to leave East Pakistan on 26 March, but there were continuing
reports in newspapers throughout the world of a systematic annihilation
of Hindus and Awami League activists by the Pakistan Amy. Those news
items gained credence in the light of reports by such bodies as the World 
3Bank.
From the beginning of the civil war India strongly supported the East
Bengali rebels. On 31 March the Indian Parliament unanimously passed a
resolution moved by the Prime Minister condemning Pakistan's actions and
assuring the people of East Bengal of the 'wholehearted support and sym-
4pathy of the people of India'.
Early in April the first refugees began to cross the border, the fore­
runners of what was to become the largest refugee movement in human 
history. As the scale of suffering became apparent, the internal 
upheavals in East Pakistan rapidly became not only a cause for inter­
national concern, but also a direct threat to international peace.
White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, Appendix D.
2 For example, in the Bangladesh 'Proclamation of Independence Order',
10 April 1971 (in Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, pp.280-282).
3 Excerpts from the World Bank Report are reprinted in Bangladesh 
Documents, Vol. I, pp.515-519. Another independent report which documented 
atrocities some time later was produced by the International Commission of 
Jurists: The Events in East Pakistan3 1971, Geneva, 1972.
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, p.672. Two months earlier tensions 
between India and Pakistan had been aggravated by an incident in which two 
young Kashmiris hijacked an Indian airliner to Lahore, where it was blown 
up. India withdrew over-flight rights for Pakistani military and civil 
aircraft.
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U THANT'S EARLY QUIET DIPLOMACY
U Thant expressed his concern over the situation in East Pakistan to
President Yahya Khan shortly after the events of 25 March 1971.^ Within
48 hours of the military action he met with Pakistan's Permanent
Representative, Ambassador Shahi, and asked him to inform President Khan
of his concern with regard to both the humanitarian aspects and the
potential threat to peace and stability. On 29 March the Indian Permanent
Representative, Ambassador Sen, visited Thant to outline the views of his 
2government. From that point the Secretary General was in continuous 
touch with the governments of both India and Pakistan.
Pakistan's objections
On 30 March Thant assured Ambassador Sen, in a note replying to his
representations, that 'both from personal conviction and as Secretary
General of the United Nations, I am never neutral on humanitarian issues'.’
But he pointed to two obstacles standing in the way of action by the
Secretary General, the first being the lack of authoritative information
and the second being 'the claims of governments that the Secretary
4General has no right to interfere in their internal affairs'. This was 
clearly a reference to the Pakistan Government's attitude, as outlined to 
him by Ambassador Shahi. Thant stated that his authority was'limited to
Introduction to Annual Report of the Secretary General, A/8401/Add.l, 
17 September 1971, para. 178.
2 Thomas w. Oliver, The United Rations and Bangladesh: A Private
History, UN Secretariat, New York, March 1974 (to be published), pp.12-13. 
Oliver's account was prepared within the Secretariat and it includes 
extensive verbatim quotations from letters, cables and memoranda on the 
Bangladesh crisis which in many cases are available only within the 
Secretariat.
3
Introduction to Annual Report, 1971, loc. cit.
4 Secretary General to Ambassador Sen, 30 March 1971, Oliver, op. cvt.3
p . 13.
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what is granted . . .  by the consent of Member Governments'.
The second of these obstacles was by far the more intractable.
India's reply sought immediately to bypass the problem of domestic juris­
diction by arguing that the scale of suffering in East Pakistan was such
that the situation ceased to be a matter of domestic concern for 
2Pakistan alone. India stated at the very beginning that the situation
was bound to increase tensions in the relations between India and Pakistan,
and that it was likely to result in a flow of refugees across the border.
India believed that the 'international community can and should take
3suitable action to deal with the situation'.
The position adopted in this early Indian Government statement was
more flexible and certainly more amenable to UN involvement, than the
position which India adopted later. By seeking an early meeting with the
Secretary General on the East Pakistan crisis, and by referring
explicitly to the matter of relations between India and Pakistan, the
Indian representative held open the door for United Nations participation
in attempts to maintain peace between the two countries.
Although there appeared to be Indian support for United Nations
involvement, Thant's reply to the Indian statement was very low-key. He
said that he would inform the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
of India's anxieties, and he advised the Indian Government to contact the
4International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). His note referred only 
to the Indian Government's concern about the refugees and did not respond
1 Ibid.
2 Note Verbale from Ambassador Sen to Secretary General, 30 March 1971, 
Oliver, op. oit. , pp.13-14.
Ibid.
Oliver, op. oit., p.14.4
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to the key statement in the Indian note, which referred to the threat of
increased tensions in Indo-Pakistani relations.
Pakistan's initial opposition to UN involvement in any form was
demonstrated after Thant released a press statement on 1 April, four days
after the military action, stating that he was very concerned about the
'loss of life and human suffering resulting from the recent developments
in East Pakistan'.^  Ambassador Shahi sent him a note protesting that this
2statement amounted to a violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter. Yet in 
the same note it could be said that Pakistan also opened the door to 
involvement by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining inter­
national peace. The note accused India of attempting to undermine the 
national solidarity and territorial integrity of Pakistan, citing as 
evidence the Indian Parliament's resolution on East Pakistan, Indian
propaganda, and claims that India was infiltrating armed volunteers over 
3the borders.
Thus, within eleven days of the military action, each party had gone 
on record in notes to the Secretary General with charges that the actions 
of the other party constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. Neither, of course, admitted the charges laid against it by the 
other. But the fact that such charges had been made by both sides appeared 
at least to give the Secretary General an opening capable of being exploited 
in order to establish the legitimacy on his own involvement and that of 
other United Nations organs such as the Security Council.
SG/SM/1446, 1 April 1971.
2 Note Verbale, Ambassador Shahi to Secretary General, 7 April 1971, 
Oliver, op. oit., p.15.
3 Ibid.
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Events in April and May
Early in April the Soviet Union, the United States and China
indicated their positions. On 2 April, President Podgorny of the USSR
appealed to Khan to end the repression in East Pakistan and to move
towards a political settlement.'*’ A week later Premier Chou-En Lai pledged
China's full support to Pakistan, stating that the crisis was purely 
2internal. In the meantime a US State Department spokesman said 'we con­
tinue to believe it important that every feasible step be taken to end
3the conflict and achieve a peaceful accommodation'. In this and subsequent
statements Washington carefully refrained from any condemnation of the
4Pakistan Government's actions.
During most of April Pakistan denied widespread reports of continued
fighting, stating that order was being restored and there were 'no untoward 
5incidents'. On 17 April the Awami League announced the formation of the 
Democratic Government of Bangladesh in Chuadanga, which was designated as 
the provisional capital. The following day Chuadanga was captured by the 
Pakistan Army. The rebel movement appeared to many outside observers to 
be facing imminent defeat.6
In the forum provided by the United Nations India took a number of 
opportunities to condemn Pakistani actions. On 12 May 1971, in a discussion 
on human rights in the Social Committee of the Economic and Social Council,
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, p.510. Jackson, op. cit., p.40; 
Oliver, op. cit., p.16.
2 Jackson, op. cit., pp.41-42. Oliver, loc. cit.
3 Jackson, op. <yit., p.42.
4 Ibid., p.150.
Oliver, loc. cit.
6 Ibid.
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India accused Pakistan of violating human rights on 'an unprecedented
scale'.’*’ Pakistan's representative replied that the statement by India
2'amounted to interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan'. He 
accused 'the secessionist movement' in East Bengal of embarking on 'a 
senseless slaughter of Pakistanis not of Bengali origin', complained that 
the world press had been very hostile to the Pakistan Government, and 
accused the Indian Government of 'playing a major role in that campaign' 
and trying to profit from the opportunity to dismember Pakistan. He 
claimed the Pakistan Army had intervened to put a stop to the violations 
of human rights, but admitted that Pakistan was 'in an exceedingly diffi­
cult position'. He implicitly admitted the conflict of principles by 
stating that certain departures were even permissible from the criteria
laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when the existence
3of the state was at stake. Later he said that Pakistan had been obliged 
to resort to extreme measures to defend its existence and territorial 
integrity against a group of fanatics who were receiving arms and support 
from India.^
At the same time there were signs of increasing Indian frustration at 
the slow reaction of the international community to events on the Indian 
sub-continent. When the Indian Parliament passed its resolution of support 
for the East Bengalis on 31 March, many Members thought it was not worded 
strongly enough, but Prime Minister Indira Gandhi insisted that the Indian
E/AC.7/SR.669, 12 May 1971, pp.10-12.
Ibid., p .13.
Ibid.
4 E/AC.7/SR677, 18 May 1971, p.110.
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Government had to act 'within international norms'.1 On 24 May, however, 
in a speech to the Indian Parliament, after pleading with other powers to 
recognise the need for a political solution, Mrs Gandhi warned that:
If the world does not take heed we shall be constrained to take 
all measures as may be necessary to ensure our own security and 
the preservation and development of the structure of our social 
and economic life.^
As Mrs Gandhi warned the world, India stepped up its support to the
3Bandladesh movement and to the guerilla fighters, the Mukti Fauj. Rebel
fighters were reported to be trained at camps on the Indian side of the
4border and the 'free Bangladesh radio' was located in Indian territory. 
There was increasing pressure within India, especially in Parliament, for 
the Indian Government to officially recognise the Provisional Government 
of Bangladesh.
By the end of May, the Indian Government had begun to commit itself 
in both words and actions to the success of the Bangladesh movement. 
Inevitably such a commitment was accompanied by more strident attacks on 
Pakistan and greater defensiveness about the actions of India. The 
earlier private representations to the Secretary General about the threat 
to international peace were superseded by covert military assistance to 
the rebels, and a growing unwillingness to discuss the external aspects 
of the situation with the UN Secretariat.
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, p.670.
2 Ibid. , p .677.
3 Renamed the Mukti Bahini on 15 July (ibid. , p.336).
4
The Times, London, 2 June 1971.
5 'Foreign Minister's reply to the short duration discussions regarding 
demand for recognition of Bangladesh in Rajya Sabha on 25 May 1971' , 
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, pp.676-680.
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Since 25 March the Pakistan Government had been extremely defensive 
about its actions and the internal situation in the country, protesting 
strongly at every mention of that situation on the international stage. 
Defensiveness of this kind had meant from the outset an unwillingness to 
engage in discussion of the political issues. Thus within a few short 
weeks of the onset of the crisis Thant was confronted with a situation in 
which neither of the parties wanted the United Nations to take action on 
the political issues, either formally through the Security Council, or 
informally through the Secretariat. Moreover, because of the stance 
adopted by each of the parties, none of the permanent members of the 
Security Council would support a call for a meeting. Thant wrote in his 
memoirs that for four months he was in almost daily contact, not only with 
India and Pakistan, but also with individual members of the Council, most 
of whom refused even to discuss the situation. He described the exercise 
as 'futile'
Domestic jurisdiction
The problem of domestic jurisdiction had previously bedevilled UN
attempts to mediate in the long-standing dispute between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir. After the 1965 India-Pakistan war, India had
refused to attend meetings of the Security Council on the Kashmir question,
and in reply to Pakistan's letters to the Council on Indian Government
actions in Kashmir, invariably stated that the matters raised were within
2the domestic jurisdiction of India. While Pakistan was highly critical 
3of this approach it adopted precisely the same response to calls for UN
1 u Thant, View from the UN, p.423.
2 Letter from India to the President of the Security Council, S/10094,
28 January 1971.
3 Letter from Pakistan to the President of the Security Council, S/10102, 
5 February 1971.
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action over the situation in East Pakistan. Pakistan's representative at
the United Nations stated that to raise the situation of East Pakistan in
the Economic and Social Council was 'tantamount to having the United
Nations discuss the political system in Pakistan'.^
Thus, just as India had claimed the UN had no jurisdiction over the
Indian Government actions in Kashmir, now Pakistan claimed the same
prerogative with regard to East Bengal, despite the fact that Pakistan had
earlier strongly attacked India for its attitude and had compared it to the
2South African approach to UN debates on apartheid. The Pakistan 
representative sought to distinguish its position on East Bengal from that 
of India on Kashmir. He argued that the East Bengalis had exercised their 
right to self-determination at the time of partition, and thenceforth East 
Bengal was an integral part of Pakistan. The Kashmiris had been denied the 
right of self-determination by India, he said, and therefore India's claim 
of domestic jurisdiction in that case was invalid. India, on the other 
hand, maintained that the actions of the Pakistan Government in East Bengal 
were so atrocious and unprecedented in their scale that international 
concern, indeed international intervention, could no longer be justly denied 
on the grounds of domestic jurisdiction.
The dilemma with regard to UN involvement was that India increasingly 
denied the existence of an international dispute, since this would have 
implied admission of Indian involvement, but exhorted the UN to take action 
over the situation within East Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan denied 
UN jurisdiction with respect to the internal situation in East Pakistan, 
while urging the UN to act with regard to the 'interference' of India.
Each country clearly wanted only those forms of UN involvement which would
E/AC.7/SR.669, p.14.
2 S/10102, para. 8.
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have been  f a v o u r a b le  t o  i t s  own c a s e , w h i l e  a t  t h e  same t im e  s t r o n g l y  
o p p o s in g  any UN in v o lv e m e n t  w hich  i t  p e r c e iv e d  a s  b e in g  i n i m i c a l  t o  i t s  
i n t e r e s t s .
The s e c r e t  good o f f i c e s  a t t e m p t
W hile  T h a n t  was a t t e m p t in g  t o  g e t  members o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t o
c o n s id e r  t h e  d e v e lo p in g  c r i s i s ,  a t  t h e  same t im e  he  s e t  i n  m o tion  an
i m a g in a t iv e  s e c r e t  i n i t i a t i v e  w hich  s o u g h t  t o  g e t  a ro u n d  th e  o b s t a c l e
c r e a t e d  by P a k i s t a n ' s  p e r s i s t e n t  i n v o c a t i o n  o f  d o m e s t ic  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  I t
has  been  r e v e a l e d  o n ly  i n  h i s  r e c e n t l y  p u b l i s h e d  m em oirs .^  On 23 A p r i l  he
w ro te  a s e c r e t  l e t t e r  t o  Tunku Abdul Rahman, a s k in g  him t o  e x e r c i s e  h i s
good o f f i c e s  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  a v i a b l e  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t
be tw een  Yahya Khan and th e  Awami L eague . The Tunku had  fo rm e r ly  been  Prim e
M i n i s t e r  o f  M a la y s ia  and was a t  t h a t  t im e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  o f  th e  I s l a m i c
C o n fe re n c e  o f  F o re ig n  M i n i s t e r s .  T h a n t  d e s c r i b e d  him as  h a v in g  immense
p e r s o n a l  p r e s t i g e  i n  th e  I s l a m i c  w o r ld ,  and a f r i e n d  o f  t h e  l a t e
2
J a w a h a r l a l  N ehru  as  w e l l  a s  Yahya Khan. T han t  c l e a r l y  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  Tunku
would be a b l e  t o  p l a y  a s p e c i a l  r o l e  i n  ' r e s o l v i n g  t h i s  t r a g i c  c o n f l i c t
3
betw een  b r o t h e r  M oslem s ',  u n d o u b te d ly  b e a r i n g  i n  mind t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f
4
r e l i g i o u s  f a c t o r s  i n  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c s  o f  P a k i s t a n .
I t  seemed t h a t  th e  Tunku was l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  be f a c e d  by an u n w i l l i n g n e s s  
t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  P a k i s t a n  on t h e  g rounds  o f  d o m e s t ic  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  th a n  would be t h e  c a se  w i t h  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  U n i te d  
N a t i o n s .
U T h a n t ,  View from the  UN, p p . 424 -4 2 5 .  The t e x t  o f  h i s  l e t t e r  t o  Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, and th e  Tunku ' s  r e p l y ,  i s  i n c l u d e d  i n  an a p p e n d ix ,  p p . 496 -497 .
Ib id .  , p .4 2 4 .
3 Ib id .  , p .497 .
4 See e a r l i e r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a s p e ec h  by M u jib u r  Rahman, p .1 5 2 ,  supra.
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T h a n t  a d v is e d  th e  Tunku he  f e l t  t h a t  ' t im e  i s  o f  t h e  e s s e n c e  and . . . 
q u ic k  a c t i o n  i s  n e e d e d ' ,  and he  r a p i d l y  r e c e i v e d  an a f f i r m a t i v e  c a b l e . 1 
The Tunku s a i d  he had  b een  a p p ro a c h e d  by many Muslim o r g a n i s a t i o n s  
p r e v i o u s l y ,  b u t  had been  c a u t i o u s  b e c a u s e  t h e  P a k i s t a n  Government 'd o e s  n o t  
welcome o u t s i d e  h e l p ' .  However, he s a i d ,  Yahya Khan was w e l l  d i s p o s e d  and 
had  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  Tunku c o u ld  come t o  P a k i s t a n  any t im e .  He con­
s i d e r e d  i t  ' a  p r i v i l e g e  t o  u n d e r ta k e  a t a s k  i n  t h e  name o f  God and i n  th e
2c a u se  o f  h u m a n i t y ' , and was 'h appy  t o  s e r v e  a s  r e q u e s t e d  by y o u ' .
T h a n t  and th e  Tunku a g re e d  t h a t  i f  and when he c o n t a c t e d  Yahya Khan
he would  n o t  d i s c l o s e  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  had  a p p ro a c h e d  h im , b u t
would  p ro c e e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  a p p ro a c h e s  from  Muslim o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
He s u c c e e d e d  i n  m ee t in g  w i t h  Yahya Khan on 17 J u l y ,  and in fo rm e d  T h a n t  t h a t
h i s  t a l k s  were ' s a t i s f a c t o r y ' .  He th e n  w en t t o  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  t o  make an
' o n - t h e - s p o t '  s tu d y  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  b e f o r e  f l y i n g  t o  S au d i  A r a b ia .  From
t h e r e  he s e n t  T h a n t  a n o th e r  l e t t e r  o u t l i n i n g  h i s  p l a n s  t o  g e t  Yahya Khan
and I n d i r a  Gandhi t o g e t h e r .  T h an t  q u o te s  him  a s  s t a t i n g  t h a t  'b o t h  . . .
l e a d e r s ,  I  t h i n k ,  a r e  am enable  t o  r e a s o n  b u t  b o t h  a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  be
3
h a r a s s e d  by t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  mood o f  t h e  n a t i o n s ' .
In  h i s  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  Tunku ' s  e f f o r t s ,  T h a n t  d e a l t  s k e t c h i l y  w i th  
w ha t  happened  n e x t ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  I n d i a  would  n o t  r e c e i v e  a d e l e g a t i o n  o f  
t h e  I s l a m i c  C o n fe re n c e ,  a l th o u g h  i t  had  h ig h  r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  Tunku. On 7 
Sep tem ber he r e c e i v e d  a l e n g th y  s e c r e t  r e p o r t  from  t h e  Tunku, w i t h  a l e t t e r  
s t a t i n g  t h a t  he  was u n a b le  t o  v i s i t  West B e n g a l  i n  I n d i a  'b e c a u s e  o f
4
I n d i a ' s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  I s l a m i c  C o n f e r e n c e ' .
1 u T h a n t ,  View from the  UN, p .4 9 7 .
2 Ib id .
3 I b i d . ,  p p . 424 -425 .
4 Ib id .
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Thant did not elaborate on the contents of the Tunku's secret report, but 
the implication was clear - while India was calling publicly for a 
political settlement between Pakistan and the Awami League, it had prevented 
a visit to the Awami League leaders in West Bengal by the person whose good 
offices held, at that time, perhaps the best hope of achieving such a 
settlement. It was symptomatic of the dilemmas which confronted any 
attempt to mediate in the situation that India's position could be justified 
in terms of pro-Pakistani statements made by individual Islamic nations - 
including Malaysia - in early April, and by a twenty-two nation conference 
of Muslim countries in June.^ The problem seemed to be that any mediator 
who was acceptable to one side was, almost by definition, unacceptable to 
the other.
Difficulties for the secretariat
Thant firmly believed that although his good offices were available to
the parties if they wished to use them, he could not press upon the parties
an intermediary role which they did not wish to accept. This belief was
reinforced by the likelihood that greater assertion of the Secretary
General's political role would jeopardise his efforts to win the Pakistan
Government's co-operation in establishing an effective humanitarian relief
2operation in the east. Yahya Khan agreed to receive a representative of
the Secretary General in June only 'on the understanding that his role and
3activities would be within the framework of humanitarian assistance'.
Jackson, op. cit., p.38.
2 The next chapter describes the efforts of the Secretary General and 
his Secretariat to overcome the difficulties which confronted them on the 
humanitarian aspects.
3 Letter from Ambassador Shahi to Secretary General, 22 May 1971, in 
SG/SM/1484.
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Thus the humanitarian crisis, which itself arose out of the political 
crisis, imposed an additional pressure against initiatives directed towards 
the political situation.
The task of improvising two humanitarian operations of unprecedented
magnitude, one in India, and one in Pakistan, stretched the Secretariat's
internal resources to the limit.^ Oliver comments that the burden on the
2small handful of officials at the centre was impossibly heavy. Further­
more, as the political crisis developed, the Secretary General lost one of
his most stalwart supports. Dr Bunche had been, as Oliver put it, a
3'pivotal figure in the handling of so many previous crises'. But his
health had been deteriorating for some time and in June, despite his own
4determination to press on, he had to retire.
On 19 June, the Secretary General himself required medical attention
in his office and was told by his doctor that he should not undertake
extensive travel. He therefore had to cancel a projected trip to several 
5countries. Thant had already announced that he would not accept another 
term of office. He told newsmen that one of the main reasons was that he 
had not had even two or three days rest in the last five years.^ And as 
he continued working under heavy strain in his last six months as Secretary 
General, amongst all the imponderables which he had to take into account in
See next chapter.
Oliver, op. oit., p.99.
3 Ibid.
4 UN Office of Public Information (OPI), Note to correspondents, No.3694, 
10 October 1971.
5 OPI, Note to correspondents, No.3673, 25 June 1971. It seems likely 
that Thant intended to visit the Indian sub-continent in view of the 
seriousness of the situation regarding the refugees in West Bengal but it 
has not been possible to definitely confirm this (letter to the writer from 
C.V.Narasimhen, Under Secretary General for Inter-Agency Affairs and Co­
ordination, 5 May 1968).
SG/SM/1488, 1 June 1971, transcript of press conference by Secretary 
General, U Thant, held in Boston on 27 May 1971.
167
s e e k in g  th e  c o r r e c t  c o u rse  o f  a c t i o n ,  T h an t had  a l s o  to  keep  in  mind t h a t  
h i s  s u c c e s s o r ,  a s  y e t  unknown, w ould  be fa c e d  w ith  th e  co n seq u e n c e s  o f  th e  
a c t i o n  ta k e n .^
THE MEMORANDUM TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
A f te r  m e e tin g  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l on 15 J u n e , th e  In d ia n  M in i s te r
f o r  E x te r n a l  A f f a i r s ,  S a rd a r  Sw aran S in g h , t o l d  a  p r e s s  c o n fe re n c e  t h a t  he
had  u rg e d  T h an t ' t o  u se  h i s  trem en d o u s i n f l u e n c e ' t o  s t a b i l i s e  th e  s i t u a t i o n
in  E a s t  P a k is ta n  so  th e  r e f u g e e s  c o u ld  r e t u r n .  Asked why th e  S e c u r i ty
C o u n c il  was n o t  s e iz e d  o f  th e  i s s u e ,  S in g h  s a id  i t  was up to  th e  S e c r e ta r y
2
G e n e ra l to  make a m ove. O l iv e r  h a s  p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  no -o n e  th o u g h t  to
3a sk  why I n d ia  d id  n o t  b r in g  th e  m a t te r  b e fo r e  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  i t s e l f .  
T h a n t 's  m em oirs s t a t e  t h a t  ' t h e  e x t r a o r d in a r y  a p a th y ' o f  th e  C o u n c il  was 
due t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  n e i t h e r  I n d ia  n o r  P a k i s t a n  w an ted  a c t io n  by th e  U n ite d  
N a t io n s . ^
On 20 J u ly  T h a n t fo rw ard e d  a  d e t a i l e d  memorandum on th e  s i t u a t i o n  in
5
th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t  to  th e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il .  W hile i t  d id  
n o t  f o rm a lly  in v o k e  A r t i c l e  9 9 , th e  memorandum c l e a r l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  a m ajo r 
i n i t i a t i v e  by th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l in  c a r r y in g  o u t  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  u n d e r 
t h a t  A r t i c l e  t o  b r in g  to  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  a  m a t te r  
w h ich  he c o n s id e re d  to  t h r e a te n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and  s e c u r i t y .
O l i v e r ,  op. c i t . , p .9 8 .
O l i v e r ,  op. o i t .  , p .3 4 .
Ib id .
U T h a n t, View from the UN, p .4 2 2 .
5 R e le a se d  in  SG/SM /1516, 2 A ugust 1971.
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I n  th e  f i r s t  p a ra g r a p h  o f  t h e  memorandum T h a n t  r e c o g n i s e d  th e  p rob lem
o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  by r e f e r r i n g  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  A r t i c l e  2(7)  o f  t h e  C h a r t e r .
He s t a t e d  t h a t  he had  a d u a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  b o th  o b s e rv e  t h a t  a r t i c l e
and t o  'h e l p  p rom ote  and e n s u re  human w e l l b e i n g  and h u m a n i ta r i a n  p r i n c i p l e s ' .
He th e n  w arned  o f  t h e  w id e r  c o n seq u e n c e s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  w ar:  f i r s t l y
th e  d a n g e r  o f  f r a t r i c i d a l  s t r i f e  on th e  s u b - c o n t i n e n t ;  s e c o n d ly  th e
i n c r e a s i n g  t e n s i o n  be tw een  I n d i a  and  P a k i s t a n ,  and t h i r d l y  th e  d a n g e r  t h a t
a m a jo r  c o n f l i c t  on t h e  s u b - c o n t i n e n t  c o u ld  ' a l l  t o o  e a s i l y  e x p a n d ' .  T han t
w arned  t h a t  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t io n  made a v a i l a b l e  t o  h im , he had
come t o  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  t h e  t im e  was p a s t  when t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community c o u ld  c o n t in u e  to  s t a n d  b y .  He saw t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a s  a ' p o t e n t i a l
t h r e a t  t o  p e a c e  and  s e c u r i t y ' , a p h r a s e  t h a t  drew a t t e n t i o n  t o  h i s  powers
2
u n d e r  A r t i c l e  99 o f  t h e  C h a r t e r .
The f i n a l  two p a ra g r a p h s  o f  T h a n t ' s  memorandum were an a p p e a l  t o  th e
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  to  ' c o n s i d e r  . . . t h e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  and t o  r e a c h
3
some a g r e e d  c o n c lu s io n s  a s  t o  m ea su res  w hich  m ig h t  be t a k e n ' . T h a n t
p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  he was t a k i n g  an u n u s u a l  s t e p  i n  r e p o r t i n g  t o  th e
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  on a q u e s t i o n  w hich had  n o t  been  i n s c r i b e d  on th e  C o u n c i l ' s
a g e n d a .  W hile  he s t a t e d  t h a t  he  was n o t  a b l e  t o  s u g g e s t  p r e c i s e  c o u r s e s  o f
a c t i o n ,  he b e l i e v e d :  ' t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s ,  w i t h  i t s  lo n g  e x p e r i e n c e  i n
p e a c e  k e e p in g  and w i th  i t s  v a r i e d  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  c o n c i l i a t i o n  and p e r s u a s i o n
m u s t ,  and  s h o u ld ,  now p l a y  a more f o r t h r i g h t  r o l e  i n  a t t e m p t in g  b o t h  t o
m i t i g a t e  t h e  human t r a g e d y  w hich h a s  a l r e a d y  t a k e n  p l a c e  and to  a v e r t  t h e
4
f u r t h e r  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ' .
1 Ib id .  , p a r a  1 .
2 Ib id .  , p a r a s .  4 - 6 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  8 .
Ib id .  , p a r a . 7 .4
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I n  m ak in g  h i s  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  T h a n t  s a i d  i t  was f o r  
t h e  members o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  t h e y  s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  i s s u e s  f o r m a l l y  o r  i n f o r m a l l y ,  a n d  i n  p u b l i c  o r  i n  p r i v a t e . ’*’ By n o t  
f o r m a l l y  i n v o k i n g  A r t i c l e  99 he  c h o s e  n o t  t o  f o r c e  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t o  
m e e t  on  t h e  i s s u e ,  b u t  l e f t  t h a t  q u e s t i o n  up t o  t h e  m em bers.  The r e a s o n ­
i n g  b e h i n d  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  was c l e a r l y  s e t  o u t  two m o n th s  l a t e r  i n  h i s  a d d r e s s  
t o  t h e  C o r r e s p o n d e n t s  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  when h e  a r g u e d  t h a t  i t  w o u ld  b e  d i v i s i v e
an d  u s e l e s s  t o  f o r m a l l y  i n v o k e  A r t i c l e  99 i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c o n s e n s u s
2
a m o n g s t  members o f  t h e  C o u n c i l .  The S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d
h i s  s t r a t e g y  i n  p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  20 J u l y  memorandum b y  n o t i n g  t h a t  h e  h a d
r e c e n t l y  a t t e m p t e d  t o  i n i t i a t e  q u i e t  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  among members o f  t h e
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  o v e r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  an d  t h e  a d j a c e n t  
3I n d i a n  s t a t e s . I n  h i s  m em oirs  h e  s a i d  t h a t  i f  h e  h a d  f o r m a l l y  i n v o k e d
A r t i c l e  99 h e  d o u b te d  t h a t  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  w o u ld  h a v e  m e t .  E ven  i f
s u c h  a  m e e t in g  h a d  t a k e n  p l a c e ,  he d o u b te d  w h e th e r  t h e  C o u n c i l  w o u ld  h a v e
4
a g r e e d  on an  a g e n d a .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  h e  saw q u i e t  d ip lo m a c y  a s  an  
a l t e r n a t i v e  w h ic h  m ig h t  h o l d  some h o p e  o f  s u c c e s s . 5
P r e s s  c o v e r a g e
The memorandum was c i r c u l a t e d  t o  a l l  members o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
an d  w ord  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  q u i c k l y  r e a c h e d  t h e  p r e s s .  I n c o m p l e t e  a c c o u n t s  
p u b l i s h e d  t h e  n e x t  d ay  c o n f u s e d  t h e  move f o r  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s
Ib id .  , p a r a .  8 .
u T h a n t ,  Correspondents A sso c ia tio n  Speech, p . l l .  
Ib id .  , p .12.
U T h a n t ,  View from the  UN., p . 4 2 3 .  
u T h a n t ,  Correspondents A sso c ia tio n  Speech, p . l l .5
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on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  a s e p a r a t e  p r o p o s a l  by  t h e  S e c r e t a r y
G e n e r a l  on t h e  r e f u g e e  s i t u a t i o n .  On 19 J u l y  T h a n t  h a d  s e n t  an  a i d e -
m em oire t o  t h e  P e rm a n e n t  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  I n d i a  and  P a k i s t a n  p r o p o s i n g
a l i m i t e d  and  e x p e r i m e n t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  UNHCR on b o t h  s i d e s  o f  t h e
b o r d e r  i n  t h e  e a s t  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  r e p a t r i a t i o n  o f  r e f u g e e s . ^  The New
York Times s p e c u l a t e d  on 1 A u g u s t  t h a t  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  was a b o u t  t o
2
s e n d  a 'UN f o r c e '  t o  t h e  a r e a .
On 2 A u g u s t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  r e l e a s e d  b o t h  t h e  memorandum and
t h e  a id e - m e m o ir e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  ' m i s l e a d i n g  . . . s p e c u l a t i o n '  a b o u t  th em ,
3
a n d  e m p h a s i s e d  t h a t  t h e  two d o c u m e n ts  w e re  e n t i r e l y  s e p a r a t e .  H ow ever ,  
t h e  damage h a d  b e e n  d o n e .  The p r o p o s a l  t h a t  some o b s e r v e r s  m i g h t  a s s i s t  
i n  r e f u g e e  r e p a t r i a t i o n  was t o r p e d o e d ,  an d  t h e  p r o p o s e d  q u i e t  d ip lo m a c y  
w i t h i n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  was no l o n g e r  q u i e t .
C o n s u l t a t i o n
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  memorandum and  a t  h i s  r e q u e s t ,
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  t h a t  m o n th ,  A m b assad o r  K o s c i u s k o - M o r i z e t  o f  F r a n c e ,  h e l d
4
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s .  They w e re  t o  no  a v a i l .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w ­
i n g  m onth  A m b assad o r  V i n c i  o f  I t a l y  was P r e s i d e n t  an d  i n  h i s  own w o rd s
5
h e l d  ' e x t e n s i v e  an d  e l a b o r a t e  c o n s u l t a t i o n s ' .  By V i n c i ' s  a c c o u n t :
See p .2 2 4  , in fra .
2 New York Times, 1 A u g u s t  1 9 7 1 .
3
SG /SM /1516, 2 A u g u s t  1 9 7 1 .
4
See comments by A m b assa d o r  V i n c i  o f  I t a l y ,  S /P V 1 6 0 6 , 4 D ecem ber 1 9 7 1 ,  
p a r a .  203 an d  A m b assad o r  Van U s s e l  o f  B e lg iu m ,  ib id . , p a r a .  2 8 4 .
5 Ib id .,  p a r a s .  2 0 3 -2 0 6 .
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. . . we could not discover one course of action among the 
several we discussed that would at that time have commanded 
the full support of the Council.^
Vinci also paid tribute to the way in which the Secretariat had foreseen
2the potential difficulties. Kosciusko-Morizet later described the
3Council's inaction as 'regrettable' and 'deplorable', criticisms which
were repeated often by other delegations in both the Security Council and
4the General Assembly.
There were accusations and counter-accusations from India and Pakistan
as to the reason for the delay. The Indian representative claimed that in
July his Pakistani counterpart was 'flying from Geneva to New York to stop
any discussions here, any discussions there; and those attempts went on for 
5months'. In the sense of short term diplomatic tactics, it was in
Pakistan's interest to delay a Security Council meeting on the issue until
the question of Chinese representation was settled at the forthcoming
General Assembly. Shahi was said to have predicted that the Assembly
would vote to admit Peking and expel Taipei, and to have so advised his 
6Government.
Pakistan, for its part, claimed that a Security Council meeting was
not called on the issue because of the opposition of India and the allies 
7of India. India's Foreign Minister told the Indian Parliament on 20 July:
Ibid. , para. 206. 
Ibid. , para. 207.
S/PV1607, 5 December 1971, para. 242.
e.g. Brazil A/PV2003, 7 December 1971, para. 98; Yugoslavia, ibid., 
122; pain, ibid. , para. 368.
S/PV1608, 6 December 1971, para. 84.
Interview with a senior diplomat. 
S/PV1608, para. 103.
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We have a l r e a d y  r a i s e d  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  B an g la d esh  in  ECOSOC; 
and d e p e n d in g  on th e  r e s p o n s e  we g e t ,  and a l s o  d e p e n d in g  on 
w h e th e r  i t  w i l l  s e rv e  o u r  p u rp o se  and i n t e r e s t ,  we w i l l  
c e r t a i n l y  r a i s e  i t  i n  th e  o th e r  a p p r o p r i a t e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  o f  
th e  UN -  p ro v id e d  we a re  a s s u r e d  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  s u p p o r t  f o r  any 
f o rm u la t io n  o r  p r o p o s i t io n  we e x p e c t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  o rg an  o f  
th e  UN to  a d o p t .1
In  th e  a b se n c e  o f  such  an a s s u r e d  fo rm u la t io n  i t  seem s t h a t  I n d ia  p e rc e iv e d
i t s  own t a c t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  in  te rm s  o f  k e e p in g  i t s  o p t io n s  o p e n , in c lu d in g
su ch  o p t io n s  a s  u n i l a t e r a l  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  w hich  may have been  i n h i b i t e d  by
2
an e a r l y  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il m e e tin g .
Thus n e i t h e r  P a k i s t a n  n o r  I n d ia  was a n x io u s  f o r  a  m e e tin g  o f  th e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  and d e s p i t e  th e  p r o t e s t a t i o n s  o f  th e  two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  b o th  a c t i v e l y  opposed  th e  i d e a .  Each n a t io n  c la im e d  t h a t  
th e  a c t i o n s  o f  th e  o th e r  e n d a n g e re d  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a ce  
and  s e c u r i t y .  B u t n e i t h e r  th e y  n o r  any o t h e r  s t a t e  e x e r c i s e d  th e  r i g h t  o f  
member s t a t e s  u n d e r A r t i c l e s  34 and 35 o f  th e  C h a r te r  t o  b r in g  'a n y  d i s p u t e ,  
o r  any s i t u a t i o n  w hich  m ig h t l e a d  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r i c t i o n  o r  g iv e  r i s e  to
3
a d i s p u t e ' ,  to  th e  C o u n c i l 's  a t t e n t i o n .
The su p e rp o w ers  and C hina
A m a jo r  f a c t o r  a f f e c t i n g  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l 's  e f f o r t s  was th e
i n t e r a c t i o n  be tw een  th e  m ajo r  p o w ers . U n ite d  S t a t e s  p o l ic y  was b a s e d  on
th e  p re m ise  of a b a la n c e  o f  pow er i n  th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t ,  m a in ta in e d  p r im a r i ly
by th e  s u p p ly  o f  m i l i t a r y  a id  t o  P a k i s t a n ,  w hich  was a l ig n e d  w ith  th e  US
4th ro u g h  b o th  th e  SEATO and CENTO a l l i a n c e s .  R e la t io n s  be tw een  th e  two
Bangladesh Documents, V ol. I ,  p .7 0 7 .
I n te r v ie w  w ith  a s e n io r  d ip lo m a t.
F o r th e  t e x t  o f  A r t i c l e s  34 and 35 , se e  A ppendix  A. 
J a c k s o n , op. d t .  , p .4 2 ;  B a l l ,  op. c i t .  , p .5 .
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had  c o o le d  somewhat f o l lo w in g  th e  tem p o ra ry  c e s s a t io n  o f  US m i l i t a r y  a id  
to  b o th  I n d ia  and P a k is ta n  a f t e r  th e  1965 w a r , a d e c i s io n  w hich a f f e c t e d  
P a k i s t a n  f a r  more th a n  I n d ia  b e c a u se  o f  th e  f o r m e r 's  g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  on th e
us .x
The S o v ie t  Union began  s u p p ly in g  arm s to  I n d ia  in  1955 , and gave added
a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t  a s  th e  S in o -S o v ie t  s p l i t  d e v e lo p e d  in  th e  
2
1 9 6 0 s . I t s  p r e s t i g e  i n  th e  r e g io n  was b o o s te d  g r e a t l y  by P re m ie r  
K o s y g in 's  m e d ia tio n  be tw een  I n d ia  and P a k is ta n  a f t e r  th e  1965 w a r, c u lm in ­
a t i n g  in  th e  T a sh k e n t a g re e m e n t.
C h ina  and I n d ia  had  jo in e d  h ands a s  th e  two c o lo s s i  o f  th e  t h i r d  w o rld  
a t  th e  Bandung C o n fe re n c e  o f  1955, b u t  th e  m u tu a l d ise n c h a n tm e n t w hich  
fo llo w e d  was c l e a r l y  d e m o n s tra te d  by th e  s e r io u s  b o r d e r  c la s h e s  be tw een  th e  
two in  1962. In  th e  fo l lo w in g  y e a r  C h ina  b eg an  s u p p ly in g  econom ic a id  to  
P a k i s t a n ,  and arms s u p p l i e s  fo llo w e d  a f t e r  th e  US tem p o ra ry  c u t - o f f  in  
1 9 6 5 .3
As th e  c r i s i s  d e v e lo p e d  in  1971 th e  new f a c t o r  in t r o d u c e d  i n t o  t h i s
com plex o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  was P r e s id e n t  N ix o n 's  announcem ent on 15 J u ly ,
f i v e  days b e fo r e  T h an t c i r c u l a t e d  h i s  memorandum, t h a t  ag reem en t had  been
re a c h e d  t h a t  he  w ould  v i s i t  C h in a . P a k is ta n  p la y e d  a key r o l e  in  a s s i s t i n g
H enry  K is s in g e r  to  n e g o t i a t e  w ith  C h in a . H is s e c r e t  t r i p  to  P e k in g  e a r l i e r
in  th e  m onth was made v i a  P a k i s t a n ,  w i th  h i s  a b se n c e  b e in g  e x p la in e d  by a
4
c o v e r  s to r y  t h a t  he was r e s t i n g  a t  Yahya K h a n 's  summer r e s id e n c e .  Ja c k so n
s u g g e s ts  t h a t  S o v ie t  p o l i c y  was r e l a t i v e l y  ev e n h an d e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y  u n d e r
5th e  i n f lu e n c e  o f  K o sy g in , u n t i l  th e  N ixon announcem en t. On 8 A ugust th e
Ib id .  US a id  was r e s t o r e d  in  1966.
Ib id .
Ib id .  , p p . 7 -8 .
J a c k s o n , op. c i t . ,  p .6 5 ;  R ushbrook W illia m s , o p . c i t . , p p . 8 8 -8 9 . 
J a c k s o n , op. c i t . ,  p .7 1 ,  p .1 5 3 .5
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Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited New Delhi and signed an
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, which included
a clause pledging 'consultation' in the event of military attack on either
of the parties."*" Jackson comments that the treaty was completed, signed
2and ratified by Moscow 'with extraordinary speed'. During the second half
3of 1971 Soviet military aid to India was stepped up markedly.
While the Soviet Union and India had a common interest in publicly
affirming their co-operation, because of their shared concerns towards
China, the latter had a concomitant interest in continuing its firm support
4for Pakistan. In the main that support was political, although in May
China supplied a number of shallow-draft mineboats which could be used in
East Pakistan for both the distribution of food supplies and the movement
5of troops during the rainy season.
India saw the US as a major source of pressure on Pakistan, and the 
lack of progress towards a political settlement in East Pakistan was there­
fore accompanied by increasing Indian resentment towards the United States, 
which was further aggravated by the news of US arms shipments to Pakistan 
in May and June.^ The US Congress had banned military sales to Pakistan
Indo-Soviet joint statement, 12 August 1971, Bangaldesh Documents,
Vol. II, pp.156-158.
2 Jackson, op. cit., p.72.
3 Ball, op. cit., p.30.
4 Jackson, op. czt. , p.95.
5 Rushbrook Williams, op. cit. , p.88; Anthony Mascenharas, article in The 
Sunday Times, London, 13 June 1971, reprinted in Bangladesh Documents , Vol. I, 
p.369. Mascenharas was formerly Assistant Editor of the Morning News, Karachi, 
and was one of a select group of West Pakistani journalists invited by the 
Government in May to visit East Pakistan to witness the return to 'normalcy'. 
With this background his account of Pakistan Army atrocities had added 
credibility. He also wrote a book, The Rape of Bangladesh, Vikas, New Delhi, 
1971.
Statement by the Minister for External Affairs in Lok Rajya and Lok 
Sabha on 24 June 1971, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, pp.696-697. See also 
Jackson, op. cit., pp.61, 63; Ball, op. cit., p.31.
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from 25 March, but two shipments had been authorised prior to that date.
The decision to proceed with the shipment was reported to have been made
personally by President Nixon.^ Kissinger visited New Delhi in early July
en route to Islamabad, and in Indian political circles it was widely
believed that the purpose of his visit to Pakistan was to help bring Yahya
2Khan closer to a compromise with the Awami League. When the real purpose
was revealed, the Indian attitude towards the US could only be exacerbated.
In turn, the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in August
adversely affected the attitude of the US administration towards India.
In dealing with both India and Pakistan the State Department continued to
prefer private diplomacy, while on a broader scale the major priority for
Kissinger was the successful continuation of the China initiative.1 23
By the time Thant produced his memorandum of 20 July, the international
situation had developed in a manner which served only to reinforce the
opposition of both the Soviet Union and the United States to a meeting of
4the Security Council. The conflicting interests of the major powers made
agreement between then difficult. Dramatic awareness of the dangers of the
situation might have motivated them to settle their differences rather than
face the possibility of major military confrontation. But no such dramatic
awareness existed. In June and July some governments believed that the
civil war was as good as over, and the Mukti Bahini was a spent force.
Others believed more realistically that the Indian Government would not accept
5the defeat of the East Pakistan guerillas as a solution to the crisis.
1 Ball, op. ait., p.10.
2 Jackson, op. ovt., p.65.
3 Ball, op. C'it. , pp.14-15.
Jackson, op. C'it., p.73.
Oliver, op. C'it., p.62.5
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So the crisis developed. The Secretary General kept the President of
the Security Council fully informed, immediately communicating to him
copies of all his messages to India and Pakistan.'*' In September he made
a public statement of rare directness, stating he maintained the view that
the situation in East Pakistan constituted a threat to international peace
and security, and regretting that the Security Council had not taken any 
2action. But the Security Council did not meet until open hostilities 
broke out between Pakistan and India two and a half months later.
THE APPEAL FOR MUJIBUR RAHMAN'S RELEASE
On the day of Thant's memorandum to the President of the Security
Council, Yahya Khan announced that Mujibur would be put on trial for 
3treason. Thant sent a personal message to Yahya Khan in which he
earnestly appealed that 'nothing be done . . . which might further increase
tension and emotion'. This appeal was combined with a firm indication to
the Pakistani President as to the range of international concern which was
developing over the situation in East Pakistan. Thant advised Yahya Khan
that he had talked to many representatives, and 'in their view the chances
of the restoration of peace and normalcy in the region are remote unless
4some kind of accommodation is reached'.
Thant's appeal highlighted the link between internal and external 
aspects, a link which he stressed quite explicitly a week later in a public 
comment through his official spokesman:
S/10410, Report of the Secretary General, 3 December 1971, p.13.
2 SG/SM/1530, 14 September 1971.
3
New York Times, 20 July; also Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, p.21.
4 Secretary General, personal message to President Yahya Khan, 3 August 
1971, Oliver, op. cit., p.66.
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The Secretary General feels that it [the trial of Mujibur] is 
an extremely delicate and sensitive matter which falls within 
the domestic competence of a Member State - Pakistan. It is 
also a matter of extraordinary interest and concern in many 
quarters, from a humanitarian, as well as a political point of 
view . . . the Secretary General shares the feelings of many 
representatives that any developments concerning the fate of 
Sheik Mujibur Rahman will inevitably have repercussions out­
side the borders of Pakistan.
In reply to an inquiry from the Foreign Minister of India as to what 
action he proposed to take on Mujibur's trial, Thant assured him that:
His fate is a matter of great concern to me . . .1 have been 
exerting my best efforts within my competence and authority 
to prevent an aggravation of the situation in East Pakistan.
I shall continue to do so . . . with all the necessary dis­
cretion and lack of publicity.2
Bangladesh spokesmen issued warnings against threats to Mujibur's
life. 3 A foreign diplomat in Islamabad was quoted as saying at the time:
There is only one man alive who could save Pakistan now, and 
that is Mujibur. Yahya vows that Mujibur must die. But the 
day he hangs by the neck, Pakistan will hang with him.^
Jackson suggests that the trial was a gesture by Yahya Khan to the 'Hawks'
in the armed forces who were opposed to his policy of introducing civilian
5rule in both wings of Pakistan. Thant interpreted the President's actions
more in terms of a deep-seated antipathy, stating in his memoirs that:
Yahya Khan was reported to have been furious whenever anyone, 
including friendly diplomats, asked him about Sheik Mujibur . . .
His views on Sheik Mujibur and the Bengalis were charged with 
emotion, bitterness and, at the same time, a certain callousness.
 ^ OPI, Note to correspondents, No.3678, 10 August 1971.
2 Secretary General to Sardar Swaran Singh, 13 August 1971, Oliver, op. 
cit. , pp.67-68.
3
Bangladesh Documents, pp.342-344.
4
Newsweek, 2 August 1971.
Jackson, op. cit., p.80.
U Thant, View from the UN, p.425.6
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Whether motivated by personal bitterness, internal politics, or both,
Yahya Khan's attitude on the trial of Mujibur remained completely 
inflexible.
Yahya Khan did not reply directly to Thant's personal message, but an
aide memoire from the Pakistan Permanent Mission claimed that it was
unreasonable to seek a political solution 'acceptable to a group which is
committing sabotage, and is bent upon bringing about famine in East
Pakistan'.'*' On the instructions of his government, Ambassador Shahi also
objected to the Secretary General's public statement, which he said
'exceeded both the bounds of humanitarian concern and the competence of the 
2United Nations'.
Need for a political settlement
Thant saw the release of Mujibur as a vital first step towards
achieving a political settlement which might alleviate the threat to
international peace. He told US Secretary of State, William Rogers, that
the Indian attitude to the UN effort in East Pakistan would change 'only
3if Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League return to the Province'.
The need for such a settlement was underlined by a blunt and hard­
hitting report prepared by a World Bank team which visited East Pakistan 
in May and June. The report described the devastation wrought by the 
punitive actions of the Pakistan Army, and recommended that further aid be
Aide memoire from Pakistan Permanent Mission to Secretary General, 
13 August 1971, Oliver, op. oit., p.65.
2 Note from Ambassador Shahi to Secretary General, 16 August 1971, 
Oliver, op. oit., p.67.
2 Memorandum of conversation, 8 August 1971, Oliver, op. oit. , p.107.
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withheld pending a 'political accommodation'. At a meeting of the
Pakistan Aid Consortium on 21 June the recommendation was accepted by all
2but the United States. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, had earlier told Parliament (on 23 June) that the British Government
believed projects already in hand in Pakistan should continue, but there
would be no new British aid until there was firm evidence of real progress
3towards a political solution. But although the western governments spoke 
in general terms of the need for political accommodation, they provided 
little effective support for the Secretary General's stress on the central 
importance of pressing home the need for Mujibur's release. Instead they 
appeared to tacitly support gestures towards Bengali identity and regional 
autonomy, which were not only too late, but avoided the reality that the 
Awami League leaders were the legitimate representatives of the East Bengali 
people.
In September Yahya Khan appointed A.M. Malik, a Bengali, as the 
civilian governor of East Pakistan. The Secretary General's representative 
in charge of the relief operation there, El Tawil, reported confidentially 
to the Secretary General that it was:
Very doubtful if his appointment will be considered by the 
Bengali people as anything more than a supervicial political 
gesture by Islamabad. It falls far short of what they con­
sider is needed to bring about the return to normalcy and 
prepare for the transfer of powers.^
Time, 2 August 1971. This article states that the report was classi­
fied by the World Bank President, Robert McNamara, on the grounds that it 
might worsen an already difficult situation, but was leaked to the press by 
a middle-level officer. McNamara apologised for the leak to Yahya Khan and 
ordered that the report be revised.
New York Times, 14 July 1971.
3
Bangladesh Documents , Vol. I, p.509.
4 Cable, El Tawil, Dacca, to Headquarters, 3 September 1971, Oliver, 
op. cit., p.96.
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Even B h u t to  was r e p o r t e d  by t h e  r e b e l s  to  have d e s c r i b e d  th e  a p p o in tm e n t
as  a ' h a l f  m e a s u re '  and  t o  have c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  im m edia te  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  r u l e . 1 L a t e r  i n  Septem ber t h e  P a k i s t a n  E l e c t o r a l  Commission
announced  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  e l e c t i o n s  would  be h e ld  i n  November t o  f i l l  th e
2
v a c a n t  s e a t s  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  and n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b le s .  The ban  on g e n e r a l
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  was l i f t e d  b u t  th e  s p e c i f i c  ban  on th e
3
Awami League rem a in ed  and  M ujibu r  was s t i l l  on t r i a l .  The Awami League
r e j e c t e d  t h e  moves and  c a b le s  from Dacca t o  UN H e a d q u a r t e r s  a t t e s t e d  t h a t
4g u e r i l l a  a c t i o n s  were s t r e n g t h e n i n g .  On 12 O c to b e r  Yahya Khan made
a n o t h e r  b r o a d c a s t  i n  w hich  he ig n o re d  th e  p l e a s  f o r  M u j i b u r ' s  r e l e a s e  and
n e g o t i a t i o n  w i th  th e  Awami L eague , and r e i t e r a t e d  h i s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o
5
p r o c e e d  w i th  t h e  e l e c t i o n s .  P r i o r  to  t h i s  b o th  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n  had
b e e n  m oving t h e i r  a rm ie s  up t o  fo rw ard  p o s i t i o n s  on th e  b o r d e r s . ^  J a c k s o n
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  was a f t e r  t h i s  sp e ec h  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  was made i n  D e lh i
7t o  s t e p  up t h e  m i l i t a r y  p r e s s u r e  on P a k i s t a n  i n  t h e  E a s t .
As t h e  G e n e ra l  Assembly convened i n  S ep tem b er ,  T h a n t  r e f u s e d  t o  make 
any f u r t h e r  s t a t e m e n t  a b o u t  M u j ib u r ' s  t r i a l  b u t  spoke o u t  p u b l i c l y  on th e  
n e e d  t o  r e s t o r e  a  c l i m a t e  o f  c o n f id e n c e  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  th e  
b a s i c  i s s u e s  were p o l i t i c a l .  He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  such  a r e s t o r a t i o n  o f
Bangladesh, w eekly  news b u l l e t i n ,  W a sh ing ton , V o l .  I ,  N o .2, 10 
S ep tem b er  1971.
2 Bangladesh Documents, v o l .  I I ,  p .4 1 .
3 J a c k s o n ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 8 1 .  E i g h t y - e i g h t  o f  t h e  167 Awami League 
Members o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  Assembly renounced  t h e i r  fo rm e r  t i e s  and were 
p e r m i t t e d  t o  t a k e  t h e i r  s e a t s ,  l e a v i n g  79 s e a t s  v a c a n t .
O l i v e r ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 9 8 .
Ib id . , p . 97.
J a c k s o n ,  op. c i t . ,  p p . 87-88 . 
Ib id . , p . 90.7
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c o n f id e n c e  was ' n o t  w i t h i n  t h e  com petence o f  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l '  b u t  
t h a t  'e v e ry b o d y  w i t h  whom I  t a l k  a g re e s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  f i r s t  p r e ­
r e q u i s i t e  t o  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  p e a c e ' . 1 In  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  h i s
Annual R e p o r t  he  r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  t h e  b a s i c  p ro b le m  c o u ld  be s o lv e d  o n ly  i f
2
a p o l i t i c a l  s o l u t i o n  was a c h ie v e d .
A p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  w i t h i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  r e q u i r e d ,  as  P r in c e
S a d ru d d in  Aga Khan, t h e  High C om m issioner  f o r  R e fu g e e s ,  n e a t l y  p u t  i t ,
n o t  m e d ia t io n  be tw een  D e lh i  and I s la m a b a d ,  b u t  be tw een  I s la m a b a d  and 
3
Dacca. Once a g a i n ,  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  a c r i s i s  were 
i n e x t r i c a b l y  l i n k e d .  To m eet t h e  e x t e r n a l  g o a l  o f  m a i n t a i n in g  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  r e q u i r e d  an i n t e r n a l  s e t t l e m e n t .  B u t t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s '  
a b i l i t y  t o  a s s i s t  i n  su ch  a s e t t l e m e n t  was s e v e r e l y  c o n s t r a i n e d  by  th e  
P a k i s t a n  G o v e rn m e n t 's  s t r o n g  and p e r s i s t e n t  i n v o c a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  2(7) 
and th e  t a c i t  a g re e m e n t  o f  key  g o v e rn m e n ts ,  n o t a b l y  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  
w i th  P a k i s t a n ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  
i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .
THE FORMAL OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES
In  h i s  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  on 3 December, Than t s a i d  he
h a d  u sed  h i s  good o f f i c e s  i n  v a r io u s  ways e v e r  s in c e  t h e  e v e n t s  o f  March
b u t  f o r  'o b v io u s  r e a s o n s '  d i d  t h i s  w i t h  co m p le te  l a c k  o f  p u b l i c i t y ,  e x c e p t
i n  t h e  c a se  o f  h i s  p u b l i c  s t a t e m e n t  on 10 A ugust  c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  r e l e a s e  
4
o f  M u jib u r .  One p r o p o s a l  p u r s u e d  th ro u g h  t h e  good o f f i c e s  o f  t h e
SG/SM/1530, 14 S e p tem b e r  1971: t r a n s c r i p t  o f  p r e s s  c o n fe r e n c e  by
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  a t  H e a d q u a r t e r s .
A /8 4 0 1 /A d d .1 ,  17 S e p tem b e r  1971, p a r a .  25 .
3 O l i v e r ,  op. c-it. , p . 6 4 .
4 S /1 0 4 1 0 ,  p .5 .
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Secretary General involved the withdrawal of the forces of both countries
to an agreed distance from their respective borders.'*' The proposal was
accepted by Pakistan but rejected by the Indian Prime Minister at a press
conference on 19 October, on the grounds that Pakistan lines of communi-
2cation with its two borders were shorter than those of India.
On 20 October Thant took a new initiative. It was based on 'the
possible usefulness of comprehensive discussions with the heads of
Government of India and Pakistan on all the aspects of the problem as set
3forth in his memorandum of 20 July. Identical messages were sent to the 
Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan in which the Secretary 
General formally offered his good offices to both parties:
In this potentially very dangerous situation, I feel that it 
is my duty as Secretary General to do all that I can to 
assist Governments immediately concerned in avoiding develop­
ments which might lead to disaster. I wish Your Excellency to 
know, therefore, that my good offices are entirely at your 
disposal if you believe that they could be helpful at any 
time.^
This formal offer of good offices may be seen as a natural extension of 
the months of informal activity which had gone before. It could also be 
considered as a last attempt to exert an intermediary role after all else 
had failed. Furthermore it placed Thant's efforts on record at a time when 
there was mounting criticism over the UN's inaction, especially in the 
western press.
President Yahya Khan replied two days later that he welcomed the 
Secretary General's offer of his good offices and hoped that he could pay
Ibid., p .7; Jackson, op. cit., p.91. 
Bangladesh Documents, vol. II, p.250. 
S/10410, p.5.
4 SG/SM/1566, 27 October 1971.
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an immediate visit to India and Pakistan, 'to discuss the ways and means
of withdrawal of forces'. He further stated that a public declaration by
the Secretary General of his intention to visit India and Pakistan to
seek a settlement of differences would be most desirable
India did not reply formally for some weeks, but on 22 October
Ambassador Sen 'rather pointedly', as Oliver puts it, transmitted a copy
of the Indian Foreign Minister's statement in the General Assembly to Under
2Secretary General Roberto Guyer. On the same day Indian army reservists 
3were called up and a delegation led by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Nikolai Firybin visited New Delhi for talks which were later announced to
have been consultations under Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Friendship 
4Treaty.
Thant's letters to the two leaders were confidential, but there were
5leaks, so the text was released to the press. Once again, press specu­
lation created difficulties. The Secretary General sent a note to corres­
pondents pointing out that he had offered his good offices, not mediation. 
He stressed that the offer was made entirely on his own initiative, follow­
ing up his memorandum to the Security Council. It should be viewed in the
S/10410, p.7.
2 Oliver, op. cnt., pp.102-103.
3 Jackson, op. cit., p.101.
4
Ibid. , pp.91-92. Article IX provided for consultations between India 
and the Soviet Union in the event of either party being subject to attack 
or threat of attack. See p.174, supra.
SG/SM/1566, 27 October 1971. The release stated that:
As is indicated in the letter to the President of the Security 
Council . . .  it was the Secretary General's intention that the 
message should remain confidential. In view of the fact, how­
ever, that there has been widespread reporting concerning its 
content, the Secretary General has felt it best to publish the 
text in full.
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context of that memorandum and his comments in the Secretary General's
Introduction to the Annual Report. It was not directed to any one aspect, 
but to the problem as a whole.’*’
Indian reactions
In Indian circles it was suggested that the leaks were deliberate and
2were intended to embarrass India. On 24 October Prime Minister Gandhi
left Delhi to visit a number of foreign capitals. In Vienna she told a
press conference that the Secretary General's 'action or inaction' on the
whole issue of Bangladesh had been 'so even handed' that neither the UN
3nor its Secretary General could do much by offering good offices.
En route to Washington Mrs Gandhi visited New York where it had been
4intended that she would pay a courtesy call on the Secretary General.
5Thant had been admitted to hospital on the day before Mrs Gandhi's arrival, 
and for this reason she did not visit the United Nations Headquarters.
When asked by the Washington press why she had not visited the UN, Mrs
7Gandhi said 'I didn't think it would serve much useful purpose'.
OPI, Note to correspondents No.3703, 28 October 1971.
2 Oliver, op. ovt., pp.100-101.
3 Oliver, op. cvt., p.103.
4 C.V. Narasimhan, letter to the writer, 5 May 1978. Mr Narasimhan 
called on Mrs Gandhi at her hotel to apologise for the inability of the 
Secretary General to receive her.
5 OPI, Note to correspondents, No.3705, 2 November 1971. Thant was found 
to be suffering from a serious ulcer condition (Note to correspondents,
No.3707, 3 November 1971) and was kept in hospital for the following four 
weeks (Note No.3714, 26 November 1971). While in hospital he maintained 
constant contact with his office through Roberto Guyer and Brian Urquhart, 
attending to urgent official work within two or three days of his admission 
(Note No.3708, 6 November 1971, and View from the UN, p.427).
Note from Ambassador Sen to Secretary General, 9 November 1971, Oliver, 
op. oit., p .104.
7 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's speech at National Press Club, Washington, 
5 November 1971, Bangaldesh Documents, Vol. II, p.265.
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L a t e r  s h e  s a i d  t h a t  T h an t  was a lw ays  w elcom e, b u t  commented t h a t  I n d i a  
had  drawn h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  p ro b le m  f i r s t  and was n o t  a b le  t o  move any­
b ody , a d d in g  t h a t  'now th e y  w an t t o  come on w ha t  seems to  us P r e s i d e n t  
Yahya K h a n 's  t e r m s ' .1
Mrs Gandhi r e p l i e d  f o r m a l ly  t o  t h e  o f f e r  o f  good o f f i c e s  on 16
November. She began  by s a y in g  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  l e t t e r  had  been
r e c e i v e d  two days b e f o r e  h e r  d e p a r t u r e  a b ro a d  and i t  had  n o t  b een  p o s s i b l e
t o  r e p l y  u n t i l  h e r  r e t u r n  t o  D e l h i .  The I n d ia n  Prim e M i n i s t e r  made a
number o f  s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  a g g r e s s i v e  m e a su re s  to w a rd s  I n d i a  on th e  p a r t  o f
P a k i s t a n  and a s s e r t e d  t h a t  ' such  m ea su res  as  we have t a k e n  a r e  e n t i r e l y  
2d e f e n s i v e ' .  Mrs Gandhi th e n  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  key  t o  th e  whole s i t u a t i o n  was
to  f i n d  a  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  E a s t  B e n g a l .  She r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  f a c t
t h a t  T h a n t  had  h i m s e l f  made s e v e r a l  s t a t e m e n t s  e m p h a s i s in g  th e  n eed  f o r  such
a s e t t l e m e n t  and s t a t e d  t h a t  'y o u r  o f f e r  o f  good o f f i c e s  c o u ld  p l a y  a
3
s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ' .  She was d i p l o m a t i c a l l y  c o o l  a b o u t
th e  p r o s p e c t  o f  a v i s i t  by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  t o  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n ,
s t a t i n g  m e re ly  ' t h a t  i t  i s  a lw ays  a p l e a s u r e  t o  m eet you and t o  exchange  
4v i e w s ' .  However sh e  th e n  w en t on t o  make a s t a t e m e n t  w hich  i n  T h a n t ' s  view
to rp e d o e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  good o f f i c e s  r o l e  b e in g  e f f e c t i v e l y  e x e r c i s e d ,
s t a t i n g  t h a t  ' i f  you a r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  view t h e  p ro b lem  in  p e r s p e c t i v e , you
5
w i l l  have  o u r  s u p p o r t  i n  y o u r  i n i t i a t i v e s ' .
P rim e M i n i s t e r  I n d i r a  G a n d h i 's  i n t e r v i e w  on NBC (USA) program  'M eet 
t h e  P r e s s ' ,  b r o a d c a s t  on 7 November 1971, Bangladesh Documents, p .2 8 0 .
2 S /1 0 4 1 0 ,  p . 8.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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Oliver suggests that the Secretary General's initiative may have been
misunderstood, that its intent was not clear, and that it may have been
confused with the earlier proposal for the stationing of UNHCR observers on
the East Pakistan border.^" Certainly when Mrs Gandhi was questioned on the
two proposals in Washington she devoted most of her reply to a rebuttal of
the proposal for UNHCR observers. She answered the part of the question
concerning India's response to Thant's offer of good offices only indirectly,
with a comment suggesting that the first task for the Secretary General 'or
2whoever is taking an interest' was to stop the flow of refugees.
End of the offer
On 22 November, the Secretary General replied to Prime Minister Gandhi's 
letter of 16 November. He said he was 'puzzled' by several references in 
Mrs Gandhi's letter, specifically 'the present attempt to save the military 
regime' and the statement that 'to sidetrack this main problem and to con­
vert it to an Indo-Pakistani dispute can only aggravate tensions', as well 
as the statement about viewing the problem 'in perspective'. Thant pointed 
out that his letter of 20 October was deliberately written in the context of 
his memorandum of 20 July which took into account those aspects of the 
situation mentioned by Gandhi. In fact, he said, he had intended that the
memorandum of 20 July would serve as the terms of reference for the exercise
3of his good offices. He advised that:
As Your Excellency knows, the exercise of good offices requires 
the assent and co-operation of all the parties concerned.
1 Oliver, op. ctt., p.107.
2 Indira Gandhi, Speech to National Press Club, Washington, Bangladesh 
Documents, vol. II, p.269.
3 S/10410, p.9.
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Under the present circumstances, much to my regret, there does 
not seem to be a basis for the exercise of the Secretary General's 
good offices in this infinitely serious and complicated problem.^
The following day, 23 November, the Secretary General received a letter 
from the President of Pakistan detailing alleged large scale attacks of 
Indian armed forces on various parts of East Pakistan and stating that this 
offensive would be met by Pakistan by all the force at its command in the 
defence of its territorial integrity. Yahya Khan referred to an attempt by 
Pakistan to seek the establishment of a good offices committee of the 
Security Council and concluded his letter by stating that at this juncture
2the Secretary General's personal initiative could still avert a catastrophe. 
Thant released a statement from his hospital bed that he was gravely con­
cerned about the situation, was following the developments closely, and was
3in constant touch with his office on this matter.
In reply to Yahya Khan on 26 November, the Secretary General repeated 
his statement that there did not seem to be a basis for the exercise of the 
Secretary General's good offices. Responding specifically to Yahya Khan's 
request for a personal initiative, he stated that he had been obliged to 
conclude that:
I have gone, for the moment, as far as my authority under the 
Charter permits me, usefully, and meaningfully, to go into 
the present circumstances.
He said he would, of course, remain in touch with the representatives of both
4India and Pakistan.
Ibid. , p.10.
Ibid. , p . 12.
OPI, Note to correspondents, No.3712, 23 November 1971.
4 S/10410, p.13.
188
On 28 November, Ambassador Shahi of Pakistan contacted Under Secretary 
General Guyer at 9.00 p.m. and conveyed a message from Yahya Khan requesting 
the Secretary General to station a force of UN observers on the Pakistan side 
of the East Pakistan border to observe and report violations of its territory. 
The following day, the Secretary General conveyed this request to the 
President of the Security Council. Apart from re-stating his belief that the 
Security Council should 'give serious consideration to the situation pre­
vailing on the sub-continent' Thant repeated his conclusion that he had gone 
as far as he could in the circumstances.^
In Bahrain and Yemen Thant had been prepared to take initiatives, 
including in the latter case the stationing of observers, without a formal 
mandate provided the parties to a dispute were in agreement with the actions 
proposed. But in this case, in view of the strong opposition to such 
proposals by one disputant, India, Thant felt his hands were tied. The need 
for consent by both parties remained an essential prerequisite for the 
Secretary General to exercise an effective role, particularly in the absence 
of a mandate from a deliberative organ. That one party wanted Thant to act 
at this stage, while the other party now desired and anticipated an inability 
to act, was yet another example of the dilemmas which the Secretary General 
faced.
On the surface the statements in Mrs Gandhi's letter seemed insufficient 
for the Secretary General to decide to withdraw his offer, since she did not 
refuse categorically to meet him. However, her unfavourable reaction had 
been amply demonstrated in her earlier public statements. Furthermore, by 
demanding that the Secretary General see the problem 'in perspective',
Mrs Gandhi implied that a good offices role concerning the dispute between
1 Ibid. , p. 14.
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India and Pakistan was insufficient. India was in effect suggesting a more
adjudicative role based on broader questions of justice and human rights, a
role for the UN Secretariat which would have been unacceptable in principle
to the majority of member states.'*' Finally, it was physically impossible
for Thant to go to Delhi and Islamabad personally at the end of November and
it seemed unlikely that Indira Gandhi would have received a representative
in his place. It should be noted that Mrs Gandhi also rejected other
proposals for mediation between India and Pakistan by other parties, includ-
2ing the Shah of Iran, as well as suggestions that she meet personally with 
3Yahya Khan, while India's earlier veto of the secret Tunku Rahman mission
4to meet Awami League leaders in West Bengal has already been described.
Oliver has questioned the timing of the formal offer, suggesting it 
might have been more profitable to have worked for a private meeting with 
Mrs Gandhi during her visit to the United States, and for the offer of good 
offices to have been made then.^ Possibly Thant intended that his confi­
dential letter form the basis for such a meeting. If so, the widespread 
reports and speculation about its contents brought a publicly negative 
response from the Indian Prime Minister before such a meeting could take 
place. From the beginning of November onwards any remaining possibility 
that the UN Secretariat could influence the course of events virtually 
disappeared altogether.
Mrs Gandhi implied an awareness of this difficulty in her reply to a 
question at the National Press Club in Washington, Bangaldesh Documents, 
Vol. II, p.270.
2
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, p.250; Jackson, op. cit., p.82.
3
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, p.272.
4
5
Pp.163-165, supra. 
Oliver, op. cit., p.107.
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THE BUILD-UP TO WAR
Indira Gandhi's visit to the Western capitals had been in effect the
last attempt to prevent war/ She found the Nixon administration
unresponsive. Just before her visit Kissinger had told a senior ON
official that India was 'at least partly to blame for the undoubted
2aggravation of the refugee situation'. At a White House banquet Gandhi 
told the Americans that her people could not understand 'how it is that we 
who are the victims, we who are bearing the brunt and have restrained our­
selves with such fortitude, should be equated with those whose actions have
3caused the tragedy'.
A factor in this indignation on the part of the Indian Prime Minister
and Government was the mounting frustration within India over the steadily
increasing influx of refugees, and the lack of any political solution in
East Bengal which might ease the refugee problem. But there were also more
direct political and military considerations. The Indian Government had
become concerned that increasing internal dissension within the Awami League
and its guerilla force, the Mukti Bahini, might result in extremist factions
becoming dominant, with repercussions in India's own volatile state of West 
4Bengal. There were important strategic considerations, including the 
opportunity to inflict lasting damage on Pakistan, while tactically the end
Loo. cit.
2 Cable, Paul-Marc Henry, to Secretary General, 29 October 1971, Oliver,
loo. cit.
3 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's speech at a banquet given by President 
Nixon, Washington, 4 November 1971, Bangladesh Documents, Vol.il, p.263.
The Economist, 27 November 1971, p.15; Time, 2 August 1971; see also 
Jackson, op. cit., who comments that India pressed the Awami League to form 
a 'United Front' government in order to exercise greater control over the 
extremist elements (p.78).
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o f  t h e  monsoon made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t a n k s  t o  o p e r a t e  i n  th e  E a s t .  The
armed f o r c e s  had  been  on a l e r t  s i n c e  A u g u s t ,  and a s  th e  end o f  th e  y e a r
a p p ro a c h e d  t h e i r  s e r v i c e a b i l i t y  r a t e  was i n  d a n g e r  o f  d e c l i n i n g .  S o v i e t
s u p p o r t  was a s s u r e d ,  w h i le  C h in ese  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  P a k i s t a n  
2
seemed u n l i k e l y .  D uring  th e  l a s t  two weeks o f  November b o r d e r  i n c i d e n t s  
i n  t h e  E a s t  became more num erous. On 21 November I n d i a n  t a n k s  c r o s s e d  th e
3
b o r d e r  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e .  Two days l a t e r  Yahya Khan d e c l a r e d  a S t a t e  o f  
4Em ergency. In  t h e  words o f  one I n d i a n  o f f i c e r ;
I t  became I n d i a ' s  game to  p ro v o k e  t h e  P a k i s t a n i s  i n t o  a  show­
down, a nd , a f t e r  numerous t h r e a t s ,  on t h e  e v e n in g  o f  3 December 
1971 t h e  m i l i t a r y  j u n t a  w i l l i n g l y  o b l i g e d ' .5
On 3 December f u l l  s c a l e  h o s t i l i t i e s  b ro k e  o u t  b e tw e en  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n  
on b o th  t h e  W este rn  and E a s t e r n  f r o n t s . ^  T h a n t ' s  p e r s i s t e n t  q u i e t  d ip lom acy  
h a d  b e e n  u n a b le  t o  p r e v e n t  war on t h e  I n d i a n  s u b - c o n t i n e n t ,  o r  t o  p r e v e n t  
t h e  in v o lv e m e n t  o f  t h e  s u p e r  p o w e rs .  In  f a c t ,  t h e  in v o lv e m e n t  and m u tu a l ly  
c o n f l i c t i n g  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  made t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  a l r e a d y  
d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  im p o s s ib l e .  O l i v e r  comments t h a t  t h e  I n d ia n  G e n e ra l  s t a f f  
t h o u g h t  t h e  r i s k  o f  w id e r  war i n v o lv i n g  th e  n u c l e a r  powers was one th e y
The Economist, loc. c i t .
2 O l i v e r ,  op. c i t . ,  p .1 0 8 .
3 The Economist, toe. c i t ; c o n f i rm e d  i n  s t a t e m e n t  by Prim e M i n i s t e r  I n d i r a  
Gandhi i n  P a r l i a m e n t  on D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  Emergency i n  P a k i s t a n ,  Bccngtadesh 
Documents, V ol.  I I ,  p p . 1 41 -142 . (N ote: In  a  l i s t  o f  i n c i d e n t s  on I n d i a ' s
E a s t e r n  b o r d e r ,  p p . 142 -1 4 5 ,  Bangladesh Documents i n c o r r e c t l y  l i s t s  th e  
i n c i d e n t  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  Prim e M i n i s t e r  a s  o c c u r r i n g  on 24 November.)
^ O f f i c i a l  Announcement, ib id . ,  p .1 4 1 .
5
L i e u t .  Comm. Ravi K a u l ,  I n d ia n  Navy, R e t . ,  'The I n d o - P a k i s t a n i  w ar and 
t h e  c h a n g in g  b a la n c e  o f  power i n  t h e  I n d ia n  O c e a n ' , US N aval I n s t i t u t e  p r o ­
c e e d i n g s ,  May 1973 , c i t e d  by O l i v e r ,  loc. c i t .
6 S /1 0 4 1 0 /A d d . l ,  4 December 1971.
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could safely take, but that in many capitals at the end of November 'the 
possibility seemed frighteningly close'.^
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES
On 27 November Belgium took the initiative of consulting all the other
2members of the Security Council in order to convene an urgent meeting, but 
to no avail.
On 29 November the Secretary General addressed a message to the 
President of the Council stating that:
. . . the Security Council should give serious consideration 
to the situation prevailing in the sub-continent.^
Still no meeting was held.
It was not until 4 December, following the outbreak of hostilities
between India and Pakistan on both the Western and the Eastern fronts, at
4the request of nine members, that a meeting of the Security Council was 
finally convened.
The Secretariat's role
The Secretary General was not able to attend the first round of 
Security Council meetings as he was still confined to his home on doctor's 
orders. On 7 December he returned to his office and made a brief statement 
in the Assembly. He did not formally intervene at any other stage of the 
Security Council or General Assembly debates on the crisis.
Oliver, op. cit., p.112; see also Jackson, op. eit., p.160. 
S/PV1608, para. 290.
3 S/10410, p.14.
4 S/10411, 4 December 1971, letter to the President of the Security 
Council from nine members: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan,
Nicaragua, Somalia, United Kingdom and the United States.
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The Secretariat had a formal responsibility to provide information
which was relevant to the dispute from the United Nations military observer
group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)^ stationed along the ceasefire line
in Kashmir and Jammu. From the outbreak of hostilities on 3 December, the
Secretary General distributed daily reports filed by the Chief Military
Observer which provided for members of the Council a careful, succinct and
impartial account of the military actions in that sector. The ability of
the UN observer mission in Kashmir to report on the military situation was
significantly limited by the destruction of the mission's only observer
2aircraft by Indian forces on the second day of hostilities. In the East, 
on the other hand, there was no UN observer operation, nor was the Secretary 
General in a position to place information from informal sources officially 
before the Council.
Senior officers of the Secretariat undoubtedly participated in the 
intense informal consultations which occurred throughout the debates, in 
particular seeking to facilitate the reconciliation of opposing points of 
view. Most of the proposals put forward in the form of draft resolutions 
to the Security Council included clauses which required various actions by 
the Secretariat. While this does not constitute proof of the Secretariat's 
involvement in consultations, presumably most delegations sponsoring such 
proposals would have deemed it prudent to consult senior Secretariat 
officials about them.
The following summary of the Security Council and General Assembly 
debates helps to illustrate the context in which the Secretariat had earlier 
sought to exercise an intermediary role. The debates also demonstrate the
UNMOGIP was established in 1948.
2 See p.198, infra.
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s e v e r e  l i m i t s  p l a c e d  on t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  once th e  
m a t t e r  came b e f o r e  open m e e t in g s .
A t te n d a n c e  by B a n g la d esh
T here  was a t  t h e  o u t s e t  o f  t h e  f i r s t  m e e t in g  on 4 December a s tu m b l in g
b lo c k  o v e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  a t t e n d a n c e  by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  B a n g la d e s h ,
w hich  had  d e s i g n a t e d  a d e l e g a t i o n  t o  t h e  UN l e d  by Mr J u s t i c e  Chowhudry.
The S o v i e t  Union moved t h a t  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  B an g la d esh  be i n v i t e d
and be h e a r d  u n d e r  Rule 39 o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  R u le s  o f  P r o c e d u r e .^
2
The p r o p o s a l  was s t r o n g l y  opposed  by C h in a .
The move f o r  an i n v i t a t i o n  t o  be e x te n d e d  t o  t h e  B an g lad esh  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e  p r o v id e d  an im m edia te  d i f f e r e n c e  w i t h i n  t h e  C o u n c i l .  I n d i a  and i t s  
s u p p o r t e r s  a rg u e d  on t h e  one hand  t h a t  ' t o  d i s c u s s  t h i s  p ro b lem  w i t h o u t
h e a r i n g  t h e  v o i c e  o f  B an g lad esh  i s  l i k e  p l a y i n g  Hcarilet w i t h o u t  th e  P r in c e  
3
o f  D enm ark '.  P a k i s t a n  and  C h in a ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a rg u e d  t h a t  I n d i a ' s
e n d e a v o u r  t o  have  B a n g la d esh  i n v i t e d  was a t a c t i c  a im ed a t  w in n in g  i n t e r -
4n a t i o n a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e b e l s .
The C o u n c i l  was c a u g h t  i n  a d i f f i c u l t  p ro b le m  i n v o l v i n g  m a t t e r s  o f
b o t h  p r o c e d u r e  and  s u b s t a n c e .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  was i m p o r ta n t  b e c a u s e  a
p r o c e d u r a l  q u e s t i o n  c o u ld  be d e te r m in e d  by a s im p le  m a j o r i t y , * 2345 w h i le  a
6s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t t e r  was s u b j e c t  t o  th e  v e to  o f  a  p e rm a n en t  member.
S/PV1606, p a r a .  8; P r o v i s i o n a l  R u les  o f  P ro c e d u re  o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l ,  S /9 6 /R e v .4 ,  29 J u ly  1952.
2 Ib id .  , p a r a .  20.
3 I n d i a ,  ib id .  , p a r a .  51.
4 P a k i s t a n ,  i b i d . ,  p a r a s .  127, 142 , 144.
5
The C h a r t e r ,  A r t i c l e  2 7 ( 2 ) .
6 A r t i c l e  2 7 ( 3 ) .
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Both China and India stated that the question was substantive, and had 
there been a vote, it appears that a negative vote by China would have 
been sufficient to block an invitation. In the event, the question was 
raised at a number of Security Council meetings throughout December but, 
despite intensive consultations behind the scenes,2 it was not resolved 
and Bangladesh did not attend.
One can only speculate as to the effect which a successful move to 
invite the representatives of Bangladesh might have had, particularly with 
respect to the Council's ability to consider all the matters, including 
those labelled as internal, which were relevant to the international 
breach of peace. But to avoid a negative vote by China, it would have been 
necessary to obtain the acquiescence of the Pakistan Government whose 
refusal to recognise the rebels in any way had been the major obstacle to 
settlement since the civil war began.
Pakistan's appeal
Long statements by the representatives of India and Pakistan at the 
first meeting on 4 December set the pattern for the remainder of the 
Security Council's consideration of the dispute.
The essence of Pakistan's statement was an appeal to the United Nations 
to prevent the aggression of India.
The Pakistan representative, Ambassador Shahi, maintained that overt 
Indian aggression had begun on 21 November when, he said, Indian regular 
troops, tanks and aircraft launched attacks in the East, followed by
China, S/PV1607, 5 December 1971, para. 27; India, ibid., para. 35. 
As an observer at the meeting India was not able to speak on a procedural 
point.
2 The President, ibid. , para. 7.
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attacks in the West on 3 December. He accused India of seeking to use the
internal crisis in Pakistan to bring about the dismemberment of his country,
establish India as the dominant power on the sub-continent, and to create
2conditions for the emergence of India as a super power.
He presented a detailed exposition of the way in which his government 
had endeavoured to co-operate with the United Nations. But these statements 
were qualified by attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the UN, with state­
ments, for example, that 'the nature of Pakistan's internal crisis is out-
3side the Security Council's concern'.
India's reply
India was less than co-operative with the United Nations, as indicated 
by the tenor of Mrs Gandhi's letter to the Secretary General on 16 November 
in reply to his offer of good offices. This attitude clearly angered a 
number of other delegations and governments, notably the United States, who 
felt that India was brazenly flouting the international institutions to which 
it had in the past devoted so much rhetoric. But it was also clear that 
within the Indian Government and political elite there was a profound sense 
of disillusion and loss of confidence in the United Nations. From the Indian 
point of view the United Nations had failed to act on a matter within the 
Charter, namely the trampling of human rights on a massive scale, on the 
grounds that to do so would have been interference in the internal affairs 
of a member state. Some Indian statesmen of the time were sympathetic to 
the United Nations' dilemma. Many others were openly and scathingly critical.
1
2
3
S/PV1606, paras. 76-90. 
Ibid., paras. 121-122. 
Ibid. , para. 105.
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In  h i s  o p e n in g  s t a t e m e n t  t h e  I n d i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s a i d :
We a r e  m ost  g r a t e f u l  t h a t  t h e  c o n c e rn  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  h a s  been  
shown o v e r  t h e  r e c e n t  e v e n t s ,  b u t  s t i l l  i t  i s  a m a t t e r  o f  g r e a t  
s u r p r i s e  and  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e t  t o  us  t h a t  when so  many men, women 
and  c h i l d r e n  were b u t c h e r e d ,  r a p e d ,  m a s s a c re d ,  no a c t i o n  was 
t a k e n .  We c a n n o t  f o r g e t  t h i s  b a c k g ro u n d  i f  we a r e  t o  c o n s id e r  
t h e  p ro b le m  s e r i o u s l y . ■*■
I n d i a  saw th e  move t o  ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e  t h e  p ro b le m ' a s  b e in g  d e s ig n e d  so
as  t o  make t h e  i s s u e  i n t o  an  I n d o - P a k i s t a n  d i s p u t e ,  w i th  th e  aim o f  d i v e r t i n g
2
a t t e n t i o n  from  'w h a t  t h e  P a k i s t a n  Army i s  d o in g  t o  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ' . W ith
t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  I n d i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  Mr S en ,  a d o p te d  a d e f i a n t
3
a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  from  t h e  b e g in n in g .  As th e  m e e t in g
4wore on i n t o  t h e  s m a l l  h o u r s  o f  t h e  m orn ing  Mr S e n ' s  e x a s p e r a t i o n  became 
5
more a p p a r e n t .  He c o n c lu d e d  w i th  a r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  ' s t r o n g  s e n s e  o f  
g r i e v a n c e '  w i t h i n  I n d i a  o v e r  UN d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  o u tb r e a k s  o f  
h o s t i l i t y  be tw een  I n d i a  and  P a k i s t a n ,  and a w a rn in g  t o  ' t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  
and a l l  members o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l '  t h a t  I n d i a  would  n o t  s u b m it  ' t o  
any p r e s s u r e s  o r  t h r e a t s  from  any q u a r t e r ' .
The I n d ia n  a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  a p p e a re d  to  have  become 
m a n i f e s t e d  i n  a  co m p le te  l a c k  o f  c o - o p e r a t i o n  a t  t h e  f i e l d  l e v e l .  The m ost
Ib id .  , p a r a .  158.
2 Ib id .  , p a r a .  166.
3
' I  w ish  t o  g iv e  a v e ry  s e r i o u s  w a rn in g  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  t h a t  we s h a l l  n o t  
be  a p a r t y  t o  any s o l u t i o n  t h a t  w i l l  mean c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  th e  o p p r e s s i o n  o f  
t h e  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  p e o p le  . . . . '  { ib id . , p a r a .  1 7 5 ) ;  'No one can  remove us 
from  o u r  p a t h  by mere r e s o l u t i o n s  and  mere e x h o r t a t i o n s '  { ib id . ,  p a r a .  1 8 5 ) .
4 I t  c o n c lu d e d  a t  1 .2 5  a .m . on Sunday , 5 December.
5
' I  s h o u ld  l i k e  t o  sa y  h a d  t h i s  c o n c e rn  f o r  s a v in g  l i v e s  been  m atched  
w i th  s i m i l a r  c o n c e rn s  w i th  s a v in g  c o u n t l e s s  l i v e s  d u r in g  th e  l a s t  n in e  m on ths ,  
i t  w ould  have  been  a s o u rc e  o f  some c o m fo r t  t o  my governm ent and t o  t h e  
I n d i a n  p e o p l e . '  (Ib id . , p a r a .  3 6 3 ) .
^ Ib id .  , p a r a .  366.
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extreme example of this was the destruction of the United Nations' observer 
aircraft, a Twin Otter, on the ground at Chakala Airport at Rawalpindi, by- 
two Indian jet aircraft. The Twin Otter, which was chartered for the 
United Nations by the Canadian Government, was the only aircraft available 
for the use of UNMOGIP. It was painted white and carried large blue United 
Nations markings, and was destroyed by strafing at 5.15 p.m. at a time of 
day when there should have been no difficulty in identifying it as a United 
Nations' aircraft.^
It should be noted, however, that the Indian criticism of the United
Nations was not directed at any time at the Secretary General or the
Secretariat, but rather at the member states and in particular at some of
the major powers. The Indian representative complained that for nine months
the international community had received a large number of reports written
by ' . . . most distinguished civil servants both of this organisation and
of its specialised agencies', but that these reports had not been made
available because '. . . that would have done harm to whatever interests
2are being served by this debate'. The United States came in for special
criticism as having ' . . . resorted to ineffectual secret diplomacy that
3by-passed and served to paralyse the world organisation'. India's 
recalcitrance in the face of the Security Council in December was largely 
due to the Indians' determination to see their action through to a successful 
conclusion on the battlefield. But a contributing factor in both the 
initial decision to act unilaterally and the subsequent stance in the Council
S/10412/Add.1, Report by the Secretary General on the situation along 
the ceasefire in Kashmir, 5 December 1971, para. 2.
2 S/PV1608, para. 75. Examples were the report of a three man mission 
from the office of the UNHCR, which visited the refugee areas from 6 to 19 
May, and the report of the IBRD team which visited Pakistan in June (see 
p.154, supra).
3 Ibid. , para. 181.
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was clearly a lack of confidence in the United Nations - the institution 
representing what the Indians perceived as an unresponsive international 
community.
The role of the Big Powers
The speeches in the Security Council by the Soviet Union, China and 
the United States tended to be set pieces. When one reads the statements 
in which representatives of the great powers so clearly avoided the slight­
est deviation from the instructions given to them by their governments, one 
becomes aware of the limitations which tie the hands of international civil 
servants seeking to adopt an intermediary role in the face of a clash between 
the unbending powers. At the first meeting, the Chinese representative 
fired the first shot in what was to become an increasingly vitriolic 
exchange between China and the Soviet Union, with a statement that: 'This
act of aggression of the Indian Government was launched with the support of
social imperialism. 1^  The Sino-Soviet exchanges became a feature of the
2debate as they wore on.
The debate took place within weeks of China's triumphant entry to the 
United Nations and was the first time the Governments of China and the 
Soviet Union had clashed head-on at the United Nations on a matter in which 
each believed major national interests to be involved.
Whereas the main aim for both the Soviet Union and China was to give 
full backing and support to one or other of the disputing parties, the prime
S/PV1606, para. 242.
2 Mr Huang Hua and Mr Malik made a point of calling each other 'Mr' rather 
than 'comrade'. Mr Huang referred to the Russians as 'social imperialists' 
while Mr Malik called China 'the social traitors'. As The Economist reported 
'many other delegates became somewhat bemused as the half forgotten names of 
earlier 20th century history were exhumed by Mr Huang and Mr Malik in a 
debate about the Indian sub-continent', The Economist, 11 December 1971, p.25.
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concern of the United States, in terms of its own interests, was to bring 
about a cessation of the conflict as quickly as possible.'*’ Continuation 
of the conflict could only undermine the US premise of stability in South 
Asia based on a balance of power between India and Pakistan, while at the 
same time endangering the Nixon/Kissinger plan for accommodation with both 
the Soviet Union and China. Furthermore the Americans' continuing experi­
ence in Vietnam made the US Government particularly wary about the dangers 
of being drawn into another Asian war. What happened within East Bengal 
was of little concern to the national interests of the United States, except 
insofar as it contributed to the general instability in the region. The 
cessation of fighting was all important.
Given this perspective, what was seen by the United States as Indian 
obduracy became increasingly frustrating. The United States saw India as 
acting against the US attempts to bring about a cessation of hostilities, 
the pre-eminent concern of the United States in terms of its own interests, 
and tended to brush aside the Indian concerns over the civil war raging in 
East Bengal.
The United Kingdom and France, as members that were rather more 
disinterested in the conflict in terms of contemporary national interests, 
tended to adopt an 'honest broker' position, mentioning several times in 
the debates that they were engaged in intensive consultations with the 
other permanent members and with the disputants in an endeavour to find 
an agreement which would be acceptable to all concerned.
1 Jackson, op. cit. , pp.156-157.
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Deadlock and referral to the General Assembly
The United States resolution moved at the first meeting reflected the 
American concern to stop the fighting rather than to tackle the political 
issues involved. The resolution called for an immediate cessation of 
hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of armed forces, the placement of UN 
observers along the borders, and acceptance of the Secretary General's 
offer of good offices. The Soviet Union moved a counter resolution directed 
solely at Pakistan, calling for a political settlement in East Pakistan.
The US resolution received 11 votes but was vetoed by the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet resolution was supported only by Poland; China voted against, 
while the remaining members of the Council abstained. A further resolution 
proposed by a number of non-permanent members was supported by a majority 
but was also vetoed by the Soviet Union.
Following a series of moves and counter moves within the Council, a 
number of delegations, led by Somalia, moved to implement the 'Uniting for 
Peace' procedure, under which a question on which there was a lack of 
unanimity amongst the permanent members could be referred to the General 
Assembly.^ The Council adopted the necessary resolution (with the Soviet 
Union and Poland abstaining) and on the next day, 7 December, the issue was 
considered by the General Assembly.
U Thant returned from his illness and made a statement at the beginning 
of the General Assembly meeting devoted to the crisis. It was an appeal to 
all the combatants to spare the lives of the innocent civilian population in 
the area of conflict. The proposers of the draft resolution responded to
S/PV1608, para. 137; The Uniting for Peace Resolution was General 
Assembly Resolution 337A(V), 3 November 1950, adopted to obtain a mandate 
for UN action in Korea. It has also been used during the Suez Canal crisis 
(October 1956) and on the question of Hungary (November 1956) and the 
question of Lebanon (1958) (U Thant, View from the UN, p.429).
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the Secretary General's appeal by including a clause on this matter in
their resolution.^ He did not speak publicly on the military or political
aspects of the situation, but had been engaged in private consultations
with the representatives of the parties on these aspects since shortly
2after his discharge from hospital on 27 November.
By far the majority of speakers in the General Assembly pressed as
their major concern the need for the immediate cessation of hostilities
3and withdrawal of forces. Overall, the greater emphasis was on the war 
between nations rather than the internal civil war. For the majority of 
governments the question of territorial integrity was the higher priority.
The resolution adopted by the Assembly was virtually identical with 
the resolution which had been sponsored by several non-permanent members 
in the Security Council, but had been vetoed by the Soviet Union. It 
began by noting the reports of the Secretary General of 3 and 4 December 
1971, referred to the need for an early political solution, and made 
statements relating to territorial integrity. In the substantive clauses 
it called for an immediate ceasefire, and for India and Pakistan to each 
withdraw their forces to their own side of the borders. It urged efforts 
to bring about conditions necessary for the voluntary repatriation of the 
refugees, and called for all States to co-operate with the Secretary 
General in rendering assistance to those refugees. In response to the 
Secretary General's appeal a clause was added urging efforts to safeguard 
the civilian population in the area of conflict. The Secretary General was
A/L647/Rev.1, 7 December 1971.
2 Ambassador Sen was the first to see Thant in his home on 29 November 
(U Thant, View from the UN, p.247).
3 The verbatim transcript of the debate is contained in A/PV2003; a 
summary of the points made by speakers appears in Bangaldesh Documents, 
Vol. II, pp.487-493.
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f u r t h e r  r e q u e s t e d  ' t o  keep  t h e  G e n e ra l  Assembly and th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
p ro m p t ly  and  c u r r e n t l y  in fo rm e d  o f  t h e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  p r e s e n t  
r e s o l u t i o n * , and t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  was c a l l e d  upon ' t o  t a k e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
a c t i o n  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  r e s o l u t i o n ' . 4
E v e n ts  a f t e r  t h e  G e n e ra l  Assembly r e s o l u t i o n
The w id e r  d a n g e rs  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  were r e v e a l e d  i n  m in u te s  o f  m e e t in g s
o f  t h e  'W a sh in g to n  S p e c i a l  A c t io n  Group ' (WSAG) w hich  met d a i l y  on th e
2
c r i s i s  u n d e r  K i s s i n g e r ' s  c h a i r m a n s h ip .  On 4 December th e  to p  o f f i c i a l s
a t t e n d i n g  t h e  m e e t in g  a p p e a r e d  t o  be s a n g u in e  a b o u t  t h e  w id e r  d a n g e r s .  CIA
D i r e c t o r  R ic h a rd  Helms t o l d  t h e  Group t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  a s s e s s m e n t  was t h a t
3
t h e r e  was n o t  much chance  o f  a  g r e a t  power c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  By 8 December,
f o l l o w i n g  r a p i d  I n d i a n  ad v a n ce s  i n  t h e  E a s t ,  t h e  WSAG m e e t in g s  had  become
c o n c e rn e d  w i th  t h e  p o s s i b l e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  P a k i s t a n  armed f o r c e s  i n
b o th  E a s t  and  W est.  K i s s i n g e r  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e th e r  t h e  US c o u ld  a l lo w  an a l l y
t o  go down, w h i l e  Helms r e p o r t e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  C h in e se  ' r a t t l e d  t h e  sw ord ' on
I n d i a ' s  n o r t h e r n  b o r d e r s ,  t h e  S o v i e t  Union h a s  p ro m is e d  Mrs Gandhi t o  t a k e
4
' a p p r o p r i a t e  c o u n t e r - a c t i o n ' .  On 10 December, t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  d e c id e d  to
move a t a s k  f o r c e  o f  t h e  US S e v e n th  F l e e t  h ea d ed  by th e  a i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r
5
' E n t e r p r i s e '  i n t o  t h e  Bay o f  B e n g a l ,  an a c t i o n  w hich  c a u se d  c o n s t e r n a t i o n
g
i n  New D e l h i ,  w here  some A m ericans  w ere  a t t a c k e d  on th e  s t r e e t s .
1 A/2793/XXVI; t h e  o r i g i n a l  d r a f t  was c i r c u l a t e d  as  A/L647; f o r  t e x t  o f  
r e s o l u t i o n  se e  A ppendix  B.
2
The m in tu e s were l e a k e d  t o  t h e  p r e s s  and a p p e a re d  i n  the. New York 
HeraZd Tribune, P a r i s  e d i t i o n ,  15 J a n u a r y  1972. They a r e  r e p r i n t e d  i n  
J a c k s o n ,  op. c i t .  , A ppendix  14, p p . 212 -229 .
3 Ib id . , p .2 1 6 .
4 Ib id . , p . 226.
c;
J a c k s o n ,  op. c i t . ,  p .2 3 0 .
P e r s o n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  by th e  w r i t e r  i n  New D e l h i ,  December 1971.6
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On 12 December, the United States requested a Security Council meeting
on the grounds that while one of the parties to the conflict, Pakistan, had
accepted Resolution 2 793, the other party, India, was yet to do so."*’ On the
same day India forwarded in reply to Resolution 2793 a letter which pre-
2sented a detailed rationale for India's actions. The positions adopted by 
the various major actors in the second round of the Security Council debates 
were similar to those of the first round. The Soviet Union and China main­
tained their previous positions of support for Pakistan and India respectively, 
and engaged even more fiercely in vitriolic attacks on each other. India was 
alternately critical of the attitude adopted by the majority of governments 
and conciliatory in asking that others try to understand the situation which 
it faced. Pakistan became increasingly resentful over the inaction of the 
Council as military defeat became more and more imminent. The United States 
moved to a position of strong criticism of India.
The American CIA reportedly received information from several sources, 
including Islamabad, New Delhi, and the monitoring of Chinese radio traffic, 
indicating the possibility of Chinese intervention on the northern border.
The Soviet Ambassador was said to have promised Mrs Gandhi on 13 December 
that the USSR 'would open a diversionary action' against the Chinese in
Sinkiang, and would 'not allow the US Seventh Fleet to intervene' in the
3Bay of Bengal noting that a Soviet Fleet was now in the Indian Ocean.
The Security Council remained deadlocked and the debates wore on with 
little change in the content of the various statements, with references to 
the need for further consultations and expressions of regret at the lack of
S/10444, 12 December 1971.
2 S/10445, 12 December 1971.
3 Jackson, op. cit. , pp.229-231 (article by Jack Anderson, 10 January 
1972).
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p r o g r e s s ,  com bined w ith  p e r i o d i c  r e f e r e n c e s  by s e v e r a l  o f  th e  n o n -p erm an en t 
d e le g a t i o n s  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  p e o p le  w ere d y in g  w h ile  th e  C o u n c il t a l k e d .
The F o re ig n  M in is te r s  o f  b o th  I n d ia  and P a k i s t a n  a t t e n d e d ,  th e  l a t t e r  (B hu tto ) 
s to rm in g  o u t  o f  th e  m e e tin g  on 15 December a f t e r  a  f i n a l  im p a ss io n e d  s t a t e ­
m ent f o l lo w in g  th e  f a l l  o f  D acca .^
On 16 December th e  In d ia n  F o re ig n  M in i s te r  announced  t h a t  th e  P a k i s t a n i
arm ed f o r c e s  had  s u r r e n d e re d  i n  B a n g la d esh  and  th e  In d ia n  G overnm ent had
2
o r d e r e d  a  c e a s e f i r e  on th e  w e s te rn  f r o n t  w i th  e f f e c t  from  F r id a y  17 . F iv e  
days and  f i v e  m e e tin g s  l a t e r ,  on T uesday  21 D ecem ber, th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il 
f i n a l l y  r e a c h e d  a g re e m e n t on a r e s o l u t i o n  w hich  was a c c e p ta b le  to  b o th  
I n d ia  and  P a k i s t a n .  The r e s o l u t i o n  n o te d  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly R e s o lu t io n  
2793 , t h e  r e p l i e s  o f  th e  two g o v e rn m e n ts , th e  s ta te m e n ts  o f  th e  F o re ig n  
M in i s te r s  an d  th e  c e a s e f i r e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and  demanded t h a t  ' . . . a  d u ra b le  
c e a s e f i r e  and  c e s s a t io n  o f  a l l  h o s t i l i t i e s  i n  a l l  a r e a s  o f  c o n f l i c t  be  
s t r i c t l y  o b s e rv e d  and  rem a in  i n  e f f e c t  u n t i l  w ith d ra w a ls  ta k e  p l a c e ' .  I t  
th e n  r e i t e r a t e d  th e  re m a in in g  s u b s ta n t iv e  p a ra g ra p h s  o f  R e s o lu t io n  2793 w ith  
th e  a d d i t i o n  o f  an im p o r ta n t  c la u s e  a u t h o r i s i n g  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l to  
a p p o in t  a  s p e c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  to  l e n d  h i s  good o f f i c e s  f o r  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  
o f  h u m a n i ta r ia n  p r o b le m s .“*
The S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il  r e s o l u t i o n  was a r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a f a i t  accompli.
I t  was c l e a r  from  th e  c o n d u c t o f  th e  d e b a te  b e tw een  4 December and 21 
Decem ber t h a t  th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  th e  m a jo r  pow ers to  r e c o n c i l e  t h e i r  a p p a re n t  
c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  had p a r a ly s e d  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il .  B e fo re  th e
S /PV 1615, 15 Decem ber 1971, p a r a .  84 . B h u tto  had  been  a p p o in te d  
D eputy P rim e M in i s t e r  and F o re ig n  M in i s te r  i n  a c o a l i t i o n  governm en t form ed 
on 7 Decem ber ( J a c k s o n , op. c i t . , p . 1 4 4 ) .
2 S/PV 1616, 16 Decem ber 1971, p a r a .  5 .
S /1 0 4 6 5 , 21 Decem ber 1971; f o r  t e x t  o f  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  se e  A ppendix  B.
3
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o u tb re a k  o f  open h o s t i l i t i e s  be tw een  I n d ia  and P a k i s t a n  th e  S e c r e ta r y  
G e n e r a l 's  i n i t i a t i v e s  h ad  been  d i r e c t e d  to w a rd s  two p o s s i b i l i t i e s  -  a good 
o f f i c e s  r o l e  b a s e d  on th e  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  d i s p u t in g  p a r t i e s ,  and S e c u r i ty  
C o u n c il a c t i o n  b a s e d  on a c o n se n su s  am ongst th e  p e rm an en t m em bers. T h a t 
n e i t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  was r e a l i s e d  was due b o th  to  th e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  th e  
d i s p u t a n t s ,  and  to  th e  p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  b ig  p o w ers . A f te r  th e  o u tb re a k  o f  
h o s t i l i t i e s  th e s e  same a t t i t u d e s  and p o l i c i e s  e n s u re d  t h a t  th e  outcom e o f  
th e  c r i s i s  was in f lu e n c e d  more by e v e n ts  on th e  b a t t l e f i e l d  th a n  by any o f  
t h e  o rg a n s  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  -  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il ,  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly , 
o r  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t .
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WAR: 'THE BANGLADESH DILEMMA1
In  R e s o lu t io n  2793 , t h e  m a jo r i ty  o f  governm en ts r e p r e s e n te d  in  th e
G e n e ra l A ssem bly a s s e r t e d  th e  p rim a cy  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  n a t i o n a l
s o v e r e ig n ty ,  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  and  n o n - in t e r v e n t io n  in  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .
B ut f o r  many d e c is io n  m akers and o b s e rv e r s  a b a s ic  dilem m a rem a in e d :
w h e th e r  such  p r i n c i p l e s  s h o u ld  rem a in  so  i n v i o l a t e  i n  th e  f a c e  o f  th e
m a ss iv e  s u f f e r i n g  and  t r a g e d y  e x p e r ie n c e d  by th e  p o p u la t io n  o f  E a s t  B e n g a l.
Moore s t a t e s  t h a t  ' th e  s p e c t a c l e  o f  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly t r e a t i n g  th e
c a rn a g e  i n  E a s t  P a k is ta n  . . . a s  a  m a t te r  o f  d o m e s tic  j u r i s t i c t i o n  . . .
s ta n d s  i n  s h a rp  c o n t r a s t  t o  th e  human r i g h t s  g o a ls  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s '. '* ’
2
I t  i s  t h i s  w h ich  R ic h a rd  F a lk  h a s  d e s c r ib e d  as ' t h e  B an g lad esh  d ile m m a '.
In  th e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  to  h i s  F in a l  R e p o r t a s  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l , T h an t 
r e f e r r e d  to  ' a  p ro b le m  w hich  h a s  been  a lm o s t d a i l y  i n  my m ind d u r in g  my 
tim e  a s  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l . . . th e  v i o l a t i o n  o f  human r i g h t s  w i th in  th e
1 John N. Moore ( e d .)  , Law and C iv il War in  the Modem World, Jo h n s  
H opkins UP, B a l t im o r e ,  1974, p .x v .
2 I b id . ,  p p . 5 4 1 - 5 4 5 .
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frontiers of a state'.''’ A related problem he said, was ' . . . the con­
flict between the principles of integrity of sovereign states and the 
assertion of the right to self-determination and even secession by a large 
group within a sovereign state'.2
Even before the Indo-Pakistani hostilities of 1971, Oscar Schächter
wrote in 1968 that the question of 'foreign intervention in civil strife'
had 'already imposed on the United Nations its greatest burdens, its almost
3galling frustrations and its most profound crises'. When the OAU con­
sidered the Nigerian civil war, African member states were more concerned
to prevent a precedent for secession than they were with the wide scale
4infringement of human rights, or even the allegations of genocide. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by African governments in relation to the Pakistan 
civil war during the General Assembly debate. It was clear that there was a 
ready response from many third world countries to Pakistan's assertion that 
the principles of territorial integrity was of central importance to all 
governments, particularly those in developing countries.
On the question of self-determination, it should be noted that the fear 
of secession among new states had restricted the concept in their eyes to 
the right of colonised peoples to independence. Self-determination was 
interpreted by the third world governments which comprised a majority of 
the General Assembly in terms of 'a single act of choice', such that 'when 
a choice was made it was considered that self-determination was fulfilled
1 Introduction to Annual Report, 1971, para. 147.
Ibid. , para. 148.
3 Oscar Schächter in Stanford Journal of International Studies , Vol. ill, 
June 1968, p.6.
Ian Brownlie, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in J.N. Moore, op. cit., 
p.227.
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once and for all'. Throughout the developing crisis Pakistan made strong
assertions based on the concept of a single act of choice. The Pakistan
representative stated repeatedly that East Pakistan did not originally
become part of the new country of Pakistan in 1947 by any act of annexation
or acquisition by force, but through the free will of the East Bengali
people. He asserted on one occasion: 'if that was not self-determination,
2then self-determination never did or can never occur anywhere'.
India, for its part, was initially most cautious in officially support­
ing the right of the East Bengalis to self-determination, stressing rather 
the sheer magnitude of suffering created by the Pakistan Government's 
actions and the burden imposed on India by the influx of refugees.
Pressures within India for recognition of the Bangladesh Provisional
Government were resisted until 6 December, that is, until after the outbreak
3of open hostilities and the beginning of the Security Council debates.
By that time India began to speak out in support of the East Bengalis' 
right to self-determination, but carefully maintained the interpretation 
which linked self-determination with the emergence from colonisation by 
accusing West Pakistan of imposing a form of colonial rule on East Pakistan.
The fear of secession among new states was bound to have a powerful 
influence on the approach to crises adopted by the UN Secretariat. On 4 
January 1970, Secretary General Thant stated:
Oscar Schächter, 'The United Nations and Internal Conflict', in Moore, 
op. cit. , p.407.
2 A/AC.109/PV826, 'Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples', 8 September 1971. Pakistan argued that self-determination had 
not occurred in Kashmir because accession to India had taken place by 
decision of a traditional ruler and did not reflect the wishes of the people.
3 See p.160, supra.
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So, as far as the question of secession of a particular 
section of a member state is concerned, the United Nations' 
attitude is unequivocal. As an international organisation 
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept 
and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of 
secession of a part of one of its member states.^
The concern for sovereignty and territorial integrity had led to a par­
ticular emphasis on the view that any involvement by the United Nations in 
internal strife must be subject to the consent of the government concerned. 
Schächter points out that this requirement, and the stress placed upon it, 
has profoundly affected both decisions taken by UN organs as to UN involve­
ment, and the approach adopted by the Secretariat in acting to carry out 
2such decisions. Furthermore, the stress placed on the interpretation of 
self-determination as a single and irrevocable act of choice added to the 
pressures on the Secretariat, not only from Pakistan but also from other 
governments, against any form of contact with the Awami League rebels. In 
the absence of such contact the Secretariat was unable to exercise an 
intermediary role either within Pakistan or between Pakistan and India, and 
thus was denied the possibility of exerting any real influence on the under­
lying political issues.
In general, the Secretariat was faced with the reality that violations
of human rights alone have not been regarded as sufficient for intervention
3by the United Nations. Any intervention or involvement in the political 
aspects of the crisis, as distinct from the humanitarian aspects, had to 
be justified in terms of a threat to international peace and security.
This reality was clearly reflected in the memoranda and public statements
UN Monthly Chronicle, 36, February 1970.
Schächter, 'The United Nations and Internal Conflict', p.420. 
Ibid. , p .408.
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of the Secretary General where he argued that the human tragedies in East 
Pakistan threatened to have serious consequences for international peace.
Yet despite his warnings and his clear elaboration of the threat, the 
principle of sovereignty was sufficiently strong and the immediate interests 
of the various parties, both direct and indirect, were perceived to be so 
much in conflict that the Secretary General's initiatives were negated. His 
strenuous and persistent attempts to undertake an intermediary role on the 
political issues were almost totally unrewarded.
The Secretary General did succeed, however, in establishing a role 
which enabled the United Nations to tackle the humanitarian needs, which 
were of unprecedented dimensions. The Secretariat's experiences in dealing 
with the humanitarian issues provide further insights into the deeply 
rooted nature of the problems faced by the Secretary General on the political 
questions, in particular the problem of sovereignty, and is discussed further
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDY THREE (CONTINUED): BANGLADESH, HUMANITARIAN
ISSUES, 1971, 1972
INTRODUCTION
In civil war in densely populated East Pakistan and the exodus of
refugees into India created a need for international assistance on a massive
scale. In May and June the Secretary General appealed for assistance from
the international community both for the East Pakistan refugees in India and
for the population of East Pakistan. With the agreement of the Indian
Government he designated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) as the 'focal point' for assistance to the refugees in India."'’ In
addition, the UNHCR was given responsibility for efforts to facilitate the
voluntary repatriation of the refugees. With the eventual agreement of the
Pakistan Government, he established the United Nations East Pakistan Relief
2Operation (UNEPRO), based in Dacca and headed by a Special Representative.
U Thant emphasised in his Annual Report, and it was frequently stressed 
in various documents, that in providing humanitarian assistance the United 
Nations was observing strictly Article 2(7) of the Charter. The problem of 
domestic jurisdiction clearly inhibited humanitarian measures in India and 
East Pakistan in various ways, but that problem did not prove insurmountable 
with regard to the humanitarian role of the United Nations, as it had with 
regard to its attempts to avert a serious threat to international peace.
SG/SM/1478, 19 May 1971. 
SG/SM/1498, 16 June 1971.
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Nevertheless, it was never possible in practice to completely separate the 
humanitarian from the political aspects. In technical reports on the 
humanitarian missions this separation was maintained and indeed highlighted 
to the maximum extent possible. But the Secretary General left no doubt in 
his 1971 Annual Report that political elements were inevitably involved in 
any humanitarian mission.'*'
This chapter discusses the negotiations undertaken by the Secretary 
General and members of the UN Secretariat with governments over the two 
relief operations. Since the Indian relief operation was co-ordinated 
through the office of the UNHCR, it is considered only briefly here, with 
particular reference to the Secretary General's role in its establishment.
A major part of the chapter is devoted to the establishment and conduct of 
UNEPRO, since this operation was directly administered by the UN Secretariat. 
Of particular interest were the connections between these negotiations and 
the Secretary General's endeavours to undertake an intermediary role on the 
political issues. Finally, the link between humanitarian and political 
issues is most clearly illustrated by two special good offices missions on 
humanitarian issues undertaken by Winspeare Guicciardi after the fighting 
had ended.
Introduction to the Annual Report, 1971, paras. 129, 184, 191.
2 Oliver, The United Nations and Bangladesh: A Private History is an
important source on this aspect, providing a comprehensive documentation of 
the relief effort in East Pakistan.
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INITIATION OF RELIEF OPERATIONS 
Pakistan's sensitivity
From the beginning of the crisis the Pakistan Government was extremely 
sensitive in its responses to offers of assistance. Shortly after the events 
of 25 March, the Secretary General made a public offer of humanitarian 
assistance to Pakistan, stating that:
If the government of Pakistan were to request the Secretary 
General to assist in humanitarian efforts, he would be very 
happy to do everything in his power in this regard. Of course, 
the Secretary General is very much concerned about the loss of 
life and human suffering resulting from the recent developments 
in East Pakistan.1 2
Pakistan did not comment publicly, but a private protest was delivered
through Ambassador Shahi, who claimed that the Secretary General had violated 
2Article 2(7). He also maintained that the situation was returning to 
normal and claimed the difficulties had been due to Indian propaganda and 
infiltration.3 His note immediately indicated the difficulty of separating 
humanitarian and political issues.
On 22 April the Secretary General sent a letter to President Yahya Khan
formally offering humanitarian assistance on behalf of the UN system. He
stressed that as Secretary General he had always scrupulously observed
Article 2(7), and that he was making his offer 'prompted merely by humani-
4tarian considerations'. Yahya Khan's reply made no mention of Article 2(7), 
and recognised that the Secretary General's offer was prompted by his
SG/SM/1446, 1 April 1971.
2 Note verbale, Ambassador Shahi to Secretary General, 7 April 1971, 
Oliver, op. oit., p.15.
Ibid.
Text released in SG/SM/1474, 12 May 1971.4
214
'sincerity and deep personal commitment to humanitarian principles'. He 
welcomed the offer, but said there was no immediate need, accusing the 
Indian and western press of publishing reports which were 'highly exagger­
ated, if not altogether tendentious'. He added that his government was 
assessing needs and would advise of any requirements for international 
assistance.^
Relief operations in India
Meanwhile, Indian sources reported that 600,000 refugees had crossed
3the border in the first three weeks after the crisis began. On 23 April
4Ambassador Sen lodged a formal request for UN assistance. The Secretary 
General had the matter discussed by the UN system's administrative committee 
on co-ordination on 26 April. After consultation with a number of govern­
ments he decided on 29 April that the UNHCR should act as the focal point
5for co-ordination of international assistance to the refugees in India.
There was later some criticism of the time it took the United Nations 
system to gear up for the humanitarian operations on the sub-continent,^  
but the time between the request from the Government of India and the 
Secretary General's decision to act was only six days. In that time an 
entire structure of organisation was brought into being. Emergency supplies 
of milk powder and butter oil were released by the World Food Program and
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Oliver, op. cit., p.17.
S/10539/Add.3, 11 August 1971, Report of the United Rations High Com­
missioner for Refugees on the activities of the United Rations focal point 
for assistance to refugees from East Bengal in India, para. 10.
5 Ibid.
e.g. US State Department Paper, 21 June, cited in Oliver, op. cit. ,
p . 34.
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and a i r l i f t e d  to  th e  a r e a  by UNICEF. From 6 to  19 May a th r e e  man m is s io n
from  th e  o f f i c e  o f  th e  High C om m issioner v i s i t e d  I n d i a ,  w ent t o  th e  re fu g e e
a r e a s , and  m et w i th  a l l  th e  r e l e v a n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  in c lu d in g  governm ent
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  s p e c i a l i s e d  a g e n c ie s  and  n o n -g o v e rn m e n ta l o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
T h e ir  r e p o r t  was d i s t r i b u t e d  to  governm en ts th ro u g h  p e rm an en t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
2
a t  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s . On 19 May, a t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  t h i s  m is s io n  and
se v en  w eeks a f t e r  th e  e v e n ts  o f  25 M arch, th e  S e c r e t a r y  G en e ra l la u n c h e d  an
3
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a p p e a l f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  th e  r e f u g e e s .
The r e l i e f  e f f o r t  w hich  was e v e n tu a l ly  u n d e r ta k e n  f o r  a lm o s t sev en
4m i l l i o n  r e f u g e e s  i n  I n d ia  can o n ly  be d e s c r ib e d  as  m a s s iv e . One c a n n o t 
f a i l  t o  be  im p re ss e d  by  th e  m agn itude  o f  th e  p ro b le m s and  th e  d im e n s io n s  o f  
th e  t e c h n i c a l  i s s u e s  w h ich  w ere conveyed  i n  th e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  p r e s e n te d  by 
th e  UNHCR. The r e p o r t  p r e s e n te d  an a c c o u n t o f  how th e  r e l i e f  o p e r a t io n  
e n d e a v o u re d  to  fa c e  up to  v a r io u s  c r i s e s  -  s h o r ta g e s  o f  fo o d , t h r e a t s  o f  
c h o le r a  and  sm a llp o x  o u tb r e a k s ,  th e  o n s e t  o f  th e  monsoon s e a so n  and th e  
d e s p e r a te  n e e d  f o r  s h e l t e r .  W hile th e  c o n d i t io n s  w ere a b o m in a b le , th e r e  
was re m a rk a b ly  low lo s s  o f  l i f e .  As i t  was th e  human t ra g e d y  was enorm ous. 
W ith o u t th e  UN sy s te m  th e  p o t e n t i a l  e n o rm ity  was a lm o s t  beyond i m a t i n a t i o n .
S /1 0 5 39/A d d .3 , p a r a .  11 .
2 I b i d . ,  p a r a .  12.
I b i d . , p a r a .  13 and SG/SM /1478, 19 May 1971.
^ S t a t i s t i c s  r e l e a s e d  by th e  In d ia n  and  P a k i s t a n  G overnm ents d i f f e r e d  
g r e a t l y .  O f f i c i a l  I n d ia n  s t a t i s t i c s ,  w hich  w ere u se d  f o r  p la n n in g  p u rp o se s  
by b o th  t h e  In d ia n  a u t h o r i t i e s  and  th e  UNHCR, showed t h a t  on 1 December 1971 
6 .9  m i l l i o n  re fu g e e s  w ere  i n  cam ps, and w ere t h e r e f o r e  a s s i s t e d  by th e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l i e f  e f f o r t .  A f u r t h e r  3 .1  m i l l i o n  had  been  r e g i s t e r e d  
c r o s s in g  th e  b o r d e r  b u t  d id  n o t  e n t e r  th e  cam ps, and w ere shown in  th e  
s t a t i s t i c s  a s  s ta y in g  w ith  f r i e n d s  and  r e l a t i v e s .  S /1 0 5 3 9 /A d d .3 , p a r a s .  
19-22 and t a b l e  V I I I - 1 .
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P r e s s u r e  on P a k is ta n
The s i t u a t i o n  w i th in  P a k is ta n  was q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  B u t d e s p i t e  Yahya 
K h a n 's  p o l i t e l y  c o o l re s p o n s e  to  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l 's  o f f e r ,  c o n s id e r a b le  
p r e s s u r e  on him  to  a c c e p t  b egan  to  d e v e lo p . P r e s s u r e  came from  b o th  th e  
U n ite d  S t a t e s  and  from  th e  W orld Bank w hich  p la y e d  a m ajo r r o l e  i n  P a k i s t a n 's  
d e v e lo p m en t p ro g ra m . W orld Bank P r e s id e n t  McNamara m et th e  B r i t i s h  P rim e 
M in i s te r  and F o re ig n  S e c r e ta r y  i n  London on 22 and  23 A p r i l ,  and r e p o r t e d ly  
g a in e d  t h e i r  ag reem en t t o  B r i t i s h  c o - o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  US in  an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  to  s h o re  up th e  P a k is ta n  econom y, p ro v id e d  Yahya Khan 
a g re e d  to  se e k  an accom m odation w ith  th e  B e n g a l is  and  p e r m i t t e d  an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  r e l i e f  p rog ram  in  E a s t  P a k is ta n .^ -
Yahya Khan s e n t  h i s  econom ic a d v i s e r ,  M.M. Ahmed, to  W ash ing ton  on 
15 and  16 May. Ahmed a s s u r e d  P r e s id e n t  N ixon , S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  R ogers
and N a t io n a l  S e c u r i ty  A d v is e r  K is s in g e r  t h a t  P a k i s t a n  w ould comply w ith
2th e  W orld B a n k 's  c o n d i t io n s .  He th e n  m et th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l in  New
York and  a d v is e d  him t h a t  th e  P a k is ta n  G overnm ent w ould  a c c e p t  h i s  o f f e r
3
o f  h u m a n i ta r ia n  a s s i s t a n c e .  A t T h a n t 's  r e q u e s t ,  t h i s  was c o n firm e d  in  
w r i t i n g . ^
The c o n t in u in g  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  P a k is ta n  was i n d i c a t e d  d u r in g  a d i s ­
c u s s io n  o f  human r i g h t s  i n  th e  S o c ia l  Com m ittee o f  ECOSOC, w hich  saw a
5
s e r i e s  o f  s h a rp  ex ch an g es  b e tw een  th e  I n d ia n  and P a k i s t a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
New York Times, 20 May 1971.
2 O l i v e r ,  op. c i t .  , p .2 0 .
3 Ib id .
4
SG /SM /1484, L e t t e r  from  A m bassador S h ah i to  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l ,  22 May
1971.
See E/AC. 7 /SR 669, 12 May 1971 , p p . 1 0 -1 7 ; E/AC. 7 /S R 675 , p p . 1 0 1 -1 0 2 ,
17 May 1971.
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Following Ahmed's visit to the Secretary General, Shahi stated bluntly in
the Committee that Pakistan 'needed aid, not interference in its domestic
affairs'."*’ He said that his government would accept UN assistance as long
as it was prompted by purely humanitarian considerations, and not by
ulterior motives. To drive home the point, he warned that the people of
East Pakistan could in no way be assisted against the will, or without the
2participation of the Government of Pakistan.
Kittani's mission
During Ahmed's visit to the Secretary General on behalf of Yahya Khan,
Thant suggested that he send a representative to discuss the humanitarian
aid program with the Pakistan Government. Shahi's letter of 22 May accepted
this suggestion but stated clearly that his government would receive the
representative 'on the understanding that his role and activities would be
3within the framework of humanitarian assistance'. The legitimacy of a UN
role in humanitarian measures was, under pressure, conceded by the Pakistan
Government, but in so doing the government was more concerned than ever to
exclude the UN from the political aspects.
Ismat Kittani, the Assistant Secretary General for Interagency Affairs,
had been designated before the crisis as the focal point for the co-
4ordination of United Nations action on natural disasters. On behalf of the
E/AC.7/SR677, 18 May, p.110.
Ibid.
 ^ SG/SM/1484, Shahi to Secretary General, 22 May 1971.
4 OPI Note to correspondents No.3669, 5 June 1971. No UN machinery for 
disaster relief had been established when the East Pakistan crisis occurred.
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Secretary General he went to Pakistan on 3 June, following briefings by a
range of agencies and organisations in Washington and Geneva.^"
In Islamabad Kittani met with Yahya Khan to discuss arrangements for
the UN relief operation in East Pakistan. Khan agreed to the appointment
of a personal representative of the Secretary General to head the operation.
The President's letter of early May replying to the Secretary General's
offer had stated that if and when international assistance was required, it
would be administered by Pakistan's relief agencies which were, he said,
2'well prepared and well equipped to undertake the task'. This was an area 
of great sensitivity because donor countries wished to be assured that the 
aid they provided would reach the people for whom it was intended. It was 
a major point in the negotiations between Kittani and the Pakistan Govern­
ment.
Yahya Khan agreed that the UN should be associated with the operation
as a whole, including the distribution of supplies, and that the UN mission
would have full freedom of movement. He withdrew his original stipulation
that the supply vessels should be manned by Pakistani crews and agreed
reluctantly to the establishment of a radio link between the mission in East
3Pakistan and UN headquarters in New York. Kittani reportedly gave guaran­
tees to Yahya Khan that the representative and his staff in Dacca would be
engaged solely in humanitarian work and would have no function in observing
4or reporting on political aspects.
Ibid, In Washington he met officials from the IBRD, the IMF and the 
US Government; in Geneva he met with the Director General of WHO, the UNHCR, 
the Secretary General of the League of Red Cross Societies, the Director 
General of FAO and the ex Director of WFP. Oliver, op. oit., p.25.
2 SG/SM/1474.
2 Kittani, Report to Secretary General, 14 June, Oliver, op. cit. , p.29.
0. Schächter, 'The United Nations and Internal Conflict', p.430.4
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In his confidential report to the Secretary General, Kittani himself 
commented on the problem of political reconciliation within Pakistan.
Observing that it was 'for Pakistan to find the formula of national reconcili­
ation' , Kittani wrote that the consensus among diplomats and others to whom 
he spoke was that the President was sincere in his desire to transfer powers 
to the elected representatives of the people, 'but there were no political 
leaders in East Pakistan with whom the government could consult and
negotiate'. ^ Oliver comments dryly that with Mujibur Rahman in gaol and the
2other leaders dead or underground, this was an understatment.
On 7 June, Kittani went to Karachi and met with El Tawil, who had been
designated as the Secretary General's representative in East Pakistan. He
briefed El Tawil during the long flight around the south of India en route
to Dacca. There he introduced him to the Military Governor of East Pakistan,
3and received assurances of full co-operation at all levels.
Insistence on quiet diplomacy
While Kittani was completing his mission, considerable pressures were 
being brought to bear on the Secretariat at Headquarters, both by govern­
ments and by the press, which was not fully aware of the behind-the-scenes
4activity. The upheavals in East Pakistan were highly publicised in the news 
media of the world, generally in terms favourable to the Bangladesh rebels.
 ^ Oliver, loc. cit.
Ibid.
3
Ibid. , p .26.
For example, an Editorial in The Sunday Australian, Sydney, 6 June 1971, 
criticised the United Nations for showing 'little sign of urgency' in dealing 
with the relief problem; an article by Fortes Gil, Ex-President of Mexico and 
Ambassador of Mexico to India, in El Heraldo, 24 June 1971, asked what the 
United Nations had done (in Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, p.558).
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Pressures of public opinion were exerted both indirectly through governments,
and directly on the Secretariat itself. On 3 June the President of the UN
Correspondents Association posed a number of questions to the Secretary
General."*" There were comments by the press that he did not explain the
2practical and political obstacles to action by the United Nations.
Despite these criticisms, Thant maintained that quiet diplomacy was 
essential. Replying to a query from the British Foreign Secretary about the 
progress of the relief operation Thant wrote:
I doubt very much whether even this much could have been achieved 
under the circumstances . . . without observing the greatest
reserve as to publicity.^
There had to be a choice, he added, between 'proceeding quickly and allowing
4a natural desire for favourable publicity to complicate the task at hand'.
Nevertheless he sought to allay press speculation and concern by assuring
correspondents that he had received encouraging reports from Kittani and was
confident that in a very short time the UN family of agencies would be able
5to contribute substantial relief. Prince Sadruddin held several press 
conferences at which he answered detailed questions and stressed that a 
great deal of Thant's effort on both the political and the humanitarian 
aspects had been undertaken through quiet diplomacy.6
See SG/SM/1493, 4 June 1971.
2 Oliver, op. cit., p.31.
3 Letter from Secretary General to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 8 June 1971, 
Oliver, op. cit. , pp.31-32.
4 Ibid.
5 SG/1755, 4 June 1971, Note to Correspondents No.3669, 5 June 1971.
UNHCR, Press Conferences in Geneva, 5 May 1971 (Bangladesh Documents, 
Vol. I, pp.612-618) , New York, 23 June 1971 (-ibid., pp.628-632) , London,
30 June 1971 (ibid., pp.633-642) and Paris, 9 July 1971, (ibid., pp.643-649).
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Governments also expressed concern, but did so privately. US Ambassador 
Bush told the Secretary General that 'the slowness with which this is develop­
ing is disturbing'.''' A US State Department paper later indicated that the
American Government had pressed for more vigorous action through its per-
2manent representative as well as 'other channels'.
On 16 June the Secretary General launched his appeal for assistance to
3the people of East Pakistan. The delay of nearly a month after his public 
appeal for assistance to the refugees in India was due to the great diffi­
culty experienced in obtaining the consent of the Pakistan Government to a 
United Nations operation. Yahya Khan had agreed only after the exertion of 
considerable pressure by the United States and other Western governments, 
as well as the World Bank. Even after this agreement in principle, it was 
necessary for the UN Secretariat, through Ismat Kittani, to engage in 
difficult and sensitive negotiations to ensure that the relief operation 
would have the independence and freedom of movement necessary for its 
credibility in the eyes of donor countries.
The extreme sensitivity of the Pakistan Government revealed through 
these negotiations on humanitarian issues provides an insight into the 
obstacles which stood in the way of Thant's early efforts to establish an 
intermediary role on the political issues. The record also clearly reveals 
the fact that the two sets of issues were very closely linked together.
US Mission to the UN, talking paper, 14 June 1971, Oliver, op. ott.
p. 38.
2 Oliver, op. <yit. , p.34.
3 SG/SM/1498, 16 June 1971.
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E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  UNEPRO
The U n i te d  N a t io n s  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  R e l i e f  O p e r a t io n  (UNEPRO) was b e s e t
from t h e  b e g in n in g  by d e la y s  w hich  r e f l e c t e d  th e  d i s a r r a y  o f  th e  P a k i s t a n
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  th e  E a s t e r n  w ing . The G o v ern m en t 's  r e l i e f  com m ittee  w hich
was su p p o sed  t o  c o - o p e r a t e  w i th  UNEPRO d i d  n o t  m eet u n t i l  24 J u n e . ’*' There
was ' a p a t h y ,  d i s a f f e c t i o n  and  a s e n s e  o f  h e l p l e s s n e s s '  amongst many o f  th e  
2
o f f i c i a l s .  B e n g a l i  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  s t i l l  o p e r a t e d  on a non c o - o p e r a t i v e
b a s i s .  L o c a l  co m m it tee s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  food  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f t e n  a c t e d
u n f a i r l y  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e i r  t a s k ,  and h a r r a s s e d  p e o p le  s u s p e c t e d  o f
3
sympathy w i t h  t h e  i n s u r g e n t s .
F u r th e rm o re  t h e r e  was c o n f u s io n  i n  p r e s s  r e p o r t s  o v e r  th e  S e c r e t a r y
G e n e r a l ' s  p r o p o s a l  f o r  UNHCR o b s e r v e r s  on t h e  b o r d e r ,  t h e  i d e a  w hich  had
4
been  f l o a t e d  i n  some q u a r t e r s  o f  a  p e a c e  k e e p in g  o p e r a t i o n ,  and th e  a c t u a l
r o l e  b e in g  u n d e r t a k e n  by t h e  UNEPRO s t a f f  i n  D acca. The S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l
t r i e d  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  a n o t e  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  ' t h e  main
p u rp o s e  o f  t h e  r e l i e f  p e r s o n n e l  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  i s  t o  e n s u re  t h e  m ost
e f f e c t i v e  p o s s i b l e  u se  o f  t h e  r e l i e f  made a v a i l a b l e  by th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
5
c o m m u n ity ' .  The S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  s a i d  t h e  UN a c t i v i t y  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  
was s o l e l y  h u m a n i ta r i a n  i n  n a t u r e .  T here  was no 'p e a c e  k e e p in g '  e le m e n t  
i n  i t s  te rm s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  and i t  was e n t i r e l y  m is l e a d i n g  and e r r o n e o u s  to  
r e f e r  t o  i t  a s  a  'UN f o r c e '  o r  'UN o b s e r v e r s ' . ^
UN c a b l e ,  Dacca t o  H e a d q u a r t e r s ,  25 June  1971, O l i v e r ,  op. o i t .  , p . 4 4 .
2
E l  T a w i l ,  r e p o r t  t o  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  29 O c to b e r  1971, O l i v e r ,  op. 
o it .  , p . 4 5 .
Ib id . , p  .4 6 .
4
F o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  and  F re n ch  r e p o r t e d l y  t a l k e d  a b o u t  a scheme 
f o r  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  U n i te d  N a t io n s  c o n t r o l  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  t o  be 
f o l lo w e d  by f r e s h  e l e c t i o n s  ( J a c k s o n ,  op. c i t .  , p . 1 0 5 ) .
5
OPI N ote  t o  c o r r e s p o n d e n t s ,  N o .3675, 2 A u gus t  1971.
6 Ib id .
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In  t h e  Econom ic and S o c ia l  C o u n c il/  b o th  P r in c e  S a d ru d d in  and K i t t a n i  
gave d e t a i l e d  a c c o u n ts  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  o p e r a t i o n s .^  The u s u a l  custom  in  
c a s e s  o f  n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r  was f o r  ECOSOC to  a d o p t  a  unanim ous r e s o l u t i o n  
c a l l i n g  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e .  S tre n u o u s  e f f o r t s  by New Z e a la n d  and o th e r s  to  
a c h ie v e  a g re e m e n t on such  a r e s o l u t i o n  in  t h i s  c a se  w ere u n s u c c e s s f u l .  The 
m ost t h a t  c o u ld  be a c h ie v e d  was a t e n t a t i v e  e n d o rse m e n t f o r  th e  S e c r e ta r y
2
G e n e r a l 's  a c t i o n s  i n  th e  form  o f  a s ta te m e n t  made by th e  p r e s i d e n t  o f  ECOSOC.
The S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l had  e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  two r e l i e f  o p e r a t io n s  on h i s  
own i n i t i a t i v e  and was r e q u i r e d  to  c o n tin u e  f o r  s e v e r a l  more m onths w i th o u t  
a fo rm a l m andate  from  an a p p r o p r ia t e  o rg a n . A t a tim e  when th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  
was b e in g  a c c u se d  o f  n o t  d o in g  enough a b o u t t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in  E a s t  P a k is ta n  
th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l was i n  f a c t  s t r e t c h i n g  c o n s id e r a b ly  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  
l i m i t e d  pow ers o f  in d e p e n d e n t d e c is io n  m aking . The f i n a l  r e p o r t  o f  th e  
UNHCR n o te s  t h a t  t h e r e  was no p re c e d e n t  t o  g u id e  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  sy s te m  
i n  th e  em ergency  c a u se d  by th e  u p h e a v a ls  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n .  B u t, i t  s t a t e d ,
' t h e  u r g e n t  n e e d s  o f  m i l l i o n s  o f  human b e in g s  i n  e x tre m e  d i s t r e s s  c o u ld  n o t
3w a i t  f o r  t h e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  l e g i s l a t i v e  m a c h in e ry  to  g iv e  g u id in g  r e s o l u t i o n s ' .  
The r e p o r t  n o te d  i t  was t h e r e f o r e  n e c e s s a ry  t o  in n o v a te  in  te rm s  o f  UN p r a c ­
t i c e .  The c r i s i s  m arked an e v o lu t io n  i n  th e  r o l e  o f  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l
i n  r e g a r d  to  d e c i s io n  m aking i n  th e  h u m a n i ta r ia n  f i e l d  on h i s  own i n i t i a t i v e
4b e f o r e  r e c e iv in g  r e s o l u t i o n s  from  UN o rg a n s .
In  t h i s  r e s p e c t  th e  S o v ie t  U nion , in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  i t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
p o s i t i o n ,  q u e r ie d  a t  an in fo rm a l  m ee tin g  o f  28 d o n o r and p r o s p e c t iv e  dono r
1 E /S R .1 7 0 5 , 16 J u ly  1971.
2 Ibid. ; s e e  a l s o  Introduction to the Annual Report, 1971, p a r a .  180.
 ^ S /1 0 5 3 9 /A d d .3 , p a r a .  77 .
4 Ibid.
countries on 15 August whether the operations 'could . . .  be conducted by
2the Secretariat in the absence of a decision by the competent organ'. The
Secretary General replied that he knew the Soviet position, but the fact
was that if there was no action until a decision had been reached by a
principal organ such as the Security Council, there would be no action for
another ten years. He stated that he had no doubt about his competence to
3launch operations of this kind.
The meeting provided the Secretary General with at least the informal 
acquiescence of 28 governments who were either donors or potential donors. 
But the difficulties experienced by the Secretary General in getting a man­
date from member governments on humanitarian issues were an indication of 
the much greater problems he faced in getting the international community 
to act on the political issues.
Repatriation of Refugees
In June the High Commissioner for Refugees visited both India and
Pakistan for discussions aimed at facilitating the voluntary repatriation
4of refugees back to East Pakistan. On 19 July Thant sent identical letters 
to Prime Minister Gandhi and President Yahya Khan proposing an experimental 
and limited representation of the UNHCR on both sides of the eastern border 
to assist in and facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees. The 
proposal was concerned with humanitarian objectives, but was perhaps 
inevitably linked by others with the Secretary General's efforts, through
Press release EA/SH/1523; IHA/41, 13 August 1971. 
Oliver, op. cit., p.70.
Ibid.
4 Bandladesh Documents, Vol. I, p.628.
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his memorandum to the Security Council on the following day, to bring about 
a peaceful resolution of the political issues.
The proposal for UNHCR observers was accepted by Yahya Khan, who had 
previously said that more refugees would return 'if only India desisted from 
discouraging and hindering their movement'.'*' Mrs Gandhi's reply was, 
however, long and uncompromisingly negative. She expressed 'total 
opposition' to the proposal. Her government resented any insinuation that 
it was preventing the refugees from returning to East Bengal. The proposal 
would, she continued:
. . . only provide a facade of action to divert world attention 
from the root cause of the problem, which is the continuation of 
military atrocities, leading to further influx of refugees and 
absence of political settlement acceptable to the people of East 
Pakistan and their already elected leaders.2
Her Government could not support something which was 'unrealistic, unhelpful
3and even dangerous'. The Bangladesh provisional government strongly
4criticised the proposal, using similar arguments.
The Indian assertion, that stationing of observers would in some way 
have been an admission of the validity of Pakistan's claim, seemed to pro­
vide tenuous grounds for rejecting the proposal. A more likely reason for 
the strongly negative response was that India feared the observers would not 
only report on the voluntary movement of refugees, but would also be in a 
position to report on the military activity of both the Indian armed forces 
and the Bengali guerilla fighters. Mrs Gandhi implied as much when she later
President Yahya Khan to Secretary General, 28 June 1971, Oliver, op. 
clt. , p.58.
2 Indira Gandhi, aide memoire to Secretary General, 2 August 1971, 
Bangladesh Documents , vol. I, p.662.
3
4
Ibid. , p .663.
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, p.334.
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told students at Columbia University that observers would 'try and prevent 
the guerillas but not prevent the [Pakistan] army killing the people'."*"
This analysis is consistent with other evidence of India's desire to avoid 
UN observation, such as its rejection of proposals for military observers 
and its destruction of the UNMOGIP observer aircraft in West Pakistan.
UNEPRO - AUGUST TO DECEMBER 
Henry's appointment
On 24 August the Secretary General announced that he had appointed
Paul-Marc Henry to take overall charge of the UN humanitarian relief
2operation on East Pakistan. Until then Thant had personally carried out
3this task with the assistance of Kittani and Roberto Guyer.
Henry, a former Assistant Administrator of UNDP, was appointed on loan 
from the French Foreign Service until the end of the year. He was respons­
ible directly to the Secretary General for the day to day running of the 
operation from Headquarters, including the co-ordination of various UN 
Secretariat units, and communications with the representative in East 
Pakistan and the inter-agency working group in Geneva, chaired by Erik
Jensen, Chef de Cabinet to Winspeare Guicciardi. He was also in charge of
4maintaining contacts with governments and other donors. Thant also
stressed the extent to which Secretariat personnel had become involved in the
operation in Dacca 'so as to assure donors and potential donors that relief
5supplies reach the people of East Pakistan'.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's address at the Columbia University New 
York, 6 November 1971, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, p.274.
Press Release SG/A/107; IHA/46, 24 August, 1971.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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Henry b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  t a s k  a r e p u t a t i o n  as a  dynamic and c a p a b le  a d m in i­
s t r a t o r  and d ip lo m a t .  The a p p o in tm e n t  o f  a  p e r s o n  o f  h i s  c a l i b r e  w i th  
o v e r a l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  UNEPRO was a key  move aimed a t  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  th e  
o p e r a t i o n  as  a whole,'*’ and  i t s  c r e d i b i l i t y  w i th  t h e  governm en ts  c o n c e rn e d .
From S ep tem ber  onwards he v i s i t e d  Dacca a t  l e a s t  once a m onth, s u b s t a n t i a l l y
b o o s t i n g  m o ra le  t h e r e ,  and  m et r e g u l a r l y  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r - a g e n c y  g ro u p  i n
„ 2 Geneva.
Henry q u i c k l y  became aware o f  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h e  P a k i s t a n  Government. 
On h i s  f i r s t  v i s i t  t o  P a k i s t a n  he r e p o r t e d  t h a t  P a k i s t a n ' s  o f f i c i a l s  i n  
I s la m a b a d  were ' r e s e n t f u l  o f  t h e  UN's i n s i s t e n c e  on s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  th e  u se
3
o f  r e l i e f  s u p p l i e s  and  e q u i p m e n t ' . They c la im e d  th e  UN was a t t e m p t i n g  to
i n t r o d u c e  ' o b s e r v e r s '  i n  t h e  g u i s e  o f  ' r e l i e f  s p e c i a l i s t s ' ,  and c o n t r a s t e d
t h e  UN's p o l i c y  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  w i th  an a l l e g e d  l a c k  o f  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  th e
4I n d ia n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  r e l i e f  o p e r a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  r e f u g e e s .  C e r t a i n l y ,  th e
r e p o r t  o f  t h e  UNHCR l a t e r  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  d i d  n o t
d i r e c t l y  a d m i n i s t e r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  r e f u g e e s  i n  I n d i a ,  b u t  'p l a y e d  a c e r -
5
t a i n  c o n s u l t a t i v e  r o l e  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s ' .  B u t t h e  UN's i n s i s t e n c e  
on s u p e r v i s i o n  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  p l a i n  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  r e l i e f  e f f o r t  i n  t h e  a c t u a l  l o c a l e  o f  t h e  c i v i l  w ar c o u ld  o n ly  be 
m a i n ta i n e d  i f  dono r  governm en ts  w ere  a s s u r e d  t h a t  s u p p l i e s  w ere  r e a c h in g  
t h e  p e o p le  f o r  whom th e y  w ere  i n t e n d e d .
J a c k s o n ,  op. c i t . ,  p .6 7 .
2 O l i v e r ,  op. o i t . ,  p . 7 8 .
3 Henry t o  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  14 S ep tem b er  1971 , O l i v e r ,  op. <yit. , 
p p . 78 -7 9 .
4 Ib id .
S /1 0 5 3 9 /A d d .3 , p a r a .  25.
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The problem of rebel support
At Henry's instigation UNEPRO now attempted to move into a new phase 
involving the use of mobile teams outside Dacca. The Pakistan authorities 
said they could not guarantee their safety and Henry reported his assessment 
that no relief effort could succeed without acceptance by the Bangladesh 
rebels.
The UN operation thus began to face one of the central dilemmas of 
involvement in a civil war where the recognised government was under severe 
threat, the rebels were gaining ground and controlled parts of the country, 
and both sides were locked in a life and death struggle. The UN was bound 
legally and practically to operate with the consent of the recognised 
government. Yet this very requirement created enormous difficulties for the 
winning of acceptance by the rebels. Without such acceptance the operation 
could not succeed in areas which were under rebel control, or were increas­
ingly subject to rebel attack. An Awami League spokesman had stated that UN 
observers 'would be treated as collaborators of West Pakistan if they were 
posted in the province without the permission of the elected representatives." 
The problem for UNEPRO was to find a way of working with the Pakistan Govern­
ment without antagonising its opponents.
The prospects for acceptance of the UN relief operations by the rebels
had been badly damaged by the action of the Pakistan forces in seizing United
3Nations vehicles and equipment. In August El Tawil suggested to the
Henry to Secretary General, 14 September 1971, Oliver, op. ovt. , p.80.
2 Cable, Dacca to Headquarters, 26 August 1971, Oliver, op. C'tt. , pp.87-88; 
see also Jackson, op. ctt., p.77.
3 For example, an article by Peter R. Kann in the Walt Street Journal,
New York, 23 July 1971, stated 'A vehicle with UNICEF markings on its doors 
but with armed West Pakistani soldiers inside cruises by'.
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Governor of Pakistan that it would be 'extremely helpful' if the government
were to return 'all their vehicles to the UN agencies, and the fifty US
donated assault boats which are still being used by the Army'. ^ The Governor
said it would be done. Thant had already advised the Pakistan Government
that such actions were the main reason for the hesitation of major donors
in meeting the government's requests for food supplies, vehicles and 
2vessels. Shortly after Henry's return to New York the Secretary General
tried to counter at least this aspect of the problem by proposing that the
Government of Pakistan and the United Nations conclude a formal agreement
3setting out conditions for the conduct of the operation. Such an agreement
was not formalised for another two months, by which time it was virtually 
4too late.
But even if the local Pakistan forces had not commandeered UN vehicles 
the fundamental dilemma for UNEPRO remained the unavoidable face that relief 
operations had strategic significance for both sides in the desperate 
struggle. It was part of the guerilla's strategy to totally disrupt supply 
networks. The government's objective was to reopen them.
From the fact of this genuine dilemma it was not a large step to the 
partisan viewpoint that condemned UNEPRO as a device to bolster the shaky 
regime of the Pakistan generals, a view expressed by an American citizen in
Cable, Dacca to Headquarters, 14 August 1971, Oliver, op. cit., p.85.
2 Secretary General to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, 26 July 
1971, Oliver, op. cit., p.85.
3 Secretary General to President Yahya Khan, 20 September 1971, Oliver,
op. cit., p.82.
4 Permanent Representative of Pakistan to Secretary General, 15 November; 
Secretary General to Permanent Representative of Pakistan, 16 November 1971, 
Oliver, toe. cit.
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a w id e ly  r e p o r t e d  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  New York Times. Her l e t t e r  was r e p ro d u c e d
i n  a p r e s s  r e l e a s e  from  th e  I n d ia n  P erm anen t M is s io n ,  an a c t i o n  w hich
2
sh o c k e d  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  and i t  a l s o  a p p e a re d  i n  Bangladesh, a w eek ly
3
news b u l l e t i n  p ro d u c e d  by t h e  B ang ladesh  m is s io n  i n  W a sh ing ton . The 
i n s u r g e n t s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  a c t s  o f  t e r r o r i s m  would b r i n g  th e  t h r e a t  o f  s t a r v ­
a t i o n  n e a r e r  t o  v a s t  numbers o f  B e n g a l i s ,  b u t  th e y  c la im e d  th e y  w ere  t a k i n g
a c a l c u l a t e d  r i s k  ' t o  b r i n g  t h e  c i v i l  w ar t o  a  s p e e d i e r  end th a n  i f  th e
4
P a k i s t a n  Army rem a in s  f r e e  t o  im p o r t  s u p p l i e s  o f  w ar m a t e r i a l s ' .  Henry
h i m s e l f  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  a f t e r  a  bombing a t t a c k  w hich damaged UNEPRO t r u c k s  i n  
5
C h i t t a g o n g ,  t h a t  a s  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  became more e f f e c t i v e  i t  w ould  c l a s h
w i th  t h e  'o b v i o u s  g u e r i l l a  o b j e c t i v e  t o  s to p  th e  f lo w  o f  h u m a n i ta r i a n  g o o d s ' . ^
He p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  i t  would  be n e c e s s a r y  ' t o  r e v ie w  th e  a s su m p t io n  t h a t
7h u m a n i t a r i a n  o b j e c t i v e s  would be acknow ledged by b o t h  p a r t i e s ' .
On t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  c o in ,  Henry r e p o r t e d  t h a t  P a k i s t a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  
opp o sed  t h e  f r e e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  food  i n  some b o r d e r  a r e a s  b e c a u s e  t h e  food  
w ould  be  's m u g g le d  i n t o  I n d i a ' .  Henry commented t h a t  ' t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  now 
so  much and  so  o p e n ly  on t h e i r  [ the  i n s u r g e n t s ' ]  s i d e ,  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  i n d e e d
g
f e e d  t h e  r e b e l s ' .
P r o f e s s o r  A l i c e  T h o m e r ,  New York Times, 19 A u gus t  1971.
2
OPI N ote  t o  c o r r e s p o n d e n t s ,  N o .3685, 1 S ep tem ber  1971.
3
Bangladesh, W a sh in g to n ,  V o l.  1, N o . l ,  3 Sep tem ber  1971.
4 Ib id .
5
OPI N o te  t o  c o r r e s p o n d e n t s ,  N o .3701, 22 O c to b e r  1971.
^ H e n ry ,  n o t e  o f  22 O c to b e r  1971, O l i v e r ,  op. o i t .  , p . 9 2 .
Ib id .
8 H e n ry ,  r e p o r t  t o  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l ,  26 O c to b e r  1971, O l i v e r ,  op. c i t .  ,
p .9 3 .
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The problem of acceptance by the rebels could not be avoided indefin­
itely. The situation in East Pakistan was rapidly providing the 'extra­
ordinary circumstances',“'" which required the Secretary General and his 
representatives to deal with parties not 'recognised1 by virtue of United 
Nations membership. Late in November, with the Secretary General's per­
mission, Henry had secret talks with representatives of the provisional
2government of Bangladesh in New York. The talks accomplished little 
immediately although they may have assisted the new relief operation 
established in Dacca after the Bangladesh victory in December. The signi­
ficant point was that as the effective power of the insurgents grew the 
Secretariat had no option but to deal with them, if it was to have any 
chance of achieving humanitarian objectives.
UNEPRO's last weeks
In November, UN Headquarters considered a scheme called 'Operation
Neutral' for the provision of essential supplies for areas outside Pakistan
3Government control. The plan was not worked out in any detail and was 
overtaken by events. UNEPRO's experiences during its last few weeks of 
formal existence highlight the kind of difficulties faced by UN operations 
in civil war situations.
As the tide turned against the Pakistan forces they began to seize UN 
trucks again, and the head of UNEPRO, William McCaw, ordered those trucks
See Schächter, memorandum to Secretary General, 8 March 1963, p.87,
supra.
2 Oliver, op. C'it. , p.95.
Oliver, op. C'it. , p.113.3
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remaining on the Chittagong wharves to be immobilised. On 27 November 
McCaw cabled that:
As the army's situation becomes increasingly desperate . . . 
it is unrealistic to think that [relief] supplies and equip­
ment . . . will not be seized ultimately for military use 
when the need arises.2
UNEPRO was providing 'a means of improving the transport capabilities of the
government while the rebel forces are attempting to cripple such capabilities',
and therefore 'it is not surprising that the rebel forces and supporters of
the Bangladesh movement could consider those engaged in UNEPRO as collabor- 
3ators'.
Henry arrived on the last commercial flight from Bangkok, and for the
following three weeks he and the remaining members of UNEPRO remained iso-
4lated in the war ravaged city. Three attempts at evacuation were unsuccess- 
5ful. As the Mukti Bahini moved into the city there was the very real problem 
of UNEPRO staff being labelled as collaborators, reinforced by the fact that 
the Pakistan soldiers and militia had been seen using UN and UNICEF vehicles.
Cable, McCaw to Headquarters, 23 November. McCaw was appointed to 
succeed El Tawil on 19 September. Following his orders the UNICEF officer in 
charge of UNEPRO operations in Chittagong spent the night of 23 November with 
his colleagues removing rotors from 162 trucks on the dockside, ignoring the 
threats of the Pakistan officer in charge. In the morning they left in a 
small vessel for the outer anchorage pursued by a motor boat manned by armed 
Pakistanis demanding the return of the rotors. The UNICEF officer decided he 
could not hear the Pakistan officer's orders above the noise of the engines 
and they reached a UN chartered ship waiting in the anchorage, which then 
sailed for Singapore with a further 153 trucks on board. (Cable from Henry 
in Bangkok, incident described by Oliver, op. oit. , p.115.)
2 McCaw to Headquarters, 27 November 1971, Oliver, op. O'tt., p.117. This 
followed an exchange of cables between Dacca and Headquarters over evacuation 
proposals.
Ibid.
4 Oliver, op. cit. , p.118.
5 The first when Dacca airport was bombed moments before the scheduled 
evacuation; the second when the pilot of the aircraft believed he had been 
fired upon by an Indian aircraft carrier; the third when the British RAF 
evacuated various international personnel in four flights, but did not make 
a fifth flight planned for UNEPRO personnel.
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The UNEPRO personnel moved to a Catholic college whose Principal had well- 
known sympathies with the Mukti Bahini, and was thus able to provide them 
with protection.^
On 20 December UNEPRO came to an end when the Secretary General renamed
2it the United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca (UNROD). From that point on
the UN turned to the dual tasks of immediate relief and reconstruction, in
co-operation with the new government. The beginning of the new task was
shaky. The first meeting between the new head of UNROD, Tom Hagen, and the
Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Tajuddin Ahmed, was described by Hagen as
'stormy'. He reported that the Prime Minister complained bitterly about
3UNEPRO's activities. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister gave the 'green
light' for UNROD to go ahead. Two days later the Bangladesh Government
4delivered its first list of aid requirements. Henry returned to the French
diplomatic service and in March 1972 Sir Robert Jackson was appointed Under
5Secretary General in charge of relief operations. In the postwar situation 
UNROD had more success in its relations with the Bangladesh authorities than 
its predecessor, UNEPRO, had experienced with either the Pakistan authorities 
or the rebels. It was able to make a significant contribution in co­
ordinating the international effort to restore tolerable living conditions 
for the people of East Bengal and to rehabilitate their economy.
1 Oliver, op. oit., p.141.
2 Ibid. , p. 148.
3 UNROD to Headquarters, 3 January 1972, Oliver, op. oit. , p.155.
4 Oliver, op. ovt. , p.156. Bangladesh was not admitted to membership 
until 1973, and until then UN reports carried the following disclaimer:
'the competent organs of the United Nations, which alone can decide on the 
status of the area vis a vis the Organisation, have not yet expressed them­
selves on the matter. The name 'Bangladesh', as used by the authorities in 
control of the area, is therefore used in this report without any legal or 
political connotations' (e.g. in the reports on Winspeare's missions).
5 Oliver, op. oit., p.193.
234
WINSPEAKB 1S GOOD OFFICES MISSIONS
F o llo w in g  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  R e s o lu t io n  307 i n  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il  on 21
December 1 9 7 1 ,1 and  in  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w ith  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l d e s ig n a t e ,
T h an t d e c id e d  on 23 December to  a p p o in t  W in sp eare  G u ic c ia r d i  a s  h i s  s p e c i a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on h u m a n ita r ia n  p ro b le m s . He a sk e d  im m e d ia te ly  f o r  th e
2
c o n c u rre n c e  and c o - o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  I n d ia n  and  P a k i s t a n  G overnm ents.
P a k is ta n  s i g n i f i e d  i t s  c o n c u rre n c e  w h ile  I n d ia  s t a t e d  i t  w ould  e x te n d  i t s  co ­
o p e r a t io n  to  th e  s p e c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  'w i t h in  th e  l i m i t s  o f  i t s  l e g a l  and
3
p r a c t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' .
F i r s t  v i s i t
The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l a sk ed  W in sp eare  t o  p ro c e e d  to  th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t  
4
im m e d ia te ly , and he l e f t  Geneva on 27 D ecem ber, h a v in g  m et w i th  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e s  o f  I n d ia  and P a k i s t a n ,  and th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C om m ittee o f  th e  Red
5C ross (ICRC) o v e r  th e  C h ris tm a s  w eekend . I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  n o te  t h a t  h i s  
m is s io n  i n e v i t a b l y  becam e c o n c e rn e d  n o t  o n ly  w i th  h u m a n i ta r ia n  a s p e c t s  b u t  
a l s o  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s .  I n  t h i s  s e n se  i t  was n o te d  in  th e  r e p o r t  on 
h i s  f i r s t  m is s io n  t h a t  th e  te rm s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  w ere d e r iv e d  from  ' t h e  r e l e v a n t  
p a ra g ra p h s  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il r e s o l u t i o n  307 (1971) in  the  c o n te x t o f  
the r e s o lu tio n  as a w ho le ' . 6
See p p .2 0 2 -2 0 3 , supra.
S /1 0 4 7 3 , 25 December 1971, p a r a .  2 .
3 Ib id .  , p a r a .  3.
 ^ Ib id .  , p a r a .  4 .
5
S /1 0 5 1 2 , 17 J a n u a ry  1972 , p a r a s .  5 and  7. He was accom pan ied  by h i s  
Chef de C a b in e t ,  E r ik  J e n s e n .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  2 (em p h asis  a d d e d ) .
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The reports on Winspeare's missions provides an insight into a masterly
demonstration of the work of a skilled international intermediary. When he
first arrived in Delhi to meet with the Foreign Minister and Indian officials
he stressed that his initial talks were exploratory only and he offered the
services of his good offices mission but stated that 'it was for the parties
concerned to decide how best to avail themselves of this particular instru- 
2ment'. He noted in his report the Indian Government's position that:
. . . the limits of such assistance [by the Indian Government]
were governed by official insistence that India was not and should 
not be considered either an 'occupying' or a 'protecting' power 
in Bangladesh . . . [and that] . . . insofar as there were 
humanitarian problems in the region, the Bangladesh government 
was the sole authority with which to confer.
The problem of recognition might have emerged, as it did in the Security
Council, as an obstacle to the mission, but Winspeare noted in his report
that he had been authorised by the Secretary General to consult on an ad hoc
4basis with any authorities relevant to the situation. The Secretary General 
noted that in his meetings with the authorities in Dacca:
Mr Winspeare was careful to emphasise the humanitarian nature 
of his mission and to state explicitly that neither the mission 
as such nor his meetings with the authorities should or could 
possibly be interpreted as having implications for political 
recognition on the part of the United Nations since such
The officials whom Winspeare met were recognised in diplomatic circles 
as being particularly influential and close to the Prime Minister (interviews). 
They were the Foreign Secretary, T.N. Kaul, the Principal Secretary to the 
Prime Minister, P.N. Haksar, and Mr D.P. Dhar in his capacity as special 
envoy to Bangladesh (S/10512, para. 7). The latter's role of liaison with 
the Bangladesh leadership during the civil war is mentioned in Jackson, op. 
cit., p.78.
S/10512, para. 8.
3 Ibid. , para. 9.
 ^ Ibid. , para. 10.
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q u e s t io n s  la y  w i th in  th e  e x c lu s iv e  com petence  o f  th e  Member 
S t a t e s  a c t i n g  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  C h a r te r  th ro u g h  th e  a p p r o p r ia t e  
o rg a n s  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s . T h is  p o i n t  was w e l l  u n d e rs to o d .^
W inspeare  i n q u i r e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a b o u t  th e  f a t e  o f  th e  n o n -B e n g a li
m in o r i t i e s  who l i v e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  th e  tow ns o f  Mohammed P u r and M ir P u r .
C oncern  o v e r  t h e i r  f a t e  had  been  e x p re s s e d  by th e  US R e p r e s e n ta t iv e  to  th e
S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l ,  who a sk e d  W inspeare  to  lo o k  i n t o  th e  m a t te r  r a t h e r  th a n
in v o lv e  UNROD and p o s s ib ly  je o p a r d is e  th e  l a t t e r ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  new
G overnm ent. The a u t h o r i t i e s  a s s u re d  Mr W in sp eare  t h a t  he and th e  ICRC w ere
f r e e  to  o b se rv e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in  th o s e  tow ns f o r  th e m s e lv e s . W in sp e a re ,
accom pan ied  o n ly  by J e n s e n ,  u n e s c o r te d  and  in  one c a se  w i th o u t  p r e v io u s
w a rn in g , v i s i t e d  b o th  co m p lex es . The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l r e p o r t e d  t h a t  'h e
was a b le  to  s a t i s f y  h im s e l f  t h a t  c o n d i t io n s  a t  th e  tim e  o f  h i s  v i s i t  w ere  
2t o l e r a b l e ' .
The i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  h u m a n i ta r ia n  and  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  becam e 
c l e a r l y  e v id e n t  when q u e s t io n s  w ere r a i s e d  a b o u t th e  f a t e ,  on th e  one hand 
o f  Dr M a lik , fo rm er g o v e rn o r  o f  E a s t  P a k is ta n  and  o th e r  o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  
fo rm er re g im e , and  on th e  o th e r  hand  o f  S h e ik  M u jib u r Rahman. The a u t h o r i ­
t i e s  gave a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  Dr M alik  and  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  w ere  b e in g  c o r r e c t l y
t r e a t e d  and th e s e  a s s u r a n c e s  w ere c o n firm e d  by  a v i s i t  u n d e r ta k e n  by th e  ICRC
3
and Red C ross  s o c i e t i e s  d u r in g  W in sp e a re ' s  s t a y  i n  D acca. The D acca
a u t h o r i t i e s  a sk ed  W inspeare  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  t r a n s m i t  t h e i r  c o n c e rn s  to
Is la m a b a d  c o n c e rn in g  th e  r e l e a s e  and r e t u r n  o f  S h e ik  M u jib u r , th e  f u tu r e  o f
B e n g a li  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  em ployed by th e  governm en t i n  I s la m a b a d , th e  f a t e  o f
th e  B e n g a li  m in o r i t i e s  i n  W est P a k is ta n  and a l s o  t h a t  o f  B e n g a li  s tu d e n t s
4l i v i n g  i n  th e  W est.
 ^ Ib id .  , p a r a .  11 .
2 Ib id .  , p a r a .  15 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  16 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  17 .4
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Thus Winspeare began to fulfil a good offices mission in the classic 
sense, acting as an intermediary between disputants who at that stage were 
unwilling to meet directly with each other, and thereby helping to clear up 
practical difficulties which lay in the way of eventual solutions.
Winspeare returned from Dacca to Delhi where he met again with D.P. 
Dhar, who supported on behalf of the Indian Government the main points 
raised in Dacca, 'in particular the vital significance attached to the 
release of Sheik Mujibur Rahman'. ^ He then went to Rawalpindi and Islamabad 
for a stay of five days, meeting with Bhutto, who had replaced Yahya Khan as 
President and senior Pakistan ministers and officials.2 He was asked in 
particular about the non-Bengali minorities in Mohammed Pur and Mir Pur and 
described the situation as he had seen it. The Pakistan Government pub­
lished a resume of his description in the media with a view to reassuring 
3public opinion. This was most significant, since Winspeare was able to 
fulfil the role of intermediary in clearing up possible misunderstandings 
not only with opposing authorities but also with respect to entire popu­
lations .
Winspeare passed on the views of the Dacca and Delhi authorities
regarding the release of Mujibur, and during his stay the Bangladesh leader
was released and left Rawalpindi for London on his way to Dacca. Winspeare
later said he had particularly emphasised to Bhutto the need to release
Mujibur since this action would provide the new element necessary to enable
4negotiations to proceed on the other issues.
Ibid., para. 19. 
Ibid. , para. 20. 
Ibid., para. 21.
4 Interview, Geneva, December 1977.
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W ith r e g a r d  t o  B e n g a li  c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  and s t u d e n t s ,  W inspeare  engaged  
in  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s io n s .  On b o th  th e  i s s u e  o f  fo rm er s e n io r  o f f i c i a l s  o f  
th e  E a s t  P a k is ta n  reg im e and a ls o  th e  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t io n  o f  p r i s o n e r s  o f  
w a r , W inspeare  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  s in c e  th e s e  a r e a s  f e l l  w i th in  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  th e  Red C ross he com m unicated th e  d e t a i l s  o f  h i s  
d i s c u s s io n s  to  th e  Red C ro ss  d e le g a te s  in  Is la m a b a d  and s u b s e q u e n t ly  in  
D e lh i  .■*"
In  a f o r e r u n n e r  o f  K i s s in g e r - s t y l e  s h u t t l e  d ip lo m ac y , W in sp eare  th e n
r e tu r n e d  to  D e lh i  and p r e s e n te d  to  th e  In d ia n  Governm ent th e  p o i n t s  w hich
he had  been  r e q u e s te d  to  t r a n s m i t  by P a k i s t a n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  h a v in g  d e t a i l e d
d i s c u s s io n s  w ith  th e  ICRC C om m issioner f o r  Red C ro ss  a c t i o n  in  th e  su b -
2c o n t in e n t  and o th e r  Red C ro ss  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  He a l s o  com m unicated in  
Geneva w ith  th e  H igh C om m issioner f o r  R efugees and th e  s e n io r  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e s  o f  th e  ICRC and th e  S e c re ta r y  G en era l o f  th e  League o f  Red C ro ss
S o c i e t i e s ,  b e fo r e  t r a v e l l i n g  to  New York to  r e p o r t  t o  th e  in co m in g  S e c r e ta r y
3
G e n e ra l ,  K u rt W aldheim , on h i s  m is s io n .
The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l n o te d  t h a t  in  D e lh i ,  D acca and I s la m a b a d , h i s
S p e c ia l  R e p r e s e n ta t iv e  'r e c e i v e d  f u l l  a s s i s t a n c e  from  governm en t o f f i c i a l s  
4
a t  a l l  l e v e l s ' .  W ith consummate s k i l l ,  W inspeare  won and m a in ta in e d  th e  
c o n f id e n c e  o f  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  in  each  o f  th e  th r e e  c e n t r e s .  In  a l l ,  he 
a c te d  as  a  h ig h ly  e f f e c t i v e  c l e a r i n g  house  f o r  com m un ica tions be tw een  th e  
t h r e e  r e l e v a n t  a u t h o r i t i e s :  th e  G overnm ents o f  I n d i a ,  P a k i s t a n  and B a n g la ­
d e s h , and be tw een  each  o f  th e s e  governm ents and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n c ie s  such  
a s  th e  ICRC.
Ib id .  , p a r a . 24 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  26 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  27 .
Ib id .  , p a r a .  29 .4
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The seco n d  v i s i t
T h ree  w eeks l a t e r ,  W inspeare  r e tu r n e d  to  th e  th r e e  c a p i t a l s .  The 
S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l n o te d  t h a t :
Among h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  d e c is io n  was a m essage o f  7 F e b ru a ry  
1972 from  P r e s i d e n t  B h u tto  o f  P a k i s t a n  w h ich  r e f e r r e d  in  p a r ­
t i c u l a r  to  th e  P r e s i d e n t 's  co n c e rn  f o r  th e  n o n -B e n g a li  p o p u la t io n ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  th e  to w n sh ip s  o f  Mohammed P u r and M ir P u r n e a r  D acca.
W inspeare  w en t to  D e lh i and th e n  to  D acca , m e e tin g  w ith  S h e ik  M u jib u r , who
was by th e n  th e  P rim e M in is te r  o f  B a n g la d e sh .
2
He a g a in  to u r e d  th e  two to w n s h ip s . A t a  se co n d  m e e tin g  w ith  M u jib u r
and th e  F o re ig n  M in i s te r  he  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  governm en t o f  B a n g la d esh  had
th e  p r im a ry  and p r i n c i p a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  law  and  o r d e r  and ' t h e  w e l f a r e
3
o f  a l l  p o p u la t io n  g ro u p s in  th e  c o u n t r y ' . M u jib u r p ro p o se d  t h a t  a l l  no n - 
B e n g a lis  be g iv e n  an o p p o r tu n i ty  to  l i v e  i n  th e  c o u n try  o f  t h e i r  c h o ic e  
and he s t a t e d  t h a t  h i s  G overnm ent w ould be  g la d  to  a c c e p t  th e  h e lp  o f  any 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  su ch  as  th e  ICRC in  a r r a n g in g  th e  m ove. A t th e  
same tim e  he hoped  t h a t  B e n g a lis  l i v i n g  in  th e  W est w ould  be  a b le  to
4r e t u r n ,  and he a p p e a le d  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a s s i s t a n c e  in  o r g a n i s in g  t h i s .
W inspeare  th e n  w ent to  P a k is ta n  v i a  D e lh i  (w here he m et w i th  th e  In d ia n
F o re ig n  S e c r e ta r y )  and in  Is la m a b a d  m et P r e s i d e n t  B h u tto  who s t a t e d  t h a t
'h e  was g r a t e f u l  f o r  th e  u se  o f  Mr W in s p e a re ' s  good o f f i c e s  i n  t r a n s m i t t i n g
5th e  p r o p o s a ls  o f  S h e ik  M u j i b u r '. A rran g em en ts  w ere made f o r  com m unicating
S /1 0 5 1 2 /A d d .1 , 26 F e b ru a ry  1972 , p a r a .  2 .
2 Ib id . , p a r a s .  8 and 9 . In  one c a se  W in sp eare  and J e n se n  w ere e x p o sed  
to  c o n s id e r a b le  p h y s ic a l  d a n g e r from  an u n ru ly  mob ( O l iv e r ,  op . o i t . ,  p p .1 7 2 -  
173; a ls o  New York Times, 13 F e b ru a ry  1 9 7 2 ).
3 Ib id . , p a r a .  10 .
 ^ Ib id .,  p a r a .  11 .
Ibid . , p a r a .  13 .5
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In  a  s e n se  W in s p e a re 's  m iss io n  h ad  g r e a t e r  p r o s p e c t s  o f  s u c c e s s  th a n  
th e  e a r l y  i n i t i a t i v e s  by T han t b e c a u se  o f  th e  d e c is iv e  outcom e on th e  b a t t l e ­
f i e l d .  N e v e r th e le s s  th e  c i v i l  w ar and th e  accom panying  a t r o c i t i e s  and 
s u f f e r i n g  h ad  l e f t  deep s c a r s  and a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  b i t t e r n e s s .  W in s p e a re 's  
good o f f i c e s  m is s io n  d id  much to  a m e l io r a te  i s s u e s  w hich  w ere th e  s u b je c t  o f  
s t r o n g  f e e l in g s  on b o th  s i d e s .  H is m is s io n  a l s o  h ig h l i g h t e d  th e  v a lu e  o f  
s e n d in g  a s k i l l e d  and e x p e r ie n c e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c i v i l  s e r v a n t  t o  e a ch  o f  th e  
c a p i t a l s  in v o lv e d . Through h i s  c o n ta c ts  w ith  a l l  t h r e e  s e t s  o f  a u t h o r i t i e s  
W inspeare  n o t  o n ly  p ro v id e d  an im p o r ta n t  means o f  co m m u n ica tio n , b u t  was 
a b le  to  g a in  an o v e rv ie w  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  from  d i r e c t  c o n ta c t  w i th  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  and w ith  key members o f  t h e i r  b u r e a u c r a c i e s .
EFFECTS OF INTERMEDIARY ACTIVITY: SUMMARY
W in s p e a re 's  a b i l i t y  to  e x e r c is e  a  good o f f i c e s  r o le  on b o th  h u m a n ita r ia n  
and p o l i t i c a l  p ro b lem s a f t e r  th e  14 d ay s  w ar o f  December 1971 was a s s i s t e d  
c o n s id e r a b ly  by th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il m an d a te , t o  w hich  b o th  I n d ia  and 
P a k is ta n  h ad  a g re e d . I n  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  end  o f  f i g h t i n g  and th e  o p e n in g  up o f  
a th r e e - c o r n e r e d  s i t u a t i o n  c r e a te d  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  w hich  h ad  n o t  e x i s t e d  
p r e v io u s ly .  D is c u s s io n  w ith  th e  B an g la d esh  a u t h o r i t i e s  was no lo n g e r  
r e g a rd e d  by th e  P a k is ta n  Governm ent as  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  P a k i s t a n 's  i n t e r n a l  
a f f a i r s .  In  t u r n ,  I n d ia  was more r e c e p t iv e  to  d i s c u s s io n s  w ith  th e  UN 
e m is s a ry  i n  th e  know ledge t h a t  h e  was a l s o  m e e tin g  w ith  th e  B an g la d esh  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  th u s  e n a b l in g  I n d ia  to  a d o p t th e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i t  was n o t  a 
p a r t y  to  th e  d i s p u te  b u t  was m ere ly  a s s i s t i n g  i n  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  o u t s t a n d ­
in g  i s s u e s  b e tw een  P a k i s t a n  and  B a n g la d e sh .
The d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  a c t i v i t i e s  
b e f o r e  th e  December w a r , a s  d e s c r ib e d  i n  t h i s  and th e  p r e c e d in g  c h a p te r ,
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and t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  W in s p e a re 's  m is s io n  a f t e r  t h e  w a r ,  a r e  h i g h l i g h t e d  by a 
c om par ison  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  c h e c k l i s t  s u g g e s t e d  i n  C h a p te r  I I .
1. M o d e ra t in g  e f f e c t
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  from  A p r i l  
1971 onw ards w i th  t h e  p e rm anen t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and w i th  t h e  f o r e i g n  
m i n i s t e r s  i n  New York had  ve ry  l i t t l e  m o d e r a t in g  e f f e c t  on th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  
t h e  p r i n c i p a l s .  Nor d i d  h i s  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  w i t h  Yahya Khan and I n d i r a  G andhi. 
From T h a n t ' s  a c c o u n t  o f  Tunku Abdul Rahman's s e c r e t  m is s io n  i t  seems t h a t  
t h e  Tunku may have had  some m o d e ra t in g  e f f e c t  on th e  l e a d e r s ,  b u t  i f  s o ,  
such  p o s i t i v e  r e s p o n s e s  were n e g a te d  by  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  and were n e v e r  mani­
f e s t e d  p u b l i c l y .
I n  a b r o a d e r  s e n se  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  norms had  some e a r l y  
i n f l u e n c e  on th e  I n d i a n  Government i n  m o d e r a t in g  t h e  to n e  o f  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  
p ro p o s e d  t o  t h e  I n d i a n  P a r l i a m e n t .  B u t  I n d i a  r a p i d l y  p e r c e i v e d  t h a t  i t s  
g o a ls  w ould  n o t  be  a c h ie v e d  th ro u g h  t h e  UN, and f a r  from m o d e ra t in g  i t s  
a c t i o n s ,  e s c a l a t e d  them . P a k i s t a n ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  r e f u s e d  to  ta k e  
a c t i o n s  w hich  m ig h t  have  a l l e v i a t e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n . Through th e  m edia  and 
i n  UN fo ru m s ,  b o th  s i d e s  engaged  i n  in f la m m a to ry  and a c c u s a to r y  s t a t e m e n t s  
a g a i n s t  each  o t h e r .
In  t h e  changed  b u t  s t i l l  b i t t e r  p o l i t i c a l  e n v iro n m e n t  w hich  e x i s t e d  
a f t e r  t h e  w a r ,  W in s p e a r e 's  m is s io n s  h a d  a m o d e r a t in g  e f f e c t  on th e  p r i n ­
c i p a l s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  P a k i s t a n  and  B a n g la d e s h .  Each s o u g h t  
t o  i n d i c a t e  g o o d w il l  i n  s e e k in g  a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  o u t s t a n d i n g  p ro b le m s .
2 .  Means f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  c o n c e s s io n s
The UN S e c r e t a r i a t  was n o t  a means f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  c o n c e s s io n s  o r  
r a t i o n a l i s i n g  f l e x i b l e  b e h a v io u r  d u r in g  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  c r i s i s ,  
s i n c e  f i r s t  P a k i s t a n ,  th e n  I n d i a ,  eschew ed  any i n t e n t i o n  t o  make c o n c e s s io n s
o r  a c t  f l e x i b l y .  L a t e r ,  when P a k i s t a n  became more f e a r f u l  o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e
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outcome o f  t h e  open c o n f l i c t  w i th  I n d i a ,  Yahya Khan s o u g h t  t o  u se  t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  i n  such  a f a s h io n  th ro u g h  h i s  rea d y  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e r a l ' s  i n i t i a t i v e s  and h i s  u r g e n t  p l e a s  f o r  T han t to  i n t e r v e n e  p e r s o n ­
a l l y .  By th e n ,  how ever ,  I n d i a ' s  l a c k  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  l e d  T han t t o  r e s p o n d  
t h a t  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  more he co u ld  do. A f t e r  t h e  war B h u t to  a c c e d e d  t o  
t h e  many p r e s s u r e s  f o r  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  M u jibu r  d u r in g  W in s p e a r e 's  f i r s t  
v i s i t ,  w h i l e  b o th  l e a d e r s  d e m o n s t ra te d  c o n s id e r a b l e  f l e x i b i l i t y  on q u e s t i o n s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  p e o p le  who w ish e d  to  move i n  e i t h e r  d i r e c t i o n .
3. D ip lo m a t ic  ( d i s ) a d v a n t a g e s  o f  e x t e r n a l  ( d is )  a p p ro v a l
The P a k i s t a n  Government i n i t i a l l y  ig n o re d  any d i p lo m a t i c  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  
o f  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  c h o o s in g  i n s t e a d  to  
o b j e c t  p u b l i c l y  and  p r i v a t e l y  to  h i s  o f f e r s  o f  a s s i s t a n c e  on t h e  g rounds 
t h a t  th e y  mounted to  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .  The S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e r a l ' s  c a r e f u l l y  w orded p u b l i c  d i s a p p r o v a l  o f  P a k i s t a n ' s  r e f u s a l  t o  
r e l e a s e  M ujibu r  h a d  l i t t l e  e f f e c t .  In  t h e  l a t t e r  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  c r i s i s ,  
h o w e v e r ,  P a k i s t a n  r a t h e r  d e s p e r a t e l y  so u g h t  to  p o r t r a y  i t s e l f  as b e in g  
c o - o p e r a t i v e  w i t h  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s .
I t  was c l e a r  from Mrs G a n d h i 's  p r e s s  i n t e r v i e w s  d u r in g  November t h a t  
s h e  was aware o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  d i s a d v a n ta g e s  o f  p u b l i c l y  r e j e c t i n g  UN 
i n i t i a t i v e s ,  b u t  t h a t  s h e  had  d e c id e d  t o  d i s c o u n t  t h o s e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s .
The p u b l i c l y  a v a i l a b l e  r e p o r t s  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  to  t h e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l  conveyed  d i s a p p r o v a l  i n  c e r t a i n  i n s t a n c e s ;  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  r e p l y  
to  Mrs Gandhi o v e r  h i s  o f f e r  o f  good o f f i c e s ,  and t h e  UNMOGIP r e p o r t  on 
d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  i t s  o b s e r v e r  a i r c r a f t .  However, su c h  r e p o r t s  had  l i t t l e  
e f f e c t  on I n d ia n  a c t i o n s .
A f t e r  t h e  w a r ,  B h u t to  and M ujibur made a p o i n t  o f  p u b l i c l y  c o ­
o p e r a t i n g  w i th  W inspeare  and w i th  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  i n  g e n e r a l ,  w h i l e  key 
I n d ia n  o f f i c i a l s  e x te n d e d  a l l  p o s s i b l e  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  W in s p e a re .  T h is
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co-operation and assistance was publicly acknowledged by the Secretary 
General in his reports to the Security Council.
4. Clearing up misunderstandings
On this aspect the difference between the effects of the Secretariat's 
activities before and those after the December war was most significant. 
Before the war the Secretariat was unable to clear up misunderstandings 
over, for example, the purpose of observers to facilitate the repatriation 
of refugees. Rather, there were instances of misunderstanding about the 
Secretary General's own initiatives, a situation aggravated by lack of 
confidentiality and misleading press speculation. After the war Winspeare 
was able to help in an important way to clear up misunderstandings between 
the parties, particularly in regard to conditions in the Bihari enclaves 
in the East.
5. Dramatising the dangers
From early April onwards the Secretary General tried strenuously to 
dramatise the danger of failure to resolve the conflict. In private 
correspondence to the leaders, in discussions with their representatives, 
in his memorandum to the Security Council of 20 July, in his introduction 
to the Annual Report of 19 71, and finally in public statements. All were 
to no avail. In fact, one significant underlying factor may have been 
that key governments, notably the United States, were unconvinced of the 
extent of the danger until it was too late.
After the war there was a very real danger that deeply rooted bitter­
ness would create a situation of entrenched official hostility akin to 
that which had existed in the Middle East for 30 years. Winspeare alluded 
to such dangers in his discussions and found the parties responsive to his
hopes that, in the South Asian sub-continent, such a situation might be 
1avoided.
1 Interview, Geneva, December 1977.
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5 . E s t a b l i s h i n g  com m unications
T h ro u g h o u t th e  lo n g  m onths o f  th e  c r i s i s  T han t p ro v id e d  th e  o p p o r tu n i ty ,  
th ro u g h  h i s  f r e q u e n t  m ee tin g s  w ith  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  I n d ia  and P a k i s t a n ,  
f o r  h i s  o f f i c e  to  be u se d  as an in fo rm a l  means o f  com m unication  be tw een  th e  
d i s p u t a n t s .  Tunku A bdul Rahman p r o v id e d  s i m i l a r  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  i n  h i s  
v i s i t s  to  th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t .  From th e  r e c o r d  i t  seem ed t h a t  t h e r e  was no 
s e r io u s  a t te m p t  by e i t h e r  s id e  to  com m unicate p r o p o s a ls  p r i v a t e l y  to  th e  
o t h e r  by su ch  m eans. A m ajo r  p ro b lem  was th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  
to  com m unicate w i th  th e  r e b e l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  view  o f  P a k i s t a n 's  s t r o n g  
in v o c a t io n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o n - in t e r f e r e n c e  i n  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s ,  w h ile  
t h e  Tunku was d e n ie d  th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  o f  su ch  co m m u n ica tio n s  by  I n d ia .  A f te r  
t h e  w a r, on th e  o th e r  h a n d , no o b je c t io n  was r a i s e d  to  W in s p e a re 's  d i s ­
c u s s io n s  w ith  th e  new a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  D acca , and h i s  s h u t t l e  d ip lom acy  
b e tw een  th e  th r e e  c a p i t a l s  p ro v id e d  a  h ig h ly  e f f e c t i v e  and s i g n i f i c a n t  r o le  
i n  com m unicating  p r o p o s a ls  o f  th e  p a r t i e s  to  e a c h  o t h e r .
7. C re a t io n  o f  ' s a l i e n c y '
The s a l i e n t  p o i n t  w h ich  was m ost f i r m ly  e m p h a s ise d  by T han t from  A u g u st 
onw ards was th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  M u jib u r to  be r e l e a s e d  a s  th e  f i r s t  s te p  
to w ard s  s e r io u s  n e g o t i a t i o n s  aim ed a t  a  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  E a s t  B e n g a l. 
T h is  was th e  key f o c a l  p o i n t  m ost l i k e l y  t o  p ro v id e  a b re a k th ro u g h  i n  th e  
s e a r c h  f o r  a  p e a c e f u l  outcom e r a t h e r  th a n  one d e te rm in e d  on th e  b a t t l e f i e l d .  
T h a n t 's  la c k  o f  s u c c e s s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  was p ro b a b ly  due to  a  c o m b in a tio n  
o f  th e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c s  o f  P a k i s t a n ,  Yahya K h a n 's  p e r s o n a l  o b d u racy  and 
a n t ip a th y  tow ard  M u jib u r , and th e  la c k  o f  d ip lo m a t ic  s u p p o r t  from  key 
p o w e rs , e s p e c i a l l y  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s .  A f t e r  t h e  w ar W inspeare  em p h a s ise d  
t h i s  same key p o i n t  a s  b e in g  th e  f r e s h  f a c t o r  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  p a r t i e s  to  
b e g in  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  n o r m a l is in g  r e l a t i o n s  on th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t .  The 
a d d i t io n  o f  h i s  v o ic e  on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l to  th e  many o th e r s
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c a l l i n g  f o r  M u j i b u r 's  r e l e a s e ,  and h i s  p r e s e n c e  i n  I s la m a b a d  a t  t h e  r i g h t  
t im e ,  seem to  have  b een  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s  i n  B h u t t o ' s  d e c i s i o n  to  n o t  o n ly  
r e l e a s e  t h e  B a n g la d e s h  l e a d e r ,  b u t  to  do so  w i t h o u t  c o n d i t i o n s .
8 . B r i n g in g  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o g e t h e r
A lthough  T han t m ust have e x p lo r e d  a l l  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i n  h i s  
f r e q u e n t  m e e t in g s  w i th  t h e  In d ia n  and P a k i s t a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  t h e r e  i s  no 
p u b l i c  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  he p e r s o n a l l y  a t t e m p t e d  t o  p e r s u a d e  t h e  two s i d e s  to  
engage i n  d i r e c t  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th  e a ch  o t h e r .  Tunku Abdul Rahman's e f f o r t s  
i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  w ere  u n s u c c e s s f u l ,  w h i l e  Mrs Gandhi r e j e c t e d  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n s  
by o t h e r  governm en ts  f o r  a m ee t in g  w i th  Yahya Khan on th e  g rounds t h a t  I n d i a  
was n o t  a p a r t y  to  P a k i s t a n ' s  i n t e r n a l  d i s p u t e .  A f t e r  t h e  w ar W inspeare  was 
a b le  th ro u g h  h i s  p e r s o n a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  and  th ro u g h  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  
r e p o r t s  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  to  g iv e  s t r o n g  e ncou ragem en t  t o  moves f o r  
d i r e c t  t a l k s  be tw een  t h e  p r i n c i p a l s .
9 .  I n i t i a t i n g  f a c e - s a v i n g  p r o c e d u r e s
As Yahya Khan became f u l l y  c o g n iz a n t  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  w hich  P a k i s t a n  fa c e d  
from I n d i a ,  he began  t o  s e e k  UN i n i t i a t e d  f a c e - s a v i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  c a l l i n g  f o r  
t h e  w i th d ra w a l  o f  t r o o p s  from  t h e  b o r d e r s ,  t h e  s t a t i o n i n g  o f  o b s e r v e r s ,  a 
good o f f i c e s  com m iss ion , and a p e r s o n a l  v i s i t  by  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l .  B u t  
by th e n  I n d i a  was n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  f a c e - s a v i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  and T han t  a d v i s e d  
Yahya Khan t h a t  h e  had  gone as f a r  as h e  c o u ld .  A f t e r  t h e  w a r ,  W in s p e a re ' s  
m is s io n  i t s e l f  p r o v id e d  t o  some e x t e n t  a f a c e - s a v i n g  p r o c e d u r e ,  making i t  
e a s i e r  f o r  P a k i s t a n ,  t h e  d e f e a t e d  p a r t y ,  t o  b e g in  com m unica tions  w i th  b o th  
B a n g la d esh  and I n d i a ,  f i r s t l y  on th e  exchange  o f  p e r s o n n e l ,  and l a t e r  on t h e
n o r m a l i s a t i o n  o f  r e l a t i o n s .
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CONCLUSION
As I n d ia  re sp o n d e d  to  th e  c i v i l  w ar i n  E a s t  P a k is ta n  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
d i s p u te  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  th e  i n t e r n a l  u p h e a v a l d e v e lo p e d  i t s  own dynam ic.
F i r s t  th e  P a k is ta n  G overnm ent, d e fe n s iv e  a b o u t  i t s  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s ,  b lo c k e d  
th e  good o f f i c e s  r o l e  o f  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l . N ex t I n d i a ,  r a p i d l y  l o s i n g  
p a t i e n c e  a t  th e  u n w i l l in g n e s s  o f  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community to  a c t  on th e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  com m itted  i t s e l f  to  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  r e b e l s  
and s te p p e d  up i t s  s u p p o r t  f o r  them . P a k i s t a n 's  re s p o n s e  was to  se ek  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r e s s u r e  a g a in s t  w h a t i t  te rm ed  In d ia n  a g g r e s s io n .  I n d i a ,  i n  
t u r n ,  r e s i s t e d  UN in v o lv e m e n t i n  th e  e x t e r n a l  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  d i s p u t e ,  c la im ­
in g  t h a t  th e  r o o t  ca u se  o f  th e  p ro b lem  was w i th in  P a k i s t a n .
One o f  th e  unansw ered  q u e s t io n s  i s  w h e th e r  a  v i s i t  t o  th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t  
by th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l o r  a p e r s o n a l  e m is s a ry  d u r in g  th e  e a r l y  s ta g e s  o f  
th e  c r i s i s  m ig h t have  h e lp e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  a good o f f i c e s  r o le  a c c e p te d  by 
th e  p a r t i e s .  The p o s i t i o n s  r a p id ly  a d o p te d  by th e  p a r t i e s  l e f t  v e ry  l i t t l e  
sc o p e  f o r  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  b u t  a f a c t - f i n d i n g  e x e r c i s e  may have made i t  
p o s s ib l e  to  d i s c u s s  th e  e x t e r n a l  a s p e c ts  r a i s e d  by  each  o f  th e  two member 
s t a t e s  c o n c e rn e d  -  I n d i a 's  c la im  t h a t  p e a c e  was th r e a te n e d  by th e  e v e n ts  i n  
E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  and  P a k i s t a n 's  a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e  from  I n d ia .  In  
t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e r e  w ere s i m i l a r i t i e s  w ith  th e  e a r l y  s ta g e s  o f  th e  Yemen 
d i s p u t e ,  i n s o f a r  as th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  m eet th e  r e b e l s  l e d  to  a 
c o o l re s p o n s e  from  th e  e x t e r n a l  p a r t y  s u p p o r t in g  th e  r e b e l s .  T here  may, 
h o w ev er, have  b een  some p r o s p e c t  f o r  a 'ta n d e m ' e x e r c i s e  i n  w hich  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  w ould  have s o u g h t to  s t r e n g th e n  Tunku Abdul Rahm an's c h a n ce s  o f  
s u c c e s s ,  s i m i l a r  to  (b u t  n o t  e x a c t ly  a n a la g o u s  w ith )  th e  Bunche and B unker
m is s io n s  i n  Yemen.
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H u m a n ita r ia n  and p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  w ere i n e x t r i c a b l y  l in k e d  a t  e v e ry  
l e v e l .  The UNHCR o p e r a t io n  i n  I n d ia  s a v e d  many l i v e s .  H ow ever, i t  i s  more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  gauge UNEPRO's e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  a c h ie v in g  i t s  h u m a n i ta r ia n  
g o a ls  g iv e n  th e  e x trem e  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l i a b i l i t i e s  im posed  by 
th e  c i v i l  w a r . The re q u ire m e n t t h a t  UNEPRO work c lo s e ly  w ith  th e  P a k is ta n  
a u t h o r i t i e s  c r e a te d  i t s  own p ro b le m s. I n t e r n a l l y ,  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  a t  
p r o v i n c i a l  and  l o c a l  l e v e l s  was i n  d i s a r r a y  and r e f l e c t e d  th e  d i v i s i o n s  
w hich  h a d  l e d  to  th e  c i v i l  w a r, w h ile  th e  o p e r a t io n  was ham pered by  th e  
a c t io n s  o f  th e  g u e r i l l a s .  E x t e r n a l l y ,  dono r governm en ts h ad  c a u se  f o r  
c o n c e rn  as to  w h e th e r  s u p p l i e s  and eq u ip m en t w ere b e in g  used  f o r  t h e i r  
in te n d e d  h u m a n i ta r ia n  p u rp o s e s ,  o r  w ere b e in g  comm andeered by th e  l o c a l  
f o r c e s .  A tte m p ts  by  th e  UN S e c r e t a r i a t  to  e x e r c i s e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  to  overcom e b o th  th e s e  s e t s  o f  p ro b lem s i n  tu r n  b ro u g h t  
a b o u t  re s e n tm e n t  from  th e  P a k is ta n  a u t h o r i t i e s .
One o f  th e  more d i f f i c u l t  p ro b le m s, i n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  was th e  e x te n t  to  
w hich  th e  c o n cern  to  w in P a k is ta n  G overnm ent s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  
o f  a h u m a n i ta r ia n  r e l i e f  o p e r a t io n  i n  E a s t  B engal m ig h t have  a f f e c t e d  th e  
p r o s p e c t s  o f  an e f f e c t i v e  S e c r e t a r i a t  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e .  W ith  h i s  deep  
h u m a n i ta r ia n  c o n c e rn  and a s t r o n g  p e r s o n a l  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  
had  a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  a l l e v i a t e  human s u f f e r i n g ,  T han t s t r o v e  to  a c h ie v e  
b o th  h u m a n i ta r ia n  and p o l i t i c a l  g o a ls .  I t  c o u ld  b e  a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  
h u m a n i ta r ia n  e f f o r t  im posed  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  c o s ts  w hich  
e x a c e r b a te d  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a p o l i t i c a l  r o l e .  T han t 
t r i e d ,  u n s u c c e s s f u l ly  a t  t im e s ,  to  p u b l i c ly  s e p a r a te  th e  tw o. He d id  
su c c e e d  i n  in n o v a t in g  a new r o le  f o r  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  sy s te m  i n  re s p o n d in g  
to  l a r g e - s c a l e  h u m a n i ta r ia n  n e e d s , even  in  th e  a b sen ce  o f  r e s o l u t i o n s  from
d e l i b e r a t i v e  o rg a n s .
249
The e le v e n  W este rn  n a t io n s  w hich  w ere i n  a p o s i t i o n  to  in f lu e n c e  
P a k i s t a n  th ro u g h  th e  P a k is ta n  A id  C o n so rtiu m  c o n c e n t r a te d  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  
on th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  a UN h u m a n i ta r ia n  r o l e  r a t h e r  th a n  a UN p o l i t i c a l  
r o l e .  In  c o - o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  W orld Bank th e y  c o n v in c e d  th e  P a k is ta n  
Governm ent to  s to p  i t s  r e s i s t a n c e  to  a r e l i e f  o p e r a t io n ,  b u t  th e  same 
s u p p o r t  was n o t  fo rth c o m in g  f o r  UN p o l i t i c a l  i n i t i a t i v e s .  The U n ite d  
S t a t e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  p r e f e r r e d  to  p u rs u e  i t s  own p o l i c i e s ,  even  in  
o p p o s i t io n  to  o th e r  W estern  g o v e rn m en ts . A t b e s t ,  US s u p p o r t  f o r  UN 
i n i t i a t i v e s  was s e l e c t i v e ,  b e in g  l i m i t e d  t o  p r o p o s a ls  w hich  w ere  a c c e p ta b le  
to  P a k is ta n  b u t  n o t  to  I n d ia .  The A m ericans f a i l e d  to  r e c o g n i s e ,  a s  T han t 
d i d ,  th e  c r u c i a l  im p o rta n c e  o f  s e c u r in g  th e  r e l e a s e  o f  M u jib u r.
T h is  was a s p e c i f i c  exam ple o f  a  g e n e r a l  p ro b le m  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  th e  
a t te m p ts  by  g o v e rn m e n ts , n o ta b ly  th e  m a jo r  p o w e rs , to  i n f lu e n c e  e v e n ts  
b i l a t e r a l l y  r a t h e r  th an  i n  c o n c e r t  th ro u g h  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s .  D u rin g  th e  
e i g h t  m onths o f  c r i s i s  l e a d in g  up to  th e  December w ar th e r e  was no la c k  o f  
c o n ta c t  b e tw een  th e  d i s p u ta n t s  and a w hole  ran g e  o f  o t h e r  g o v e rn m e n ts , 
w i th  th e  d i s p u t a n t s  en g a g in g  i n  in te n s e  d ip lo m a t ic  a c t i v i t y  to  w in s u p p o r t  
f o r  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  p o s i t i o n s .  The s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  i s  t h a t  by p u r s u in g  
s e p a r a te  c o u rs e s  o f  a c t io n  b i l a t e r a l l y ,  th e  m a jo r  pow ers n e g a te d  th e  
o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  common a c t io n  w hich  d id  e x i s t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  June and 
J u ly .  F u r th e rm o re , th e  r e c o r d  o f  th e  t o p - l e v e l  American/WSAG m e e tin g s  
d u r in g  th e  December w ar, t o g e th e r  w i th  th e  a c t i o n s  o f  th e  m a jo r  pow ers and 
t h e i r  v a r io u s  t h r e a t s  and co rn  t e r - t h r e a t s , adds up to  a r a t h e r  c h i l l i n g  
p i c t u r e  o f  e v e n ts  g e t t i n g  o u t  o f  c o n t r o l .
The U n ited  N a tio n s  -  th ro u g h  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i v e  o rg a n s  and  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  -  p ro v id e d  from  th e  o u t s e t  a  means f o r  s e a r c h in g  f o r  common 
g ro u n d , b o th  be tw een  th e  d i s p u t a n t s ,  and  be tw een  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  s u p p o r t e r s .  
A f t e r  th e  w ar was o v e r ,  W in s p e a re 's  m is s io n s  p ro v id e d  an exam ple o f  w hat
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could be achieved with the acceptance by the disputants of a UN inter­
mediary role, and the backing of the major powers. By failing to respond 
to the earlier opportunities created by the Secretary General, each of the 
member states which were direct and indirect parties ultimately sacrificed 
interests that were important to them. Pakistan was split into two. The 
outcome of the war was a major setback for US policy. Tension between the 
Soviet Union and China was exacerbated, to the benefit of neither. India 
had a strategic victory, but in taking unilateral military action it 
suffered a major diplomatic defeat in the General Assembly and inflicted 
serious damage on the international institution in which it had been for so 
long a leading light.
Thant's memoirs record his assessment of the effects of the war on the 
United Nations:
No matter how history judges the motivations of India or Pakistan, 
their conflict had a tragic result for the international community: 
a major victim of the war was the United Nations and the principle 
of international co-operation that it embodies . . . throughout
the struggle, the United Nations made no move to act; my pleas and 
warnings to the Security Council, both privately and publicly, fell 
on deaf ears. The Council was immobilised, both by the refusal of 
the parties directly involved (India and Pakistan) and by the major 
powers, to face up to their obligations under the Charter to con­
front the issues forthrightly.
For the Secretariat, the tragedy of Bangladesh coincided with the end of an 
era. Ralph Bunche died on 9 December. Thant retired at the end of the month. 
It was a period of sadness and dismay.
Those who suffered most of all during the long months of crisis were the 
innocent victims. The UN humanitarian relief operation saved many lives, 
especially amongst the massive refugee population in India. But it would
1 U Thant, View from the UN, p.436.
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have b een  b e t t e r  i f  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community h ad  s o u g h t  w ith  g r e a t e r  
c o h e s io n  and p u rp o se  t o  a c h ie v e  an e a r l y  end to  th e  t r a g e d y .  O rd in a ry  
p e o p le  p a id  th e  m ost b i t t e r  p e n a l i t e s  f o r  th e  c o l l e c t i v e  f a i l u r e  o f  g o v e rn ­
m ents .
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CHAPTER V II
THE SECRETARIAT' S INTERMEDIARY ROLE
T h i s  c h a p t e r  r e - e x a m i n e s  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r ­
m e d ia r y  r o l e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  C h a p te r  I  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  e v i d e n c e  from  t h e  
c a s e  s t u d i e s .  F i r s t l y ,  t h o u g h ,  i t  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  p r o p o s i t i o n  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  i n  
s e e k i n g  t h e  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s  i s  m ore  a c c u r a t e l y  p e r c e i v e d  
i f  e x a m in e d  n o t  i n  i s o l a t i o n  b u t  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  h i s  
s e n i o r  c o l l e a g u e s  i n  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t .
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SECRETARIAT
The c e n t r a l  r o l e  o f  R a lp h  Bunche i n  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  h a n d l i n g  o f  
d i s p u t e s  was i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  Yemen and  B a h r a i n  d i s ­
p u t e s .  B unche  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e r a l  and  t h e  p a r t i e s  a t  h e a d q u a r t e r s .  He w e n t  t o  Yemen and  E g y p t  a s  
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  p e r s o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  March 1 9 6 3 ,  and  m a in ­
t a i n e d  c l o s e  l i a i s o n  w i t h  P i e r  S p i n e l l i  d u r i n g  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  
m i s s i o n s  t o  t h e  a r e a .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  B a h r a i n ,  B u n ch e  p l a y e d  a  p i v o t a l  
r o l e  from  b e g i n n i n g  t o  e n d .  He e n g a g e d  i n  c l o s e  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
B r i t i s h  and  I r a n i a n  m i s s i o n s  i n  New York d u r i n g  t h e  l o n g  d r a w n - o u t  s e c r e t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  f l e w  t o  G eneva  t o  m eet t h e  B a h r a i n i s  w i t h  W in s p e a re  G u i c c i a r d i ,  
c a r e f u l l y  w a tc h e d  o v e r  t h e  i i r p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  e a c h  s t e p  i n  t h e  a g r e e d  p r o ­
c e d u r e ,  an d  m a i n t a i n e d  d ay  t o  day  c o n t a c t  w i t h  W in s p e a re  b e f o r e  and  d u r i n g  
t h e  good o f f i c e s  m i s s i o n .
The s e n s i t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  m i s s i o n s  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  B u n c h e ,  S p i n e l l i  and  
W in s p e a re  h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  s u c h  o f f i c e r s  t o
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t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  ways o f  r e s o l v i n g  d i f f i c u l t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p ro b le m s .
S p i n e l l i  ' s  m is s io n s  t o  Yemen in v o lv e d  p r o lo n g e d  and i n t e n s i v e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  two e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s ,  E gyp t  and S aud i  
A r a b ia ,  as  w e l l  as Yemen i t s e l f .  I n  t h e  B a h r a in  c a s e ,  a f t e r  months o f  
n e g o t i a t i o n  and c a r e f u l  p r e p a r a t i o n ,  e v e r y t h i n g  depended  on t h e  th o ro u g h n e s s  
and i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  work c a r r i e d  o u t  by  W inspeare  and h i s  team .
B e fo re  t h e  B a n g la d esh  w ar ,  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  u n d e r ta k e n  by I sm a t  
K i t t a n i  and l a t e r  by P au l-M arc  Henry d e m o n s t r a te d  t h e  l i n k s  be tw een  hum ani­
t a r i a n  and p o l i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  W in s p e a r e 's  good o f f i c e s  
m is s io n  a f t e r  t h e  war a ro s e  o u t  o f  h u m a n i ta r i a n  c o n c e rn s  b u t  was a l s o  
i n t i m a t e l y  in v o lv e d  w i th  key p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s .
The t h r e e  c a se  s t u d i e s  have d e m o n s t ra te d  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  
r o l e s  u n d e r ta k e n  by s e n i o r  members o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  o t h e r  th a n  th e  
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  i n  s e e k in g  th e  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s .  N e v e r­
t h e l e s s ,  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  h e ld  th e  u l t i m a t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
a c t i o n s  t a k e n  and members o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  a c t e d  u n d e r  h i s  a u t h o r i t y .
H is  r o l e  rem a ined  a c e n t r a l  one t h r o u g h o u t ,  b u t  n o t  one w hich  was i s o l a t e d .  
The case  s t u d i e s  em p h as ise  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G eneral b e in g  
a b le  t o  c a l l  on t h e  s e r v i c e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  w i th  
n e g o t i a t i n g  s k i l l s  o f  t h e  h i g h e s t  o r d e r .
Nor was t h e  r o l e  o f  s e n i o r  members o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
t h e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  I n  e a c h  c a se  t h e  o f f i c e r s  c o n c e rn e d  
had  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  b o th  f o r m u l a t i n g  th e  o v e r a l l  ap p ro a c h  t o  be 
a d o p te d  by  th e  UN S e c r e t a r i a t ,  and recommending s p e c i f i c  i n i t i a t i v e s  and 
a c t i o n s  t o  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  B u n c h e 's  m e t ic u lo u s  
im plernent a t i o n  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  and h i s  c a r e f u l  
i n s i s t e n c e  a t  a l l  t im es  t h a t  he was a c t i n g  on t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  
b e h a l f ,  s h o u ld  n o t  o b s c u re  h i s  p e r s o n a l  i n p a c t  on th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  a p p ro a c h .
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R a th e r ,  B u n c h e 's  u n sw e rv in g  i n t e g r i t y  and d i s c r e t i o n  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  as 
in  o t h e r s ,  were i m p o r t a n t  e le m e n ts  o f  t h e  f u l l  c o n f id e n c e  w hich th e  S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e ra l  h a d  i n  h im . He was o f t e n  w i th  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  d u r in g  d i s ­
c u s s io n s  w i t h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  g o v e rn m e n ts ,  and was c l e a r l y  a key s o u rc e  
o f  a d v ic e  i n  b o th  t h e  Yemen and B a h r a in  d i s p u t e s .
S i m i l a r l y ,  S p i n e l l i ' s  a s s e s s m e n ts  i n f l u e n c e d  d e c i s i o n s  by  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e ra l  t o  c o n t in u e  UNYOM th ro u g h  th e  f i r s t  n in e  months o f  1964, t h e  m is s io n  
b e in g  e x te n d e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  on S p i n e l l i ' s  recom m endation  i n  J a n u a r y  o f  t h a t  
y e a r .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  B a n g la d esh  c r i s i s ,  K i t t a n i ' s  r e p o r t  
s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  w i t h i n  P a k i s t a n  
c o u ld  o n ly  be d e a l t  w i th  by t h e  P a k i s t a n i s  th e m s e lv e s  b o th  r e f l e c t e d  and 
f u r t h e r  r e i n f o r c e d  th e  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e s  a g a i n s t  any a t t e m p t  t o  a s s e r t  a 
more a c t i v e  o r  o v e r t  S e c r e t a r i a t  r o l e  i n  t a c k l i n g  t h e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
q u e s t i o n s  w hich  were t h r e a t e n i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e .  A f t e r  H e n r y 's  f i r s t  
v i s i t  t o  P a k i s t a n ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  s e n t  a  l e t t e r  t o  P r e s i d e n t  Yahya 
Khan on H e n r y 's  recom m endation  s e e k in g  a fo rm a l  ag reem en t  be tw een  h i s  
governm ent and th e  UN S e c r e t a r i a t  on g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  th e  c o n d u c t  o f  UNEPRO. 
H e n r y 's  comments on th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  w in n in g  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  UNEPRO by th e  
B a n g la d esh  r e b e l s  u n d e r l i n e d  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  b r o a d e r  t h i n k i n g  on th e  
need  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  accom modation be tw een  th e  governm ent and th e  r e b e l s .  
W in s p e a r e 's  o b s e r v a t i o n  on th e  n e e d  f o r  d i r e c t  t a l k s  be tw een  th e  l e a d e r s  o f  
I n d i a ,  P a k i s t a n  and B a n g la d esh  r e c e i v e d  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  from th e  new 
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  K u r t  W aldheim. In  e a ch  c a se  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  a c te d  
f o l lo w in g  c lo s e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i th  s e n i o r  o f f i c e r s  and c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
t h e i r  judgem en ts  and reco m m en d a tio n s .  One would  n o t  e x p e c t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  
a t  t h e  to p  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  to  be o t h e r w i s e ,  y e t  i t  i s  an i n p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  
w hich i s  o v e r lo o k e d  i f  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  i s  c o n s id e r e d  i n
i s o l a t i o n .
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GOOD OFFICES
The S e c r e t a i r a t ' s app roach  in  s e e k in g  t h e  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  
d i s p u t e s ,  a s  d e v e lo p e d  d u r in g  th e  Hammarskjöld p e r i o d  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  
d u r in g  th e  U T h a n t  p e r i o d ,  was i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  c o n c e p ts  o f  good o f f i c e s  
and q u i e t  d ip lo m a c y .  The c e n t r a l  aim  o f  b o th  good o f f i c e s  and q u i e t  
d ip lom acy  was c l e a r l y  u n d e rs to o d  to  be t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
pe a c e .
The n a t u r e  o f  good o f f i c e s
Good o f f i c e s ,  as p r a c t i s e d  by t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  h ad  p a r t i c u l a r  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  :
a .  i t  was low p r o f i l e ,  s e e k in g  to  a s s i s t  and  f a c i l i t a t e ,  and 
a v o id in g  any s u g g e s t io n  o f  c o e rc io n  o r  even  o v e r t  p e r s u a s i o n ;
b .  i t  was n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t ,  c l e a r l y  d e p e n d in g  from th e  o u t s e t  
on th e  c o n t i n u in g  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  p a r t i e s ;
c .  i t  was n o n - ju d g e m e n ta l ,  s e e k in g  t o  e s t a b l i s h  com m unica tions
and  a r e a s  o f  common i n t e r e s t ,  and to  r e d u c e  a r e a s  o f  d i f f e r e n c e ,  
r a t h e r  th a n  to  d e te rm in e  r i g h t s  and w rongs ;
d . i t  was b a s e d  upon t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e g r i t y  and i m p a r t i ­
a l i t y ,  e n g e n d e r in g  c o n f id e n c e  w i t h in  t h e  p a r t i e s .
In  each  o f  t h e  t h r e e  c a s e s  th e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  were e v i d e n t  when th e  
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  u n d e r to o k  a good o f f i c e s  r o l e  i n  th e  g e n e r a l  s e n s e  o f  
m aking h i m s e l f  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th  t h e  p a r t i e s .  He m et i n  New 
York w i th  t h e i r  p e rm a n e n t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and som etim es  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  
m i n i s t e r s ,  t o  d i s c u s s  ways i n  which th e  UN c o u ld  a s s i s t  them i n  s e e k i n g  a 
r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e i r  d i s p u t e s .  In  t h e  Yemen c a se  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  
took  p l a c e  from th e  e a r l i e s t  days o f  t h e  c r i s i s .  I n  t h e  B a h r a in  c a se  t h e
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S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  was i n i t i a l l y  c o n s u l t e d  by B r i t a i n  and th e n  by I r a n  on 
t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  l o n g s t a n d in g  d i s p u t e ,  and t h e r e a f t e r  
Bunche m a in ta in e d  c lo s e  c o n t a c t  w i th  b o th  p a r t i e s .  In  t h e  B a n g la d e sh  c a s e ,  
T han t h a d  f r e q u e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  two member 
g o v e rn m en ts ,  d i s c u s s i o n s  w hich  c o n t in u e d  th r o u g h o u t  t h e  e n t i r e  e i g h t  m onths 
o f  t h e  c r i s i s .
The p o i n t  was made i n  C h a p te r  I  t h a t  a good o f f i c e s  r o l e  m ig h t  in v o lv e  
s u b s t a n t i v e  as w e l l  a s  p r o c e d u r a l  q u e s t i o n s .  T h is  was d e m o n s t ra te d  i n  t h e  
Yemen d i s p u t e  when th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  f o rm a t io n  o f  a 
governm ent o f  b r o a d e r  c o m p o s i t io n  w i th  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  Yemen and w i th  
th e  two e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s ,  E g y p t  and Saud i  A r a b ia ,  i n  an e n d e a v o u r  t o  f i n d  
common g round  be tw een  them. S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  t h e  B a n g la d e s h  c a s e ,  he  p u t  
fo rw ard  p r o p o s a l s  on such  s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t t e r s  a s  w i th d ra w a l  o f  t r o o p s  away 
from t h e  b o r d e r s ,  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  M ujibu r  Rahman, and a p o l i t i c a l  s o l u t i o n  
w i t h i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n .
The Bunche and S p i n e l l i  m is s io n s  i n  t h e  Yemen c a se  were l i n k e d  c l o s e l y  
w i th  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  e f f o r t s  a t  h e a d q u a r t e r s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  ag reem en t  
be tw een  th e  p a r t i e s  on an a s s u r e d  s e t t l e m e n t .  W hile t h e s e  m is s io n s  were n o t  
d e s c r i b e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a s  good o f f i c e s  m i s s io n s ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  good 
o f f i c e s  were e v i d e n t  t h r o u g h o u t .  P e rh ap s  S p i n e l l i ' s  m is s io n  came c l o s e s t  
t o  b e i n g  a m e d ia t io n  e x e r c i s e ,  i n  th e  s e n se  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  him  i m p l ie d  an approach  o f  a c t i v e l y  s e e k i n g  s e t t l e m e n t  and 
t h e r e  was added em phas is  on s u b s t a n t i v e  i s s u e s ,  t h u s  i l l u s t r a t i n g  t h e  o v e r ­
l a p  be tw een  m e d ia t io n  and good o f f i c e s  i n  p r a c t i c e .  The s e t  o f  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  d e s c r i b e d  above was a g a in  a p p a re n t  i n  W in s p e a re ' s m is s io n s  t o  B a h ra in  
and B a n g la d e s h ,  b o th  o f  w hich were o f f i c i a l l y  d e s c r i b e d  as  'g o o d  o f f i c e s
m i s s i o n s ' .
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T h is  c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r ­
m ed ia ry  a p p ro a c h  i n  b o th  h e a d q u a r t e r s  a c t i v i t y  and  s p e c i f i c  m is s io n s  w i th  
d i f f e r e n t  t a s k s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  th e  good o f f i c e s  a p p ro a c h  had  become 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d ;  i t  had  become p a r t  o f  t h e  a c c e p te d  p a t t e r n  o f  S e c r e t a r i a t  
b e h a v io u r .
B a s i s  f o r  good o f f i c e s
I t  was s u g g e s t e d  i n  C h a p te r  I  t h a t  w h i l e  good o f f i c e s  i s  n o t  s p e c i ­
f i c a l l y  m en t io n ed  i n  t h e  C h a r t e r ,  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h a t  r o l e  i s  found b o th  i n  
e s t a b l i s h e d  p r a c t i c e  g o in g  back  to  t h e  d a y s  o f  Drummond i n  th e  League o f  
N a t i o n s ,  and a l s o  i n  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  A r t i c l e  33. In  none o f  t h e  t h r e e  
c a s e s  was t h e r e  any c h a l l e n g e  to  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  
good o f f i c e s  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  s e n se  o f  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th  t h e  p a r t i e s  a t  h e a d ­
q u a r t e r s .  R a th e r ,  i t  was o b v io u s ly  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  he would  engage in  
a c t i v i t y  o f  t h i s  k in d  s in c e  i t  had  become e s t a b l i s h e d  as a  m a jo r  and s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  e le m e n t  i n  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  r o l e .
Nor was t h e r e  any d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  a c t i o n  
i n  s e n d in g  f i r s t  Bunehe and l a t e r  S p i n e l l i  t o  Yemen. In  t h e  B a h r a in  c a s e ,  
h ow ever ,  t h e  S o v i e t  Union d id  o b j e c t ,  an d  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  d e fe n d e d  
t h e  good o f f i c e s  m is s io n  i n  term s o f  A r t i c l e  33, s t a t i n g  t h a t  he  f e l t  bound 
t o  a s s i s t  member s t a t e s  who w ish e d  t o  r e s o l v e  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a c c o r d ­
ance  w i th  t h a t  a r t i c l e ,  p r o v id e d  th e  p ro p o s e d  a c t i o n  was n o t  i n  c o n f l i c t  
w i t h  o t h e r  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C h a r t e r .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o te  t h a t ,  t e c h n i c a l l y ,  such  a b a s i s  d i d  n o t  
a p p ly  to  t h e  good o f f i c e s  m is s io n  on h u m a n i ta r i a n  p ro b le m s  w hich W inspeare  
u n d e r to o k  a f t e r  t h e  B a n g la d e sh  w ar  u n d e r  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  R e s o lu t io n  307, 
s i n c e  a s s i s t i n g  t h e  p a r t i e s  to  s e ek  a s o l u t i o n  t o  a d i s p u t e  e n d a n g e r in g  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  was n o t  s t a t e d  t o  be  p a r t  o f  h i s  m andated  t a s k .
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In  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  m andate c o n ta i n e d  i n  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  i s  to  
be found  i n  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  p u r p o s e s ,  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 ( 3 ) ,  w hich c a l l s  
f o r  ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  s o l v i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p ro b lem s  o f  an . . .
[ i n t e r  a l i a ]  . . . h u m a n i ta r i a n  c h a r a c t e r ' .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  W in s p e a r e 's  
m is s io n  was i n  p r a c t i c e  a b le  t o  a s s i s t  i n  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
w hich  p r e s e n t e d  a t h r e a t  t o  t h e  r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a ce  and 
s e c u r i t y  i n  t h a t  r e g i o n ,  and i t  was t h e r e f o r e  a l s o  i n  k e e p in g  w i th  th e  
s p i r i t  o f  A r t i c l e  33.
The w i l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s
The e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  good o f f i c e s  r o l e  rem a ined  th e  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  h i s  o f f i c e  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s  i f  th e y  w ish e d  to  use  i t .  In  
o r d e r  f o r  t h a t  r o l e  to  make a u s e f u l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  a 
d i s p u t e ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  th e m s e lv e s  h a d  to  have  a w i l l  tow ards  s e t t l e m e n t .
Such a w i l l  was m ost c l e a r l y  d e m o n s t r a te d  i n  t h e  c a se  o f  B a h r a in ,  where t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  good o f f i c e s  made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  d e s i r e d  by 
e a ch  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  to  be a c h ie v e d .  I n  t h e  c a se  o f  Yemen, a  w i l l  tow ards  
s e t t l e m e n t  was in d u c e d  th ro u g h  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and t h e  
Arab L eague , b u t  b e i n g  l a r g e l y  t h e  outcome o f  e x t e r n a l  p r e s s u r e ,  was s h a k i e r  
from t h e  o u t s e t .  I n  t h e  c a se  o f  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n ,  any w i l l  tow ards  s e t t l e ­
ment was overshadow ed  c o m p le te ly  by t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  t h e  m u tua l  a n ta g o n ism  
be tw een  th e  d i s p u t a n t s  and  t h e  r i g i d i t y  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p o s i t i o n s .
W hile t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  rem a in e d  t h e  key  f a c t o r  b e h in d  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  ou tcom es i n  t h e  t h r e e  c a s e s ,  i t  was n o t  t h e  o n ly  f a c t o r .  In  t h e  
B a h ra in  c a se  m onths o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  were r e q u i r e d  t o  overcome q u i t e  fu n d a ­
m en ta l  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  so  a s  to  c o n v e r t  a  g e n e r a l i s e d  w i l l  f o r  s e t t l e m e n t  
i n t o  a v i a b l e  and m u tu a l ly  a c c e p t a b l e  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  s e t t l e m e n t .  As th o s e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  p ro c e e d e d  t h e  in f o r m a l  good o f f i c e s  e x e r c i s e d  by T han t and
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Bunche h e lp e d  to  b u i l d  a l e v e l  o f  c o n f id e n c e  w hich  e n a b le d  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  t o  be  overcom e. Even when t h e  p r o c e d u r e  was e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  
e v e n t u a l  outcome s t i l l  depended  on a s u c c e s s f u l  good o f f i c e s  m is s io n ,  i n  
t h a t  t h e  c o n f id e n c e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  had  t o  be  m a in ta in e d  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  
W inspea re  t e a m 's  d i s c r e t i o n ,  i m p a r t i a l i t y  and  th o ro u g h n e s s  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  
i t s  t a s k .  An i m p o r ta n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  B a h r a in  c a s e ,  s i n p l e  to  s t a t e  b u t  more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  a p p ly  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  was t h e  c a r e  t a k e n  by Bunche and W inspeare  
t o  m in im ise  t h e  ch an ces  o f  so m e th in g  g o in g  wrong once th e  a g re e d  p r o c e d u r e  
h a d  s t a r t e d .  T h is  was a m a t t e r  o f  m e t i c u lo u s  p r e p a r a t i o n ,  a v o id a n c e  o f  
p r e s s  s p e c u l a t i o n ,  and  u n d e r s t a n d in g  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  o p e r a t i n g  
b o t h  w i t h i n  B a h r a in  i t s e l f  and w i t h i n  t h e  r e g io n  g e n e r a l l y .  E f f e c t i v e  
im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  t h e  a g re e d  p r o c e d u r e  was a s  much a f a c t o r  i n  th e  f i n a l  
s u c c e s s f u l  outcome as t h e  i n i t i a l  w i l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s .  T h e i r  w i l l  was an 
e s s e n t i a l  p r e c o n d i t i o n ,  b u t  n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  e v e n t u a l  s u c c e s s .
F u r th e r m o r e ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  s h o u ld  n o t  
be  r e g a r d e d  as so m e th in g  f i x e d  and im m u tab le ,  n o r  as  s o m e th in g  w hich  was 
n e c e s s a r i l y  i n s u l a t e d  from  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n f l u e n c e .  In  any d i s p u t e  t h e  
w i l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  and  t h e i r  d i s p o s i t i o n  to w ard s  s e t t l e m e n t  r e f l e c t s  a 
w hole  range  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  and c o n te m p o ra ry  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  
b o t h  th e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  and th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i ro n m e n t .  As 
t h o s e  f a c t o r s  i n t e r a c t  a t  v a r i o u s  s t a g e s  o f  a  d i s p u t e  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  
p a r t i e s  m ig h t  w e l l  change . T h is  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e  Yemen 
c a s e ,  where t h e  w i l l  to w ard s  a n e g o t i a t e d  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r ­
n a l  and e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s  seemed t o  f l u c t u a t e  w i t h  t h e  f o r t u n e s  o f  t h e  
v a r i o u s  f a c t i o n s  w i t h i n  Yemen and th e  ebb and flow  o f  i n t e r - A r a b  p o l i t i c s  
th r o u g h o u t  t h e  r e g i o n .  T h is  p a r t i c u l a r  q u e s t i o n  i s  c o n s id e r e d  f u r t h e r  i n  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r .
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S o v e re ig n ty
The r o l e  o f  good o f f i c e s  i s  i t s e l f  an outcom e o f  th e  em p h asis  p la c e d  
upon th e  n o t io n  o f  s o v e r e ig n ty  w i th in  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s .  As one o f  th e  
m ost j e a l o u s ly  g u a rd ed  p r e r o g a t i v e s  o f  th e  member s t a t e s ,  s o v e re ig n ty  
m i l i t a t e s  n o t  o n ly  a g a in s t  an a d ju d ic a t iv e  r o l e  by  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l ,  
b u t  a l s o  a g a in s t  an o v e r t l y  p e r s u a s iv e  r o l e .
In  th e  T han t p e r i o d ,  th e  te rm  'g o o d  o f f i c e s '  summed up b o th  th e  v a lu e  
and th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  r o l e  i n  s e e k in g  th e  p e a c e f u l  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s .  The v a lu e  o f  a  good o f f i c e s  a p p ro ach  l a y  i n  i t s  
la c k  o f  t h r e a t  t o  th e  s o v e re ig n ty  t o  th e  p a r t i e s ,  th u s  v e ry  o f t e n  e n h a n c in g  
th e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  UN in v o lv e m e n t. I t s  l i m i t a t i o n  l a y  i n  a p e r c e p t io n  by 
th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  and o f t e n  by  th e  d e l i b e r a t i v e  o rg a n s  as  w e l l ,  o f  an 
i n a b i l i t y  t o  in f lu e n c e  th e  c o u rse  o f  e v e n ts  i f  th e  d i s p u t a n t s  d id  n o t  them ­
s e lv e s  have  a w i l l  to w ard s  s e t t l e m e n t .
QUIET DIPLOMACY
The S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  em p h asis  on q u i e t  d ip lo m acy  was b a se d  on th e  f i rm  
c o n v ic t io n s  t h a t :
a .  an in te r m e d ia r y  r o l e  was m ost e f f e c t i v e  when l e a s t  v i s i b l e ,  
and in  p a r t i c u l a r  when d i s c r e t i o n  was o b s e rv e d  i n  com m enting 
to  th e  p r e s s ;
b . p r e v e n t io n  o f  c o n f l i c t  was more l i k e l y  to  r e s u l t  from  q u i e t  
d i s c u s s io n  w i th  th e  p a r t i e s  to  a d i s p u te  and w ith  o th e r  g o v e rn ­
m en ts , th a n  from  p u b l ic  e x h o r t a t i o n ;
c .  q u i e t  c o n s u l t a t i o n  among members o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il was 
more l i k e l y  th a n  p u b l ic  d e b a te  to  r e s u l t  i n  c o n s e n s u s .
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P re s s  c o v e ra g e
In  B e i r u t ,  en ro u te  t o  Yemen, Bunche fe n d e d  o f f  q u e s t io n s  from  th e  
p r e s s  a b o u t  h i s  m is s io n . The p r o - r e p u b l i c a n  d e m o n s tra t io n s  w hich  g r e e te d  
him  on a r r i v i n g  in  Yemen p ro v id e d  a means f o r  t h e  governm ent to  b o l s t e r  i t s  
c a se  th ro u g h  r e p o r t s  from  S ana r a d io .  A f t e r  l e a v in g  Yemen, Bunche h ad  to  
o f f i c i a l l y  deny a s ta te m e n t  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  him  w hich  p o r t r a y e d  th e  UN as 
b e in g  p a r t i s a n  in  th e  d i s p u t e .  In  Aden and C a i ro ,  he r e f u s e d  to  answ er 
q u e s t io n s  from  th e  p r e s s  on th e  c o n te n t  o f  h i s  t a l k s  w ith  Al S a l l a l  and 
N a s s e r .
Q u ie t  d ip lom acy  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t r e s s e d  i n  th e  ca se  o f  B a h ra in .
Bunche and W inspeare  w ent to  g r e a t  l e n g th s  to  e n s u re  th e  s e c re c y  o f  th e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  and  th e  p ro p o se d  m is s io n  r i g h t  up to  th e  a g re e d  tim e o f  th e  
announcem ent. The i ro n y  o f  th e  B a h ra in  c a se  was t h a t  w h ile  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  
and s e v e r a l  members o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  r e g a rd e d  i t  as an o u t s t a n d in g  
s u c c e s s  f o r  th e  good o f f i c e s  r o le  o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  t h a t  r o l e  was l a r g e l y  
u n re c o g n is e d  o u ts id e  th e  im m edia te  r e g io n  c o n c e rn e d . The d i s p u te  o v e r  th e  
I r a n i a n  c la im  was p u b l i c i s e d  in  th e  Arab p r e s s ,  b u t  r e c e iv e d  s c a n t  a t t e n t i o n  
in  th e  W est, and th e  s e t t l e m e n t  was t r e a t e d  i n  a  s i m i l a r  v e in .  The U n ite d  
N a t io n s ' D i r e c to r  o f  In fo rm a t io n  w ro te  to  th e  New York Times p r o t e s t i n g  a t  
th e  o m is s io n  o f  any r e p o r t  on th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  m e e tin g  a t  w h ich  th e  
i s s u e  was fo rm a lly  s e t t l e d .  R e f e r r in g  to  th e  o c c a s io n  as ' h i s t o r i c '  he  
n o te d  t h a t  ' t h i s  was th e  f i r s t  tim e  th e  C o u n c il  h ad  e v e r  e n d o rs e d  th e  r e s u l t s  
o f  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l 's  e x e r c i s e  o f  h i s  "good o f f i c e s " ' . ^
The c i v i l  w ar i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  on th e  o th e r  h a n d , was th e  s u b j e c t  o f  
t h e  m ost i n te n s e  p r e s s  a t t e n t i o n ,  w ith  a l l  t h e  a t t e n d a n t  p ro b lem s o f  
s p e c u la t io n  and m is r e p o r t in g .  D e ta i l s  o f  t h r e e  m a jo r  i n i t i a t i v e s  by th e
^ L e t t e r  from  W illia m  P o w ell to  E d i t o r ,  New York T im es, 15 May 1970, 
u n p u b lis h e d .
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S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l -  th e  19 J u ly  p r o p o s a l  f o r  UNHCR o b s e r v e r s ,  th e  20 J u ly  
memorandum to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il ,  and th e  o f f e r  o f  good o f f i c e s  -  w ere 
s l l  le a k e d  to  th e  p r e s s  and w ere th e  s u b je c t  o f  c o n fu se d  and dam aging r e p o r t s .  
In  each  c a se  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l ju d g ed  t h a t  i t  was l e s s  dam aging to  
r e l e a s e  t h e  c o r r e c t  t e x t s  th an  to  a llo w  s p e c u la t i o n  to  c o n tin u e  u n ch eck ed .
In  th e  c a se  o f  th e  memorandum to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c i l ,  th e  e s s e n c e  o f  T h a n t 's  
s t r a t e g y ,  as he l a t e r  d e s c r ib e d  i t ,  was th e  en co u rag em en t o f  q u i e t  c o n s u l ­
t a t i o n  be tw een  members o f  th e  C o u n c il .  W hile such  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  s t i l l  to o k  
p l a c e ,  th e  w id e s p re a d  p u b l i c i t y  d id  n o t  enhance  th e  l ik e l i h o o d  t h a t  th e  
governm en ts c o n c e rn e d  w ould  be f l e x i b l e  enough to  a g re e  on a means o f  h an d ­
l i n g  th e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  th e  C o u n c il.
P r e v e n t iv e  d ip lom acy
H am m arsk jö ld 's  o r i g i n a l  u sage  o f  th e  te rm  'p r e v e n t iv e  d ip lo m a c y ' had  
p la c e d  UN d ip lo m a t ic  i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  c o ld  w a r , r e f e r r i n g  
t o  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  a UN p re s e n c e  i n  an a r e a  o f  d i s p u te  so  as to  g iv e  
e a ch  o f  th e  s u p e r  pow ers a g u a ra n te e  a g a in s t  i n i t i a t i v e s  by th e  o t h e r .  In  a 
v e ry  l im i t e d  way UNYOM p e rfo rm e d  su ch  a f u n c t io n  i n  Yemen. I t  was c l e a r l y  
p r e f e r a b l e  to  th e  U n ite d  S t a te s  t h a t  a UN o b s e r v a t io n  m is s io n  be e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
r a t h e r  th a n  t h a t  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  i t s e l f  become m i l i t a r i l y  in v o lv e d ,  and 
th e re b y  i n v i t e  c o u n te r  in v o lv e m e n t i n  some form  o r  o t h e r  by  th e  S o v ie t  U nion.
G ordenker d e f in e d  p r e v e n t iv e  d ip lom acy  a s  k e e p in g  d i s p u te s  o f f  th e  
agenda o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il and th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly w here th e y  m ig h t 
become c o ld  w ar i s s u e s .  T h is  was c l e a r l y  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  aim  i n  b o th  th e  
Yemen and B a h ra in  c a s e s .  The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l o r i g i n a l l y  p ro p o se d  to  
e s t a b l i s h  UNYOM w i th o u t  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il e n d o rse m e n t, w h ile  th e  B a h ra in  i s s u e  
was b ro u g h t  b e f o r e  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il o n ly  when a l l  th e  r e q u ire m e n ts  f o r
s e t t l e m e n t ,  e x c e p t  en d o rse m en t, h ad  b een  f u l f i l l e d .
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In  th e  m ost g e n e ra l  s e n s e ,  p r e v e n t iv e  d ip lom acy  s im p ly  p ro v id e d  th e  
b a s i c  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  q u i e t  d ip lo m acy . Hence q u i e t  d i s c u s s io n  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  
was j u s t i f i e d  as th e  b e s t  means o f  p r e v e n t in g  a d i s p u te  from  e s c a l a t i n g  to  th e  
p o i n t  o f  m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t .  Thus th e  im m ediate aim  o f  UN d ip lo m acy  in  th e  
Yemen d i s p u te  was to  p r e v e n t  m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t  be tw een  th e  UAR and S au d i 
A r a b ia .  S h o r t ly  a f t e r  th e  r e p u b l ic a n  r e v o lu t io n  i n  Yemen, th e  UAR d ro p p ed  
arms and  am m unition n e a r  Jeddah  i n  an a tte m p t to  fom ent r e b e l l i o n  a g a in s t  th e  
S a u d i d y n a s ty .  UAR a i r  and ground f o rc e s  m ounted r a i d s  from  Yemen a g a in s t  
r o y a l i s t  b a s e s  a c ro s s  th e  b o r d e r  i n  S aud i A ra b ia . The in v o lv e m e n t o f  b o th  
p a r t i e s  i n  th e  Yemen c i v i l  w ar c r e a te d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r i s k  o f  e s c a l a t i o n  to  
th e  p o i n t  o f  d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t  be tw een  them . By d is c o u r a g in g  su ch  i n c i d e n t s ,  
th e  aim  o f  UN q u i e t  d ip lom acy  was to  h e lp  c o n ta in  th e  c o n f l i c t  and p r e v e n t  
e s c a l a t i o n .
I n  B a h ra in ,  th e r e  may p e rh a p s  have been  some d a n g e r  o f  m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t  
b e tw een  I r a n  and th e  B r i t i s h  i f  th e y  f a i l e d  to  r e a c h  a g re e m e n t. B u t th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  p e r c e iv e d  a p a r t i c u l a r  d a n g e r o f  in c r e a s e d  te n s io n  b e tw een  I r a n  
and th e  A rab w o rld  w ith  a c o n c o m ita n t r i s k  o f  m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t  o c c u r r in g  in  
th e  f u t u r e ,  e i t h e r  o v e r  B a h ra in  o r  o v e r  a n o th e r  p o i n t  o f  d is a g re e m e n t.  The 
b e l i e f  t h a t  q u i e t  d ip lo m acy  was more l i k e l y  th an  open  d ip lo m acy  to  p r e v e n t  
th e  em ergence o f  su ch  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  was q u i te  c l e a r l y  th e  m a jo r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  an e x e r c i s e  w here th e  
p a r t i e s  d e s i r e d  s t r i c t  s e c r e c y .
In  t h e  ca se  o f  I n d ia  and  P a k i s t a n ,  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l j u s t i f i e d  h i s  
em phasis  on q u i e t  d ip lo m acy  and i n i t i a t i v e s  w hich w ere in te n d e d  to  be con­
f i d e n t i a l  on th e  g rounds t h a t  th e  q u i e t  app roach  h e ld  th e  b e s t  c h a n c e s  o f  
p r e v e n t in g  w ar b e tw een  th e  two n e ig h b o u rs .
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C o n s u l ta t io n  and c o n sen su s
In  ea ch  o f  th e  c a se  s tu d i e s  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  was s t r o n g ly  i n c l i n e d  to  
e n c o u ra g e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  among members o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il w ith  th e  aim  o f  
s e e k in g  a c o n se n su s  on a c t io n  to  be  ta k e n .  M a jo r i ty  d e c is io n s  a lo n e  w ere 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a c t io n  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  v e to  r i g h t s  o f  th e  p e rm an en t m em bers.
When th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il  c o n s id e r e d  th e  Yemen d i s p u t e ,  th e  t r a n s c r i p t  
showed c l e a r l y  t h a t  th e  C o r n e l l 's  r e s o l u t i o n  e n d o rs in g  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  
UNYOM was th e  r e s u l t  o f  su ch  a p r o c e s s .  T h is  was d e m o n s tra te d  even  more 
c l e a r l y  i n  th e  c a se  o f  B a h ra in ,  when th e  r e s o l u t i o n  e n d o rs in g  W in s p e a re 's  
f in d in g s  was p u t  w i th o u t  d e b a te  fo l lo w in g  in fo rm a l  ag reem en t b e tw een  a l l  
members o f  th e  C o u n c il .  B e fo re  th e  B a n g la d esh  w a r , w h ile  a d v is in g  th e  
C o u n c il o f  a t h r e a t  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e ,  T han t d e l i b e r a t e l y  r e f r a i n e d  
from  in v o k in g  A r t i c l e  9 9 , a  s t r a t e g y  to  e n c o u ra g e  in fo rm a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  on 
th e  q u e s t io n  am ongst C o u n c il  m em bers. The S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  was i n d i c a t e d  d i r e c t l y  by  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l 's  own comments 
a t  th e  se co n d  C o u n c il m e e tin g  on Yemen, and i n  comments made by r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e s  i n  th e  m e e tin g  on B a h ra in ,  as w e l l  as th e  m e e tin g s  h e ld  d u r in g  
th e  B a n g la d esh  w a r.
As w ith  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  good o f f i c e s  ap p ro a c h  to  in te r m e d ia r y  
a c t i v i t y ,  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  c o n s u l t a t i o n  am ongst members o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  
C o u n c il h ad  become i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d .  I t  h ad  become th e  a c c e p te d  way o f  
d o in g  t h i n g s .  T h is  was p a r t  o f  a b r o a d e r  d ev e lo p m en t i n  t h a t  th e  t r a d i t i o n  
o f  q u i e t  d ip lom acy  h a d  become f i r m ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i th in  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  and 
th e  p r a c t i c e  h ad  become more w id e ly  a c c e p te d  among member s t a t e s .
265
THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
A p a rt from  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il in  th e  h a n d lin g  o f  
d i s p u te s  was f u r t h e r  in f lu e n c e d  by a lo n g s ta n d in g  d i f f e r e n c e  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  
Union o v e r  th e  a u th o r i t y  o f  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l . The c o n c e p t o f  p r e v e n t iv e  
d ip lom acy  a s  a  means o f  s id e s te p p in g  c o ld  w ar i s s u e s  i n  UN o rg a n s  was c l e a r l y  
n o t  fa v o u re d  by th e  S o v ie t  U nion, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  view  o f  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  to  
S o v ie t  i n t e r e s t s  a f f o r d e d  by th e  r o le  o f  p e rm a n en t members and th e  r i g h t  o f  
v e to .  A lthough  th e  S o v ie t  Union s u p p o r te d  th e  c o n c e p t o f  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  and 
c o n s e n s u s - s e e k in g  am ongst C o u n c il members, i t  h e ld  th e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  su ch  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  s h o u ld  i n  g e n e ra l  be  f o rm a lis e d  i n  r e s o l u t i o n s .
Thus th e  S o v ie t  Union c a l l e d  f o r  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il m e e tin g  to  con­
s i d e r  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l 's  r e p o r t s  on Yemen and p r o t e s t e d  fo rm a lly  a t  th e  
s e n d in g  o f  a m is s io n  to  B a h ra in  w i th o u t  p r i o r  C o u n c il  a p p ro v a l .  The S o v ie t  
U n io n 's  em p h asis  on m andates from  d e l i b e r a t i v e  o rg a n s  was a l s o  i n d i c a t e d ,  
b u t  l e s s  s t r o n g l y ,  when a S o v ie t  d e le g a te  q u e r i e d  t h e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  
h u m a n i ta r ia n  r e l i e f  o p e r a t io n s  i n  I n d ia  and E a s t  P a k i s t a n  by th e  S e c r e ta r y  
G e n e ra l on h i s  own a u t h o r i t y .
In  th e  c a se  o f  Yemen, th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l m a in ta in e d  UNYOM a f t e r  th e  
f i r s t  f o u r  m onths on th e  b a s i s  o f  a te n u o u s  m andate d e r iv e d  from  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  
by th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  f i r s t l y  w ith  th e  p a r t i e s  d i r e c t l y  in v o lv e d ,  and th e n  w ith  
members o f  th e  C o u n c il .  Each tim e th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l c o n tin u e d  UNYOM f o r  
a f u r t h e r  two m onths on th e  b a s i s  t h a t  th e  c o s ts  w ould  be  s h a re d  by th e  
p a r t i e s  and  t h a t  th e r e  was no o b je c t io n  by any member o f  th e  C o u n c il .  In  th e  
c a se  o f  B a h ra in ,  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a S o v ie t  o b j e c t io n  to  th e  p ro p o se d  
m is s io n  may have r e in f o r c e d  th e  d e s i r e  f o r  s e c r e c y  on th e  p a r t  o f  b o th  th e  
d i s p u t a n t s  and th e  S e c r e t a r i a t .
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As r e v e a le d  by T h a n t 's  r e p ly  to  th e  S o v ie t  U nion o v e r  th e  B a h ra in  
c a s e ,  t h e r e  was an i n h e r e n t  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  o b ta in in g  m andates from  a 
d e l i b e r a t i v e  o rg an  f o r  good o f f i c e s  a c t i v i t i e s  u n d e r ta k e n  by th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  
when th e  d i s p u ta n t s  th e m se lv e s  h ad  r e q u e s te d  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y .  T hus, i t  
was i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  th e r e  s h o u ld  be some te n s io n  b e tw e en  th e  r e l a t e d  con­
c e p ts  o f  good o f f i c e s  and  q u i e t  d ip lo m acy , and th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  S o v ie t  
Union on th e  n eed  f o r  a fo rm a l m andate f o r  S e c r e t a r i a t  a c t i v i t y .  I t  i s  
w o rth  r e f l e c t i n g  t h a t  t h i s  i n h e r e n t  d i f f i c u l t y  m ust have added  one more 
o b s ta c l e  i n  th e  p a th  o f  t h e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l 's  a t te m p ts  to  e x e r c i s e  a 
good o f f i c e s  r o le  and w in  c o n sen su s  am ongst members o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il 
d u r in g  th e  b u i ld u p  to  th e  B an g la d esh  w ar i n  mid 1971. A lth o u g h  th e  m a jo r  
p ro b lem  was o b v io u s ly  th e  i n t r a n s ig e n c e  o f  th e  p a r t i e s ,  th e  S o v ie t  p o s i t i o n  
w ould  have added to  th e  p r e s s u r e s  a g a in s t  any S e c r e t a r i a t  i n i t i a t i v e s  su ch  
a s ,  f o r  ex am p le , a  UN f a c t - f i n d i n g  m is s io n , w hich  m ig h t have b een  ta k e n  on 
th e  b a s i s  o f  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  re a c h e d  in fo r m a l ly  w ith  C o u n c il  members i n  th e  
know ledge t h a t  a  fo rm a l m andate was im p o s s ib le .
Good o f f i c e s  and q u i e t  d ip lom acy  w ere shown i n  th e  c a se  s tu d i e s  to  
in v o lv e  r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  an d , to g e th e r ,  th o se  tw o c o n c e p ts  summed up th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  a p p ro a c h  to  an in te rm e d ia ry  r o le  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s .
I t  was a f e a tu r e  o f  th e  d i s p u te s  c o n s id e re d  in  th e  c a se  s t u d i e s  t h a t ,  e x c e p t  
in  th e  c a se  o f  th e  W inspeare  m is s io n  a f t e r  th e  B a n g la d esh  w a r , t h a t  r o l e  was 
p u rsu e d  p r im a r i ly  on th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l r a t h e r  th a n
t h a t  o f  th e  d e l i b e r a t i v e  o rg a n s .
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CHAPTER V II I
THE SECRETARIAT'S EFFECTIVENESS
T h is  c h a p t e r  t a k e s  up t h e  q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  i n  C h a p te r  I I  c o n c e r n in g  
th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  a c h ie v in g  i t s  p r im a ry  g o a l  i n  r e l a t i o n  
to  d i s p u t e s  o f  h e l p i n g  to  m a in ta in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e .  F i r s t l y  i t  con­
s i d e r s ,  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  case  s t u d i e s ,  p ro b le m s  r e l a t e d  to  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
o f  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .  I t  th en  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  b r o a d e r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  o f  
t h e  d i s p u t e s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  case  s t u d i e s  and draws some c o n c lu s io n s  
a b o u t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n te r m e d ia r y  a c t i v i t y  by com paring  th e  e v id e n c e  from 
th e  c a se  s t u d i e s  w i th  t h e  c h e c k l i s t  o f  p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t s  d e r i v e d  from  Oran 
Young.
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
The q u e s t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a l  c r i s e s  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  
o f  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  l i t e r a t u r e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law  and p o l i t i c s .  T h is  
r e f l e c t s  t h e  d e p th  o f  t h e  l e g a l  and p o l i t i c a l  dilemmas in v o lv e d  and t h e  
f re q u e n c y  w i th  w hich  t h i s  p rob lem  c o n f r o n t s  th o s e  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  t h e  m ain­
te n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r .  The p r e s e n t  d i s c u s s i o n  does n o t  p r e t e n d  
t o  encompass a l l  t h e  i s s u e s ,  b u t  r e f e r s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  th o s e  a s p e c t s  
w hich a f f e c t e d  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r m e d ia r y  r o l e  i n  t h e  t h r e e  c a se  s t u d i e s .
In  each  o f  t h e  t h r e e  c a se s  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  e n d e a v o u re d  to  r e l a t e  i t s  
i n t e r m e d ia r y  a c t i v i t i e s  s o l e l y  to  th e  e x t e r n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e s  i n  
q u e s t i o n .  In  h i s  i n i t i a l  r e p o r t  on Yemen, t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  s t a t e d  
t h a t  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n s  had  been  c oncerned  w i th  ' a s p e c t s  o f  e x t e r n a l  o r i g i n ' ,  
a p h r a s e  w hich  was i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  r e s o l u t i o n  e n d o r s i n g
2 6 8
t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  UNYOM. In  B a h r a in ,  th e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  r e p o r t  
a g a in  e m p h a s ise d  t h a t  he had  a g re e d  to  e x e r c i s e  h i s  good o f f i c e s  to  a s i s t  
two member s t a t e s  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  an o b l i g a t i o n  under  t h e  C h a r t e r ,  t h e  
p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e .  In  t h e  c a se  o f  I n d i a  and 
P a k i s t a n ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  memorandum to  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  h i s  
w a rn in g s  i n  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  th e  Annual R e p o r t ,  and h i s  o f f e r  o f  good 
o f f i c e s  i n  O c to b e r ,  w ere  a l l  r e l a t e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p e a c e .
B u t  C h a p te r  I I  s u g g e s t e d  a s e r i e s  o f  i n t e r r e l a t e d  p ro b le m s  t h a t  c o u ld  
fa c e  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  i t s  a d h e re n c e  to  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  non­
i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .  Those p rob lem s a r e  b r i e f l y  d i s c u s s e d  
a g a in  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  c a se  s t u d i e s .
1 . The g e n e r a l  p ro b le m  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  i n t e r n a l
c o n f l i c t
Both  t h e  B a n g la d esh  and  t h e  Yemen c a se s  in v o lv e d  t h r e a t s  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p e a c e  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  a d jo i n in g  s t a t e s  to  i n t e r n a l  u p h e a v a l s .
In  t h e  B an g la d esh  c a se  t h e  P a k i s t a n  Government a c t i v e l y  d i s c o u r a g e d  any 
S e c r e t a r i a t  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s ,  e i t h e r  w i th  i t s e l f ,  w i th  t h e  
governm ent i t  h a d  l a b e l l e d  as t h e  a g g r e s s o r ,  o r  w i th  o t h e r  g o v e rn m e n ts .  T h is  
s t a n c e  u n d e rc u t  from  t h e  b e g in n in g  th e  p r o s p e c t  o f  an i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e  
b e in g  e x e r c i s e d  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e  betw een  P a k i s t a n  and I n d i a .
In  t h e  Yemen c a s e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  was a b le  to  
d i s c u s s  t h e  i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  w i th  th e  two e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
e x p r e s s  c o n s e n t  and encou ragem en t  o f  t h e  r u l i n g  re g im e .  T h is  e n a b le d  t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  to  s t r e s s  a  key f o c a l  p o i n t  -  t h e  f o rm a t io n  o f  a governm ent o f  
b r o a d e r  c o m p o s i t io n  -  w hich  had  p r o s p e c t s  o f  l e a d i n g  to  a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  
b o th  t h e  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t  and  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e .
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2 . The p ro b le m  o f  r e c o g n i t io n
The S e c r e t a r i a t  u n d e rs to o d  t h a t  i t  was l e g a l l y  r e q u i r e d  to  d e a l  o n ly  
w ith  governm en ts r e c o g n is e d  by th e  UN th ro u g h  th e  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  c r e d e n t i a l s  
a t  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly , and t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  n o t  d e a l  w ith  g roups o p p o s in g  
a governm ent i n  a c i v i l  w ar s i t u a t i o n  e x c e p t  i n  'e x t r a o r d i n a r y  c i r c u m s ta n c e s '.
In  Yemen, th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  d e c id e d  from  th e  o u t s e t  t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  d e a l  
o n ly  w ith  th e  r e p u b l ic a n  g o v e rn m en t, and t h a t  th e r e  w ere n o t  th e  k in d  o f  
c ir c u m s ta n c e s  w hich  m ig h t r e q u i r e  i t  t o  d e a l  w ith  th e  r o y a l i s t  r e b e l s .
In  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  ho w ev er, a s  th e  c i v i l  w ar n e a re d  i t s  c lim a x , th e  
i n c r e a s i n g  c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  by th e  in s u r g e n ts  c r e a t e d  a new s i t u a t i o n  w hich  
th e  UN c o u ld  n o t  f a i l  to  r e c o g n is e .  A d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  th e  UN was th e  l a g  
b e tw een  th e  new r e a l i t i e s  o f  pow er i n  th e  E a s t  B en g a l c o u n tr y s id e  and 
UNEPRO's a b i l i t y  to  undergo  a t r a n s i t i o n  from  c o - o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  o u tg o in g  
a u t h o r i t i e s  to  a new s ta g e  o f  c o -o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  im com ing a u t h o r i t i e s .
Even a f t e r  th e  w a r , W in s p e a re 's  r e p o r t s  on h i s  d i s c u s s io n s  w ith  th e  B an g la ­
desh  a u t h o r i t i e s  had  to  be accom pan ied  by a d i s c la im e d  on th e  q u e s t io n  o f  
r e c o g n i t i o n . ^
In  th e  B a h ra in  ca se  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  r e c o g n i t io n  form ed p a r t  o f  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw een  B r i t a i n  and I r a n  and th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  w ere n o t  
r e c o g n is e d  by v i r t u e  o f  UN m em bersh ip . H ence, c o n s e n t  by th e  R u le r  o f  
B a h ra in  to  UN S e c r e t a r i a t  in v o lv e m e n t was n o t  a  l e g a l  r e q u ire m e n t  upon th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t .  B u t su ch  c o n s e n t  rem a in ed  n e v e r th e l e s s  a p r a c t i c a l  r e q u ir e m e n t .
T hus, i n  a l l  th r e e  c a s e s  i t  was im p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  to  
e x e r c i s e  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  in te r m e d ia r y  r o le  w i th o u t  t a k in g  some p o s i t i o n ,  
even i m p l i c i t l y ,  on th e  q u e s t io n  o f  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  a u t h o r i t i e s .
S c h ä c h te r  m en tio n s  t h a t  such  d i s c la im e r s  have  been  u se d  in  a num ber o f  
such  c a s e s  ( S c h ä c h te r ,  'T h e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  and I n t e r n a l  C o n f l i c t ' ,  op. o i t . ,  
p .4 2 7 )  .
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3. G overnm enta l  a t t i t u d e s
W hether P a k i s t a n ' s  i n v o c a t io n  o f  A r t i c l e  2(7)  was v a l i d  o r  n o t ,  i t  
was c l e a r l y  m o t iv a t e d  by a concern  t h a t  i n t e r m e d ia r y  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  c o u ld  be d i s a d v a n ta g e o u s  i n t e r n a l l y .  The m i l d e s t  p u b l i c  s t a t e ­
ments by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G ene ra l  on th e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  were 
l a b e l l e d  as i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  P a k i s t a n ' s  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .  The d i f f i c u l t i e s  
i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  th e  h u m a n i ta r ia n  o p e r a t i o n  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  f u r t h e r  
h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  ex tre m e  d e f e n s iv e n e s s  and s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h e  P a k i s t a n  
Government i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .
In  t h e  B a h r a in  c a s e ,  t h e  r u l i n g  fa m i ly  h e l d  s i m i l a r ,  i f  l e s s  i n t e n s e  
c o n c e r n s ,  and  i t  was n e c e s s a r y  to  win i t s  c o n f i d e n c e ,  t h i s  b e in g  t h e  m ajo r  
r e a s o n  f o r  Blanche 's  New Y e a r s '  Eve f l i g h t  t o  Geneva. S e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  
d i s p u t e ,  i n  t h e  judgem ent o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  d epended  upon t h e  R u l e r ' s  con­
c e rn s  a b o u t  s t a b i l i t y  b e in g  r e c o g n i s e d  and r e s p e c t e d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as  th o s e  
c o n c e rn s  were s u p p o r t e d  and s h a re d  by a member s t a t e ,  B r i t a i n .
In  t h e  Yemen c a s e ,  t h e  r e p u b l i c a n  goveamment e v i d e n t l y  p e r c e i v e d  from 
t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e s t  t h r e a t  t o  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  was t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  
o f  t h e  c i v i l  w a r ,  and s i n c e  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r m e d i a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  h e l d  
o u t  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  an end  to  th e  w ar ,  th o s e  a c t i v i t i e s  were welcomed.
4. E f f e c t s  on t h e  i n t e r n a l  s t a t u s  quo
I n  t h e  Yemen c a s e ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  p e r c e i v e d  i n s t a b i l i t y  w i t h i n  t h e  
governm ent a s  an im pedim ent to  s e t t l e m e n t  and th u s  h a d  an i n t e r e s t  i n  work­
i n g  f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c a n  reg im e .  I n  B a h r a in ,  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  
o f  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  governm ent, t h i s  t im e  a t r a d i t i o n a l  Arab 
a u to c r a c y ,  was c e n t r a l  t o  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e  be tw een  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s ,  B r i t a i n  and I r a n .
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Thus i n  b o th  Yemen and B a h ra in  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  
i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  was a c c e p t a b l e  p r o v id e d  i t  d i d  n o t  d i s t u r b  t h e  i n t e r n a l  
s t a t u s  qu o .  T h is  a p p l i e d  w h e th e r  th e  s t a t u s  quo was r e p u b l i c a n ,  newly 
e s t a b l i s h e d  and sh a k y ,  a s  i n  Yemen, o r  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  o f  lo n g  s t a n d i n g  and 
r e a s o n a b ly  i n  c o n t r o l  ( though  co n c e rn e d  a b o u t  d i s s e n t ) , as i n  B a h r a in .  To 
have a c te d  o t h e r w i s e  c a r r i e d  t h e  r i s k  o f  S e c r e t a r i a t  a c t i v i t y  b e in g  l a b e l l e d  
as  i n t e r f e r e n c e  and  i t s  i n t e r m e d ia r y  r o l e  b e in g  j e o p a r d i s e d .
N e v e r th e l e s s  i n  b o th  c a s e s ,  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  i n t e r n a l  s t a t u s  quo was a 
s o u rc e  o f  t e n s i o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  The S e c r e t a r i a t  t h e r e f o r e  had  t h e  
d e l i c a t e  t a s k  o f  a m e l io r a t i n g  t h a t  t e n s i o n  w i t h o u t  a c t i n g  so  as t o  be 
ac cu se d  o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i th  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .
In  t h e  B a n g la d esh  c a s e ,  t h e  i n t e r n a l  t e n s i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  from  th e  
i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  were so s e r i o u s  t h a t  th e y  p r e s e n t e d  th e  
UN S e c r e t a r i a t ,  n o t  m ere ly  w i th  a d e l i c a t e  d i p lo m a t i c  t a s k ,  b u t  w i th  a 
fu n d a m e n ta l  d ilem m a. Even th e  m ounting  o f  a  h u m a n i ta r i a n  r e l i e f  o p e r a t i o n  
te n d e d  t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  s t a t u s  quo . B u t i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  UN was in v o lv e d  
i n  a s i t u a t i o n  w here t h e  s t a t u s  quo was i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  b e in g  o v e r th ro w n ,  
t h e r e b y  c r e a t i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  i n  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  
r e b e l  g roups  w hich  were i n c r e a s i n g l y  a s s e r t i n g  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  th e  
a r e a .
Summa ry
I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  c a se  s t u d i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a c o n t i n u i t y  be tw een  
th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e s  and c e r t a i n  i n t e r n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
each  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n .  When an i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t  t h r e a t e n e d  
e x t e r n a l  p e a c e ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  c o u ld  n o t  e x e r c i s e  an e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r m e d ia r y  
r o l e  w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  t h a t  c o n f l i c t  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The S e c r e t a r i a t  had  
to  ta k e  some p o s i t i o n  on th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t i e s .
I t s  i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e  was bo u n d  t o  g i v e  r i s e  t o  s u b j e c t i v e  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  
i n t e r n a l  a d v a n ta g e  o r  d i s a d v a n t a g e .  And s u c h  a  r o l e  u n a v o i d a b l y  a f f e c t e d  
t h e  i n t e r n a l  s t a t u s  q u o .  T h i s  a n a l y s i s  s u p p o r t s  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e  d i d  h a v e  i n t e r n a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  and  c o u l d  
n o t  b e  l i m i t e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  t o  s o l e l y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  d i s p u t e s .
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  d o m e s t i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
A r t i c l e  2( 7)  was n o t  o f  i t s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
im p o se d  on t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  r o l e  i n  t h e  B a n g la d e s h  c a s e .  I t  i s  a l s o  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  a s k  why t h e  p r i n c i p l e  was i n v o k e d  i n  t h a t  c a s e  b u t  n o t ,  f o r  
e x a m p le ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Yemen. P u t  s i m p l y ,  i f  a p a r t y  v ie w e d  t h e  l i k e l y  
i n t e r n a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  i n t e r m e d i a r y  a c t i v i t y  f a v o u r a b l y  i t  was more l i k e l y  
t o  s u p p o r t  s u c h  a c t i v i t y  th a n  i f  i t  t h o u g h t  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  w o u ld  be  
u n f a v o u r a b l e .  M o re o v e r ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  o r  o t h e r w i s e  
o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e  was a l s o  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  o t h e r  
f a c t o r s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  t h e  b r o a d e r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t .
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
The p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  o f  d i s p u t e s  may b e  su m m a r ise d  f o r  c o n v e n ie n c e  
u n d e r  t h r e e  h e a d i n g s :  t h e  i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  t o  w h ic h  r e f e r e n c e  h a s  j u s t
b e e n  m ade, t h e  r e g i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n  an d  t h e  g l o b a l  s i t u a t i o n  ( i n c l u d i n g  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  b i g  p o w e r s ) .
I n  b o t h  Yemen an d  E a s t  P a k i s t a n ,  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  h i g h l y  u n s t a b l e  
i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n s  c r e a t e d  t h r e a t s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  b y  a c t i n g  a s  
c a t a l y s t s  on p r e - e x i s t i n g  r e g i o n a l  t e n s i o n s .  B u t  w h e re a s  an  i n t e r m e d i a r y  
r o l e  was a c c e p t e d  b y  a l l  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  Yemen, t h i s  was n o t  t h e  c a s e  i n  
E a s t  P a k i s t a n .
I n  t h e  Yemen c a s e  t h e r e  w e re  d e e p  r e g i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  
t u r b u l e n c e  o f  i n t e r - A r a b  p o l i t i c s  and  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  c l a s h  b e tw e e n
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r e p u b l ic a n is m  and t r a d i t i o n a l  d y n a s t i e s .  T here w ere a ls o  c o h e s iv e  r e g io n a l  
e le m e n ts ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  th e  m u tu a lly  s t a t e d  i d e a l  o f  A rab u n i ty  m a n if e s te d  
th ro u g h  th e  Arab L eague. In  th e  B ang ladesh  c a se  th e  r e g io n a l  d i v i s i o n s  on 
th e  s u b - c o n t in e n t  w ere deep and e m b i t te r e d ,  and th e r e  w ere few c o u n te r v a i l in g  
c o h e s iv e  e le m e n ts .  T han t t r i e d  s e c r e t l y  to  in t r o d u c e  an e x t r a - r e g i o n a l  
c o h e s iv e  e le m e n t  th ro u g h  th e  good o f f i c e s  o f  Tunku A bdul Rahamn. B u t m u tu a l 
an tag o n ism s w ere so  s t r o n g ,  th e  th e  p e r c e p t io n  o f  common ground  so  m in im a l, 
t h a t  th e r e  was s c a n t  r e g a rd  f o r  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  an in te r m e d ia r y  r o le  
be tw een  th e  two s i d e s .
The i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  B a h ra in  d i f f e r e d  from  th e  o th e r  two c a s e s ,  i n  
t h a t  i t  was r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  (though  th e  s u b je c t  o f  some c o n c e rn  on th e  p a r t  
o f  th e  r u l i n g  fam ily )  and d id  n o t  sp a rk  o f f  th e  e x t e r n a l  d i s p u t e .  The r e g io n a l  
s i t u a t i o n  was p o t e n t i a l l y  d a n g e ro u s , b u t  one o f  th e  d i s p u t a n t s ,  I r a n ,  was 
s t r o n g ly  m o tiv a te d  to  se ek  rap p ro ch em en t w ith  th e  Arab w o r ld , and th e r e f o r e  
e n c o u ra g e d  in te r m e d ia r y  a s s i s t a n c e  w hich c o u ld  h e lp  t o  c irc u m v e n t a m ajo r 
s tu m b lin g  b lo c k  in  th e  p a th  o f  t h i s  g o a l .  N e ig h b o u rin g  Arab s t a t e s ,  on th e  
o th e r  h a n d , w h ile  v a ry in g  in  t h e i r  r e a c t io n s  t o  th e  UN's in te r m e d ia r y  
a c t i v i t y  from  lukew arm  to  s t r o n g ly  c r i t i c a l ,  e v e n tu a l ly  p e r c e iv e d  t h a t  th e  
outcom e w ould  be i n  Arab i n t e r e s t s .
W ith r e g a r d  to  th e  g lo b a l  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  th e  t h r e a t  o f  s u p e r  
pow er r i v a l r y  loom ed in  th e  b ackg round  o f  th e  Yemen d i s p u te  b u t  d id  n o t  
become a s i g n i f i c a n t  s o u rc e  o f  d i v i s i o n .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o te  t h a t  
a lth o u g h  th e  s u p e r  pow ers w ere com m itted  i n  g e n e ra l  te rm s t o  th e  o p p o s in g  
e x te r n a l  p a r t i e s ,  S au d i A ra b ia  and E g y p t, th e y  b o th  s u p p o r te d  th e  same 
i n t e r n a l  p a r t y .  The U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  f o r  w hich  th e  p re e m in e n t  c o n c e rn  was 
s t a b i l i t y ,  was i t s e l f  draw n i n t o  an in te r m e d ia r y  r o l e ,  and a t  th e  same tim e 
gave s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  to  th e  in te rm e d ia ry  work o f  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t .  On th e  
o th e r  hand  B r i t a i n  s o u g h t to  p r o t e c t  i t s  i n t e r e s t s  i n  Aden and m a in ta in e d
its traditional policy of supporting monarchists, both within Yemen and 
in the region as a whole. There was therefore less incentive for Britain 
to co-operate with intermediary activity.
In the case of East Pakistan there was a clash of big power interests, 
particularly between the Soviet Union and China. Again the preeminent 
concern of the United States was stability, especially as it sought 
rapprochement with China. In this case the United States failed to see an 
intermediary role as a means of assisting the maintenance of stability, 
but tried instead to achieve its goal by exerting pressure on India to 
desist from military action. Thus deep regional divisions were strongly 
reinforced by the taking of sides on the global level, and the scope for a 
Secretariat role was further restricted.
In the case of Bahrain, the major power with a direct interest, 
Britain, had a strong will towards settlement, while the other major 
powers did not become involved. Thus there were no restraints at the 
global political level on the Secretariat's intermediary role, with the 
sole exception of a procedural objection which was formally lodged but 
not pursued by the Soviet Union.
In summary, conditions for the exercise of an effective intermediary 
role by the UN Secretariat seemed to be most favourable:
(a) when the dispute began at the international rather than 
the internal level;
(b) when there were integrative regional forces offsetting
regional divisions; and
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(c) when b i g  power i n t e r e s t s  were n o t  i n  d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t .
A l l  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  c a se  o f  B a h r a in ,  i n  w hich  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  r o l e  was ju d g ed  t o  be c o m p le te ly  s u c c e s s f u l .  The se co n d  and 
t h i r d  c o n d i t i o n s  a p p l i e d  t o  some e x t e n t  i n  t h e  Yemen c a s e ,  where t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  was a b le  t o  h e lp  c o n ta i n  t h e  d i s p u t e  b u t  n o t  r e s o l v e  i t .  None 
o f  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  a p p l i e d  i n  th e  B a n g la d e sh  c a s e ,  where t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  
a t t e m p t s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  an i n t e r m e d ia r y  r o l e  f a i l e d  from t h e  b e g in n i n g .
EFFECTS OF INTERMEDIARY ACTIVITY: AN OVERALL SUMMARY
Each c a s e  s tu d y  h a s  i n c l u d e d  a summary o f  i n t e r m e d i a r y  e f f e c t s  b a s e d  
on t h e  c h e c k l i s t  d e r i v e d  from  Oran Young as o u t l i n e d  i n  C h a p te r  I I .  The 
v a r i a t i o n  i n  th o s e  e f f e c t s  from  c a se  t o  c a s e  fo l lo w s  a f a i r l y  c o n s i s t e n t  
p a t t e r n ,  w hich  may be seen  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  p r e c e d in g  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  b o th  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p ro b lem s  r e l a t e d  to  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  and th e  g e n e r a l  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  i n  w hich  e a c h  d i s p u t e  o c c u r r e d .
1 .  M o d e ra t in g  e f f e c t
The S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r m e d ia r y  r o l e  seemed t o  have  a m o d e ra t in g  e f f e c t  
on t h e  d i s p u t a n t s  i n  Yemen, and on t h e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  B a h r a in .  In  
t h e  B a n g la d e sh  c a s e ,  t h e  d i s p u t a n t s '  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e i r  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  even  th ro u g h  an i n t e r m e d i a r y ,  d e n ie d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a 
m o d e ra t in g  e f f e c t  from t h e  o u t s e t .  Once t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  an i n t e r m e d ia r y  
r o l e  was a c c e p t e d  a f t e r  t h e  w a r ,  th e  m o d e ra t in g  e f f e c t  o f  such  a r o l e  
became e v i d e n t  a lm o s t  im m e d ia te ly  W inspeare  v i s i t e d  t h e  r e g i o n .
2 .  Means f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  c o n c e s s io n s
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  p r o v id e d  a means f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  c o n c e s s io n s  
and  r a t i o n a l i s i n g  f l e x i b l e  b e h a v io u r  on t h e  p a r t  o f  l e a d e r s  i n  b o th  t h e  
Yemen and B a h r a in  c a s e s ,  b u t  n o t  i n  t h e  B a n g la d e sh  c a se  u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  w ar .
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Once a g a i n ,  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e  h a d  a  u s e f u l  e f f e c t ,  b u t  o n l y  i f  t h e r e  
was a t  l e a s t  some w i l l  to w a r d s  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t .
3 . D i p l o m a t i c  ( d i s ) a d v a n t a g e s  o f  e x t e r n a l  ( d i s ) a p p r o v a l
T h i s  was a  more d i f f i c u l t  e f f e c t  t o  i d e n t i f y  i n  t h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s .  I n  
t h e  B a h r a i n  c a s e  i t  s eem ed  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Shah  r e g a r d e d  i t  a s  b e i n g  t o  
I r a n ' s  a d v a n ta g e  t o  b e  s e e n  a s  a  p e a c e l o v i n g  n a t i o n  a c t i n g  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  t h e  UN C h a r t e r ,  and  t h e  k n o w led g e  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  w o u ld  
e v e n t u a l l y  comment on  h i s  a c t i o n s  may h a v e  h a d  some e f f e c t  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  
t h e  a p p r o a c h  h e  a d o p t e d .  S i m i l a r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  may h a v e  h a d  some i n f l u e n c e  
w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h .  I t  seem ed  l i k e l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  more t a n g i b l e  co n ­
s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  d e t e r m i n e d  t h e  a p p r o a c h e s  o f  b o t h  d i s ­
p u t a n t s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  a p p r o v a l  a t  t h e  UN, w h i l e  u n d o u b t e d l y  
w e lc o m e ,  h a d  o n ly  a  m a r g i n a l  i n f l u e n c e  on d e c i s i o n s .
I n  t h e  Yemen c a s e  i t  was t o  t h e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  b o t h  e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s  t o  
b e  s e e n  a s  w i l l i n g  t o  e n g a g e  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  a  p e r c e p t i o n  w h ic h  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  may h a v e  a i d e d  th r o u g h  h i s  s t a t e m e n t s .
I n  t h e  B a n g la d e s h  c a s e ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  s c o p e  f o r  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  
a p p r o v a l  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  and  any  p o s s i b l e  a d v a n ta g e  w h ic h  m ig h t  
h a v e  f lo w e d  f ro m  su c h  s t a t e m e n t s  seem ed  t o  h a v e  b e e n  d i s c o u n t e d  i n  
a d v a n c e  b y  t h e  p a r t i e s .  S i m i l a r l y  t h e  p o s s i b l e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  p u b l i c l y  
e x p r e s s e d  d i s a p p r o v a l  was a p p a r e n t l y  d i s c o u n t e d ,  and  t h e r e f o r e  h a d  l i t t l e  
e f f e c t .  O nly  a f t e r  t h e  d i s p u t e  h a d  b e e n  l a r g e l y  r e s o l v e d  on t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d  
w e re  t h e s e  a t t i t u d e s  a l t e r e d .
4 .  C l e a r i n g  up m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s
T h is  seem ed  t o  b e  a  more i m p o r t a n t  e f f e c t  o f  i n t e r m e d i a r y  a c t i v i t y ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  Yemen c a s e ,  w h e re  t h e r e  w e re  b o t h  d i v i s i v e  and  i n t e ­
g r a t i v e  t e n d e n c i e s .  C l e a r i n g  up m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s  and  c o r r e c t i n g  m i s l e a d i n g  
i n f o r m a t i o n  h e l p e d  t o  d i m i n i s h  t h e  d i v i s i v e  t e n d e n c i e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  t h e
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B a h ra in  c a se  w here i n t e g r a t i v e  e le m e n ts  w ere s t r o n g e r  b u t  d i v i s i v e  e le m e n ts  
c o u ld  s t i l l  have j e o p a r d is e d  a p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t ,  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  p la y e d  
an im p o r ta n t  r o le  i n  a s s i s t i n g  th e  p a r t i e s  to  b o th  c l e a r  up and a v o id  m is­
u n d e rs ta n d in g s  .
In  th e  B an g la d esh  c a se  i t  seem ed p o s s ib l e  t h a t  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  c o u ld  
have done more to  red u c e  th e  l e v e l  o f  d iv i s iv e n e s s  by a t t e i r p t i n g  to  c l e a r  
up some o f  th e  g r o s s e r  m is u n d e rs ta n d in g s  b e tw een  th e  p a r t i e s .  A d m itte d ly , 
th e  l e v e l  o f  m u tua l a n ta g o n ism  and th e  u n w i l l in g n e s s  to  a c c e p t  an i n t e r ­
m ed ia ry  r o l e  made t h i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  b u t  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ere compounded by 
m is u n d e rs ta n d in g s  o v e r  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  own i n i t i a t i v e s .  A f te r  th e  w ar 
W inspeare  was a b le  to  p la y  a m ost im p o r ta n t  r o l e  i n  c l e a r i n g  up m is­
u n d e r s ta n d in g s  w hich  th r e a te n e d  to  e x a c e rb a te  th e  s t i l l  b i t t e r  d i v i s i o n s  
and c o u ld  have d e s t r o y e d  th e  g ra d u a l  movement to w ard s  a n o r m a l is a t io n  o f  
r e l a t i o n s .
5 . D ra m a tis in g  th e  d a n g e rs
In  ea ch  o f  th e  th r e e  c a s e s  th e r e  w ere e i t h e r  p u b l i c  o r  p r i v a t e  s t a t e ­
m ents on r e c o r d  w hich in d i c a t e d  t h a t  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  h ad  s o u g h t to  dram a­
t i s e  th e  d a n g e rs  o f  f a i l u r e ,  b u t  a s  i n  I te m  3 ab o v e , i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to  
a s s e s s  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th o s e  s ta te m e n ts  on th e  d i s p u t a n t s .  I n  th e  B a h ra in  
c a se  th e  p a r t i e s  w ere r e s p o n s iv e  to  th e  d a n g e rs ,  and i t  seem ed t h a t  such  
an aw aren ess  h e lp e d  to  m a in ta in  th e  momentum to w ard s  s e t t l e m e n t  d u r in g  one 
o r  two d i f f i c u l t  p e r io d s  i n  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
In  th e  Yemen c a s e ,  i t  seemed p ro b a b le  t h a t  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  e a r l y  
p r i v a t e  s ta te m e n ts  to  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  th e  p a r t i e s ,  and th e  S e c r e ta r y  
G e n e r a l 's  f i r s t  r e p o r t  to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il , h e lp e d  to  w arn th e  p a r t i e s  
o f  t h e  d a n g e rs  o f  e s c a l a t i o n ,  and th e re b y  r e i n f o r c e d  moves f o r  a d is e n g a g e ­
m ent a g re e m e n t. M oreover, i n  h i s  seco n d  s ta te m e n t  t o  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il ,
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T h a n t  c l e a r l y  d r a m a t i s e d  t h e  dangers  o f  th e  c o n f l i c t  to  a w id e r  a u d ie n c e  
and t h e r e  was l i t t l e  d o u b t  t h a t  h i s  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  s t a t e m e n t s  to  C o u n c i l  
members h e lp e d  to  win t h e i r  a c q u ie s c e n c e  i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  UNYOM.
When t h e  main d a n g e r  p e r i o d  had  p a s s e d  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  c o n t in u e d  w a rn in g s  
t o  t h e  d i s p u t a n t s  h a d  l e s s  e f f e c t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  on F a i s a l .
B a n g la d e sh  a g a in  showed th e  o t h e r  s id e  o f  t h e  c o in .  T h a n t ' s  s t r o n g  
w a rn in g s  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p eace  h a d  l i t t l e  e f f e c t .  I n d i a ,  
i n  t h e  s t r o n g e r  p o s i t i o n  a t  t h e  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l ,  came to  f e e l  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  
s a f e l y  t a k e  t h e  r i s k s  i n v o lv e d  i n  a p o l i c y  o f  l i m i t e d  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  
P a k i s t a n  p e r c e i v e d  a t h r e a t  t o  i t s e l f  from I n d i a ,  b u t  b a d ly  m is ju d g e d  t h e  
d a n g e ro u s  c o n seq u e n c e s  o f  t h e  p o l i c i e s  i t  a d o p te d  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h a t  t h r e a t .  
A f t e r  t h e  w ar a l l  t h e  p a r t i e s  seemed t o  be r e s p o n s iv e  to  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  
d a n g e rs  o f  f a i l i n g  t o  s e t t l e  h u m a n i ta r ia n  i s s u e s  w hich  had  s e r i o u s  p o l i t i c a l  
i m p l i c a t i o n s .
6 .  E s t a b l i s h i n g  com m unications
In  t h e  Yemen c a se  t h e r e  was no d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  a c h ie v e d  t h e  
i m p o r ta n t  e f f e c t  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  com m unications be tw een  th e  p a r t i e s .  In  t h e  
B a h r a in  c a s e ,  d i r e c t  com m unications  be tw een  th e  B r i t i s h  and t h e  I r a n i a n s  
a p p l i e d  from  t h e  b e g in n i n g .  L a t e r ,  by a c t i n g  as t h e  c h a n n e l  f o r  fo rm a l  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s ,  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  had  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  c o n f id e n c e  
t h a t  t h e  m essages  were exchanged  i n  good f a i t h .
In  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  c r i s i s ,  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  r e c o r d  
o f  T h a n t ' s  i n f o r m a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  I n d i a  and 
P a k i s t a n  d i d  n o t  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  he so u g h t  t o  comm unicate m essages  o r  p o i n t s  
o f  view b e tw een  th e  p a r t i e s ,  b u t  he d id  t r y  to  e n c o u ra g e  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
means o f  com m unication th ro u g h  Abdul Rahman. A f t e r  t h e  w a r ,  t h e  r e c o r d  o f  
W in s p e a r e 's  m is s io n  i n d i c a t e d  a s t r o n g  d e s i r e  e s p e c i a l l y  on th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  I s la m a b a d  and Dacca, f o r  such i n d i r e c t  e x c h a n g e s .  W in s p e a r e 's
a b i l i t y  t o  m eet t h a t  n e e d  c o n s t i t u t e d  a m ost i m p o r ta n t  e f f e c t  on th e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s .
7. C r e a t i o n  o f  ' s a l i e n c y '
I n  t h e  Yemen c a se  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  em p h as is  on key f o c a l  p o i n t s  
seemed to  have  th e  e f f e c t  o f  h i g h l i g h t i n g  th o s e  p o i n t s  i n  th e  minds o f  t h e  
p a r t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  b r o a d e n in g  t h e  c o m p o s i t io n  o f  t h e  
gov e rn m en t.  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o te  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  r e s p o n s e s  o f  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s  to  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  em phasis  on t h i s  p o i n t  w ere  a t  b e s t  
lukew arm , b u t  i t  e v e n t u a l l y  became c e n t r a l  t o  t h e i r  l a t e r  moves f o r  s e t t l e ­
m ent. T h is  i n d i c a t e d  a s t r o n g  in te r m e d ia r y  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  r e s p e c t .
In  t h e  B a h r a in  c a se  s a l i e n c y  was i n i t i a l l y  c r e a t e d  by th e  Shah o f  
I r a n ' s  s t a t e m e n t  i n  J a n u a ry  1969 g iv in g  p rom inence  t o  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  p e o p le  
o f  B a h r a in  as t h e  key f a c t o r  i n  a s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e .  A f t e r  t h a t ,  
t h e  key  f o c a l  p o i n t  w hich  emerged t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  r e m a in in g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  was 
t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  own r o l e  i n  b e in g  a b le  to  s a t i s f y  t h e  c o n c e rn s  o f  b o th  
s i d e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t h e  m ethod by which t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  p e o p le  was to  be 
d e te r m in e d .  I n  b o th  t h e  Yemen and B a h ra in  c a s e s  t h e r e  was scope  f o r  t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  to  fo c u s  on key p o i n t s  l i k e l y  to  l e a d  t o  s e t t l e m e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  i n t e g r a t i v e  e le m e n ts  w hich  were a l r e a d y  p r e s e n t .  The l a c k  o f  such  
i n t e g r a t i v e  t e n d e n c ie s  i n  t h e  B an g lad esh  c a s e  m eant t h a t  t h e r e  w ere  few 
o b v io u s  f o c a l  p o i n t s .  One such  p o i n t  w hich was e m p h a s ise d  by T h a n t ,  b u t  
w i t h o u t  e f f e c t ,  was t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  r e l e a s i n g  M u jib u r  Rahman. 
W in s p e a r e 's  r e i t e r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p o i n t  had  more e f f e c t  a f t e r  t h e  w ar and 
B h u t t o ' s  a c t i o n  i n  r e s p o n d in g  t o  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o f  W inspeare  and 
o t h e r s  by  r e l e a s i n g  M u jibu r  paved  th e  way f o r  t h e  o p e n in g  o f  m e a n in g fu l
n e g o t i a t i o n s .
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8 .  B r i n g i n g  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o g e t h e r
I n  t h e  Yemen c a s e  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  h a d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on  t h e  
d e c i s i o n s  b y  E g y p t  and  S a u d i  A r a b ia  t o  e n g a g e  i n  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  
e a c h  o t h e r .  I n  t h e  B a h r a i n  c a s e  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  h a d  some e f f e c t  on t h e  
p r e c i s e  p r o c e d u r e  a d o p t e d  by t h e  p a r t i e s ,  t h e r e b y  h e l p i n g  t o  e n s u r e  i t s  
v i a b i l i t y .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  and i n  W i n s p e a r e ' s  m i s s i o n  a f t e r  t h e  B a n g la d e s h  
w a r ,  t h e  p a r t i e s '  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  an i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e  was an  o b v i o u s  p r e ­
r e q u i s i t e  f o r  i n f l u e n c e  on p r o c e d u r a l  m a t t e r s ,  o n e  w h ic h  d i d  n o t  e x i s t  
p r i o r  t o  t h e  B a n g l a d e s h  w a r .
I n  n o n e  o f  t h e  t h r e e  c a s e s  d i d  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  much 
e f f e c t  on t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  m a t t e r s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  O ran  Young -  t h e  ' p a c k a g i n g '  
o f  i t e m s ,  o r d e r i n g  o f  a g e n d a s  and  s o  o n . ^
9 .  I n i t i a t i o n  o f  f a c e - s a v i n g  o p e r a t i o n s
I t  was n o t i c e a b l e  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  d i d  n o t  a c t u a l l y  i n i t i a t e  
f a c e - s a v i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  any o f  t h e  c a s e s .  As w as p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  c h a p t e r s ,  when s u c h  o p e r a t i o n s  o c c u r r e d ,  t h e y  w e re  i n i t i a t e d  b y  
one o f  t h e  p a r t i e s .  So t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  i n t e r m e d i a r y  
p r e s e n c e  was more a c c u r a t e l y  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  p r o v i d i n g  a  means f o r  
r a t i o n a l i s i n g  f l e x i b l e  b e h a v i o u r .  F a c e - s a v i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
r e q u i r e d  a c c e p t a n c e  on b o t h  s i d e s  t o  w o rk .  I n d i a  was n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  h e l p  
Y ahya Khan t o  s a v e  f a c e  when h e  t r i e d  d e s p e r a t e l y  t o  i n i t i a t e  s u c h  o p e r ­
a t i o n s  j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  w a r .
1 See C h a p t e r  I I ,  p . 4 3 .
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The key point which emerges from this discussion is the scope which 
existed for a number of positive effects of intermediary activity, provided 
there were at least some integrative tendencies within the dispute. There 
was also a related proviso that there needed to be at least a basic accept­
ance by the parties of the desirability of an intermediary role. Given 
these conditions, the Secretariat was able to exercise significant effects 
in terms of establishing communications, clearing up misunderstandings, 
creating or strengthening saliency, and encouraging direct negotiations.
The Secretariat also seemed to exercise some moderating influence on the 
participants, and to encourage flexible behaviour. There were possible 
effects of creating an awareness of dangers, and of altering disputants' 
calculations of advantages and disadvantages through statements of approval 
or disapproval, but in these respects the significance of the intermediary 
role seemed less clear.
Comparison of the Bahrain and Yemen cases suggests a correlation between 
the strength of integrative tendencies, and the strength of each of these 
effects on the negotiations. The effects achieved by Winspeare's mission 
after the Bangladesh war underlined the significance of an intermediary role 
which through its mandate from the Security Council had the support, or at 
least acquiescence, of the big powers, and was also accepted by each of the 
parties.
The Secretariat's effectiveness was obviously affected by the political 
will of disputants and their big power supporters towards peaceful settle­
ment. But as stated in the previous chapter, while the existence of such 
political will was a necessary condition for settlement it was not always a 
sufficient condition. In this respect the Secretariat's role was effective 
when it was able to provide the means of achieving the settlement which the
parties desired.
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F u r th e r m o r e ,  such  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  was i t s e l f  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  a complex 
o f  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s ,  which i n c l u d e d  i n t e r a c t i o n s  
th ro u g h  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  d e l i b e r a t i v e  o rg a n s  and th ro u g h  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  
good o f f i c e s .  The p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  as t o  t h e  e x t e n t  to  w hich  
t h e i r  g o a ls  m ig h t  be  s a t i s f i e d  o r  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  p r o t e c t e d  i n  such  i n t e r ­
a c t i o n s  h a d  an im p o r ta n t  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e i r  c h o ic e  be tw een  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  a 
p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  th ro u g h  th e  UN, o r  a more c o e r c iv e  s e t t l e m e n t  th ro u g h  
u n i l a t e r a l ,  b i l a t e r a l  o r  b l o c  a c t i o n s .  I n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  p a r t i e s  t r i e d  b o th  
c o u r s e s  o f  a c t i o n ,  as was c l e a r  a t  d i f f e r e n t  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  Yemen and 
B a n g la d e sh  d i s p u t e s ,  and i t  was t h e  b a la n c e  o f  e m p h a s is  by  t h e  p a r t i e s  on 
t h e s e  two c h o ic e s  w hich  e x e r t e d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n f l u e n c e  on th e  S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  The S e c r e t a r i a t  was e f f e c t i v e  n o t  o n ly  to  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
t h e  d i r e c t  o r  i n d i r e c t  p a r t i e s  w anted  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t ,  b u t  a l s o  to  t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  th e y  b e l i e v e d  an i n te r m e d ia r y  r o l e  c o u ld  h e l p  them  to  a c h ie v e  a 
s e t t l e m e n t  w hich  w ould  s a t i s f y  t h e i r  b a s i c  c o n c e r n s .
CHAPTER IX
SOME IMPLICATIONS
Throughout this study it has been evident that the question of national 
sovereignty has had a crucial importance in determining both the nature and 
the effectiveness of the Secretariat's intermediary role. In each of the 
case studies the consent of governments to an active intermediary role was 
a key determinant of the success or otherwise of the Secretariat's efforts.
The basic premise underlying the Secretariat's practice of good offices 
and quiet diplomacy was the need to avoid approaches which might be seen as 
threatening the sovereignty of governments. This would seem to be a 
realistic premise. For although there is a case to be made for the gradual 
erosion of the nation-state as the definitive political unit, it is clear 
that nation states continue to be dominant sources of power in the contem­
porary world. Initiatives which challenge governmental sovereighty are 
almost certain to be negated by the reactions of governments determined to 
maintain and register the power they have.
From the point of view of governments, it is submitted that good 
offices and quiet diplomacy as practised by the Secretariat provide a means 
for seeking settlement which is less threatening to the sovereignty of 
either the disputants or their supporters, than other approaches which have 
been applied or have been suggested in the period of the UN's existence. 
Although other means of peaceful settlement, such as arbitration, judicial 
settlement, or mediation by other governments are still dependent on the 
consent of the parties, they represent a greater likelihood of external 
pressure.'*’ For this reason it might well be in the interests of governments
On the failures of more coercive methods of settlement, such as those 
contained in the collective security provisions of the UN Charter, see the 
general works on international relations cited in Chapter II, and in par­
ticular inis Claude's Power and International Relations , pp.150-204 and 
pp.278-279.
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to  e n c o u ra g e  th e  k in d  o f  in te r m e d ia r y  r o le  w hich h a s  d e v e lo p e d  w i th in  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t .
In  g e n e r a l  te rm s , th e r e  w i l l  a lw ays be some te n s io n  be tw een  a d e s i r e  
by governm en ts to  se ek  in te r m e d ia r y  a s s i s ta n c e  i n  th e  s e a r c h  f o r  s o lu t i o n s  
and th e  f e a r  o r  b e l i e f  t h a t  su ch  in te rm e d ia ry  a c t i v i t y  m igh t i n f r i n g e  t h e i r  
s o v e r e ig n ty .  In  th e  c a se  o f  th e  b i g  p o w ers , an e m p h a s is  on t h e i r  s o v e re ig n ty  
i n  d e te rm in in g  n a t i o n a l  f o re ig n  p o l ic y  f r e e  from  in te r m e d ia r y  i n f lu e n c e  le a d s  
to  th e  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  th e y  s h o u ld  se e k  to  in f lu e n c e  e v e n ts  d i r e c t l y  and in  
a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  t h e i r  own a s se s sm e n ts  and w is h e s . T h is  a p p e a re d  f o r  
exam ple to  be K i s s i n g e r 's  ap p ro ach  in  th e  B an g la d esh  c r i s i s .  I n  th e  c a se  o f  
d i s p u t a n t s ,  an em p h asis  on t h e i r  s o v e re ig n ty  b e c a u se  o f  th e  f e a r  o f  u n fa v o u r­
a b le  i n t e r n a l  e f f e c t s  l e a d s  to  u n w il l in g n e s s  to  d i s c u s s  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  to  
th e  e x t e r n a l  d i s p u te  on th e  g rounds t h a t  th ey  f a l l  w i th in  th e  d o m es tic  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  s t a t e .
H ow ever, i n  to d a y 's  w o rld  n a t i o n a l  s o v e re ig n ty  i s  n o t  i n  r e a l i t y  
u n c o n d i t io n a l  o r  f r e e  from  e x te r n a l  i n f lu e n c e .  I t s  a s s e r t i o n  i s  i n v a r i a b l y  
d e p e n d en t on v a r io u s  k in d s  o f  s u p p o r t  from  e x te r n a l  s o u r c e s .  A governm ent 
engaged  i n  a d i s p u te  a c t i v e l y  s e e k s  s u p p o r t  from  a ran g e  o f  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  
and th e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  w in n in g  and m a in ta in in g  such  s u p p o r t  i s  a m ajo r 
f a c t o r  i n  i t s  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  B u t i t s  o p p o n e n ts , w h e th e r  th e y  be  o th e r  
governm ents o r  r e b e l  g ro u p s  w i th in  th e  s o c i e t y ,  a re  d o in g  p r e c i s e l y  th e  
same th in g .  T hus, i n  th e  ab sen ce  o f  a means f o r  p e a c e f u l ly  r e c o n c i l i n g  th e  
v a r io u s  p o l i t i c a l  f o rc e s  th e  outcom e i s  a b le  to  be d e te rm in e d  o n ly  by t r i a l s  
o f  s t r e n g t h ,  i n c lu d in g  m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t ,  i n  w hich b o th  th e  u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  
o f  ou tcom es and  th e  r i s k  o f  s e r io u s  damage i s  much h ig h e r .
I t  m ig h t be p r o t e s t e d  t h a t  th e r e  i s  n o th in g  new i n  th e  argum ent t h a t ,  
i n  th e s e  te rm s , w ar i s  i r r a t i o n a l .  The re sp o n se  to  su ch  a p r o t e s t  i s  t h a t  
th e  co n tem p o ra ry  w o rld  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  n o t  o n ly  b y  g r e a t e r  u l t im a te  
d a n g e rs  th a n  th o se  w hich  e x i s t e d  i n  th e  p a s t ,  b u t  a l s o  by  a g r e a t e r
285
i n t e n s i t y  o f  g lo b a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  w ith  r e s p e c t  t o  d i s p u te s  (a s  w e l l  a s  o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  an d  s o c i a l  phenomena) th an  h a s  e v e r  e x i s t e d  b e f o r e .
I n  s e e k in g  more p e a c e f u l  p r o c e s s e s ,  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n  be tw een  th e  
p a r t i e s  a lo n e  i s  n o t  a lw ays p r a c t i c a b l e  when a d i s p u te  b r e a k s  o u t ,  as h as  
b een  s e e n  in  th e  c a se  s t u d i e s ,  a lth o u g h  i t  rem a in s  an im p o r ta n t  s te p  to w ard s 
s e t t l e m e n t  w h ich  i s  en c o u ra g e d  by t h i r d  p a r t i e s .  On th e  o th e r  h a n d , p r e ­
s c r i p t i v e  means o f  r e c o n c i l i n g  c la s h e s  o f  i n t e r e s t s  a re  more l i k e l y  t o  be 
r e s i s t e d  on th e  g rounds o f  n a t i o n a l  s o v e r e ig n ty ,  and th e y  have h ad  l i t t l e  
s u c c e s s  w here p a r t i e s  have p e rc e iv e d  t h e i r  v i t a l  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  to  be  a t  
s t a k e .  I t  i s  s u b m it te d  t h a t ,  as a more v ia b le  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  th e  good o f f i c e s  
r o le  d e v e lo p e d  by  th e  UN S e c r e t a r i a t  p ro v id e s  a means by  w hich d i s p u t a n t s  
can  se ek  a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  w h i le  r e t a i n i n g  a m easu re  o f  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  A t th e  same t im e , th e  good o f f i c e s  
r o le  p r o v id e s  scope  f o r  c o n s u l t a t io n  w ith  o th e r  g o v e rn m e n ts , e s p e c i a l l y  
i n d i r e c t  p a r t i e s ,  w ith  a view to  r e c o n c i l i n g  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  i n  th e  d i s p u te  
and m in im is in g  th e  d i v i s i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  com peting  e x t e r n a l  in v o lv e m e n ts .
In  t h i s  r e g a r d  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G en era l o c c u p ie s  a  p o s i t i o n  u n l ik e  any 
o th e r  i n  t h a t  he r e c e iv e s  in fo rm a t io n  from  a l l  p o i n t s  o f  v iew , g a in in g  an 
o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  w h ich  i s  i n  many r e s p e c ts  more co m p reh en siv e  th a n  t h a t  
o b ta in e d  by  any n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r .  By th e  n a tu r e  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  m a n if e s te d  
e s p e c i a l l y  th ro u g h  th e  r o l e  o f  good o f f i c e s ,  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l does n o t  
t h r e a te n  th e  s o v e r e ig n ty  o f  govern m en ts , b u t  h i s  c o l l a t i o n  and s y n th e s i s  o f  
in fo rm a t io n  and v iew s p ro v id e  a r e s o u rc e  w hich  i s  a v a i l a b l e  to  a s s i s t  them  
in  i d e n t i f y i n g  w ays o f  r e s o lv in g  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s .
The good o f f i c e s  a p p ro ach  does have d raw b ack s . I t  can  do l i t t l e  to  
r e c o n c i l e  c la s h e s  w here one p a r ty  can  a c h ie v e  i t s  u n d e r ly in g  g o a ls  o r  
p r o t e c t  i t s  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  o n ly  a t  th e  ex p en se  o f  th e  o t h e r .  H ow ever, th e  
e x t e n t  to  w h ich  su ch  'z e ro - s u m ' s i t u a t i o n s  a p p ly  i s  o f te n  a f u n c t io n  o f  th e
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c o m p e tin g  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  p a r t i e s .  The UN S e c r e t a r i a t  i s  i n  a b e t t e r  
p o s i t i o n  th a n  m ost to  a d o p t a g lo b a l  p e r s p e c t iv e  and to  p e r c e iv e  p o t e n t i a l  
c o m p a t ib i l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t s  w here d i s p u ta n ts  s e e  o n ly  c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t s .
A n o th e r p o s s ib l e  draw back i s  t h a t  a good o f f i c e s  ap p ro a c h  aim ed a t  
m a in ta in in g  p e a c e  i s  i n h i b i t e d  from  re sp o n d in g  to  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  s e v e re  
i n j u s t i c e ,  s in c e  good o f f i c e s  r e q u i r e s  v i r t u a l l y  by  d e f i n i t i o n  th e  e sch e w a l 
o f  a ju d g e m e n ta l r o l e .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  th e  g e n e r a l ly  a c c e p te d  l in k a g e  
b e tw een  q u e s t io n s  o f  p e a ce  and q u e s t io n s  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  a tw o -s id e d  c o in .  On 
one s i d e ,  th e  u n w i l l in g n e s s  o f  a  governm ent to  a l l e v i a t e  o r  even  d i s c u s s  
i n j u s t i c e s  w h ich  i t  h a s  p e r p e tu a te d  may f a t a l l y  im pede a t te m p ts  a t  p e a c e f u l  
s e t t l e m e n t ,  a s  i n  th e  B a n g lad esh  c a s e .  On th e  o t h e r  s id e  o f  th e  same c o in ,  
h o w ev er, th e  d e s i r e  o f  b o th  th e  d i s p u ta n t s  and  t h e i r  s u p p o r te r s  to  m a in ta in  
p e a c e  o r  a t  l e a s t  to  a v o id  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  may p ro v id e  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  to  t a c k l e  
th e  i n j u s t i c e s  w hich  th r e a te n  p e a c e .  F u r th e rm o re , w here such  i n j u s t i c e s  
have  econom ic o r i g i n s ,  a good o f f i c e s  r o le  may h i g h l i g h t  ways i n  w hich th e  
U n ite d  N a tio n s  sy s te m  as a w hole  c o u ld  a c t  to  a l l e v i a t e  them .
A t h i r d  and r e l a t e d  draw back i s  th e  g e n e ra l  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t ' s  good o f f i c e s  r o le  to  member s t a t e s  and  th e  c o n seq u e n t 
l i m i t a t i o n s  on i t s  a b i l i t y  to  com m unicate w ith  n o n -g o v e rn m e n ta l p a r t i e s  to  
a  d i s p u t e .  Of c o u r s e ,  i f  such  r e s t r i c t i o n s  d id  n o t  a p p ly , an e x p e c ta t io n  
t h a t  th e  S e c r e t a r i a t  w ould  d e a l  w i th  such  p a r t i e s  m ig h t c o m p lic a te  r a t h e r  
th a n  s im p l i f y  i t s  in te r m e d ia r y  r o l e .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e r e  i s  a  c a se  f o r  
s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  i t  may be i n  a g o v e rn m e n t's  lo n g - te rm  i n t e r e s t s  n o t  to  
oppose c o n ta c t s  o f  t h i s  n a tu r e  i f  th e y  a re  l i k e l y  to  a s s i s t  i n  a c h ie v in g  a 
s e t t l e m e n t .
A r e c e n t  work by a H ungarian  t h e o r i s t ,  I s t v a n  B ib o , h a s  p e rh a p s  
su c c e e d e d  i n  p in p o in t in g  a more b a s ic  d i f f i c u l t y  w hich  c o n f r o n ts  a t te m p ts  
to  s e t t l e  d i s p u te s  b e tw een  n a t io n  s t a t e s .  C o n t r a s t in g  th e  M a c h ia v e l l ia n
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and the moral views of international affairs, Bibo writes that:
Within individual societies, there exist more or less coherent 
theoretical and practical systems and methods to form one 
dialectic unit out of these two kinds of experiences, and so 
secure the practical effects of principles. Yet, when applied 
to the international community, the two schools immediately 
split and exist as thesis and anti-thesis . . . [although] . . . 
self-interest and military power cannot manage without moral 
and idealistic justification, nor can ideals and institutions 
function without an element of self-interest and power.
Bibo goes on to present a case for the establishment of 'institutions 
of impartial arbitration', but he notes in regard to the United Nations 
Secretary General that:
The essence of his function may be seen in the institutional­
isation of the previously informal and occasional acts of 
'good offices' and mediation. In other words he is a modem 
and institutionalised mediator and peacemaker.^
I t is submitted that, from the point of view of both disputants and 
their supporters, the quiet good offices role of the United Nations 
Secretariat presents one of the more practicable ways of reconciling their 
respective self-interests with international norms of behaviour, so as to 
reasonably satisfy competing demands without grossly jeopardising inter­
national peace and security. Such an approach is entirely in keeping with 
Articles 33 and 2(3) of the Charter, concerning the responsibilities of 
member states with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes. More par­
ticularly, this approach is in accord with the letter and the spirit of the 
key statement of purpose contained in Article 1(4), since i t  utilises the 
United Nations as 'a centre for harmonising the actions of nations'. It is 
seeking the ideal of peaceful settlement of international disputes through 
a pragmatic appreciation of contemporary realities.
istvan Bibo, The Paralysis o f  In ternational In s ti tu tio n s  and the 
Remedies: A Study o f  Self-Determ ination3 Concord Among the Mayor Powers
and P o litic a l A rb itra tion , John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1976, p.7.
2 Ib id . , p .120.
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APPENDIX A
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
C h a p te r  I  P u rp o ses  and  P r i n c i p l e s
A r t i c l e  1
The P u rp o se s  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  a r e :
1 . To m a in ta in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p eace  and s e c u r i t y ,  and to  t h a t  e n d : t o  ta k e  
e f f e c t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  m easu res  f o r  th e  p r e v e n t io n  and rem oval o f  t h r e a t s  to  
th e  p e a c e ,  and f o r  th e  s u p p re s s io n  o f  a c t s  o f  a g g re s s io n  o r  o th e r  b re a c h e s  
o f  th e  p e a c e ,  and t o  b r in g  a b o u t by p e a c e f u l  m eans, and in  c o n fo rm ity  w ith  
th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law , a d ju s tm e n t  o r  s e t t l e m e n t  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u te s  o r  s i t u a t i o n s  w hich  m ig h t l e a d  to  a b re a c h  o f  th e  
p e a c e ;
2 .  To d e v e lo p  f r i e n d ly  r e l a t i o n s  among n a t io n s  b a s e d  on r e s p e c t  f o r  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l r i g h t s  and  s e l f - d e t e r m in a t io n  o f  p e o p le s ,  and to  ta k e  
o t h e r  a p p r o p r ia te  m easu res  to  s t r e n g th e n  u n i v e r s a l  p e a c e ;
3. To a c h ie v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t io n  i n  s o lv in g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p ro b ­
lem s o f  an eco n o m ic , s o c i a l ,  c u l t u r a l ,  o r  h u m a n i ta r ia n  c h a r a c t e r ,  and i n  
p ro m o tin g  and e n c o u ra g in g  r e s p e c t  f o r  human r i g h t s  and  f o r  fu n d am e n ta l f r e e ­
doms fo r  a l l  w i th o u t  d i s t i n c t i o n  as to  r a c e ,  s e x ,  la n g u a g e , o r  r e l i g i o n ;  
and
4 . To be a c e n t r e  f o r  h a rm o n is in g  th e  a c t i o n s  o f  n a t io n s  i n  th e  a t t a i n ­
m ent o f  th e s e  common e n d s .
A r t i c l e  2
The O rg a n is a t io n  and i t s  M embers, i n  p u r s u i t  o f  th e  P u rp o ses  s t a t e d  
i n  A r t i c l e  1 , s h a l l  a c t  in  a c co rd a n ce  w ith  th e  fo l lo w in g  P r i n c i p l e s :
1 . The O r g a n is a t io n  i s  b a s e d  on th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  th e  s o v e re ig n  
e q u a l i t y  o f  a l l  i t s  Members.
2 . A ll  Members, i n  o r d e r  to  e n s u re  t o  a l l  o f  them  th e  r i g h t s  and 
b e n e f i t s  r e s u l t i n g  from  m em bersh ip , s h a l l  f u l f i l  i n  good f a i t h  th e  o b l i ­
g a t io n s  assum ed by  them  i n  a c co rd a n ce  w ith  th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r .
3 . A ll  Members s h a l l  s e t t l e  t h e i r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u te s  by p e a c e f u l  
means i n  su ch  a m anner t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y ,  and j u s t i c e ,  
a re  n o t  e n d a n g e re d .
4 . A ll  Members s h a l l  r e f r a i n  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  from  
th e  t h r e a t  o r  u se  o f  f o rc e  a g a in s t  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  o r  p o l i t i c a l  
in d ep e n d e n c e  o f  any s t a t e ,  o r  i n  any o t h e r  m anner i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  
P u rp o ses  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s .
2 89
5 . A ll  Members s h a l l  g iv e  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s  e v e ry  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  any 
a c t io n  i t  ta k e s  in  a c co rd a n ce  w ith  th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r ,  and s h a l l  r e f r a i n  
from  g iv in g  a s s i s t a n c e  to  any s t a t e  a g a in s t  w hich th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  i s  
t a k in g  p r e v e n t iv e  o r  e n fo rc e m e n t a c t i o n .
6 .  The O r g a n is a t io n  s h a l l  e n s u re  t h a t  s t a t e s  w hich a re  n o t  .Members o f  
th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  a c t  i n  a c co rd a n ce  w ith  th e s e  P r i n c i p l e s  so  f a r  as  may be 
n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  m ain ten an ce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p eace  and s e c u r i t y .
7 . N o th in g  c o n ta in e d  i n  th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r  s h a l l  a u th o r i s e  th e  
U n ite d  N a tio n s  to  in te r v e n e  i n  m a t te r s  w hich a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  w i th in  th e  
d o m e s tic  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  any s t a t e  o r  s h a l l  r e q u i r e  th e  Members to  su b m it 
su ch  m a t te r s  to  s e t t l e m e n t  u n d e r th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r ;  b u t  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  
s h a l l  n o t  p r e ju d i c e  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  e n fo rc e m e n t m easu res  u n d e r C h a p te r  
V I I .
C h a p te r  I I I  O rgans
A r t i c l e  7
1 . T here a re  e s t a b l i s h e d  as th e  p r i n c i p a l  o rg a n s  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s :  
a G e n e ra l A ssem bly , a S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il ,  an Econom ic and S o c ia l  C o u n c i l ,  a 
T r u s te e s h ip  C o u n c il ,  an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o u rt o f  J u s t i c e ,  and a S e c r e t a r i a t .
2 . Such s u b s id i a r y  o rg a n s  as may be found n e c e s s a ry  may be  e s t a b l i s h e d  
in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r .
C h a p te r  IV The G e n e ra l Assembly
C om position
A r t i c l e  9
1 . The G e n e ra l A ssem bly s h a l l  c o n s i s t  o f  a l l  th e  Members o f  th e  U n ite d
N a t io n s .
F u n c tio n s  and  Pow ers 
A r t i c l e  10
The G e n e ra l Assem bly may d is c u s s  any q u e s t io n s  o r  any m a t te r s  
w i th in  th e  scope  o f  th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r  o r  r e l a t i n g  to  th e  pow ers and 
f u n c t io n s  o f  any o rg a n s  p ro v id e d  f o r  in  th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r ,  a n d , e x c e p t  
as  p ro v id e d  i n  A r t i c l e  12, may make recom m endations t o  th e  Members o f  th e  
U n ite d  N a tio n s  o r  to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il o r  to  b o th  on any su ch  q u e s t io n s  
o r  m a t te r s .
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A r t i c l e  11
1 . The G e n e ra l Assem bly may c o n s id e r  th e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  co ­
o p e r a t io n  i n  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y ,  in c lu d in g  
th e  p r i n c i p l e s  g o v e rn in g  d isarm am en t and th e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  arm am ents, and 
may make recom m endations w ith  r e g a r d  to  su ch  p r i n c i p l e s  to  th e  Members o r  
to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  o r  b o th .
2 . The G e n e ra l  Assembly may d is c u s s  any q u e s t io n s  r e l a t i n g  to  th e  
m a in te n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a ce  and s e c u r i t y  b r o u g h t  b e f o r e  i t  by  any 
Member o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s ,  o r  by th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il ,  o r  by  a s t a t e  
w hich  i s  n o t  a  Member o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  A r t i c l e  35, 
p a ra g ra p h  2 , a n d , e x c e p t  as p ro v id e d  i n  A r t i c l e  1 2 , may make recommend­
a t i o n s  w ith  r e g a r d  to  any such q u e s t io n s  to  th e  s t a t e  o r  s t a t e s  c o n c e rn e d  
o r  t o  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il o r  t o  b o th .  Any su ch  q u e s t io n  on w hich  a c t io n  
i s  n e c e s s a ry  s h a l l  be r e f e r r e d  to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  by  th e  G e n e ra l 
Assem bly e i t h e r  b e fo r e  o r  a f t e r  d i s c u s s io n .
3. The G e n e ra l Assem bly may c a l l  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il 
to  s i t u a t i o n s  w hich  a r e  l i k e l y  to  e n d a n g e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y .
4 . The pow ers o f  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h i s  A r t i c l e  s h a l l  
n o t  l i m i t  th e  g e n e ra l  sco p e  o f  A r t i c l e  10.
A r t i c l e  12
1 . W hile  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il i s  e x e r c i s i n g  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  any d i s p u te  
o r  s i t u a t i o n  th e  f u n c t io n s  a s s ig n e d  to  i t  i n  th e  p r e s e n t  C h a r te r ,  th e  
G e n e ra l A ssem bly  s h a l l  n o t  make any recom m endation  w ith  r e g a r d  to  t h a t  d i s ­
p u te  o r  s i t u a t i o n  u n le s s  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  so  r e q u e s t s .
2 . The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l , w i th  th e  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il ,  
s h a l l  n o t i f y  t h e  G en e ra l Assembly a t  ea ch  s e s s io n  o f  any m a t te r s  r e l a t i v e
to  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y  w h ich  a re  b e in g  d e a l t  
w i th  by th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il and s h a l l  s i m i l a r l y  n o t i f y  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly , 
o r  th e  Members o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  i f  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly i s  n o t  in  
s e s s i o n ,  im m e d ia te ly  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il c e a s e s  to  d e a l  w i th  such  m a t te r s .
V o tin g  
A r t i c l e  18
1 . E ach  Member o f  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly s h a l l  have one v o te .
P ro c e d u re
A r t i c l e  20
The G en e ra l Assembly s h a l l  m eet i n  r e g u l a r  a n n u a l s e s s io n s  and  in  
su ch  s p e c i a l  s e s s io n s  a s  o c c a s io n  may r e q u i r e .  S p e c ia l  s e s s io n s  s h a l l  be
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convoked by  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l a t  th e  r e q u e s t  o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il o r  
o f  a  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  Members o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s .
Chap t e r  V The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il
C om position
A r t i c l e  23
1 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l  c o n s i s t  o f  f i f t e e n  members* o f  th e  
U n ite d  N a t io n s .  The R e p u b lic  o f  C h in a ,* *  F r a n c e ,  th e  U nion o f  S o v ie t  
S o c i a l i s t  R e p u b lic s , th e  U n ite d  Kingdom o f  G re a t  B r i t a i n  and N o rth e rn  
I r e l a n d ,  and th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  o f  A m erica s h a l l  be  p e rm a n e n t members o f  
th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il . The G en era l Assem bly s h a l l  e l e c t  t e n  o th e r  Members 
o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  to  be n o n -p erm an en t members o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il ,  
due r e g a rd  b e in g  s p e c i a l l y  p a id ,  i n  th e  f i r s t  in s t a n c e  t o  th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
o f  Members o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  to  th e  m ain ten an ce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p eace  
and s e c u r i t y  and to  th e  o th e r  p u rp o se s  o f  th e  O r g a n is a t io n ,  and a ls o  to  
e q u i t a b le  g e o g ra p h ic a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n .
2 . The n o n -p e rm an e n t members o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  s h a l l  be e l e c t e d  
f o r  a te rm  o f  two y e a r s .  In  th e  f i r s t  e l e c t i o n  o f  th e  n o n -p e rm a n e n t mem­
b e r s  a f t e r  th e  in c r e a s e  o f  th e  m em bership o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il from  
e le v e n  to  f i f t e e n ,  two o f  th e  fo u r  a d d i t i o n a l  members s h a l l  be chosen  f o r
a te rm  o f  one y e a r .  A r e t i r i n g  member s h a l l  n o t  be e l i g i b l e  f o r  imm edi­
a t e  r e - e l e c t i o n .
3 . Each member o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l  have  one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
F u n c tio n s  and Pow ers 
A r t i c l e  24
1 . In  o r d e r  to  e n s u re  prom pt and e f f e c t i v e  a c t io n  by  th e  U n ite d  
N a t io n s ,  i t s  Members c o n fe r  on th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il p r im a ry  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  th e  m ain ten an ce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e ace  and s e c u r i t y ,  and a g re e  t h a t  i n  
c a r r y in g  o u t  i t s  d u t i e s  u n d e r  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il 
a c t s  on t h e i r  b e h a l f .
2 . In  d i s c h a r g in g  th e s e  d u t ie s  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  s h a l l  a c t  in  
a c co rd a n ce  w ith  th e  P u rp o se s  and P r in c i p l e s  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s .  The 
s p e c i f i c  pow ers g r a n te d  to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il f o r  th e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  th e s e  
d u t i e s  a re  l a i d  down in  C h a p te rs  V I, V II , V II I  and X II .
3 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l  su b m it a n n u a l a n d , when n e c e s s a r y ,  
s p e c i a l  r e p o r t s  to  th e  G e n e ra l Assem bly f o r  i t s  c o n s id e r a t i o n .
* In  1963, e le v e n  m em bers.
** From O c to b e r  1971, C h in a .
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A r t i c l e  25
The Members o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  a g re e  t o  a c c e p t  and c a r r y  o u t  
th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  p r e s e n t  
C h a r te r .
V o tin g
A r t i c l e  27
1 . Each member o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l  have one v o te .
2 . D e c is io n s  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il on p r o c e d u r a l  m a t te r s  s h a l l  be 
made by an a f f i r m a t iv e  v o te  o f  n in e  members.
3. D e c is io n s  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il on a l l  o t h e r  m a t te r s  s h a l l  be 
made by  an a f f i r m a t i v e  v o te  o f  n in e  members in c lu d in g  th e  c o n c u r r in g  v o te s  
o f  th e  p e rm a n en t m em bers; p ro v id e d  t h a t ,  i n  d e c i s io n s  u n d e r C h a p te r  V I, 
and u n d e r p a ra g ra p h  3 o f  A r t i c l e  52 , a  p a r ty  t o  a  d i s p u te  s h a l l  a b s t a i n  
from  v o t in g .
P ro c e d u re  
A r t i c l e  28
1 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l  be so  o r g a n is e d  as t o  be  a b le  t o  
fu n c t io n  c o n t in u o u s ly .  Each member o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il s h a l l  f o r  t h i s  
p u rp o se  be r e p r e s e n te d  a t  a l l  tim es  a t  th e  s e a t  o f  th e  O r g a n is a t io n .
2 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l  h o ld  p e r i o d i c  m e e tin g s  a t  w hich  each  
o f  i t s  members may, i f  i t  so  d e s i r e s ,  be r e p r e s e n te d  by a member o f  th e  
governm en t o r  by some o t h e r  s p e c i a l l y  d e s ig n a te d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
3 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il may h o ld  m ee tin g s  a t  su ch  p la c e s  o t h e r  th a n  
th e  s e a t  o f  th e  O rg a n is a t io n  as i n  i t s  judgem en t w i l l  b e s t  f a c i l i t a t e  i t s  
w ork .
A r t i c l e  31
Any Member o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  w hich i s  n o t  a  member o f  th e  
S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il  may p a r t i c i p a t e ,  w i th o u t  v o te ,  i n  th e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  any 
q u e s t io n  b r o u g h t  b e fo r e  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il w henever th e  l a t t e r  c o n s id e r s  
t h a t  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h a t  Member a re  s p e c i a l l y  a f f e c t e d .
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A r t i c l e  32
Any Member o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  w h ich  i s  n o t  a  member o f  th e  
S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il o r  any s t a t e  w hich i s  n o t  a Member o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s ,  
i f  i t  i s  a p a r t y  to  a  d i s p u te  un d er c o n s id e r a t io n  by  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il ,  
s h a l l  be  i n v i t e d  to  p a r t i c i p a t e ,  w i th o u t  v o t e ,  i n  th e  d i s c u s s io n  r e l a t i n g  
to  th e  d i s p u t e .  The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l  l a y  down such  c o n d i t io n s  a s  i t  
deems j u s t  f o r  th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a s t a t e  w h ich  i s  n o t  a  Member o f  th e  
U n ite d  N a t io n s .
C h a p te r  VI P a c i f i c  S e t t le m e n t  o f  D is p u te s
A r t i c l e  33
1 . The p a r t i e s  to  any d i s p u te ,  th e  c o n tin u a n c e  o f  w hich  i s  l i k e l y  to  
e n d a n g e r  th e  m ain te n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y ,  s h a l l ,  f i r s t  
o f  a l l ,  s e e k  a s o lu t i o n  by n e g o t i a t i o n ,  e n q u i r y ,  m e d ia t io n , c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  
a r b i t r a t i o n ,  j u d i c i a l  s e t t l e m e n t ,  r e s o r t  t o  r e g i o n a l  a g e n c ie s  o r  a r r a n g e ­
m e n ts , o r  o th e r  p e a c e f u l  means o f  t h e i r  own c h o ic e .
2 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il s h a l l ,  when i t  deems n e c e s s a r y ,  c a l l  upon 
th e  p a r t i e s  t o  s e t t l e  t h e i r  d is p u te  by su ch  m eans.
A r t i c l e  34
The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il may i n v e s t i g a t e  any d i s p u t e ,  o r  any s i t u a t i o n  
w hich m ig h t l e a d  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r i c t i o n  o r  g iv e  r i s e  to  a d i s p u t e ,  i n  
o r d e r  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  th e  c o n tin u a n c e  o f  th e  d i s p u te  o r  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
l i k e l y  to  e n d a n g e r  th e  m ain ten an ce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y .
A r t i c l e  35
1 . Any Member o f  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s  may b r in g  any d i s p u t e ,  o r  any 
s i t u a t i o n  o f  th e  n a tu r e  r e f e r r e d  to  i n  A r t i c l e  34, to  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  th e  
S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il o r  o f  th e  G en e ra l A ssem bly .
2 . A s t a t e  w hich  i s  n o t  a Member o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  may b r in g  to  
th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il o r  o f  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly any d i s ­
p u te  to  w hich  i t  i s  a  p a r t y  i f  i t  a c c e p ts  i n  a d v a n c e , f o r  th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  
th e  d i s p u t e ,  th e  o b l ig a t i o n s  o f  p a c i f i c  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o v id e d  i n  th e  p r e s e n t  
C h a r te r .
3 . The p ro c e e d in g s  o f  th e  G en e ra l A ssem bly i n  r e s p e c t  o f  m a t te r s  
b ro u g h t  t o  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  u n d er t h i s  A r t i c l e  w i l l  be  s u b je c t  to  th e  p r o v is io n s  
o f  A r t i c l e s  11 and 12.
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A r t i c l e  36
1 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il may, a t  any s ta g e  o f  a  d i s p u te  o f  th e  n a tu r e  
r e f e r r e d  to  i n  A r t i c l e  33 o r  o f  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  l i k e  n a t u r e ,  recommend 
a p p r o p r ia t e  p ro c e d u re s  o r  m ethods o f  a d ju s tm e n t .
2 . The S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il sh o u ld  ta k e  i n t o  c o n s id e r a t io n  any p ro c e d u re s  
f o r  th e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  th e  d i s p u te  w hich have a l r e a d y  b een  a d o p te d  by th e  
p a r t i e s .
3 . In  m aking recom m endations un d er t h i s  A r t i c l e  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il 
sh o u ld  a l s o  ta k e  i n t o  c o n s id e r a t io n  t h a t  l e g a l  d i s p u te s  s h o u ld  as  a g e n e ra l  
r u le  be r e f e r r e d  by  th e  p a r t i e s  to  th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  i n  
a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  S t a tu t e  o f  th e  C o u r t .
A r t i c l e  37
1 . S hou ld  th e  p a r t i e s  to  a d i s p u te  o f  th e  n a tu r e  r e f e r r e d  to  i n  
A r t i c l e  33 f a i l  to  s e t t l e  i t  by th e  means i n d i c a t e d  in  t h a t  A r t i c l e ,  th e y  
s h a l l  r e f e r  i t  to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il.
2 . I f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il deems t h a t  th e  c o n tin u a n c e  o f  th e  d i s p u te  
i s  i n  f a c t  l i k e l y  to  e n d a n g e r th e  m ain ten an ce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a ce  and 
s e c u r i t y ,  i t  s h a l l  d e c id e  w h e th e r  to  ta k e  a c t io n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  36 o r  to  
recommend such  te rm s o f  s e t t l e m e n t  a s  i t  may c o n s id e r  a p p r o p r i a t e .
A r t i c l e  38
W ith o u t p r e ju d i c e  to  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  A r t i c l e s  33 to  37, th e  
S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il may, i f  a l l  th e  p a r t i e s  t o  any d i s p u te  so  r e q u e s t ,  make 
recom m endations to  th e  p a r t i e s  w ith  a  view to  a  p a c i f i c  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  th e  
d i s p u t e .
C h a p te r  XV The S e c r e t a r i a t
A r t i c l e  97
The S e c r e t a r i a t  s h a l l  com prise  a S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l and such  s t a f f  
as th e  O rg a n is a t io n  may r e q u i r e .  The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l s h a l l  be a p p o in te d  
by th e  G e n e ra l Assem bly upon th e  recom m endation o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il .
He s h a l l  be th e  c h i e f  a d m in is t r a t iv e  o f f i c e r  o f  th e  O r g a n is a t io n .
A r t i c l e  98
The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l s h a l l  a c t  i n  t h a t  c a p a c i ty  i n  a l l  m e e tin g s  
o f  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly , o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il, o f  th e  Econom ic and S o c ia l  
C o u n c il ,  and o f  th e  T r u s te e s h ip  C o u n c il, and s h a l l  p e r fo rm  su ch  o th e r
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f u n c t io n s  as  a re  e n t r u s t e d  to  him  by th e s e  o r g a n s .  The S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l 
s h a l l  make an a n n u a l r e p o r t  to  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly on th e  work o f  th e  
O r g a n i s a t io n .
A r t i c l e  99
The S e c r e ta r y  G en era l may b r in g  to  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  
C o u n c il  any m a t te r  w hich in  h i s  o p in io n  may t h r e a t e n  th e  m ain te n a n c e  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y .
A r t i c l e  100
1 . In  th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  t h e i r  d u t i e s  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l and th e  
s t a f f  s h a l l  n o t  se ek  o r  r e c e iv e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  from  any governm ent o r  from  
any o t h e r  a u th o r i t y  e x te r n a l  to  th e  O r g a n is a t io n .  They s h a l l  r e f r a i n  from  
any a c t io n  w hich  m ig h t r e f l e c t  on t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  as i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o f f i c i a l s  
r e s p o n s ib le  o n ly  to  th e  O r g a n is a t io n .
2 . Each Member o f  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s  u n d e r ta k e s  to  r e s p e c t  th e  
e x c lu s iv e ly  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  th e  S e c r e ta r y  
G e n e ra l and  th e  s t a f f  and n o t  to  seek  to  in f lu e n c e  them  i n  th e  d is c h a r g e  o f  
t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
A r t i c l e  101
1 . The s t a f f  s h a l l  be a p p o in te d  by th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l u n d e r  re g u ­
l a t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly.
2 . A p p ro p r ia te  s t a f f s  s h a l l  be  p e rm a n e n tly  a s s ig n e d  to  th e  Econom ic 
and S o c ia l  C o u n c il ,  th e  T ru s te e s h ip  C o u n c il, a n d , a s  r e q u i r e d ,  to  o th e r  
o rg an s  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s .  These s t a f f  s h a l l  form  a p a r t  o f  th e  
S e c r e t a r i a t .
3 . The p a ram o u n t c o n s id e r a t io n  i n  th e  em ploym ent o f  th e  s t a f f  and i n  
th e  d e te r m in a t io n  o f  th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  s e r v ic e  s h a l l  be  th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  
s e c u r in g  th e  h i g h e s t  s ta n d a r d s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y ,  co m p eten ce , and i n t e g r i t y .  
Due r e g a r d  s h a l l  be p a id  to  th e  im p o rta n c e  o f  r e c r u i t i n g  th e  s t a f f  on as 
w ide a g e o g ra p h ic a l  b a s i s  as p o s s ib l e .
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APPENDIX B 
RESOLUTIONS
YEMEN
R e s o l u t i o n  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a t  i t s  1 0 3 9 t h  M e e t i n g  on  
11  J u n e  1 9 6 3 *
( P r o p o s e d  b y  M o ro c c o  a n d  G hana)
T he  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,
N o t i n g  w i t h  s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  a s  
m e n t i o n e d  i n  h i s  r e p o r t  o f  A p r i l  29 1 9 6 3  ( S / 5 2 9 8 )  ' a b o u t  c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  Yemen o f  e x t e r n a l  o r i g i n ' , a n d  a im e d  a t  a c h i e v e m e n t  
o f  a  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  a n d  ' e n s u r i n g  a g a i n s t  a n y  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t h a t  
s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  m i g h t  t h r e a t e n  t h e  p e a c e  o f  t h e  a r e a ' ,
N o t i n g  f u r t h e r  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  b e f o r e  t h e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l  o n  10 J u n e  1 9 6 3 ,
N o t i n g  f u r t h e r  w i t h  s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  d i r e c t l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a f f e c t i n g  Yemen h a v e  c o n f i r m e d  t h e i r  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  i d e n t i c a l  
t e r m s  o f  d i s e n g a g e m e n t  i n  Y em en, a n d  t h a t  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t s  o f  S a u d i  A r a b i a  
a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  A ra b  R e p u b l i c  h a v e  a g r e e d  t o  d e f r a y  t h e  e x p e n s e s  o v e r  a  
p e r i o d  o f  tw o m o n th s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  o b s e r v a t i o n  f u n c t i o n  c a l l e d  f o r  
i n  t h e  t e r m s  o f  d i s e n g a g e m e n t ,
1 .  R e q u e s t s  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  
o p e r a t i o n  a s  d e f i n e d  b y  h im ;
2 .  U r g e s  t h e  p a r t i e s  c o n c e r n e d  t o  o b s e r v e  f u l l y  t h e  t e r m s  o f  d i s ­
e n g a g e m e n t  r e p o r t e d  i n  d o c u m e n t  S / 5 2 9 8  a n d  t o  r e f r a i n  f r o m  an y  a c t i o n  w h i c h  
w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t e n s i o n  i n  t h e  a r e a ;
3 . R e q u e s t s  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
on t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  d e c i s i o n .
V o t i n g
I n  f a v o u r  ( 1 0 ) :  B r a z i l ,  C h i n a ,  F r a n c e ,  G h a n a ,  M o ro c c o ,  N o rw a y ,  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  
B r i t a i n ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  V e n e z u e l a .
A g a i n s t :  N o n e .
* S / 5 3 3 1 ,  11 J u n e  1 9 6 3 .
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A b s t a i n i n g  ( 1 ) :  USSR.
BAHRAIN
R e s o l u t i o n  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a t  i t s  1 5 3 6 th  M e e t in g  on 
11 May 1 9 7 0 *
( I n t r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  f o l l o w i n g  c o n s u l ­
t a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  members)
The S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,
N o t i n g  t h e  c o m m u n ic a t io n  f ro m  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
o f  28 March 1 9 7 0 , ^
N o t i n g  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  made b y  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  I r a n  and t h e  U n i t e d  
Kingdom  o f  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  a n d  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d  i n  t h e i r  l e t t e r s  t o  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  o f  9 March 1970 a n d  20 March 1 9 7 0 ,  respectively, ^
1 .  E n d o r s e s  t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  P e r s o n a l  R e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e ,  w h ic h  h a s  b e e n  c i r c u l a t e d  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  u n d e r  c o v e r  o f  a 
n o t e  f ro m  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  on 30 A p r i l  1 9 7 0 ; ^
2 .  W elcomes t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  r e p o r t ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
t h a t  ' t h e  o v e rw h e lm in g  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  B a h r a i n  w i s h  t o  g a i n  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  i d e n t i t y  i n  a  f u l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  and  s o v e r e i g n  S t a t e  
f r e e  t o  d e c i d e  f o r  i t s e l f  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  S t a t e s ' . ^
V o t i n g
A d o p te d  u n a n im o u s ly .
* S /R E S /2 7 8  (1970)
S /9 7 2 6 .
S /9 7 2 6 ,  p . 2 .  
S /9 7 7 2 .
4 S /9 7 7 2 ,  p a r a .  5 7 .
298
BANGLADESH
R e s o l u t i o n  303 (1 9 7 1 )  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a t  i t s  1 6 Q 6 th  M e e t i n g  
on 6 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 1 *
( P r o p o s e d  b y  A r g e n t i n a ,  B u r u n d i ,  J a p a n ,  N i c a r a g u a ,  S i e r r a  L e o n e  a n d  
S o m a l i a )
T h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,
H a v i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  i t e m  on  i t s  a g e n d a  a s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  d o c u m e n t  S / A g e n d a /  
1 6 0 6 ,
T a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h a t  t h e  l a c k  o f  u n a n i m i t y  o f  i t s  p e r m a n e n t  m em b ers  a t  
t h e  1 6 0 6 t h  a n d  1 6 0 7 t h  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  h a s  p r e v e n t e d  i t  
f r o m  e x e r c i s i n g  i t s  p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  a n d  s e c u r i t y ,
D e c i d e s  t o  r e f e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  d o c u m e n t  S / A g e n d a / 1 6 0 6  t o  t h e  
t w e n t y - s i x t h  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y ,  a s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  G e n e r a l  
A s s e m b ly  r e s o l u t i o n  377 A (V) o f  3 N o v e m b e r  1 9 5 0 .
V o t i n g
I n  f a v o u r  ( 1 1 ) :  A r g e n t i n a ,  B e l g i u m ,  B u r u n d i ,  C h i n a ,  I t a l y ,  J a p a n ,
N i c a r a g u a ,  S i e r r a  L e o n e ,  S o m a l i a ,  S y r i a n  A ra b  R e p u b l i c ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .
A g a i n s t :  N o n e .
A b s t a i n i n g  ( 4 ) :  F r a n c e ,  P o l a n d ,  USSR, B r i t a i n .
R e s o l u t i o n  2 7 9 3  (XXVI) a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b ly  a t  i t s  2 0 0 3 r d  
P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g  o n  7 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 1 **
( P r o p o s e d  b y  A l g e r i a ,  A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l ,  B u r u n d i ,  C a m e r o o n ,  C h a d ,  
C o l o m b i a ,  C o s t a  R i c a ,  E c u a d o r ,  G h a n a ,  G u a t e m a l a ,  H a i t i ,  H o n d u r a s ,  
I n d o n e s i a ,  I t a l y ,  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  J a p a n ,  J o r d a n ,  L i b e r i a ,  L i b y a n  A ra b  
R e p u b l i c ,  M o r o c c o ,  N e t h e r l a n d s ,  N i c a r a g u a ,  P a n a m a ,  P a r a g u a y ,  S i e r r a  
L e o n e ,  S o m a l i a ,  S p a i n ,  S u d a n ,  T u n i s i a ,  U r u g u a y ,  Y em en , Z a i r e  a n d  
Z am bia)
T he G e n e r a l  A s s e m b ly
N o t i n g  t h e  r e p o r t s  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  o f  3 a n d  4 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 1  a n d  
t h e  l e t t e r  f r o m  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t r a n s m i t t i n g  t h e  
t e x t  o f  C o u n c i l  r e s o l u t i o n  303 (1 9 7 1 )  o f  6 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 1 ,
* S / 1 0 4 2 9 ,  6 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 1 ;  A / 8 5 5 5 .
** A /R E S /2 7 9 3  (X X V I), 7 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 1 .
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G ra v e ly  c o n c e rn e d  t h a t  h o s t i l i t i e s  have b ro k en  o u t  be tw een  I n d ia  and 
P a k is ta n  w hich  c o n s t i t u t e  an im m ediate t h r e a t  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and 
s e c u r i t y ,
R e c o g n is in g  th e  n eed  to  d e a l  a p p r o p r ia t e ly  a t  a  s u b s e q u e n t s t a g e ,  w i th in  
th e  fram ew ork o f  th e  C h a r te r  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s ,  w ith  th e  i s s u e s  w hich 
have  g iv en  r i s e  to  th e  h o s t i l i t i e s ,
C onv inced  t h a t  an e a r l y  p o l i t i c a l  s o lu t io n  w ould  be  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  
r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  c o n d i t io n s  o f  no rm alcy  i n  th e  a r e a  o f  c o n f l i c t  and f o r  th e  
r e t u r n  o f  th e  r e fu g e e s  to  t h e i r  hom es,
M ind fu l o f  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  C h a r te r ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  o f  A r t i c l e  2 , 
p a ra g ra p h  4 ,
R e c a l l in g  th e  D e c la r a t io n  on th e  S tre n g th e n in g  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p a ra g ra p h s  4, 5 and 6 ,
R e c o g n is in g  f u r t h e r  th e  n eed  to  ta k e  im m ediate  m easu res  to  b r in g  a b o u t an 
im m edia te  c e s s a t io n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  be tw een  I n d ia  and P a k is ta n  and e f f e c t  
a w ith d ra w a l  o f  t h e i r  armed fo rc e s  to  t h e i r  own s id e  o f  th e  I n d ia - P a k i s t a n  
b o r d e r s ,
M indfu l o f  th e  p u rp o se s  and p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e  C h a r te r  and o f  th e  G e n e ra l 
A sse m b ly 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  u nder th e  r e l e v a n t  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  C h a r te r  
and o f  A ssem bly r e s o l u t i o n  377 A (V) o f  3 November 1950,
1 . C a l l s  upon th e  G overnm ents o f  I n d ia  and P a k i s t a n  to  ta k e  f o r th w i th  
a l l  m easu res  f o r  an im m edia te  c e a s e - f i r e  and w ith d ra w a l o f  t h e i r  arm ed 
f o rc e s  on th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  th e  o th e r  to  t h e i r  own s id e  o f  th e  I n d i a -  
P a k is ta n  b o r d e r s ;
2 . U rges t h a t  e f f o r t s  be  i n t e n s i f i e d  i n  o r d e r  to  b r in g  a b o u t,  s p e e d i ly  
and i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  p u rp o se s  and  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e  C h a r te r  o f  th e  
U n ite d  N a t io n s ,  c o n d i t io n s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  v o lu n ta r y  r e t u r n  o f  th e  E a s t  
P a k is ta n  r e f u g e e s  to  t h e i r  homes;
3. C a l l s  f o r  th e  f u l l  c o -o p e r a t io n  o f  a l l  S t a t e s  w i th  th e  S e c r e ta r y  
G e n e ra l f o r  r e n d e r in g  a s s i s t a n c e  to  and r e l i e v i n g  th e  d i s t r e s s  o f  th o s e  
r e f u g e e s ;
4 . U rges t h a t  e v e ry  e f f o r t  be made to  s a fe g u a rd  th e  l i v e s  and w e l l ­
b e in g  o f  th e  c i v i l i a n  p o p u la t io n  in  th e  a r e a  o f  c o n f l i c t ;
5 . R e q u e s ts  th e  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e ra l to  keep  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem bly and  th e  
S e c u r i ty  C o u n c il p ro m p tly  and  c u r r e n t ly  in fo rm e d  on th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  
th e  p r e s e n t  r e s o l u t i o n ;
6 . Dec id e s  to  fo llo w  th e  q u e s t io n  c lo s e ly  and  t o  m eet a g a in  s h o u ld  th e  
s i t u a t i o n  so  demand;
7. C a l l s  upon th e  S e c u r i ty  C ounc il to  ta k e  a p p r o p r ia t e  a c t io n  in  th e  
l i g h t  o f  th e  p r e s e n t  r e s o l u t i o n .
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V o tin g
I n  fa v o u r : 104
A g a in s t : 11
A b s ta in in g : 10
R e s o lu t io n  307 (1971) a d o p te d  by th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il a t  i t s  1 6 2 1 s t  M eeting  
on 21 December 19 71*
(P ro p o se d  by A r g e n tin a ,  B u ru n d i, J a p a n , N ic a ra g u a , S i e r r a  L eo n e , and S om alia) 
The S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,
H aving  d i s c u s s e d  th e  g rav e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  th e  s u b c o n t in e n t  w hich rem a in s  a 
t h r e a t  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y ,
N o tin g  G e n e ra l A ssem bly r e s o l u t i o n  2793 (XXVI) o f  7 December 1971,
N o tin g  th e  r e p ly  o f  th e  Governm ent o f  P a k i s t a n  on 9 December 1971 (docum ent 
S /1 0 4 4 0 ) ,
N o tin g  th e  r e p ly  o f  th e  G overnm ent o f  I n d ia  on 12 December 1971 (docum ent 
S /1 0 4 4 5 ) ,
H aving  h e a rd  th e  s ta te m e n ts  o f  th e  D eputy Prim e M in is te r  o f  P a k is ta n  and 
th e  F o re ig n  M in is te r  o f  I n d i a ,
N o tin g  f u r t h e r  th e  s ta te m e n t  made a t  th e  16 1 7 th  m e e tin g  o f  th e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c il  by  th e  F o re ig n  M in is te r  o f  I n d ia  c o n ta in in g  a u n i l a t e r a l  d e c l a r ­
a t i o n  o f  a c e a s e - f i r e  i n  th e  w e s te rn  t h e a t r e ,
N o tin g  P a k i s t a n 's  a g reem en t to  th e  c e a s e - f i r e  i n  th e  w e s te rn  t h e a t r e  w ith  
e f f e c t  from  17 December 1971,
N o tin g  t h a t  c o n s e q u e n tly  a c e a s e - f i r e  and a c e s s a t io n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  
p r e v a i l ,
1 . Demands t h a t  a d u ra b le  c e a s e - f i r e  and  c e s s a t io n  o f  a l l  h o s t i l i t i e s  i n  
a l l  a r e a s  o f  c o n f l i c t  be s t r i c t l y  o b s e rv e d  and rem ain  i n  e f f e c t  u n t i l  w i th ­
d ra w a ls  ta k e  p l a c e ,  as soon  as p r a c t i c a b l e  o f  a l l  arm ed f o r c e s  to  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  t e r r i t o r i e s  and  to  p o s i t i o n s  w h ich  f u l l y  r e s p e c t  th e  C e a s e - f i r e  
L in e  i n  Jammu and K ashm ir s u p e rv is e d  by  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  M i l i t a r y  O b se rv e r  
Group i n  I n d ia  and P a k i s t a n ;
2 . C a l l s  upon a l l  Member S t a t e s  to  r e f r a i n  from  any a c t io n  w hich  may 
a g g ra v a te  th e  s i t u a t i o n  in  th e  s u b c o n t in e n t  o r  e n d a n g e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e ;
3 . C a l l s  upon a l l  th o s e  c o n c e rn e d  to  ta k e  a l l  m easu res  n e c e s s a ry  to  
p r e s e r v e  human l i f e  and  f o r  th e  o b se rv a n c e  o f  th e  Geneva C o n v e n tio n s  o f  
1949 and to  a p p ly  i n  f u l l  t h e i r  p r o v is io n s  a s  r e g a r d s  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
wounded and  s i c k ,  p r i s o n e r s  o f  w ar and c i v i l i a n  p o p u la t io n ;
* S/R ES/307 (1 9 7 1 ).
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4. Calls for international assistance in the relief of suffering and the 
rehabilitation of refugees and their return in safety and dignity to their 
homes and for full co-operation with the Secretary General to that effect;
5. Authorises the Secretary General to appoint if necessary a special 
representative to lend his good offices for the solution of humanitarian 
problems;
6. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Council informed without 
delay on developments relating to the implementation of this resolution;
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to keep it under active 
consideration.
Voting
In favour (13): Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan,
Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Britain and the 
United States.
Against: None
Abstaining (2): Poland, USSR.
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APPENDIX C 
BIOGRAPHIES
U THANT
S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l ,  November 1961 to  December 1971.
B om  22 J a n u a ry  1909, P an tanaw , Burma. D ied  25 November 1974.
C a re e r  p o s i t i o n s : S e n io r  M a s te r , H ea d m aste r , N a t io n a l  H igh S c h o o l,
P an tan aw , 1931; Member, Burma Textbook C om m ittee and C o u n c il  o f  N a t io n a l  
E d u c a tio n ;  E x e c u tiv e  C om m ittee , Heads o f  S c h o o ls  A s s o c ia t io n ;  F re e la n c e  
J o u r n a l i s t ;  S e c r e t a r y ,  Burma E d u c a t io n a l  R e o r g a n is a t io n  C om m ittee , 1941; 
H e a d m as te r , N a t io n a l  H igh S c h o o l, 1942-1946; P r e s s  D i r e c t o r ,  G overnm ent 
o f  Burma, 1947; D i r e c to r  o f  B r o a d c a s t in g , 1948; S e c r e t a r y ,  M in is t r y  o f  
I n f o r m a t io n ,  1949; S e c r e ta r y  fo r  P r o j e c t s ,  O f f ic e  o f  th e  P rim e M in i s te r ,  
1953; E x e c u tiv e  S e c r e t a r y ,  Economic and S o c ia l  B o a rd , Rangoon, 1955; 
A m bassador and P erm anen t R e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  Burma t o  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s ,  
New Y ork , 1957-1961 ; A c tin g  S e c re ta r y  G e n e ra l o f  th e  UN, 1961; S e c r e ta r y  
G e n e ra l o f  th e  UN, 1961-1971; P r e s id e n t ,  W orld F e d e ra t io n  o f  U n ite d  
N a tio n s  A s s o c ia t io n s .  E d u c a t io n ; N a t io n a l  H igh S c h o o l, P an tanaw ; 
U n iv e r s i ty  C o l le g e ,  Rangoon. Member; Burma R e se a rc h  S o c ie ty ;  Burma 
C o u n c il o f  W orld A f f a i r s ;  Burma H i s t o r i c a l  C om m ission; Burma T r a n s la t io n  
S o c ie ty .  A u th o r : C i t i e s  and T h e ir  S t o r i e s ,  1930; League o f  N a t io n s ,
1933; Towards a New E d u c a tio n , 1946; Democracy i n  S c h o o ls , 1952; H is to r y  
o f  P o s t-W a r Burm a, 2 vo lum es, 1961. A w ards; Wunna Kyaw H t in ,  1949; 
T h i r ip y a n c h i , 1953; S i th u ,  1957; Maha T hray S i t h u ,  1961; H onorary  Member, 
Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  S c ie n c e ,  Colum bia U n iv e r s i ty ,  1971; H onorary  D egrees 
from  U n i v e r s i t i e s  i n  B e lg iu m , C anada, I n d i a ,  I r e l a n d ,  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  U n ite d  
Kingdom and th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s . !
RALPH J .  BUNCHE
U nder S e c re ta r y /U n d e r  S e c r e ta r y  G en e ra l f o r  S p e c ia l  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s ,
19 55 to  1971.
B om  7 A ugust 1904, D e t r o i t ,  U n ited  S t a t e s .  D ied  7 December 1971.
C a re e r  p o s i t i o n s : I n s t r u c t o r ,  A s s i s t a n t  P r o f e s s o r ,  A s s o c ia te  P r o f e s s o r ,
Howard U n iv e r s i ty ,  1 9 28 -1938 , P r o f e s s o r  s in c e  1938; C o - D ir e c to r ,  I n s t i t u t e  
o f  Race R e la t i o n s ,  S w arthm ore , 1936; S e n io r  S o c ia l  S c ie n c e  A n a ly s t ,  O f f ic e  
o f  S t r a t e g i c  S e r v ic e s ,  1941-1944; D epartm en t o f  S t a t e ,  1944 -1947 ; US 
d e l e g a t i o n s ,  Dum barton O aks, 1944; ILO C o n fe re n c e , P h i l a d e lp h i a ,  1945;
From Who's Who in  the UN and Related Agencies, Arno P r e s s ,  New Y ork ,
1975.
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UNCIO, San F r a n c i s c o ,  1 945 ;  E x e c u t iv e  C o m m it te e ,  UN, L o ndon , 1 9 4 5 ;  ILO,
P a r i s ,  1 9 4 5 ;  G e n e r a l  A ssem b ly ,  UN, L ondon, 1 9 4 6 ;  W est  I n d i a n  C o n f e r e n c e ,  
V i r g i n  I s l a n d s ,  1946 ; US C o m m is s io n e r ,  C a r i b b e a n  C om m iss ion  1 9 4 5 -1 9 4 7 ;  
D i r e c t o r ,  P r i n c i p a l  D i r e c t o r ,  D i v i s i o n  ( l a t e r  D e p a r tm e n t )  o f  T r u s t e e s h i p ,
UN, 1 9 4 6 -1 9 5 4 ;  P r o f e s s o r  o f  G o v e rn m en t,  H a r v a r d ,  1 9 5 0 -1 9 5 2 ;  U nder  S e c r e t a r y ,  
UN, 1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 7  -  f o r  S p e c i a l  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s ,  1 9 5 8 -1 9 6 7 ;  U nder S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e r a l ,  1 9 6 8 -1 9 7 1 ;  P r i n c i p a l  S e c r e t a r y ,  UN P a l e s t i n e  C o m m iss io n ,  1948 ;
A c t i n g  UN M e d i a t o r  on P a l e s t i n e ,  1 9 4 8 -1 9 4 9 ;  UN S p e c i a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  
C ongo , 1960 ; UN M is s io n  t o  Yemen, 196 3 .  E d u c a t i o n : U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a
a t  Los A n g e l e s ,  H a r v a r d ,  P h .D . ;  P o s t - d o c t o r a l  w ork  i n  a n t h r o p o l o g y  an d  
c o l o n i a l  p o l i c y ,  N o r t h w e s t e r n  U n i v e r s i t y ,  London S c h o o l  o f  E co n o m ics  and  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C ap e to w n ,  S o u th  A f r i c a .  Member; B o a rd  o f  H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n ,
New Y ork  C i t y ,  1 9 5 8 -1 9 6 4 ;  B o a rd  o f  O v e r s e e r s ,  H a r v a r d ,  1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 5 ;  P o l i t i c a l  
S c i e n c e  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( p a s t - P r e s i d e n t ) ;  A m er ican  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  S o c i e t y .
A w a rd s : O z ia s  Goodwin F e l l o w ,  H a r v a r d ,  1929 ; R o sen w a ld  f e l l o w s h i p ,  E u ro p e ,
E n g l a n d ,  N o r th  and  W est  A f r i c a ,  1 9 3 1 -1 9 3 2 ;  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e  R e s e a r c h  C o u n c i l  
p o s t - d o c t o r a l  f e l l o w s h i p  i n  E u ro p e ,  S o u th  and  E a s t  A f r i c a ,  M alaya  and  
N e t h e r l a n d s  I n d i e s ,  1 9 3 6 -1 9 3 8 ;  S p r i n g a r n  M edal o f  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  f o r  
A d v a n cem en t  o f  C o lo r e d  P e o p l e ,  1949; N ove l P e a c e  P r i z e ,  1950 ; T h eo d o re  
R o o s e v e l t  A s s o c i a t i o n  M edal o f  H o n o u r ,  1954; S t  F r a n c e s  P e a c e  A w ard, 1954; 
P r e s i d e n t i a l  M edal o f  F reed o m  (USA), 1963 ; n u m ero u s  h o n o r a r y  d e g re e s . '* '
P IER  SPINELLI
U n d e r  S e c r e t a r y / U n d e r  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e ra l  an d  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  O f f i c e  a t  G en ev a ,  1958 t o  1 9 6 8 .
B o rn  8 S e p te m b e r  190 2 ,  L a u c ia n o ,  I t a l y .  C a r e e r  p o s i t i o n s : I t a l i a n  F o r e i g n
O f f i c e ;  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  I t a l i a n  T r u s t e e s h i p ,  S o m a l ia ;  D ep u ty  D i r e c t o r  o f  
E m i g r a t i o n ;  U nder S e c r e t a r y / U n d e r  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  UN, G e n ev a ,  1 9 5 8 -1 9 6 8 ;  
S p e c i a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ,  J o r d a n ,  1 9 5 8 -1 9 6 7 ;  Yemen, 
1 9 6 4 ,  C y p r u s ,  1 9 6 7 .  E d u c a t i o n ; U n i v e r s i t y  o f  N a p l e s ,  D eg ree  i n  Law.
Member: S o c i e t y  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O r g a n i s a t i o n  ( V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ) . ^
V. WINSPEARE-GUICCIARDI
U nder S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  an d  D i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  O f f i c e  a t  
G e n e v a ,  1968 t o  1 9 7 7 .
B o rn  19 A u g u s t  1 9 1 2 ,  C a t a n i a ,  I t a l y .  C a r e e r  p o s i t i o n s ; I t a l i a n  F o r e i g n  
S e r v i c e ,  1 9 3 6 -1 9 4 5 ;  Em bassy t o  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom , 1 9 4 5 -1 9 4 9 ;  Member, 
d e l e g a t i o n  o f  I t a l y  t o  P e a c e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  P a r i s ,  1 9 4 6 -1 9 4 7 ;  Em bassy  t o  
F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  o f  G erm any, 1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 4 ;  C o n s u l - G e n e r a l ,  B e r l i n ,  1 9 5 4 -1 9 5 8 ;
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